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Abstract (English version) 
 
Religious activities were a vital part of daily life in Antiquity. In this socioreligious 
background, acts or manifestations of atheism are assumed to be very rare, and 
positive atheism, i.e. the idea that each notion of divine existence must be rejected and 
all forms of religion or worship should be evaluated as being futile, could even be 
considered inconceivable to the ancient mind. The general view on this topic in 
classical studies still largely reflects the vision of Marek Winiarczyk (Methodisches 
zum antiken Atheismus, 1990, p.1-2 & 6) that atheism in Antiquity should be 
primarily interpreted as a rejection of Volksreligion (popular religion) and not a 
philosophical denial of divine existence. The aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate 
that the positive atheism could be a plausible form of critical reflection and behaviour 
with regard to the religious experience in Antiquity.  This is being examined through a 
survey that focuses on the social and philosophical dimension of positive atheism in 
Antiquity and case studies of Diagoras of Melos (ca. 470 – ca. 400 BC) and 
Theodorus of Cyrene (ca. 345 – ca. 275 BC). Both philosophers were reputed in 
Antiquity for actions and writings, which could be interpreted as expressions of 
positive atheism. By this combined approach, I aim to provide a new integrated view 
on positive atheism in Antiquity: as a social phenomenon within a broader concept of 
‘deviant religious behaviour in Ancient Greek society’ in order to determine its 
impact on ancient Greek religion, but also as a philosophical phenomenon that should 
be embedded in the history of ancient Greek philosophy. This dissertation aims to 
contribute to the field of ancient Greek religion and philosophy and ancient Greek 
atheism in particular. 
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Abstract (Dutch version) 
 
Religieuze activiteiten vormden een vitaal onderdeel van het dagdagelijkse leven in de 
Oudheid. In een dergelijk socio-religieus klimaat kunnen handelingen en uitingen die 
onder de noemer ‘atheïsme’ vallen als zeer uitzonderlijk beschouwd worden. Het 
concept van positief atheisme, meerbepaald het idee dat elk begrip van goddelijk 
bestaan dient verworpen te worden en alle godsdienstige of cultus-gerelateerde 
handelingen als dusdanig overbodig zijn, kan zelfs als onmogelijk geacht worden 
binnen het antieke denkkader. Het algemeen beeld binnen de oudheidkunde 
hieromtrent is dan ook sterk bepaald door de visie van Marek Winiarczyk 
(Methodisches zum antiken Atheismus, 1990, p.1-2 & 6), welke stelt dat atheïsme in 
de Oudheid voornamelijk dient geïnterpreteerd te worden als een verwerping van 
zogenaamde Volksreligion ofwel de populaire godsdienst en niet zozeer een 
filosofische ontkenning van het bestaan van god(en) omvatte. De hoofddoelstelling 
van deze dissertatie daarentegen is het aantonen dat positief atheïsme wel degelijk een 
plausibele vorm van kritische reflectie en gedrag ten opzichte van de religieuze 
beleving in de Oudheid kan omvatten. Dit wordt onderzocht door middel van een 
survey waarin de sociale en filosofische dimensie van positief atheïsme in de Oudheid 
uitgebreid aan bod komt. Dit wordt tevens gekoppeld aan case-studies van Diagoras 
van Melos (ca. 470 – ca. 400 voor Chr.) en Theodorus van Cyrene (ca. 345 – ca. 275 
voor Chr.). Beide filosofen werden in de Oudheid beschouwd als uitgesproken 
atheïsten op basis van hun handelingen en geschriften. Door middel van deze 
gecombineerde methode, wens ik een nieuwe, geïntegreerde kijk op het idee van 
positief atheïsme in de Oudheid te bieden: als enerzijds een sociaal fenomeen binnen 
een uitgebreider concept van ‘afwijkend religieus gedrag in de antieke Griekse 
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samenleving’ ten einde de impact ervan op de antieke Griekse religie te bepalen, maar 
anderzijs ook als een filosofisch fenomeen dat dient verankerd te worden binnen het 
geheel van de antieke Griekse filosofie. Met deze dissertatie wens ik een bijdrage te 
leveren aan het onderzoek aangaande antieke Griekse religie en filosofie en in het 
bijzonder de studie betreffende het antieke Griekse atheïsme.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The principal aim of the present study is to demonstrate the historical existence of 
actions and writings in the ancient world, and more precisely Greek and Roman 
Antiquity, which can be identified as ‘positive atheism’ according to modern 
philosophical terminology. By ‘positive atheism’, we understand the disbelief in any 
God or gods.1 This term is commonly used in a modern philosophical context to 
explain an uncompromising form of atheism that is believed to have originated in the 
19th century.  
 
Moreover, atheism is commonly perceived as being inextricably linked to the concept 
of modernity to such degree that the idea of positive atheism in the ancient world does 
not appear to be plausible.2 An explicit philosophical disbelief in the gods or the 
unequivocal denial of their existence is generally not associated with this historical 
period, resulting in the rejection of a ‘strong’ atheism in Antiquity in favour of a 
‘weak’ atheism that only denied a popular and traditional presentation of the gods or 
so-called Volksreligion.3 The most recent thesis on this matter is defended by the 
Polish scholar Marek Winiarczyk, who claims that Diagoras of Melos (ca. 470 – ca. 
400 BC), the most notorious atheist in Antiquity, cannot be considered to have been 
an atheist in the modern sense.4 A small number of classical scholars have 
                                                      
1
 Martin (2007), p. xviii. 
2
 Hyman (2007), p. 27-28 & Hyman (2010), p. 43-45. 
3
 Frank (1949), p.32 & Rankin (1983), p.135. See also Winarczyk (1990), p. 11; Rubel (2000), p. 84; 
Cancik-Lindemaier (2006), p. 32. 
4
 Winiarcyzk (2016), p. 111-115 is the most recent view on this matter. In this study, Winiarczyk 
renews his older arguments on the minor importance of radical atheism, in contrast to the denial of 
popular religion, in Antiquity. He defends once more the thesis that the archetypal atheist, Diagoras of 
Melos, was not an atheist in the modern sense (primarily based on the argument that his atheist book 
should be regarded as apocryphal), but an impious poet, whose stance manifested the decline of cult 
piety (Kultfrömmigkeit) in late 5th century BC Athens. Winiarczyk (2016), p. 74; 114 & 130 does 
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nevertheless ascribed such behaviour to Diagoras of Melos5 or they acknowledged the 
existence of an extreme type of atheism in Classical Antiquity, which they identified 
as ‘downright atheism’6, ‘complete atheism’7 or more recently ‘radical atheism’8 and 
‘absolute atheism’9. Notwithstanding these expressions, a substantial 
conceptualization or description of this exceptional type of ancient Greek atheism has 
not yet been undertaken within classical studies. For this reason, I will define and 
reconstruct the presence of a mindset in Classical Antiquity that denied the existence 
of god(s), based on an indepth analysis of ancient sources that dealt with this type of 
behaviour.  
 
But such an approach only will not suffice to comprehend the totality and complexity 
of the matter. This analysis must be embedded within the historical context of the late 
5th century BC. Athenian society in this crucial timeframe was confronted with many 
social, political, juridical, religious and philosophical challenges that not only 
interacted with an extreme type of atheism, but also shaped its final outcome.  The 
research results of this combined analysis will not only provide a new definition of the 
concept of positive atheism, applicable to the historical context of Classical Antiquity, 
but will also determine its philosophical importance and social impact on ancient 
                                                                                                                                                        
nonetheless ascribe some form of radical atheism to an unidentified  ‘small group of people’ in the late 
5th century BC, based on Plato, Laws, X, and this would have finally led to ‘the negation of the 
existence of any kind of deity or supernatural forces’ around the year 400 BC. However, Winiarczyk 
never really conceptualizes this radical atheism and he only connects it very loosely to major 
developments within the history of deviant religious behaviour in ancient Greek society. But in my 
opinion, the importance of radical atheism in Antiquity cannot be largely dismissed by assessing the 
historical sources on Diagoras mainly. The complexity of the matter demands a firm inculcation within 
the history of ancient Greek religion and philosophy as well. This different methodological approach, 
which I will apply in this dissertation besides a close reading of the historical sources on Diagoras of 
Melos (and Theodorus of Cyrene), allows a new and integrated view on the importance of positive 
atheism in Antiquity. 
5Jacoby (1959), p. 15 & Guthrie (1971), vol. III, p. 237. 
6
 Drachmann (1922), p. 2. 
7
 Jacoby (1959), p. 15. 
8
 Parker (1993), p. 201 & Parker (2012), p. 193. 
9
 Thrower (2000), p. 17. 
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societies. Concretely, the application of this modern (‘etic’) approach of positive (or 
radical) atheism10 will be limited to the cases of Diagoras of Melos (ca. 470 – ca. 400 
BC) and Theodorus of Cyrene (ca. 345 – ca. 275 BC), because they appear to be the 
only intellectuals in Antiquity to represent an open and active denial of divine 
existence that resembles the modern notion of positive atheism, although some 
borderline cases do exist. The antitheistic characteristics of 19th century Marxism (i.e. 
the Marxist idea that religion is an instrument, controlled by the establishment in 
order to keep the lower classes gullible), for instance, has similarities with the 
doctrines of Theodorus of Cyrene and his idea of the wise man believing religion to 
be only honourable by convention and custom, not by nature.11 According to 
Theodorus, sacrilege should be allowed, because the prejudice against it only exists 
for reasons of social control over the foolish masses.12 
 
Notwithstanding these similarities, it would be historically speaking incorrect to 
identify all forms of unconventional religious actions, behaviours and doctrines (of 
which the type of extreme atheism of Diagoras and Theodorus is only one exponent) 
in Classical Antiquity with the term ‘atheism’ or more specifically ‘ancient Greek 
atheism’, due to the variety and contextuality of the topic.13 Most so-called atheoi did 
not wish to abolish or replace the gods and, as such, they would have had little in 
common with atheism in the modern sense of the word.  
 
But their unconventional views on divine existence could easily lead to their 
appearance in so-called ‘atheist catalogues’ or indices atheorum (e.g., by Cicero, 
                                                      
10
 Throughout this study the term ‘positive atheism’ and the more accessible term ‘radical atheism’, as 
suggested by Parker (1993), p. 201 & (2012), p. 193, will be used interchangeably. 
11
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 99. 
12
 Ibidem. 
13
 Roubekas (2014)², p. 237-238. 
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Aetius and Sextus Empiricus), the accusation of being asebès (‘impious’) or the 
association with the stigmatizing labels atheos (‘not believing in the gods’) or 
atheotès (‘ungodliness’ or more specifically, ‘disbelief’). These latter two terms 
appear mostly in (a) the polemical context within Hellenistic theological debate (e.g., 
Stoics accusing Epicureans of ‘atheism’ and vice versa) or (b) later (Hellenistic and 
Roman) historiographical and biographical traditions (e.g., Diodorus Siculus, 
Plutarch, Athenaeus, Diogenes Laertius) which evaluated the known cases of impiety 
trials (ca. 433 – ca. 308 BC) for moralizing and epideictic reasons and based on an 
overall negative perception of the phenomenon of “not believing in the existence of 
the gods”,14 while especially in the early cases of asebeia (late 5th century BC) the 
term atheos had not yet undergone the semantic shift from “godless” to “not believing 
in the existence of the gods” and was more or less synonymous to asebès.15  
 
Apart from the cases of Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene (and, to a lesser 
extent, Prodicus of Ceos), I will defend the idea that we are not dealing with a self-
aware and self-declared atheism in Greek and Roman Antiquity, but with diverse 
forms of (what could described as) ‘deviant religious behaviour’.16 The common 
element between the atheism of Diagoras and Theodorus and mainstream 
philosophers, accused of being atheos or asebès, is the fact that both shared 
nonconformist views on the gods, which civic society most likely identified as 
‘deviant religious behaviour’. But Diagoras and Theodorus probably were self-
                                                      
14
 Filonik (2013), p. 35, based on e.g., Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris, 23 (360a). 
15
 Filonik (2013), p. 13. 
16The historical presence of a self-aware and self-declared ‘offensive’ atheism in Antiquity will be 
related to positive (philosophical) atheism, in the modern sense of not believing in God(s) only and not 
to negative (philosophical) atheism in the modern sense of having no belief in God(s). This latter type 
of philosophical atheism only corresponds, in my opinion, to the cases of Diogenes of Sinope and his 
followers. Cynicism with its disconcern for religion and lack of any alternative conception of god(s) 
was consistent throughout Antiquity. On this matter, see Goulet-Cazé (1996), p. 79-80. Due to the fact 
that this dissertation focuses on the existence of positive (philosophical) atheism, the case of negative 
(philosophical) atheism in Antiquity will be dealt with in a more concise manner. 
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proclaimed atheists17, comparable to the modern sense of the word, while the vast 
majority of philosophers would have fiercly denied any allegation that concerned 
disbelief in the existence of the gods.18   
 
A final introductionary remark concerning the aim of the dissertation involves the 
matter of scientific contribution. Although most definitions and contextualizations of 
ancient and modern atheism cannot be detached from the philosophical sphere, the 
primary ambition of this study is to contribute to the field of classical studies and not 
to the history of philosophy. The historical impact of positive atheism on ancient 
societies is the main goal of this dissertation and not the positioning of this type of 
ancient Greek atheism within a global history on Western atheism.19 
 
The structure of the dissertation itself will consist of four major parts and one minor 
part. In the first preliminary part the different categories of philosophical atheism 
(positive and negative atheism) will be analysed from a theoretical and historical 
perspective, followed by a plausible definition of positive atheism applied to the 
context of Antiquity. I will also propose in this first part a new classification of 
‘atheism in Antiquity’, based on the distinction between an etic and emic approach. 
This will provide new insights on the subject of ‘atheism in Antiquity’, not only from 
                                                      
17
 Whitmarsh (2015), p. 123. 
18
 Price (1999), p. 126-127. 
19
 I prefer the use of the more concrete term ‘ancient Greek atheism’ by Roubekas (2014)², p. 224-241 
instead of ‘atheism in ancient Greece’ as proposed by Winiarczyk (2016), p. viii, because the former is, 
in my opinion, more suitable to refer to traces of atheism outside the geographical context of ancient 
Greece (e.g., ancient Rome). In other words, I will investigate to which degree the influence of ‘ancient 
Greek atheism’ was also detectable in ancient Roman society. By doing so, I will not endorse the term 
‘ancient Roman atheism’, which I will dismiss in the final part of the dissertation. The use of the term 
‘atheism in Antiquity’ by Bremmer (2007), p. 11-26 only serves as an indicative and overarching 
reference to both ‘ancient Greek atheism’ (from an etic point of view) and ‘deviant religious behaviour 
in ancient Greek society’ (from an emic point of view). 
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the viewpoint of the modern observer (‘ancient Greek atheism’), but from the 
viewpoint of the ancient Greek citizen (‘deviant religious behaviour’) as well.  
 
Concerning this emic approach, the second part of the dissertation will deal with the 
variety of deviant Greek religious behaviour and its problematic relationship with 
ancient Greek society, and religion in particular by analyzing specific terminology 
dealing with disbelief and impiety.   
 
The third part will consist of extensive case studies of Diagoras of Melos and 
Theodorus of Cyrene. These philosophers in particular were often associated with the 
epithet atheos in ancient sources and their actions and writings on the belief in the 
gods were already viewed in Antiquity as being ‘destructive’ with regard to divine 
existence. In a fourth (major) part, a historical overview of ancient Greek 
philosophical ideas and theories, which dealt with religious reflections, disbelief and 
alternative interpretations on divine existence from the late Archaic period (ca. 500 
BC) until Hellenistic Times will be provided. This extensive analysis will also include 
an evaluation concerning the fixity of positive atheism in Antiquity: as finality in the 
development of philosophical disbelief in the gods or as a temporal intellectual 
phenomenon depending upon certain (unique) sociohistorical conditions.   
 
Although my research primarily focuses on deviant religious behaviour within a 
Greek context, similar actions and writings from the Roman period will also be 
included in order to determine whether a genuine ‘(ancient) Roman atheism’ is 
discernible or a mere Roman variant of ‘ancient Greek atheism’. Did Roman 
intellectuals develop original doctrines on the (in)existence of the gods or did they 
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rather absorb and copy Greek ideas on the matter? Therefore, a fifth (minor) part of 
the dissertation will focus on deviant religious behaviour in a Roman (religious and 
philosophical) context. The research objective in this concluding part will also include 
the assessment of charges of atheism within Roman sources. 
 
Delineated in chronological terms, this study will comprise the period of 
approximately 500 BC until 200 AD. The terminus post quem, situated near the end of 
the Archaic period, corresponds to the earliest literary accounts of critical reflection 
on mythology (cf. Hecataeus of Miletus) and religion (cf. Xenophanes of Colophon). 
The terminus ante quem of 200 AD does not only apply to the chronology of the 
(main) ancient sources, but also reflects a period which is characterized by the 
practical disappearance of prominent Hellenistic philosophical schools, such as 
Epicureanism and Stoicism, and the rise of Neoplatonism versus Christian thought in 
the course of the 3rd century AD. Philosophical debates on a purely ‘polytheistically’ 
perceived and interpreted atheos would now become redundant in this renewed 
intellectual and religious setting.20 
                                                      
20
 I agree with Whitmarsh (2015), p. 238 that the neutral term ‘polytheism’ is preferable over the 
pejorative wording ‘paganism’, when referring to Graeco-Roman religion. 
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PART 1: preliminary descriptions of philosophical atheism 
 
This dissertation investigates the impact of philosophical atheism, and more precisely 
positive atheism on ancient Greek and Roman society. Before attempting to answer 
this main question, we need to determine first what can be understood by the concept 
of philosophical atheism and how it must be differentiated from other forms of non-
philosophical atheism. In this first preliminary part of the research, philosophical 
atheism will be conceptualized as a) an antithesis to philosophical theism and b) an 
overarching term of two distinctive categories of atheism, namely positive and 
negative atheism. This division into negative and positive atheism is academically the 
most accepted form of classification of philosophical atheism1, and is believed to have 
cleared up old misconceptions about what atheism actually is.2  
 
Another focus will be the investigation of the expression ‘atheism in Antiquity’ (cf. 
Bremmer 2007). Does this involve transferring the concept of modern atheism to the 
context of ancient Greek society and assessing all actions of so-called atheoi as 
different (ancient) forms of (modern) atheism (‘the etic approach’) of should ‘atheism 
in Antiquity’ be exclusively approached from the view point of the law-abiding, god-
fearing politès and assessed in terms of ‘impiety’ or ‘deviant religious behaviour’ 
(‘the emic approach’)? Depending on the aim of the researcher, both approaches can 
be applied and, therefore, I shall propose two distinctive classifications of ‘atheism in 
Antiquity’, based on the emic and etic approach. 
 
                                                      
1
 See Maritain (1949), p. 267-281; Flew (2000), p. 36-41; Martin (2007), p. 1-3 & Bullivant (2013), 
p.11-21. 
2
 Cooke (2006), p. 49. 
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A final topic in this first part will challenge the idea that philosophical atheism and 
modernity (cf. Hyman 2007 & 2010) are inextrically linked with each other. Is 
atheism exclusively the result of a process of modernity and does only modernity lead 
to atheism? In my opinion, philosophical atheism does not have to be restricted to a 
modern (Western) context. Examples of (positive) atheism can be detected in 
premodern and non-Western contexts, on the condition that this atheism confronts 
theistically perceived religious traditions. But first, I wish to establish a clear 
definition of what the term ‘atheism’ actually embodies. 
 
Chapter 1: atheism and its basic understandings 
 
What can we actually understand by the term ‘atheism’? Does it correspond to the 
notion of a religion, a philosophy, or something else? Therefore, this first chapter will 
focus on the exclusion of certain systems of thought by which atheism should not be 
identified. 
 
As a starting point, we can consult recent studies on the definition of the word 
‘atheism’. Stephen Bullivant, for instance, dismisses the idea that a single, objective 
definition of atheism can be formulated.3 According to Bullivant, definitions of 
atheism will always vary when taking different cultural contexts into consideration. A 
universally valid meaning of atheism can therefore not be singled out. 
 
But this problem of universality may also relate to the basic understandings of the 
concept of atheism. Does atheism actually correspond with the notion of ‘(un)belief’, 
                                                      
3
 Bullivant (2013), p. 12-13. 
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‘(ir)religion’ or otherwise? The Christian theologian Alister McGrath claimed to have 
the answer by describing atheism as a ‘religion’: 
 
‘Atheism is the religion of the autonomous and rational human being, who believes 
that reason is able to uncover and express the deepest truths of the universe, from the 
mechanics of the rising sun to the nature and final destiny of humanity.’4  
 
In his analysis of atheism, McGrath argues that modern atheism has lost much of its 
significance. Similar to Christianity, atheism has claimed to possess the deepest truths 
of the universe, but modern atheism has been unable to prove these claims. Clearly, 
McGrath views atheism as a direct ‘religious’ opposite to Christianity, but, unlike 
Christianity, of only marginal importance at present. A similar, but older, view of a 
declining importance of atheism is defended by the Catholic historian Paul Johnson, 
 
‘Atheism as a positive set of beliefs, including a code of moral behaviour has failed to 
flourish’.5 
 
From an atheist point of view, the notion of atheism as a form of ‘religion’ or ‘belief’ 
is considered to be being inconsistent, because atheism, in contrast to theism, does not 
concern with uncovering the destiny of the universe or unraveling its ‘deepest truths’. 
Atheists are simply unfamiliar with such language and definitive claims. Therefore, 
atheism should not be associated with the concept of ‘belief’ in general or, as George 
                                                      
4
 McGrath (2004), p. 220. 
5
 Johnson (1996), p. 2. 
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H. Smith formulates it: an atheist is not primarily a person who believes that god does 
not exist; rather, he does not believe in the existence of a god.6 
 
Then again, it cannot be denied that the history of atheism has always been 
intertwined with the religious domain. For example, the development of modern 
philosophical or analytic atheism (i.e. the idea that having no belief in God(s) can be 
analyzed and grounded by means of logical argumentation7) can be traced back to the 
‘rationalist’ theistic frameworks of Réné Descartes with its criticisms on Thomas 
Aquinas’ dogmatic theology.8 In the Middle Ages, atheism must rather be perceived 
as different (i.e. moderate or radical) forms of religious doubt.  
 
In Antiquity, the connection between atheism and religion is probably more evident 
than in any other historical period. In Classical and early Hellenistic Athens, for 
instance, atheism was experienced as a deviation from the constraints of civic religion 
and was punishable by law. It mainly targeted those intellectuals who taught natural 
doctrines on the heavenly bodies (Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia), those who 
denied divine existence (Protagoras, Diagoras) or those who introduced new deities 
(Socrates).  
 
It remains, however, very doubtful to assume that these philosophical speculations on 
religion or divine existence affected or influenced the religious experience of the 
                                                      
6
 Smith (1979), p. 7. 
7
 Examples of such argumentation are inductive atheology (the existence of God(s) is considered 
implausible, based on specific features of the natural world) and deductive atheology (the existence of 
God(s) is considered impossible, on grounds of logical deduction). See for further information on this 
matter McCormick (2010). 
8
 Hyman (2007), p. 33-35. 
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majority of citizens in the Classical and Hellenistic period in any particular way.9 
Still, the history of philosophical atheism in Antiquity remained primarily connected 
with the notion of irreligious behaviour, given the close emphasis between those 
denoted by (what later literary traditions labeled) atheos and the accusation of asebeia 
(‘impiety’).  
 
But the close relationship between atheism and religion in Antiquity is also detectable 
in apologetic treatises such as Philodemus’s On Piety and The Epicurean Inscription 
of Diogenes of Oenoanda. 10 These authors would counter the accusations of atheism 
against Epicurus by means of the many expressions of piety Epicurus was believed to 
have displayed. Furthermore, the formulation of well-defined theologies by those 
Hellenistic philosophical schools, which were often identified with the phenomenon 
of ‘not believing in the existence of the gods’ (i.e. Epicureanism), can also be put 
forward as distinctive examples of the interaction between philosophy, atheism and 
(ir)religion in Antiquity .11  
 
In his substantial study on the history of atheism in the Western world, the French 
historian Georges Minois would tackle this issue concisely: atheism and delineations 
of irreligious behaviour, such as asebeia, were always interlinked in Antiquity to such 
extent that -apart from an atheism as the result of personal insights-, a universal 
atheism, deeply rooted in social, political, cultural and educational organizations and 
                                                      
9
 Herrmann (2007), p.385. 
10
 On Philodemus, see Obbink (1996); on Diogenes of Oenoanda, see Smith (1993) & Smith (2003). 
11
 On the definition of ‘irreligion’, see Pasquale (2007), p. 760-766: ‘irreligion’ is characterized by (1) 
the enschewing of theistic, transcendent, or supernatural worldviews, (2) the idea that such matters are 
unknown, unknowable and meaningless and (3) the absence of identification with such traditions or the 
lack of affiliation with institutions that embrace such worldviews. 
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institutions, was absent.12 Therefore, atheism could not detach itself from the notion 
of irreligious behaviour in premodern times. In the light of these observations, we can 
formulate the following axiom, based on Charles Taylor’s terminology of an 
‘Enchanted World’: an ‘enchanted’ worldview will always have to be ‘disenchanted’ 
first (e.g., by means of a process of secularization), otherwise atheism cannot develop 
into a socially accepted way of thinking that surpasses the status of a dangerous 
irreligion.13 
 
So, from a historical perspective, we can recognize ‘atheism’ as an irreligious 
counterweight to (traditional) religion and beliefs. In that case, it would also be logical 
to associate it with notions of ‘unbelief’. Which definition of atheism would then be 
appropriate to fully identify this opposition to ‘belief’? A possible definition of 
‘atheism’ might be ‘a non-religious way of life’. But even such neutral description is 
misleading, because it would imply that atheists are living their lives according to 
certain principles or codes, which theists could easily dismiss as being ‘harmful’ and 
‘immoral’. Atheism does not require any specific way of living, ‘[j]ust as the failure 
to believe in magic eleves does not entail a code of living or a set of principles’, to 
quote George H. Smith.14 
 
Other non-religious definitions of atheism have nonetheless been suggested. The 
Encyclopedia of Religion (ed. 2005), for instance, defines ‘atheism’ as ‘a doctrine that 
God does not exist’.15 But such a brief and narrow description of atheism primarily 
relates to a Judeo-Christian monotheistic context and does not appear to cover the 
                                                      
12
 Minois (1998), p. 67. 
13
 Taylor (2007), p. 26-43. 
14
 Smith (1979), p. 21. 
15
 James (2005), p. 576. 
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many varieties of atheism in a modern or ancient sense. More recent studies, such as 
The Oxford Handbook of Atheism (2013), propose to identify atheism as ‘an absence 
of belief in the existence of a God or gods’.16 Although this definition is more suitable 
to include atheism outside a modern and Judeo-Christian context, it still does not 
cover every category of (philosophical) atheism, because an ‘absence of belief’ only 
corresponds to so-called ‘negative atheism’.   
 
Therefore, I tend to acknowledge the opinion of Paul Cliteur in his article The 
Definition of Atheim (2009) that ‘atheism’ can be best interpreted as the denial of all 
theistic claims.17 Cliteur himself follows on this matter the philosopher Ernest Nagel 
(1901-1985) who stated that,  
 
‘I shall understand by ‘atheism’ a critique and a denial of the major claims of all 
varieties of theism’.18 
 
This would imply that atheism can be identified as a conflicting attitude to all forms 
of theism and should therefore always be analyzed in comparison to theism.19 By 
looking at the word etymologically, this intrinsic character of ‘atheism’ as a direct 
opposite of ‘theism’ becomes more manifest. Derived from the Greek prefix a- (to 
express negation or absence) and the noun theos (meaning ‘god’), the basic translation 
of atheism is “being without (a belief in) a god or gods”.20 Based on this literal 
                                                      
16
 Bullivant (2013), p. 13. 
17
 Cliteur (2009), p. 5. 
18
 Nagel (1967), p. 461. 
19
 On the dialectial origins of atheism, see Buckley (1987), p. 338: ‘the central meaning of any atheism 
is to be found, not in atheism, but in the theism of which it is the denial. The name, the definition, and 
the referent for atheism are set by the going atheism. The meaning of atheism, then, is always 
dialectical, that is, it emerges from its contradiction.’ 
20
 For a definition of the concept ‘god’, see M. Beardsley & E. Beardsley (1965), p. 46-50. They 
propose four criteria for a being to be considered a ‘god’: 1) having supernatural powers, 2) being free 
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meaning of atheism, George H. Smith describes atheism more concretely as ‘the 
absence of theistic belief’.21 But then again, such description only deals with the 
concept of negative atheism and not as such with the notion of positive atheism, as 
will be demonstrated in a further chapter of this part of the dissertation.  
 
To include both positive and negative atheism, atheism cannot be restricted to a mere 
absence of belief, but should also include the specific denial of belief. Therefore, I 
would define atheism as ‘the explicit and implicit denial of all theistic claims in terms 
of beliefs and practices’. 
 
One can, however, object that defining atheism in direct opposition to theism does not 
exclude the many expressions of beliefs that do not require any theistic substructure, 
such as belief in impersonal forces, spirits, ghosts and ancestral worship.22 Then 
again, we should not equate ‘atheistic’ to ‘non-theistic’ and, by doing so, construct 
dubious concepts, such as ‘atheistic beliefs’.23 As a non-religious standpoint, atheism 
cannot be associated with belief in any way. Although one can move to atheism from 
a certain theistic, non-theistic or even philosophical belief, the opposite process is 
impossible.24 If atheism would entail any form of belief, it could not function as a 
default position to theism. For these reasons, I propose to expand the definition of 
                                                                                                                                                        
from the natural limitations inanimate objects, subhuman organisms and humans are confronted with, 
3) possessing mental life and 4) being regarded as superior to human beings. 
21
 Smith (1979), p. 7.  
22
 Bullivant (2013), p. 19. 
23
 The difference between ‘atheism’ and ‘non-theism’ is still an undecided matter within modern 
research. Bullivant (2013), p. 19 uses the term ‘non-theistic’ to refer to forms of belief that do not 
involve any theistic understanding, but Cliteur (2009), p. 16-17 differentiates ‘non-theism’ from 
‘atheism’. The former can also be called ‘private atheism’, because it relates to a personal choice of 
someone, who rejects a theistic worldview on moral grounds, while ‘atheism’ actually stands for 
‘public atheism’. This represents the engagement of atheism to fulfill an active role in society. This 
understanding of ‘public’ and ‘private’ atheism by Cliteur seems to correspond with the view of Flew 
(2000), p. 36 on the difference between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ atheism. 
24
 Smith (1979), p. 21-22. 
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atheism to ‘the explicit (i.e. ‘positive’) and implicit (i.e. ‘negative’) denial of all 
theistic and non-theistic beliefs and practices’.  
 
By transferring this definition of ‘atheism’ to the concept of ‘philosophical atheism’, 
these ‘explicit and implicit denials of belief’ become integrated within an atheist 
epistemology by which means atheism can be defined and grounded, based on logical 
argumentation (fallibilism, deductive and inductive atheology), empiricial evidence 
and the rebuking of theistic arguments.25 Therefore, ‘philosophical atheism’ must be 
situated in direct opposition to ‘philosophical theism’.26 
 
Historically speaking, ‘philosophical atheism’ (in the Western world) cannot even be 
considered to be an invention of the modern era (i.e. after 1500). Evidence of a direct 
opposition to philosophical theism and religion in general can be at least traced back 
to Theodorus of Cyrene (ca. 345 – ca. 275 BC), who associated irreligion with 
wisdom and a natural state of being.27 
 
In the now following chapter, I will provide a brief overview of the most important 
historical developments of philosophical atheism and its difficult (intellectual and 
social) relationship to philosophical theism, which in return leads to the need of 
properly defining the latter term. In addition, I aim to demonstrate that the opposition 
                                                      
25
 On the rebuking of theistic arguments, see beside McCormick (2010) also Gale (2007), p. 86-101. 
26
 Buckley (1987), p. 337: ‘Since atheism did not stand on its own, it could only be understood through 
the theism of which it was the denial. A history of atheism could never achieve the determinancy 
necessary for inquiry unless it was also a history of theism.’. 
27
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 98-99. See also Runia (1996), p. 572-
573 for the dialectical technique of disjunction (also known as diaeresis or divisio) between atheism 
and theism in the 1st century AD atheist catalogue of Aetius (epitomized by Pseudo-Plutarch in the 2nd 
century AD. 
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between both philosophical systems is not only a modern intellectual contrast, but an 
ancient as well. 
 
Chapter 2: philosophical atheism versus philosophical theism: a modern 
contrast? 
 
In his book The Coherence of Theism (1977), Richard Swinburne delivers a solid 
definition for theism: ‘there is a god who is ‘a person without a body (i.e. a spirit), 
present everywhere, the creator and sustainer of the universe, a free agent, able to do 
everything (i.e. omnipotent), knowing all things, perfectly good, a source of moral 
obligation, immutable, eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship’.28 It 
is, however, important to distinguish ‘traditional theism’ from ‘philosophical theism’. 
The first is based on a series of traditions, customs and revelations, which according 
to John L. Mackie in his study The Miracle of Theism (1983), can be described as 
‘intuitive certainties’.29 These will inevitably lead to paradoxical thinking. The second 
form of theism attempts to explain the existence of God through the use of logical 
reasoning, freed from the constraints of tradition.  
 
Philosophical theism already had its origins in Classical Antiquity when natural 
philosophers like Xenophanes of Colophon (ca. 560 – ca. 478 BC) and Anaxagoras of 
Clazomenae (ca. 510 – ca. 428 BC) challenged traditional Greek polytheism by 
putting forward the idea of a ‘God’ as a supreme Nous or ‘Mind’, which was further 
elaborated by Plato and Aristotle in the form of a sophisticated philosophical theism.30 
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 Swinburne (1977), p. 2. 
29
 Mackie (1983), p.5. 
30
 On Xenophanes of Colophon, see Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 193 & 
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, V, 109-110; on Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, see Diogenes Laertius, 
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In a premodern Christian context, the ontological argument by Anselmus (1033-1109) 
is probably to oldest attempt to logically prove the existence of God, followed by the 
cosmological argument of God as ‘a first cause’ by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), 
while the teleological argument and the moral argument are other typical examples of 
the reasoning philosophical theism generally employs.31  
 
René Descartes (1596-1650) was arguably the first intellectual who attempted to 
distinguish philosophical theism from traditional theism. This demanded the rejection 
of the dominant ‘fideistic’ doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, which claimed human 
reason to be subordinate to divine revelation. According to Descartes, the existence of 
God could be explained based on a rationalistic theology and epistemology, but by 
arguing so he inevitably opened doors for modern atheism.32 By detaching the 
supposed infiniteness and limitlessness of divine truth, as Aquinas had perceived it, 
Descartes unintentionally created a rationalistic framework, which made philosophical 
theism a subject of critique.33 The same remark can be made of John Locke (1632-
1704) regarding his attempt to construct an empirical framework in order to prove the 
                                                                                                                                                        
On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 6; on Plato, see Timaeus 28c, 29e, 30c-d, 34a; on Aristotle, 
see Metaphysics, 12, 1074b. 
31
 On philosophical theist arguments and philosophical atheist counter-arguments, see Craig (2007), 
p.69-85 & Gale (2007), p.86-101. 
32
 Hyman (2007), p. 33-35. 
33
 Buckley (1987), p. 358-359: ‘Theology alienated its own nature by generating a philosophy that 
functioned as apologetics. Philosophy eventually developed into natural philosophy, which became 
mechanics. And mechanics established its own nature by denying that its evidence possessed any 
theological significance and by negating any theological interest. […] When the contradictions between 
Cartesian and Newtonian mechanics were further negated by a mechanics like Newton’s that resolved 
all its data, evidence, and explanations into mechanical principles, god became a deus otiosus.’ This 
idea of a ‘useless god’ within 17th century natural theology, and the dialectial origins of modern 
atheism in general, have been recently challenged by the Christian theologian Larry S. Chapp. Chapp 
(2013), p. 92-96 claims that the origins of modern atheism should not be explained by the self-
alienation of natural theology from religion itself, but by notable changes in economics, politics and 
disagreements among Christian factions. Concerning the latter, Chapp (2013), p. 96 remarks: ‘Once the 
Christian faith became alienated from its own sources and bogged down in endless internecine 
squabbles over the roles of those sources, it was only a matter of time before Christianity was viewed 
not just as alienated from itself, but as alienating in general.’ It should, however, be noted that Buckley 
also included this historical argument in his theories on the rise of modern atheism (see footnote 51 on 
this matter). 
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existence of God.  Although both tried to establish an efficient scientific method to 
establish the existence of God, they had actually constructed frameworks which were 
basically incompatible with theology.34  
 
In modern times (i.e. after 1540), the English neologism ‘atheism’ would also be used 
to typecast certain ‘blasphemous’ philosophical opinions by connecting it with 
immorality and lawlessness. According to Michel de Certeau, the early modern 
‘atheists’ (between 1540 and 1630) must be identified as the ‘nonconformist 
believers’ or ‘heretics’ of every Church35, although Francis Bacon (1561-1626) 
already interpreted ‘atheism’ in the chapter ‘Of Atheism’ of his treatise Meditationes 
sacrae (1597) as a ‘disbelief in God’, which he associated to some extent with natural 
philosophy, but mainly with folly and ignorance. Bacon also distinguished three types 
of ‘atheists’: (a) the irreligious and scuffolding type, whom he compared with the 
image of the ‘fool’ in the Scriptures (e.g., Psalm 14), who says in his heart that God 
does not exist, (b) the atheist statesman, who represents himself as being religious in 
order to benefit from his subjects and (c) some intellectuals with an erroneous 
approach to natural philosophy.36  
 
Also significant is the fact that Bacon described atheism in his days as a widespread 
but nonetheless secretive phenomenon, as he reports that ‘to deny God in a public 
argument were much, but in a familiar conference were current enough’.37 Based on 
Bacon’s testimony, a modern philosophical atheism that critically examined the 
existence of God could have been plausible as early as the late 16th century, but is 
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 Thrower (2000), p. 85. 
35
 de Certeau (2000), p. 101. 
36
 Thrower (2000), p. 80. 
37
 Francis Bacon (1597), Meditationes sacrae, Chapter 10 (Of Atheism). 
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nevertheless difficult to determine which specific intellectuals Bacon had in mind, 
since he indicated that this third type of atheists did not have a public identity.  
 
The concealed character of this new form of atheism becomes understandable when it 
is being related it to a series of concurring religious events, which already contested 
its early existence.  The most notorious event occurred in October 1632, as news 
spread across Europe that the nuns of the Ursuline convent in the French town of 
Loudun were believed to be possessed by diabolical forces, due to their uttering of 
hysterical and blasphemous shrieks. For a period of five years, many exorcisms were 
performed until the last sign of diabolical presence was believed to have left the 
convent.38   Michel de Certeau has identified this event as being part of a ‘diabolical 
crisis’ in the early 17th century.39  The phenomenon of possessions is somehow 
symptomatic for a society which is losing its old certainties and has not yet been 
adapted to new societal paradigms. In this case, the old certainties can be recognized 
as theistic beliefs that experience attacks not only from supposed witchcraft, but also 
from new adversary forces, such as atheism, which cast doubt on the existence of God 
and the meaning of theism in general.   
 
This hostility to early modern atheism did in return result in a reactive stream of 
clandestine antireligious and ‘heretical’ literature from the Renaissance on. One of the 
most striking examples is the so-called Theophrastus redivivus.40 This anonymous 
                                                      
38
 On the Loudun-case, see, besides de Certeau (2000), also Hyman (2007), p. 27 and Hyman (2010), p. 
5-6. 
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 de Certeau (2000), p. 2. 
40
 The first critical edition of the Theophrastus redivivus was published by Italian scholars G. Canziani 
& G. Paganini in 1981-1982. A modern translation of the original Latin manuscript has not yet been 
undertaken. See also Popkin (1984). 
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manuscript, which must be dated after the second half of the 17th century,41 
differentiates itself from other forms of clandestine and libertine literature (such as De 
Tribus Impostoribus and Les Trois Imposteurs, ou la Vie et l’esprit de M. Benoit 
Spinoza, which are basically virulent attacks on the founding figures of the different 
Abrahamic traditions) through its erudite nature and style.42 Based on information 
from ancient philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, Theophrastus, Epicurus), sceptical writers 
(Cicero, Pliny the Elder, Sextus Empiricus) and early modern sceptics such as Pietro 
Pomponazzi (1462-1525), Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486-1535), Gerolamo 
Cardano (1501-1576), Jean Bodin (1530-1596), Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), 
Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) and Lucilio Vanini (1585-1619)43, the Theophrastus 
redivivus is a lengthy study that systematically enfolds a radical materialism and 
scepticism on (controversial) topics such as physics, theology, religion, demonology 
and the soul. Jennifer Michael Hecht summarizes the manuscript more concisely as ‘a 
compendium of old arguments against religion and belief in God.’44  
 
                                                      
41
 Some scholars, such as Hall (1982), p. 369 and Hecht (2003), p. 325 mention the year 1659 as date of 
publication, but this could actually refer to another manuscript with the same title (but in German) by 
Elias Johann Hessling. According to Popkin (1984), p.63, this is not an antireligious manifest, but 
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Prince Eugene of Savoy in the early 18th century.   
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 Although these treatises must be situated in the 17th century, literature on the deceitful nature of 
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Thomas of Cantimpré (De Apibus, II, 48) was convinced that the Parisian theologian Simon of Tournai 
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 For a complete list of modern sceptics on which the Theophrastus redivivus is based, see Popkin 
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Considering its potentiality as an authentic and early modern example of radical 
scepticism and atheism, the manuscript strangely appears to have been of only 
marginal historical importance. Given the fact that most of the modern scholars on 
which the Theophrastus redivivus drew upon were forced to publically denounce their 
religious scepticism and in some cases even suffered persecution or physical torture45, 
the anonymous manuscript remained largely unknown and unmentioned by later 
libertine thinkers such as Voltaire, Diderot or Rousseau. As a result, the Theophrastus 
redivivus can rather be considered to be an anomaly in the history of modern free-
thought and philosophical atheism. 
 
The social climate in Europe before the late 17th century with its general propensity to 
regard atheism as a criminal act did not allow any self-confident atheists, who openly 
denied the existence of God. The Catholic theologian Leonard Leys (1554-1623), 
generally known as Lessius, tackled the issue of concealed atheism in his treatise De 
providential numinis et animi immortalitate. Libri duo adversus atheos et Politicos, 
published in 1613: 
 
‘Although at this day there be many who deny in their secret judgments all divine 
power and Deity, yet are they not much knowne to the world; since the feare of the 
lawes doth impose silence to these kind of men, and only secretly among their 
familiars do they vomit out their Atheisme’.46 
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 In the case of the Italian philosopher, Lucilio Vanini, an actual death sentence had been carried out. 
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The self-declared atheists Lessius identified in his treatise were no actual 
contemporary atheists, but five radical atheists from Classical Antiquity, whom all 
denied the existence of God and divine providence and could function as role models 
for the secretive atheists of the early 17th century. According to Lessius, these ancient 
atheists were (a) Diagoras of Melos, (b) Protagoras, (c) Theodorus of Cyrene, (d) 
Bion of Borysthenes and (e) Lucian.47  Lessius also classified these ancient radical 
atheists into two separate schools: the older atomists (a-b) and the younger sophists 
(c-d-e).  The stress Lessius laid on these ancient atheists, who openly and publically 
confessed their radical statements on divinity was in strong contrast to the secretive 
atheism of his own days. Still, despite his contempt for atheists, Lessius would be the 
first (Catholic) theologian to describe and recognize atheism as an intellectual 
phenomenon.48  
 
A second Catholic theologian to investigate early modern atheism was Marin 
Mersenne (1588-1648). In his work Quaestiones in genesim (1623), he claimed that 
no less than 50.000 atheists were residing in Paris, comprising about one eighth of the 
population at that time. Of course, the figure is an exaggeration and rather symbolized 
the high rate of intellectuals and scholars in Paris with nonconformist views on 
(Catholic) religion, who could have been regarded as opponents of Mersenne. More 
important for the history of modern atheism, however, is the fact that Mersenne 
identified for the first time in Quaestiones in genesim, and in his later treatise 
L’Impiété des Déistes, Athées et Libertins de ce temps (1624), what he believed to be 
actual (modern) atheists, such as Pierre Charron, Geronimo Cardano and Giordano 
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Bruno. Mersenne also linked these modern atheists to similar ‘atheist’ philosophers in 
Antiquity. 
 
Despite its intellectual recognition by theologians like Lessius and Mersenne, modern 
atheism (as it first appeared between 1540 and 1630) had not yet become an 
acceptable way of thinking in Western European society near the ending of the 17th 
century.49 Scholars like John Locke, for example, still considered ‘atheists’ to be 
untrustworthy.50  Atheism, in his point of view, clearly opposed itself against any 
notion of true belief.   
 
But, from the Age of Enlightenment on, a shift in the sociopolitical climate in 
Western Europe seems to have gradually enabled a more open-minded attitude and 
tolerance towards atheist statements on religion.51 For instance, the French scholar 
Pierre-Simon de Laplace (1749-1829) would eventually be the first scientist to 
publicly exclude God as a causal explanation for natural processes, paving thus the 
way for modern philosophical atheism.52 However, French philosophers like Julien 
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Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751) and Paul-Henri Dietrich, baron d’Hollbach (1723-
1789) along with Denis Diderot (1713-1784) are often considered to be the first self-
declared atheists53, although it is historically more accurate to associate them with 
deism.54 As deism emphasizes a transcendent, impersonal ‘Order’ or ‘Reason’ ruling 
the universe instead of ‘God’, de la Mettrie identified this order with ‘Nature’, while 
baron d’Hollbach replaced ‘God’ as supreme order by the idea of the ‘State’.55 
Diderot’s deism is nonetheless founded on the mathematical physics of Descartes, but 
with the removal of any metaphysical content in order to define matter as the creative 
source in the universe.56  
 
Contemporary theist philosophers like Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) fully realized the 
duality of Descartes and tried to ‘save’ God by placing him beyond human reason.57 
Kant argued that God is a necessary concept for human morality, but, at the same 
time, our human reasoning may never be able to obtain objective knowledge about his 
existence; we simply must assume it. Georg-Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) 
also tried to reform philosophical theism by launching the concept of ‘the dead God’, 
meaning the death of the figurative, dogmatic God as conceived by tradition, 
replacing him by a non-figurative God, who is no longer restricted to the boundaries 
of immanence or transcendence.58  
                                                                                                                                                        
(2004), p. 34-35 explains this view quite clearly: the physics of Descartes and Newton still identified 
matter as inert and dependable on movement by an external agent (‘God’ in Descartian thought), but 
the natural philosophy of Diderot and d’Hollbach would no longer view matter as inert, but as dynamic 
and equipped with motion as one of its essential qualities.  God is no longer needed as a ‘first mover’ 
and becomes a deus otiosus, ‘the idle god, not so much denied as unattended to, detached and 
uninvolved, not influential in the world of nature and of human beings, and finally yielding in 
oblivion.’ 
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Similar to Kant, 20th century philosophical theism also undertook different attempts to 
counter the ongoing radicalizing nature of philosophical atheism. For example, the 
Protestant theologian Paul Tillich (1886-1965) argued that God is beyond 
anthropomorphism or even theism. Tillich’s ‘God’ is essentially ‘transtheistic’: God 
escapes every sensory framework and can only be experienced as the ‘ultimate 
reality’.59 A disciple of Tillich, Bishop John A.T. Robinson (1919-1983) further 
elaborated on the concept of the transtheistic god in his book Honest to God (1963),  
in which he totally rejects the idea of a supernatural god by arguing that ‘God is, by 
definition, ultimate reality. And one cannot argue whether ultimate reality exists or 
not. One can only ask what ultimate reality is like.’60 Tillich and Robinson have often 
been criticized of attempting to destroy philosophical atheism. By presenting a 
concept of God that is so vague and arbitrary, atheists actually become ‘crypto-
theists’. As the whole conflict between theism and atheism can be largely reduced to 
the (in)existence of a supernatural being, the ‘God’ of Tillich and Robinson as a non-
supernatural ‘ultimate reality’ pushes atheists into theism. From an atheist point of 
view, this idea of God is experienced as empty and meaningless in such a way that the 
fundamental question arises if the word ‘God’ is still applicable to this concept.61  
 
In response to the ‘God’ of Hegel, two of his pupils, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) 
and Karl Marx (1818-1883) attacked the theism of Hegel by developing a militant 
atheism that tried to remove theology completely.62 Feuerbach wished to substitute 
‘theology’ by ‘anthropology’, by arguing that God is nothing more than an antithetic 
projection of man. Anyone who tries to understand ‘God’ has to understand man’s 
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desire to reflect his own aspirations into a supernatural being that is not restricted to 
the laws of physics.63 Marx added to Feuerbach’s atheism a socioeconomic 
dimension: religion is illusionary and only brought forward by leading classes in 
societies to console the oppressed classes.64 In Marx’s opinion religion will ultimately 
cease to exist once social differences are abolished by the oppressed. An innovative 
element on the religious critique by Feuerbach and Marx is thus the fact that they 
removed atheism and theism from the philosophical and mathematical realm, 
investigating both mind-sets from a mainly psychological and sociological approach.  
 
Marx’s uncompromising visions on religion would encourage many 20th century 
Marxist studies on the topic of atheism, of which the most substantial publication 
(comprising nine volumes of which the first volume in its entirety deals with atheism 
in Antiquity) is undoubtedly Hermann Ley’s Geschichte der Aufklärung und des 
Atheismus (1966-1989).65 Ley approached atheism in this study as a universal 
phenomenon and assessed it as a logical outcome of the process of historical 
materialism. This is nonetheless a typical late 19th- 20th century Marxist approach to 
investigate atheism: not the idea of (dis)belief in God(s) itself is being examined, but 
rather the social conditions which initiated the belief in particular God(s) within 
societies worldwide.66  
 
According to Marxist doctrine, religion (i.e Christianity) is the exponent of the 
capitalist order, which states that all worldly authority is actually the will of God that 
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must be obeyed.67 At the same time, Marx also regarded religion as an inevitable 
(Hegelian) stage in the history of mankind, because it offers an answer to man’s sense 
of alienation in this world. By the creation of religion, man can fulfill his need for 
consolidation and justification, but this only reflects a fantasy fulfillment of a world 
outside of reality.68  Religion and atheism are therefore analyzed within Marxist 
studies as being part of the dialectical process.69 The abolishment of religion (due to 
the disappearance of the capitalist order) will not lead to the rise of a atheism that is a 
mere understanding of the delusional character of religion. Religion must be replaced 
by a more rational and realistic type of human fulfillment (e.g., a scientific socialism) 
that offers justification and consolidation as well. Thompson formulates it more 
concisely,  
 
‘Just as with religion, the basic premises of a Marxist world view can only be 
achieved once the conditions which gave rise to it have been both destroyed and 
transcended.’70 
 
Due to the collapse of the former Sovjet Union in 1991 and the demise of the Second 
World Order in general, this purely political and economical approach to atheism 
from a Marxist point of view has now been largely abandoned. Instead, more recent 
Marxist studies on atheism tend to emphasize the importance of religion and 
specifically Christianity, which is no longer viewed as an exponent of the capitalist 
order that is antithetical to Marxism.71 Rather the focus is now being laid on the 
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similarities between (a less dogmatic and more open) Marxism and the early Christian 
messages of liberation and criticism of authority. The principal aim is to restore the 
idea of dynamism in history, which could lead to the creation of a secularized 
counterweight to (contemporary) challenges such as the rise of political Islam or other 
forms of religious fundamentalism in today’s globalized world. As such, 21st century 
Marxists actually rediscover the elder ‘eschatological’ works like The Principle of 
Hope (1959) and Atheism in Christianity: The Religion of the Exodus and the 
Kingdom (1972) by the Hegelian Marxist Ernest Bloch, who already anticipated this 
ideological shift in Marxist studies. 
 
However, a renewed Marxism is not the determining factor in contemporary atheism. 
This is at present characterized by a purely scientific approach, resulting in what since 
2006 is being identified and recognized as ‘New Atheism’. Its main representative at 
present is the biologist Richard Dawkins (b.1941), who states that, ‘[A]lthough 
atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it possible to 
be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.’72 As this passage indicates, ‘New Atheism’ has 
its original roots in Darwin’s theory of evolution, which indirectly disproved the 
Cartesian idea (from Meditationes 1641) that the existence of God can be proven by 
the argument of design.73   
 
The idea that natural selection is behind creation instead of a Godlike conscious 
intelligence instigated an early atheist debate within biology. The publication of John 
Dewey’s book The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (1910) was the first study to 
tackle this issue. Dewey noticed among contemporaries of Darwin already the 
                                                      
72
 Dawkins (1986), p. 6. 
73
 Dennett (2007), p. 135. 
     40 
perception to interpret natural selection not as a random process, but as a teleological 
‘design’ by God.74  This idea to consider natural selection as ‘designed’ originated 
from the first chapters of the book Genesis: the successive wave of Creation which 
ends with the words “and God saw that it was good” could be interpreted as God’s 
idea of the concept of natural selection. Creationism as a ‘biological’ theism with its 
concept of intelligent design and allegorical view of God as a ‘Watchmaker’ was born 
and this reduced the academic and popular discussion on atheism nowadays mostly to 
a debate between evolutionists and creationists.75   
 
This recent debate on creationism and Intelligent Design even triggered the interest of 
classical scholars. In 2009 David Sedley published his monograph Creationism and 
Its Critics in Antiquity in order to demonstrate that the idea of Intelligent Design and 
its philosophical acceptance or refutation is actually not a modern issue, but already 
present within ancient Greek philosophical and theological discourse. 
 
A clear example of ancient Greek belief in an intelligent force behind creation can be 
found in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (1.4.2-18), in which Socrates contests the 
interlocutor Aristodemus “the Dwarf”, who disregards religious practices, such as 
prayer, sacrifices and divination for deistic reasons.76 Socrates confronts Aristodemus 
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with six distinctive arguments, which point towards the existence of an intelligent 
creator-designer that actively operates in the universe.77    
 
However, a notion of Intelligent Design, comparable to the idea of the ‘Watchmaker’, 
was also known in Antiquity. Stoic theology referred to Archimedes’s astronomical 
mechanisms, which could mimic the rotations of the celestial bodies, as an imitation 
of Intelligent Design.78 In the orderly movement of these heavens, Stoics believed to 
recognize the ‘creationist’ abilities of Zeus or ‘God’.79 The Stoics nonetheless 
regarded Archimedes’s mechanisms as mere copies. They were not able to imitate the 
brilliantness of the actual celestial bodies, but they were still sophisticated enough to 
impress barbarians that ‘God’ or ‘Reason’ (which the Stoics identified as Logos) had 
created these mechanisms: 
 
(the Stoic Balbus): “Suppose someone were to bring to Scythia or Britain the armillary sphere recently 
built by our friend Posidonius, which revolution by revolution brings about in the sun, the moon, and 
the five planets effects identical to those brought about day by day and night by night in the heavens. 
Who in those barbarian places would doubt that the sphere was the product of reason? And yet these 
                                                                                                                                                        
state that he would aknowledge and not neglect the gods (by the denial of rituals) if he could be 
convinced that they pay any heed to humans. So, we would conclude that θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν in 
Xenophon is always situated between belief in the gods and the performance of ritual duties and might 
therefore be translated as ‘not acknowledging the gods’. But this can be contrasted to the use of θεοὺς 
οὐ νοµίζειν εἶναι in Memorabilia, 1.1.5, which only refers to the cognitive meaning of “not believing 
that there are gods”. See on this matter also Fahr (1969), p. 116-117 & Parker (2011), p. 36. 
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people [the Epicureans] hesitate as to whether the world, from which all things come into being, is 
itself the product of some kind of accident or necessity or of a divine mind’s reason. And they rate 
Archimedes’ achievement in imitating the revolutions of the heavenly sphere higher than nature’s in 
creating them -and that when the original is a vastly more brilliant creation than the copy.” (transl. D. 
Sedley)80 
 
Quite the opposite of the Stoic principles on creation was the (older) atomist point of 
view. Democritus (ca. 460 – ca. 370 BC), a contemporary of Socrates, proclaimed that 
the universe (consisting of only atoms and void) is infinite, because of the fact that it 
has not been created by anyone.81 The infinite amount of atoms and void do not 
posses any intelligence in itself -only the motion of more complex atoms situated in 
the human mind and soul can produce intelligence- , but reside in an accidental and 
random world. Moreover, the universe, according to Democritus, exists of a multitude 
of worlds, some with multiple moons and suns, others with none.82 Due to the mutable 
and perishable nature of (bodies of) atoms, no conception of eternity (and therefore 
‘God’) can be achieved.83 As such, any intelligent design or pattern seems to be 
lacking in the atomist cosmology.  
 
In his dialogue Timaeus (ca. 360 BC), Plato attacked the atomist ideas and openly 
defended a ‘creationist’ and teleological model of the universe. The main plea in 
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Timaeus is the idea that the universe is governed by an immanent being which Plato 
identifies as Zeus in the form of a ‘World-soul’ and which the later Stoics recognized 
as Logos or ‘Reason’. However, Ionic naturalists like Anaxagoras and Diogenes of 
Apollonia already considered a divine intelligence (Nous or Zeus) to be the underlying 
principle in the universe.84 The innovative view of Plato consisted of defending the 
priority of ‘soul’ over ‘matter’ and conceptualizing a structure of divine existence in 
which divine intellect, in the form of a ‘craftsman’ (δηµιουργός), brings order in ‘soul’ 
and creates the World-soul.85 This Demiurge is actually composed of the Ionian idea 
of a cosmic intelligence, Pythagorean mathematical structures and the Socratic 
concept of divine benevolence.86 Plato’s Timaeus thus formed the basis for the 
development of a sophisticated philosophical theism and its importance and influence 
on later Hellenistic philosophy can therefore not be underestimated. It presented 
‘proof’ against those who were convinced that the gods only existed by custom (νόµῳ) 
and not by nature (φύσει)87, based on the idea that indestructible, ungenerated and self-
moving souls must be the cause of all other motion.88 
 
Evidently, the debate on creation in Antiquity does not necessarily concern a denial of 
divine existence. In traditional Greek religion the gods were never regarded as 
creators of the universe, but rather conceptualized as anthropomorphic representatives 
of natural powers and certain aspects of the universe.89 This presumption could 
explain why euhemerism and its focus on the human origin of the Greek gods caused 
little consternation and was not experienced as being atheist or hostile to popular 
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Greek religion90, because the distinction between Greek gods and exceptional men 
had always been insignificant in epic and lyric poetry.91  
 
Most philosophical schools, then again, did not believe in the traditional gods of 
popular Greek religion, but they nonetheless viewed atheism as an unfavorable 
intellectual viewpoint.92 Instead, they substituted the gods of tradition by alternative 
deities, such as the stellar gods of the Stoics or the blessed gods of the Epicureans.  
The Epicureans also systematically repudiated any allegation of atheism by 
emphasizing the importance of piety and traditional worship and by propagating a 
distinct theology. Nevertheless, atheism would also function as an ideal means to 
discredit philosophical opponents, due to the highly polarized nature of Hellenistic 
philosophy and the influence of Plato’s theism. Therefore, it was no longer restricted 
to a mere denial of the existence of the gods, but generalized to a broader meaning, 
i.e. ‘disbelief in (Plato’s) philosophical theism’.93  The Epicureans were, for example, 
labeled as ‘crypto-atheists’ by their opponents, because they denied intelligent 
creation, the divine nature of the heavenly bodies, divination, providence and any 
reciprocity between gods and humans in general, all of which were essential features 
of Plato’s renewed theism.94  
 
So, we can already detect in Antiquity an antithesis between a philosophical theism 
that defended the active presence of divine existence in the universe on a combination 
of traditional and teleological grounds and a more mechanistic understanding of the 
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natural world, which did not necessarily demand any divine activity as the cause 
behind things. The aetiological theories of some Greek philosophers would even pave 
the way for a philosophical atheism that reduced the importance of divine existence to 
a mere invention of the human mind.95  As such, topics of discussion such as the 
acceptance or rejection of an active divine principle in the universe do not appear to 
be restricted to modern or even recent times.  
 
The fact that intellectuals in Antiquity already dealt with theological discourses, 
which focused on the investigation and evaluation of divine existence and its 
relationship to mankind seems to correspond with a basic human desire to 
comprehend man’s position and connection to the outer world, and this does not 
appear to be restricted to a modern world view.96  Based on the polemical opinions of 
different philosophical traditions in Antiquity regarding divine existence and action, 
we can conclude that the intellectual eagerness of understanding whether personal or 
impersonal (natural) forces operate within the universe was also present in a 
premodern context, or what Charles Taylor described as ‘The Enchanted World’.97 
The majority of the populace in an Enchanted World, such as Classical Antiquity, 
may have been satisfied with the maintaining and continuation of religious traditions 
and ancestral customs, but intellectuals demand a permanent evaluation of matters 
which concern divinity, in order to remove irrational forms of fear or eradicate what 
they might consider to be reprehensible expressions of superstition (cf. Plutarch’s 
treatise On Superstition).   
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Maybe this dichotomy is best illustrated by a passage from Plutarch (Pericles 6). The 
seer Lampon and the natural philosopher Anaxagoras were analyzing one day a one-
horned ram, when Lampon claimed the anomaly to be a sign of the gods in regard to 
the political superiority of Pericles. Anaxagoras, however, had the skull cut in two 
halves only to demonstate that a deformity in the brain was the actual cause behind 
the unusual appearance of the ram. This passage by Plutarch does not only indicate 
the inclination of supposed atheoi like Anaxagoras to contrapose scientific 
argumentation to supernatural explanations of the physical world, but it also illustrates 
that the antagonistic and contrasting relationship between religious traditions and 
those who wished to question its truths would always prove to be a difficult one.98 
 
Chapter 3: philosophical atheism in Antiquity: definitions, sources and 
classifications 
 
‘Did philosophical atheism exist in Antiquity?’ is arguably one of the fundamental 
questions within this dissertation. Some scholars, such as Walter Burkert, situated the 
actual birth of atheism in Classical Antiquity and considered it to be one of the most 
important events in the history of religion.99 However, we should be careful in 
applying the modern expression ‘atheism’ to all forms of deviant religious behaviour 
in Antiquity.  A certain ‘atheist’ mind-set in the sense of ‘not believing that God(s) 
exist(s)’ was indeed present, but it only comprised a very small fraction of those 
thinkers who were accussed of deviant religious behaviour, because of their 
unconvential views on the gods. Moreover, many intellectuals with nonconformist 
views on organized religion would not have considered themselves to be deniers of 
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the gods and those who did, like Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene, were 
seen as social and intellectual outsiders.100  
 
Besides, ‘atheism in Antiquity’ never really managed to free itself from the 
restrictedness of the philosophical domain. As a result, it did not represent a popular 
movement within ancient Greek and Roman society.101 Apart from certain 
intellectuals expressing some daring remarks on organized religion and developing 
theories on the existence of the gods, it always remained a rather peripheral mind-set 
throughout Antiquity. 102 
 
The fact that unconventional theories on religion never proved to be well-liked in 
Antiquity does not have to be surprising. As all important transitions in human life 
(e.g., birth, marriage and death) were characterized by religious activities, religion 
was omnipresent in Antiquity and formed the basis of social existence.103 Depictions 
of gods were not only adorned in temples, but also on everyday objects like amphora 
and coins. This made religion an almost inescapable aspect of human life.104 For these 
reasons, intellectual criticisms on religious traditions in Antiquity never developed 
into a popular movement with a large following.  
 
Notwithstanding this, the modern English word ‘atheism’ originates from the Greek 
adjective ἄθεος that first appeared ca. 480 BC in the poetic meaning of ‘being 
forsaken by the gods’.105 However, it quickly evolved towards a more general 
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meaning of ‘godless’, being mainly associated with impious behaviour in regard to 
organized Greek religion. 106 Plato coined the noun ἀθεότης (‘godlesness’ or 
ungodliness’) ca. 365-362 BC in Statesman (309a) to express an attitude that is 
characterized by a lack of virtue and self-restraint. In Laws (XII, 967a-b), which was 
published posthumously after 348 BC, Plato relates ἀθεότης to naturalism that denies 
the immortality of the soul. This combined interpretation of ἀθεότης as a lack of self-
control and the belief in the prevalence of ‘chance’ (tuchè) and ‘art’ (technè) over 
‘nature’ (physis) that is not determined by a divine ‘soul’ (psychè), is also ascribed to 
sophist thought on different occasions in Laws.107  
 
However, the origin of the English word ‘atheism’ is not directly derived from Plato, 
but from the earliest English translation of Plutarch’s On Superstition (164f-165c) by 
Sir John Cheke in 1540.108 In this treatise Plutarch distinguished religion from what 
he considered to be two extreme forms of false reasoning in respect to the gods, 
namely ἀθεότης (atheism, in the sense of disbelief in the gods) and δεισιδαιµονία 
(superstition).109  
 
“To return then to our subject, atheism, which is a false persuasion that there are no blessed and 
incorruptible beings, tends yet, by its disbelief of a Divinity, to bring men to a sort of unconcernedness 
and indifference of temper; for the design of those that deny a God is to ease themselves of his fear. 
But superstition appears by its appellation to be a distempered opinion and conceit, productive of such 
mean and abject apprehensions as debase and break a man's spirit, while he thinks there are divine 
powers indeed, but withal sour and vindictive ones. So that the atheist is not at all, and the superstitious 
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is perversely, affected with the thoughts of God; ignorance depriving the one of the sense of his 
goodness, and superadding to the other a persuasion of his cruelty. Atheism then is but false reasoning 
single, but superstition is a disorder of the mind produced by this false reasoning.” (transl. F.C. 
Babbitt).110 
 
Although Plutarch adopted the noun ἀθεότης from Plato, ἀθεότης in Plutarch’s treatise 
is more closely related to our modern understanding of the word ‘atheism’ as it takes 
the form of a synonym for ἀπιστία (‘disbelief’) and also involves the denial of ‘divine 
providence’ (πρόνοια).111 The latter is definitely a reference to Epicurean theology (cf: 
“those that deny a God is to ease themselves of his fear”), which different Hellenistic 
philosophical schools assessed as being ‘atheist’.112   
 
So, we might assume that the pejorative meaning of atheism as an immoral form of 
reasoning already proved to be evident in Antiquity, based on evidence from Plato 
and Plutarch. This disapproval could be related to a world view, which Charles Taylor 
defined as the ‘Enchanted World’ (i.e. a worldview in which the physical and the 
spiritual are closely connected with each other). Disbelief is a rare phenomenon in an 
‘Enchanted World’ and only detectable in a very small number of original thinkers, 
who in return encounter much hostility from the communities in which they operate, 
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because they do not support the commonly accepted idea that God or god(s), in their 
capacity as protective spirits, are the dominant forces behind reality.113  
 
But not only must the unpopularity of ‘atheism in Antiquity’ be emphasized, but also 
the fact that it never represented a well-defined body of thought.114 Comparable to 
modern atheism, ‘atheism in Antiquity’ represents an (etic) umbrella-term for 
intellectually based forms of deviant religious behaviour in Antiquity, such as  (a) 
different kinds of criticism on organized religion like agnosticism (Protagoras), 
antitheism (Diagoras, Theodorus) and adevism (Xenophanes, Heraclitus) or (b) 
alternative interpretations of divinity such as deism (Epicurus), euhemerism 
(Euhemerus) and kainotheism (Socrates).115  
 
Although these expressions of ‘atheism in Antiquity’ are well distinguishable from 
each other, they do share one common element, as H.D. Rankin once formulated, 
namely that ‘[a]theism in the ancient sense often was a matter of taking different 
views of deity from one’s fellow citizens.’116 This statement does indicate the 
accusable meaning of the adjective atheos: most of the philosophers mentioned above 
were considered atheoi, because they propagated deviant views on Greek religion and 
the nature of the gods, in contrast to the stipulations of ancestral customs.117  So, 
basically, all those who were believed to compromise ancestral customs by means of 
unconventional religious doctrines or practices would have been considered atheoi.   
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But the matter appears to be more complicated than that. Xenophanes, for instance, 
was never called atheos in Antiquity, notwithstanding the fact that he propagated a 
new approach to Greek polytheism.118 The duality of Xenophanes seems to have 
convinced A.B Drachmann nevertheless that 3 different types of ancient ‘atheists’ 
should be distinguished, as displayed in his classification of atheism in Antiquity.  
 
Concretely, Drachmann distinguished: 
 
1)  philosophers who were not called atheoi in Antiquity, but, by modern 
 standards, can be identified as having unconventional views about the 
 gods of popular religion 
2)  philosophers who were called atheoi in Antiquity 
3)  philosophers who were called atheoi in Antiquity and were confronted 
 with accusations of asebeia119 
 
Here transferred in the form of a table, Drachmann’s classification distinguishes the 
following ‘atheist’ philosophers: 
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Although this classification is a useful tool to determine the impact of atheism in 
Antiquity and the correlation between ancient atheism and asebeia, Drachmann only 
included philosophers120 and did not actually identify the diversity of deviant religious 
behaviour, like kainotheism (the concept of initiating the worship of new deities) or 
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because Critias is rather identified as a politician and Euhemerus as a writer. 
 Not called atheos 
in Antiquity 
Called atheos in 
Antiquity 
Atheoi accused of 
asebeia 
Xenophanes  x - - 
Anaxagoras  - x x  
Diogenes of Apollonia - x - 
Hippo of Rhegium - x - 
Protagoras  - x x  
Prodicus  - x - 
Critias  - x - 
Diagoras of Melos - x  x  
Socrates - - x  
Antisthenes x - - 
Plato x - - 
Aristotle - - x 
Theophrastus x - x 
Stilpo - - x 
Theodorus of Cyrene - x x 
Bion - x x 
Epicurus - x - 
Euhemerus - x - 
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antitheism. Neither does this classification informs us about the different juridical 
aspects of asebeia, such as εἰσαγγελία (“accusation before the Assembly”), γραφή 
(“accusation in writing”) and ἔνδειξις (“detention on remand”) to which different 
atheoi or asebeis (“impious persons”) could be subjected.121 Another weakness of 
Drachmann’s classification is the fact that it contains actual omissions and errors with 
regard to historiography. For example, Drachmann does not recognize Antisthenes as 
being atheos, but this is in contrast with Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc.1077, col.82, 
18-23 (19, 536-541). Also the accusation of asebeia against Bion cannot be retrieved 
by any preserved ancient source. Only Diogenes Laertius (IV, 52 & 54-55) confirms 
his affiliation with atheism. In addition, the absence of any association with atheos in 
the case of Socrates is in contrast with Plato’s Apology 26c and Xenophon’ 
Memorabilia, 1.1.2. Moreover, Drachmann’s identification of Plato with atheos is 
most likely based on his assumption that the younger Plato (The Republic) was much 
more critical of traditional religion than the religious dogmatist the older Plato 
appears to have become at the time of Laws.122 Also the fact that Drachmann does not 
include an identified atheos like the atomist Democritus123 or nonconformist religious 
thinkers (i.e. unidentified atheoi) such as the natural philosophers Heraclitus and 
Empedocles (despite the fact that they professed deviant statements concerning 
traditional Greek religion) indicates that his classification is incomplete.  
 
A more detailed and accurate overview can be found in Wilhelm Fahr’s ΘΕΟΥΣ 
ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ: Zum Problem der Anfänge des Atheismus bei den Griechen (1969). Not 
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only did Fahr identify female defendants and non-philosophical atheoi and asebeis, he 
also included a thorough overview of authors of (a) theories on the Greek gods (Περὶ 
θεῶν) and (b) theories on Greek religion.124  
 
In a concrete table, Fahr provides the following information on atheoi and asebeis: 125 
List of persons So-called atheoi So-called asebeis (faced with 
executed or planned impiety trials) 
Anaxagoras x      x (°) 
Aspasia        x (°) 
Phidias       x (°) 
Protagoras x      x (°) 
Diogenes of Apollonia x x 
Hippo of Rhegium x  
Prodicus of Ceos x x 
Diagoras of Melos x      x (°) 
Alcibiades       x (°) 
Socrates x      x (*) 
Andocides  
     x (†) 
Critias  x  
Cinesias of Athens x  
Archias of Athens  x 
Theoris of Lemnos  x 
Phryne  x 
Demades  x 
Aristotle  x 
Theophrastus  x 
Theodorus of Cyrene x x 
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Stilpo  x 
Epicurus x  
Euhemerus  x  
Nicanor of Cyprus  x  
Bion of Borysthenes x  
 
Italicized= Non-philosophical atheoi/asebeis 
x (°)= εἰσαγγελία 
x (*)= γραφή 
x (†)= ἔνδειξις 
 
In Fahr’s classification126, the different procedures concerning asebeia and the 
historical evolution of asebeia are definitely more detectable. We can observe in this 
overview how asebeia seems to culminate around 400-399 BC with the conviction of 
Andocides and Socrates, both Athenian citizens, although this assumption could be 
countered by the series of executed asebeis (Archias, Theoris and Nino(n)) between 
355 and 350 BC. Nevertheless its usefulness for evaluating the historical impact of 
asebeia, Fahr’s classification does not contain all cases of asebeia for deviant 
religious behaviour (what about Nino(n)?) nor does it single out those cases of 
asebeia, which resulted in execution. Besides, this overview of ‘atheism in Antiquity’ 
does not reflect the diversity of ancient atheism, such as agnosticism, deism, adevism, 
antitheism or kainotheism.   
 
Michael J. Buckley deals with this issue in a more recent classification, based on the 
different types of philosophical atheism in Antiquity. Buckley, who discusses this 
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matter in his book At the Origins of Modern Atheism (1987), distinguishes four factors 
on which Greek philosophy classified those who were considered ‘atheists’127: 
 
1) who ‘atheists’ identified as gods 
2) the understanding ‘atheists’ gave to the term ‘gods’ 
3) the activities ‘atheists’ defended as ‘divine’  
4) the activities ‘atheists’ denied as ‘divine’ 
 
According to Buckley, Ionic naturalists like Anaxagoras of Clazomenae belong to the 
first group, while sophists such as Protagoras represent the second. The third group 
describes the superstitious as mentioned in Plutarch’s treatise On Superstition and the 
kainotheists. The last category characterizes the antitheists. As positive atheism can be 
identified as antitheism, the last category could represent positive atheists. 
Unfortunately, Buckley (in contrast to Drachmann and Fahr) did not identify any 
specific individuals in his categories of ‘atheists’ and transfers too easily the term 
‘atheism’ to the context of Antiquity. Based on the classifications by Drachmann, 
Fahr and Buckley only, we will not be able to have a complete and integrated 
understanding of what ‘atheism in Antiquity’ might have enclosed. Therefore, I shall 
propose a new classification (see annex), based on the distinction between the emic 
and etic approach in order to assess social behaviour.128 
 
This new classification of ‘atheism in Antiquity’ aims to provide a more complete and 
integrated view on the subject by combining and expanding the existing 
classifications of Drachmann, Fahr and Buckley. It has been suggested in previous 
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studies that the term ‘atheism in Antiquity’ should only be used loosely in order to 
include the few individuals that denied the existence of the gods as well as the larger 
number of those who professed alternative theories concerning their existence.129 But 
I would suggest to narrow the use of the expression ‘atheism in Antiquity’ even 
further down in this classification to a purely indicative meaning with the sole intent 
of encompassing the totality of the matter. By means of this term, we are able to refer 
to both the emic and etic approach to the topic. When we deal with each approach 
separately, however, a more distinctive term is needed in order to reflect its 
characteristics. For these reasons, I propose to identify the emic approach by means of 
the term ‘deviant religious behaviour (in ancient Greek society)’, while the term 
‘ancient Greek atheism’ covers the etic approach. 
 
The emic approach deals with the specific historical contexts in which a certain social 
behaviour occured. From this point of view (“how did the ancient mind experience 
atheism?”), the actions and opinions of certain Greek thinkers on organized religion 
would have been perceived as ‘unconvential forms of religious behaviour’ or 
‘impiety’ and certainly not as ‘atheism’. However, some scholars do advocate the sole 
use of etic terminology within academic discourse.130  Similar to the use of the 
modern word ‘religion’, the term ‘atheism’ in Antiquity can therefore have etic 
meaning and this, in return, could be useful for the purpose of distinguishing the 
variety of ‘atheist’ behaviour in Antiquity (e.g,. adevism, agnosticism, kainotheism, 
deism, antitheism, etc.) But, at the same time, we should be aware that such approach 
always reflects the viewpoint of the modern observer.  
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Perhaps this matter can be demonstrated more concretely by means of the following 
example: Robert Mayhew in his commentary on Plato’s Laws (book 10) identifies the 
representatives of the three types of impiety (885b) as ‘heretics’ and divides them into 
(a) atheists, (b) deists and (c) traditional theists, while Plato himself presumably 
considered these to be asebeis (‘impious persons’), who could be distinguished as (a) 
‘those who do not believe in the existence of the gods’, (b) ‘those who believe that the 
gods do not care about mankind’ and (c) ‘those who be believe that the gods can be 
bribed by means of offerings and prayers’.131  Evaluating Laws (X, 885b) based on 
Mayhew’s modern terminology clearly follows an etic approach, while a strict emic 
approach only assesses the three types of impiety by means of terminology which 
would have been familiar to Plato and would also be inherent to the cultural context in 
which these social phenomena occured.132 
 
Concerning this dual approach to the topic, I believe that the distinction between an 
emic and etic approach to ‘atheism in Antiquity’ also intercepts the problem of 
ethnocentrism more efficiently. For instance, the etic approach tends to associate 
‘atheism in Antiquity’ with (Christian) concepts that were unknown to Greek 
communities in the Classical and Hellenistic period. This is the case when ‘atheism in 
Antiquity’ is associated with ‘sin’133 or ‘heresy’134 and ancient Greek beliefs are being 
identified as ‘paganism’135 or characterized by ‘a confessional proclamatory 
nature’.136 
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When we are dealing with the topic from a strict emic point of view, we can also 
detect the most important social and juridical developments in the history of deviant 
religious behaviour in ancient Greek society more efficiently. For instance, prior to 
the case of Anaxagoras, the lack of legislation seems to acknowledge the fact that 
intellectual speculation on divine existence was not yet recognized as asebeia. This is 
certainly the case for Hecataeus, Xenophanes, Heraclitus and Empedocles. The later 
impiety cases, on the other hand, indicate a concentration of impiety trials from 
Phryne to Theodorus, after which deviant religious behaviour appeared basically an 
intellectual matter of being evaluated atheos or not.  From Anaxagoras on, most likely 
because of the Diopeithes-decree137, deviant religious behaviour could lead to charges 
of asebeia, but only in a few cases (Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Protagoras 
and Diagoras) did this result in an actual impiety trial. Not all accusations of being 
asebès (e.g., Cinesias), resulted in legal charges of asebeia. The same remark can be 
made regarding those accused of atheism by later literary traditions (e.g., Hippo, 
Prodicus). The fact that these intellectuals were now being recognized as atheoi does 
not automatically imply that their contemporaries viewed them as asebeis. These 
observations indicate the somehow arbitrary character of the phenomenon of impiety 
trials. Only in the cases of Diagoras, Socrates and Theodorus can we detect a 
complete ‘atheist’ profile, namely the accusation of being atheos and the association 
with atheotès, combined with the charge of asebeia that resulted in an actual impiety 
trial. 
 
Based on this new classification, I am confident that many inconsistencies concerning 
the expression ‘atheism in Antiquity’ have now been cleared up. We can conclude 
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that this ambivalent term only has indicative meaning and should not be viewed as an 
equivalent of modern atheism, as it encloses too many varieties of unconventional 
religious views which do not correspond with modern atheism. We already mentioned 
that some scholars have suggested that the term ‘atheism in Antiquity’ should only be 
used loosely in order to avoid a too modern interpretation of the term.138 Nickolas 
Roubekas has a similar viewpoint by arguing that ‘atheism in Antiquity’ did exist, but 
‘a straightforward atheism in the modern sense of the term was not existent in ancient 
Greek history and culture’.139  
 
Although I am convinced that this statement of Nickolas Roubekas does not apply to 
the actions and writings of Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene as well as 
other borderline cases of positive atheism in Antiquity (as I will argue further in this 
section), I agree with this scholar that transferring the modern term ‘atheism’ to the 
context of Antiquity and applying it as an overarching term in order to identify the 
variety of idiosyncratic and nonconformist behaviour regarding organized Greek 
religion should be avoided. Instead, the emic approach, with the overaching term 
‘deviant religious behaviour (in ancient Greek society)’ is more appropriate to enclose 
the entirety of unorthodox views on ancient Greek religion, which due to surviving 
sources and the concentration of philosophical activity, was mainly an intellectual 
phenomenon that was limited to Classical and Hellenistic Athens.  
 
In any case, the expression ‘ancient Greek atheism’ as an overarching term from an 
emic perspective should not be preferable for different historical reasons. Firstly, 
unlike modern atheism, this ‘ancient Greek atheism’ cannot represent a strict form of 
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irreligion or antithesis to theism, although the term would suggest such. Secondly, a 
purely modern understanding of atheism would exclude all forms of critical reflection 
or behaviour regarding ancient Greek religion which, according to modern standards, 
cannot be interpreted as ‘atheism’. As such, it would be a too restrictive term. And 
thirdly, the vast majority of religious critics in ancient Greece did not wish to abolish 
or to replace traditional Greek religion, but were nonetheless aware of its flaws and 
inconsistencies and therefore promoted a more profound form of Greek theism and 
piety, which was not dictated by tradition or popularism.140  
 
Consequently, ‘deviant religious behaviour’ embodies a wide array of critical 
reflection on traditional Greek religion, ranging from an outspoken denial of the 
existence of the gods to alternative forms of Greek belief, piety and cultic practices. 
For instance, natural philosophers like Heraclitus criticized initiation into the 
Eleusinian Mysteries and the practice of blood sacrifices as a false means of 
purification141 while Empedocles rejected the principle of anthropomorphic gods and 
the idea that humans can persuade the gods simply by means of cultic practices.142   
 
Both philosophers without a doubt professed nonconformist views regarding 
traditional Greek religion, but were nonetheless never associated with the adjective 
atheos in ancient sources, which implicates that the denotation of atheos itself is not a 
reliable argument to single out all manifestations of deviant religious behaviour. The 
association of identifiable intellectuals with the adjective atheos is also a rather late 
phenomenon in Greek literature (may be as early as Philochorus in the early 3th 
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century BC143 or Clitomachus in the late 2nd century BC) and has not survived in 
ancient sources earlier than the mid-1st century BC (cf. Cicero and Diodorus 
Siciulus).144 Many studies on deviant religious behaviour in ancient Greek society 
regard Xenophanes of Colophon, Heraclitus or even Hecataeus of Miletus as the 
‘founding fathers of atheism in Antiquity’, although they were never linked to the 
term atheos in surviving sources.145 So, restricting ‘deviant religious behaviour’ to 
those intellectuals, who were identified as being atheos, is not an adequate means to 
fully define the phenomenon.  
 
The same could be said of the accusation of asebeia. Both Drachmann and Fahr 
included in their classifications individuals like Andocides, Alcibiades or even 
philosophers such as Theophrastus and Stilpo, who were accused of impiety, but not 
necessarily identified by the term atheos. But the charge of impiety itself does not 
always have to be an indication for deviant religious behaviour as it is the case for 
asebeis such as the hierophant Archias of Athens or the priestess Theoris of Lemnos, 
who were both executed because they (unintentionally or secretly) performed 
unauthorized forms of religious practices.146 Also in the cases of early asebeis like 
Phidias and Aspasia, there seems to be no link whatsoever with deviant Greek 
religious behaviour. Both were protégés of Pericles, who were most likely targeted in 
an attempt to undermine the political importance of the popular statesman.  
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In the case of those who were identified as atheoi and accused of asebeia there seems 
to be a pattern, nonetheless. Either they were accused of impiety for political reasons 
(cf: Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Socrates) or they professed their ‘atheism’ in a too open 
and public manner (cf: Diagoras and Theodorus). In the cases of atheoi such as 
Prodicus and Diogenes of Apollonia, the surviving sources are simply too insufficient 
or even spurious to determine the nature of their impiety charge.147 Between the case 
of Socrates in 399 BC and the following cases of asebeis from ca. 355-350 BC on, we 
can also discern a period of ca. 50 years in which the system of impiety trials 
underwent some significant changes, such as the passing of authority to the 
Areopagus. This initially resulted in a series of executions, but from the case of 
Phryne on (ca. 340 BC), impiety trials became more informal and ineffective, 
probably due to the gradual decline of Athenian political autonomy. After the case of 
Theodorus, no later cases of asebeia for deviant religious behaviour are reported. 
Accusations of being atheos nonetheless continued, but these have to be situated in a 
now strictly intellectual and philosophical setting. 
 
Notwithstanding the preference for an emic approach in order to detect the variety and 
complexity of deviant Greek religious behaviour, some examples of irreligious 
behaviour in ancient Greece, on the other hand, do correspond to a modern 
understanding of philosophical atheism, and more precisely the concept of negative 
and positive atheism. For instance, the association of Prodicus of Ceos, Diagoras of 
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Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene with nouns such as ἀθεότης or expressions like θεοὺς 
ἀναιρεῖν seems to indicate that in these cases etic terminology like ‘positive atheism’ 
might be useful to explain the unusal and extreme nature of their deviant religious 
behaviour. In the case of Diogenes of Sinope, we can witness a clear example of 
negative atheism.148 To the exceptional case of Bion of Borysthenes, we can even 
apply both negative and positive atheism, due to the versatility of Bion’s intellectual 
interests. But before this can be demonstrated more in detail, the specific distinction 
of philosophical atheism in respectively negative atheism and positive atheism should 
be analyzed more closely. 
 
Chapter 4: the different categories of philosophical atheism 
 
This study focuses on the possible existence of positive atheism in Classical 
Antiquity. The main goal is to examine to which extent intellectuals in the ancient 
Graeco-Roman world have proclaimed ideas and performed actions that can be 
labeled ‘positive atheism’. This can only be achieved by defining this particular term 
properly. First of all, ‘positive atheism’ does not express a certain qualifying 
statement regarding atheism as it is the case in the writings of some scholars. For 
example, Julian Baggini in his book Atheism: A Very Short Introduction (2003) uses 
the term ‘positive’ in the meaning of ‘providing a positive case for atheism’ against 
‘negative atheism’, referring to the negative nature ascribed to atheism in the course 
of history.149  
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Positive atheism as a form of philosophical atheism was first coined by the French 
Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain in his article On The Meaning of 
Contemporary Atheism (1949). Maritain divided modern (philosophical) atheism into 
two categories: ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ atheism. According to Maritain, negative 
atheism must be interpreted as an absence of any concept of God, only to be replaced 
by a meaningless void. This is actually a form of practical atheism or deism, which 
can be compared with the typical agnosticism of the libertines of the 17th century.150  
 
Positive atheism, on the other hand, is an active resistance against any concept of 
God. Because of this attitude, it takes the form of ‘antitheism’ rather than of 
‘atheism’. Therefore positive atheism must be identified as a form of ‘all-
encompassing’ atheism. Maritain believed this atheism to be more recent, appearing 
for the first time in 19th century dialectical materialism and becoming fully functional 
within 20th century existentialism.151 This active resistance against religion already 
resonates in the early writings of Karl Marx. In a critical essay on Hegelian 
philosophy Marx wrote: ‘Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feelings of 
a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of unspiritual conditions. It is the opium of the 
people. The people cannot be really happy until it has been deprived of illusory 
happiness by the abolition of religion. The demand that the people should shake itself 
free of illusion as to its own condition is the demand that it should abandon a 
condition which needs illusion.’152 
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In his book The Case against God (1979), George H. Smith elaborated further on the 
concepts of Maritain, but this time from an atheist point of view. In the chapter 
‘Jacques Maritain and the Slander of Atheism’, Smith criticized Maritain for 
associating atheism with an absence of morality and goodness. This inevitably leads 
to the idea of the positive atheist as a destroyer of values, due to his constant struggle 
with God.153 As a devout Catholic, Maritain seems to have been still influenced by old 
perceptions that associated atheism with immorality and lawlessness. Maritain’s 
negative atheist is in essence a hypocritical person, who is only atheist for practical 
reasons, while his idea of a positive atheist is that of a person who is constantly in war 
with God and, consequently, with any notion of morality.  
 
Therefore, Smith suggested other, more impartial categories of atheism, namely 
‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ atheism.154 According to Smith, an implicit atheist is a person 
who does not believe in a god but at the same time does not explicitly reject or deny 
theism. An implicit atheist is simply not familiar with the concept of theism. For 
instance, a child can grow up to be an implicit atheist due to educational choices of its 
parents. Explicit atheism is of a more philosophical nature, because it considers belief 
in gods to be irrational. Smith identifies this explicit atheism with critical atheism: an 
atheism that is based on critical arguments against theistic beliefs.  However, the 
phrasings ‘implicit atheism’ and ‘explicit atheism’ of Smith proved to be unpopular 
and were not adopted by later studies.  
 
The terms ‘positive atheism’ and ‘negative atheism’, on the other hand, resurfaced for 
the first time since Maritain in the article The Presumption of Atheism (1976) of the 
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Scottish scholar Antony Flew. Flew identified positive atheism as ‘positively asserting 
the non-existence of God’, while negative atheism would simply refer to a moral 
attitude of ‘non-theism’.155 
  
In his book Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990) Michael Martin further 
developed the terminology of Maritain, Smith and Flew, but similar to Smith and 
Flew from an atheist point of view. Martin also views the difference between negative 
and positive atheism on the level of belief in theism: an ‘absence of belief’ does not 
automatically imply a ‘disbelief’ in theism. A mere absence of belief can be regarded 
as a sort of ‘passive atheism’: one simply holds no belief in the existence of god(s), 
due to educational reasons or out of disinterest.156 Disbelief or the belief that god(s) 
do not exist requires a more ‘active atheism’. It implies an active resistance against 
the existence of god(s), like Maritain already envisaged.   
 
Additional features Martin introduced are the subcategories ‘narrow sense’ and ‘broad 
sense’, applicable to each category of atheism. Concretely, four different types of 
modern philosophical atheism can be distinguished.157 
 
Positive atheism in a narrow sense:   disbelief in the existence of theistic god(s) 
Positive atheism in a broad sense:   disbelief in the existence of any god(s) 
Negative atheism in a narrow sense:  absence of belief in (a) theistic god(s) 
Negative atheism in a broad sense:  absence of belief in any god(s) 
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The distinction between atheism in ‘narrow sense’ and ‘broad sense’ obviously 
corresponds to the notion of (a) theistic god(s) versus (a) non-theistic interpreted 
god(s) as envisioned by 20th century theologians such as Paul Tillich and John A.T. 
Robinson.158 The notion of ‘transtheism’ (i.e. the idea that God transcends the 
bounderies of the universe) is therefore a modern (Christian) concept and does not 
apply to the Graeco-Roman ‘theist’ gods who were not removed from the world of 
natural and social processes.159  
 
One could object, on the other hand, that certain philosophical theologies in Antiquity 
assumed a restricted theistic interpretation of the gods. Epicurean theology, for 
example, considered the gods to be transcendent, residing in the so-called metakosmia 
or intermundia, with no room for interaction between gods and humans.160 
Notwithstanding this, Epicurus still interpreted the gods as anthropomorphic beings 
and displayed intense respect for cultic practices. Stoic theology embodied at first an 
allegorical interpretation of the gods of popular religion that evolved towards a 
pantheistic theology in which the traditional gods acted as manifestation of a supreme 
divine principle, pervading the entire cosmos.161 Despite this abstract interpretation of 
theism, the gods within Stoic theology fulfilled an immanent role and were not 
considered to be transcendent.162 Consequently, both theologies do not resemble the 
modern idea of a ‘transtheistic’ god as a ‘ground of being’ or a ‘non-existing, non-
anthropomorphic reality of truth’.  Therefore, ‘atheism in a broad sense’ will not be 
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applied to the historical context of Greek and Roman Antiquity within this 
dissertation, because this could be experienced as anachronistic or even apocryphal. 
 
By now combining the theories of Maritain, Smith, Flew and Martin regarding the 
categories of philosophical atheism, the following definition of positive and negative 
atheism (in the narrow sense) can be formulated: positive atheism is an active attitude 
against theistic beliefs. It involves either an active resistance or an active critical 
attitude against any notion of theism, which is personally experienced as irrational. 
Therefore, positive atheism must always be comprehended as antitheism. Negative 
atheism, on the other hand, is a passive attitude against theistic beliefs. It concerns 
either an absence or a moral replacement of any notion of non-theism. Contrary to 
positive atheism, it does not endeavour an active resistance to theism and, therefore, it 
cannot be considered antitheist. 
 
With this plausible definition of positive and negative philosophical atheism in mind, 
the fundamental question arises how if this definition can be applied to the historical 
context of Classical Antiquity.     
 
Chapter 5: negative/ positive atheism and the concept of ‘modernity’ 
 
Until recently, it was generally accepted by classical scholars that the existence of 
philosophical (negative or positive) atheism in a premodern world is an inconceivable 
idea, based on the argument that modernity is a indispensible condition for any form 
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of self-aware and self-declared atheism.163 In recent studies on atheism and 
modernity, both concepts are inextricably linked with each other to such extent that 
atheism is a logical aspect of modernity and only modernity stimulates atheism.164  
 
Erich Frank was already clear on this matter. He stated that ‘Atheism, as we 
understand it today, was unknown in Greek Philosophy; for such radical negation of 
God is possible only when the World has lost its divine character, when God is 
comprehended as a Being beyond this World -as He was comprehended for the first 
time in the Jewish-Christian religion. Only where God is essentially apart from the 
world does restriction to the world mean a denial of everything divine. Of course, The 
Greek philosophers did not believe in the gods of popular religion.’165   
 
Later studies seem to confirm this statement. Winfried Schröder, for instance, rejected 
atheism in Antiquity as Denkmöglichkeit and situated the birth of atheism in Western 
Europe’s Enlightenment-movement of the 17th century with the anynomous treatise 
Theophrastus redivivus (1659) as the first materialization of atheism.166 One of the 
most recent points of view is given by Hildegard Cancik-Lindemaier, who suggests 
the term Religionskritik rather than ‘philosophical atheism’ in the context of 
Antiquity. Cancik-Lindemaier concluded that (philosophical) atheism in the strict 
sense of the word does not exist in Antiquity. Although we can find traces of 
materialism and mechanistic atomism, the idea of divinity is never really abandoned 
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(e.g., in the case of Democritus and Epicurus).167 The concept of ‘atheism’ should 
therefore not be applied to the context of Antiquity, as Cancik-Lindemaier formulates 
it: 
 
‘Eine allgemeine Bestimmung des Atheismus, deren Kriterium lediglich die 
Veneinung des einen allmächtigen Gottes des monotheistischen Religionen ist, führt 
notwendig der Ausschluβ der Antike; eine derartige Bestimmung führt zu Tautologien 
und ist auch historisch unfruchtbar.’168 
 
But most recently, these views have come under attack by the publication of Battling 
the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World (2015) by Tim Whitmarsh. Whitmarsh 
acknowledges the philosophical denial of the existence of the gods as a plausible 
intellectual phenomenon in Antiquity and therefore, rejects the ‘axiom’ that atheism 
only originated during the 17th century Enlightenment-movement. In Whitmarsh’s 
opinion, atheism simply ‘re-emerged’ in the modern era. Although I do not fully 
endorse the historical arguments of Whitmarsh (2015)169, I nevertheless believe that 
this new publication (the first survey on the topic since the English translation of A.B. 
Drachmann’s Atheisme i det antikke hedenskab (1919) in 1922) will instigate less 
restrictive academic approaches to the topic of (philosophical) atheism in Antiquity.170  
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In the now following sections of this chapter, I will oppose those views that exclude 
philosophical atheism in Antiquity and I shall demonstrate that negative and positive 
atheism are not phenomena that must be exclusively associated with modernity or 
even the modern Western world.171 
  
5.1)  negative/positive atheism and Classical Antiquity 
 
In the introductory section of this dissertation, we have identified positive atheism in 
Antiquity as ‘the explicit philosophical disbelief in the gods or the unequivocal denial 
of their existence’. An early acknowledgment of such an extreme type of atheism in 
Antiquity can be ascribed to the classical scholar Anders Bjorn Drachmann, who 
coined it ‘downright atheism’, but viewed it as a rare type of atheism that was 
restricted to a mere theoretical form. Drachmann situated this ‘downright atheism’ in 
the early Hellenistic period with Theodorus of Cyrene as a key figure.172  
 
A later study by Felix Jacoby, however, located this extreme type of atheism a century 
earlier, namely in the late 5th century BC with the sophist Diagoras of Melos as its 
main representative. Jacoby proposed the term ‘straight-forward atheism’ or 
‘complete atheism’, which seems to suggest that he was convinced that this extreme 
type of atheism did not manifest itself in a mere theoretical way, but in a pragmatical 
manner as well.173  
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More recently, Robert Parker proposed the expression ‘radical atheism’ in his article 
on atheism in The Oxford Classical Dictionary (4th edition) and, like Drachmann, 
believed it to be the most exceptional form of atheism in Antiquity.174 In his 
monograph Athenian Religion: A History (1996), Parker did specify this radical 
atheism by associating it with the sophistic movement and its radical criticisms on 
religion in the second half of the 5th century BC: 
 
‘Earlier philosophers, it can be argued, attacked religious traditions constructively and 
from within: the sophists advanced much more radical criticisms and drew more 
radical conclusions; or at the least such radical criticism first emerged in the sophistic 
period.’175 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I will apply Parker’s terminology of ‘radical atheism’ as 
a synonym for ‘positive atheism’ instead of ‘downright’, ‘straight-forward’, ‘complete 
atheism’ or more recently ‘absolute atheism’ as suggested by James Thrower176, 
because the latter are rather vague and not very suitable to identify the complex nature 
of this specific kind of philosophical atheism. Although they do express a certain 
‘totality’ in terms of denying the existence of the gods, they do not emphasize any 
connection with positive atheism in the sense of actively rejecting religion.  Besides, 
in the expression ‘radical atheism’ the meaning of a resistive and uncompromising 
atheism seems to be better embedded. Therefore, I would suggest using both 
expressions interchangeably throughout this study.  
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Radical (or positive) atheism in Antiquity remains nonetheless a controversial, but at 
the same time peripheral subject matter within the academic world. The small number 
of scholars who have acknowledged it, have analyzed it only briefly and even then, 
we can hardly speak of any consensus on the topic. Moreover, the acceptance of 
positive atheism (next to negative atheism) in Antiquity nowadays appears to be an 
isolated position with Robert Parker and David Sedley as one of the few remaining 
supporters.177 Nonetheless, some reference works like The Encyclopedia of Religion 
(ed. 2005) did acknowledge the existence of positive atheism in Antiquity by stating 
that ‘the denial of the gods was finally expressed in uncompromising terms only 
around 300 BC’.178 This statement clearly relies on the arguable opinion of 
Drachmann that such a type of atheism was only historically plausible from the early 
Hellenistic period on with Theodorus of Cyrene (ca. 350 – ca. 275 BC) as its main 
exponent.179 
 
Most scholars, however, do not accept the existence of radical atheism in Antiquity. 
Charles H. Kahn, for instance, argued that atheism is the negative response to 
monotheism, which he considered non-existing in Antiquity.180 Michael J. Buckley 
confirmed this statement, but also referred to the practical nature of atheism in 
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Antiquity as a denial of worship.181  The latest opinion on this matter can be found in 
Gavin Hyman’s A Short History of Atheism (2010). This scholar largely agrees with 
the visions of Kahn & Buckley that atheism is inextricably linked with a notion of 
modernity and that such notion was unknown in Antiquity.182 Hyman states that ‘It 
has often been noted by scholars of antiquity that what we understand as ‘atheism’ 
would have been unintelligible to the classical mind. Certainly, there were 
disagreements on the nature of the gods or their activities, and sometimes even the 
denial of the existence of certain gods. But the notion, intrinsic to the modern 
understanding of atheism, of immanence –of the world existing quite free of any sort 
of transcendent realm–  would have been almost unintelligible to them.’183 
 
The reference to ‘scholars of antiquity’ by Hyman, in order to support his argument, 
must be identified as the article Atheism in Antiquity by the classical scholar Jan 
Bremmer in the Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2007). However, his 
interpretation of Bremmer’s idea of a ‘soft atheism’ in Antiquity is rather selective, 
since Bremmer only situated this type of atheism during the Hellenistic period and not 
as the prevailing form of atheism throughout Greek and Roman Antiquity. 
 
Besides, Hyman’s opinion could be fallible: by means of critical reflection or personal 
experience, intellectuals in premodern times did also possess the ability to develop 
mind-sets that were extremely hostile to religious beliefs and practices.184 Maritain 
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already argued that positive atheism starts as a ‘basic act of moral choice, a crucial 
free determination’.185  
 
In his substantial study on Greek philosophy, William K.C. Guthrie also stressed the 
idea of a universal ‘enlightenment’, which manifests itself in two aspects: firstly, the 
determination to only believe what is reasonable and to connect this reason with the 
progress of natural science, and secondly, the determination to ameliorate human life 
by setting relative and humanistic moral standards which aim the elimination of 
absolute standards that claim supernatural authority.186 These determinations were 
present during the Renaissance and the later Age of Enlightenment, but also 
detectable in ancient Greece as the Greek gods were particularly vulnerable to both. 
Naturalist thinkers such as Anaxagoras and Archelaus did gradually replace divine 
matters by more scientific and mechanistic theories “about the heavenly things”, a 
phenomenon Plato identified as atheism in Laws (X, 886d-e) and which could have 
instigated the so-called Diopeithes-decree ca. 438/7 BC.187  
 
Accordingly, positive atheism is the result of a personal choice, in combination with 
an intellectual understanding of natural phenomena, and such behaviour should not 
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have to be limited to a modern context. It could manifest itself in any historical 
period.  
 
Moreover, the invention of atheism in Ancient Greece is interpreted by authoritative 
studies as one of the most important events in the history of religion.188 Alfred N. 
Whitehead already argued that ‘the progress of religion is defined by the denunciation 
of the gods.’189 Besides its unlocking of intellectual freedom, it also created the 
awareness that religious traditions can be challenged with rational arguments.190  
 
Intellectuals in Antiquity were, in return, also convinced of the fact that disbelief in 
the gods could have a devastating impact, not only on organized religion, but on 
society as a whole. Plato, for example, compared the success of ‘ungodliness’ in his 
days with the spread of disease and juxtaposed it to violence and injustice.191  In the 
Roman period, Cicero would report on the social implications of irreligious 
behaviour, in the second chapter of his treatise On the Nature of the Gods (I,2),  
 
“Piety however, like the rest of the virtues, cannot exist in mere outward show and pretence; and, with 
piety, reverence and religion must likewise disappear. And when these are gone, life soon becomes a 
welter of disorder and confusion; and in all probability the disappearance of loyalty and social union 
among men as well, and of justice itself, the queen of all virtues.” (transl. H. Rackham)192 
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In the extended paragraph Cicero also described two different types of atheism, 
similar to Plato’s first and second type of impious persons (Laws, X, 885b). Those 
who do not believe in the existence of the gods at all, like Diagoras of Melos and 
Theodorus of Cyrene -whom Cicero (I, 2, 63 & 117) mentions explicitly- could be 
interpreted as antitheists or positive atheists, because they utterly (omnino) and openly 
(aperte) denied the existence of any god. Those who believe that the gods exist while 
they are being confined to an inactive status and take no part in any direction or 
government of the world are basically deists. Cicero does not mention any 
philosophers by name concerning this second type of atheism, but it is most likely that 
he implicitly referred to the Epicureans, because the passage further describes how 
providence is being denied by this type of atheist philosophers.193 According to 
Cicero, both types of atheism will ultimately lead to the dissolving of piety and, 
consequently, any human virtue. Thus, the supposed destructive power of atheism on 
the social level was already a judgmental issue in Antiquity. 
 
Paradoxically, Cicero himself could be classified as ‘negative atheist’. Being an 
Academic Sceptic in the vein of Carneades and Clitomachus, Cicero advocated the 
principle of epochè (suspension of judgment) on the subject of the existence the 
gods.194 But, in contrast to modern negative atheism, this type of atheism in Antiquity 
did not necessarily correspond to an absence of belief in god(s)195, but rather 
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acknowledged the existence of the gods on sociological or philosophical grounds until 
the opposite could be asserted with absolute certainty.196  
 
A similar opinion was detectable in the agnosticism of the sophist Protagoras but also 
in the theological opinions of the Pyrrhonian Sceptic Sextus Empiricus. The latter 
defended the existence of the gods, despite the principle of epochè, on the universal 
opinion that belief in the gods forms the foundation of piety.197 The (Pyrrhonian) 
Sceptic complies with worship of the gods for reasons of conformity to ancient 
customs and laws198, but will refrain from any speculation about the nature of divine 
existence, because of the inevitable contradictions the ‘dogmatist’ views of other 
philosophical schools induce on this topic.199  
 
It is also remarkable that precisely ‘negative atheists’ such as Cicero and Sextus 
Empiricus provided the most extensive indices atheorum in Graeco-Roman 
literature.200 Perhaps it was considered an additional method to distance oneself from 
any association with atheism by pointing out the ‘real atheists’? Epicurus and his 
followers had already applied this method, but they only succeeded partially in their 
attempts.201   
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5.2) negative/positive atheism and Medieval Europe 
 
Traces of negative and positive atheism in a premodern context should not be related 
exclusively to the ancient world. In studies dealing with critical reflection on religion 
in the Middle Ages, the term ‘radical’ also surfaces in references to exceptional cases 
of deviant religious behaviour.202 In the Middle Ages, one cannot actually speak of 
‘atheism’, because ‘atheism’ as a concept of philosophical criticism on theistic belief 
was absent. Secondly, critical reflection on religion manifested itself primarily in 
different forms of religious doubt (dubitare).  
 
The only known cases of ‘radical doubt’ in the Middle Ages are situated in the so-
called ‘long 12th century’ (ca. 1060- ca. 1220).203 In this time frame in the history of 
Western Europe, fundamental socioeconomic changes seem to have been taken place, 
which in return led to religious uncertainty or doubt within the writings of 
contemporary intellectuals. This period of religious doubt would last until Thomas 
Aquinas’ Summa theologiae (1265) did provide ‘radical’ theological arguments to 
counter and even condemn all forms of religious doubt.204  For instance, we have 
already mentioned that 12th century theological discourse in Western Europe was 
familiar with the subject of the ‘three imposters’.205 But a more concrete example of 
radical doubt on the existence of God can be detected in the book Liber de 
temptatione cuiusdam monachi (1068) by Otloh von St. Emmeran (1010-1072): 
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“on this occasion I was altogether enveloped by complete doubt and darkness of mind, and I 
thouroughly doubted if there were any truth or profit in the Bible or if Almighty God existed.” (transl. 
C. Morris).206 
 
In this passage, Otloh specifies spiritual doubts, which his protagonist (possibly a 
fellow monk) experiences as devilish temptations. The protagonist desperately seeks 
relief in prayer and profound study of the Scriptures in order to be relieved of these 
‘inappropriate’ thoughts. Remarkely in the case of Otloh, is the fact that radical 
atheism or doubt is being experienced in an opposite way: Otloh’s protagonist, who is 
identified as a ‘follower of doubts’ (amator dubitationis), actively tries to resist his 
doubting of God, as he also experiences doubts of a sexual nature (i.e. doubting his 
choice of a monastic life). Finally, Otloh’s protagonist manages to cast out his radical 
doubts by arguing that such thoughts are clearly diabolical delusions.207  He thus 
concludes in his De temptatione that only ‘the fool’ (cf. Psalm 14), who is being 
distracted by the Devil and does not posses the spiritual and intellectual strength to 
resist this temptation says in his heart that there is no God.   
 
A later individual case of radical doubt can be addressed to Herbert of Bosham (1120-
1194). In contrast to Otloh, whose doubt involved the Holy Scriptures, Herbert 
experienced doubts about the true nature of the Sacraments at a certain point. Similar 
to Otloh, Herbert referred to the Devil as the cause of his radical doubts. In stead of 
concealing his doubts from his associates (what Otloh’s protagonist did), Herbert 
reported the matter to his archbishop, Thomas Becket (1118-1170), in the form of an 
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anecdote: during some night Herbert witnesses a host moving around in a chalice.208  
The archbishop explained this particular incident as a reference to his destabilized 
state of mind, which convinced Herbert of the fact that his radical doubts were being 
caused by diabolical distractions.209 From that point on, Herbert felt relieved and no 
longer questioned the nature of the Sacraments.  
 
These two individual cases of radical doubt may have been quite exceptional in the 
Middle Ages, but two independent sources seem to suggest that the matter was not 
confined to Otloh and Herbert. Hildegard von Bingen (1098-1179) (Letter to Abbot 
Adalard of Cologne) and Peter of Cornwall (1140-1221) (Liber relevationum, fol.2r) 
both mention the fact that some might deny the existence of god. The latter source is 
more specific and informs that: 
 
“Although nearly all nations of men, having discarded idols, believe there is one God, yet there are 
some who think there is no God and that the world was always as it is now and judge that is is ruled by 
chance rather than the providence of God. And there are many who, thinking only of the things that 
they see, do not believe either good or bad angels exist, nor that the soul of man lives on after the body 
nor that other spiritual and invisible things exist.” (transl. S. Flanagan).210 
 
The information provided by Peter of Cornwall is not very precise concerning the 
interpretation of this existing ‘unbelief’: is it restricted to individuals (like Diagoras of 
Melos in Antiquity) or even entire (‘pagan’) nations, comparable to the ancient 
Scythians and Libyans? Is it a logical theological phase after the denunciation of 
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(pagan) idiolatry or is it merely the product of childish ignorance?211 Is it referring to 
intellectuals who actively self-identified as ‘atheists’ or does it merely refer to 
‘heretics’ in the sense of Catholic ‘nonconformists’(cf. Michel de Certeau)?212   
 
According to Dorothea Weltecke, medieval atheism, in the sense of ‘absence of belief 
in God or gods’ could have existed, not as an open and self-declared conviction 
(comparable to modern atheism)213, but as an anonymous phenomenon which was 
mostly recognized and described in theological literature.214 The medieval idea of 
‘there is no God’ could thereby be interpreted as a constructed example of flawed 
argumentation and logic by which orthodox (Christian and Muslim) theologians 
distinguished ‘foolish’ and ‘ignorant’ adversaries (e.g., heterodox philosophers or 
even ancient philosphers) who they identified as ‘having no belief in God’ and 
associated with madness, arrogance and immorality.215 
 
We can therefore conclude that the phenomenon of ‘disbelief in God’ was recognized 
in the medieval period, based on sources like Peter of Cornwall. This author referred 
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to it as a problem of ignorance, a lack of education or spiritual problems, but it was 
not to be taken very seriously. Alternative (‘heterodox’) interpretations of religious 
traditions were believed to be far more dangerous.216  
 
5.3) negative/positive atheism and the non-Western ancient world 
 
The debate on the existence of negative or positive atheism outside a context of 
modernity is not necessarily restricted to Western civilization. It could even be 
extended to non-Western philosophical doctrines in the ancient world.  By analyzing 
the characteristics of certain Eastern philosophical schools, which existed 
synchronically with Greek philosophy, non-Western ancient forms of disbelief or 
absence of belief in God(s) can also be discerned.   
 
For example, in ancient Chinese religion and philosophy, the concept of ‘God’ or 
personalized deities was basically lacking. Instead, the impersonal concepts of Tian 
(‘Heaven’), from ca. 1200 BC on, and Dao (‘Way of Nature’), from ca. 400 BC on, 
dominated. The early philosopher Kongzi, better known in the Western world by his 
latinzed name ‘Confucius’ (551-479 BC), developed the idea of a harmonious Heaven 
guiding a moral order, which can only be achieved by reliance on traditional values 
like duty and protocol in the way it had been handed down by the rulers of the past.217 
The Confucian idea of ‘Heaven’, however, was still that of an impersonal providence.  
 
In the course of the 5th century BC, Confucianism was directly attacked by Mohism. 
This philosophical school was founded by Mo Tzu or Mozi (470-391 BC), who is also 
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known in the Western world by the name ‘Micius’.  In stead of family-based loyalty 
and devotion to traditional values, Mozi proposed the idea of jian’ai, meaning 
‘impartial care’ and the concept of state consequentialism: a state can only prosper if 
three goods (i.e. wealth, order and population’s growth) are well-balanced.218 This can 
be achieved when rulers appoint capable administrators to implement these three 
goods. Mohism therefore represented a social and idealistic alternative to 
Confucianism, which Mozi dismissed as being too restricted, partial and elitarian.  
 
In order to have a broader appeal, Mozi proposed the introduction of ghosts and spirits 
as a supporting concept to Tian within ancient Chinese religion. Because Mohism was 
based on a strict system of reward and punishment, belief in apparitions was most 
useful to secure appropriate behaviour instead of wickedness. The purpose of ghosts, 
according to Mozi, was simply to reward the sincere and punish the depraved. In 
Mozi’s teachings (Chapter 31: On Ghosts), an example is given: king Xuan of Zhou 
ordered the killing of his innocent minister Du Bo, but when Xuan and his escort 
witnessed Du Bo in the form of an apparition during a hunting party, the king was 
deadly struck by an arrow Du Bo shot while driving a ghostly chariot.219 The question 
whether these ghosts or spirits did actually exist was only of secondary importance to 
Mozi, because adoration for these entities would most of all strengthen social life and 
communal responsabilities in order to obtain the three goods.  
 
Later followers of Confucian, such as Meng Tzu or Mengzi (371-289 BC), who is 
also known by his latinized name ‘Mencius’, attempted to reduce the fatalistic nature 
of Confucian’s teaching, in response to Mohism, by developing a more humanistic 
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Confucianism, which attributed personal features like ‘Love’ and ‘Desire’ to Tian.220 
According to Mengzi, the ‘universal love’ or ‘impartial care’ of Mohism did not 
correspond with the natural order of human interaction: love and care for one’s 
parents and family members is a natural stage before the love and care for 
strangers.221 Mengzi did not advocate belief in ghosts and spirits within his system of 
reward and punishment. Instead, Mengzi proposed a system of ‘natural inclination’: 
human nature is based on moral behaviour (e.g., compassion, empathy, etc.) that 
enables the display of kindness. Dreadful environments or circumstances, however, 
can corrupt this moral behaviour. A shortage of basic needs (e.g., food supply) within 
society can also jeopardize the natural inclination of humans to perform goodness. 
Therefore, Mengzi also advocated the Mohist principle of high-quality government, in 
order to stimulate moral behaviour.222  
 
Despite Mengzi’s attempt to reconcile Confucianism and Mohism, in a universal and 
humanistic form, the suggestions of Monzi appear to have responded to a more 
substantial social need in ancient Chinese religion: due to its philosophical 
complexity, traditional Confucianism and Taoism had little appeal to the uneducated 
masses. Popular elements like personalized deities and spirits were therefore 
introduced in the course of the 3rd and 2nd century BC. This religious development 
would eventually be criticized by Chinese intellectuals such as the naturalist Wang 
Ch’ung (27-97 AD), who detected a large influx of superstition in now personalized 
Confucianist concepts like Tian.223 The Confucian intellectual Hsun Tzu or Xunzi 
(298-238 BC) had already proposed a purely naturalistic Confucianism, in which Tian 
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was reduced to a strictly materialistic designation, as guidance for natural 
processes.224 In this form of Confucianism, all supernatural elements were eliminated 
and all religious practices demythologized, in order to be reduced to a ceremonial 
function.225 Due to the fact that Xunzi denied the existence of supernatural agents like 
gods and ancestral spirits, he could be considered to have been a positive atheist. Yet, 
Xunzi still believed in the importance of ritual.226 In contrast to Mengzi, Xunzi argued 
that human nature in itself is bad, but not in the sense that it naturally tends towards 
evil.227 Ritual, in this context, could function as a restraint for wrongdoing, which 
indicates that Xunzi adopted Mozi’s views on the usefulness of ritual. 
 
Notwithstanding this often artificial and social meaning attributed to religious 
concepts like ‘ritual’ and ‘spirits’ in ancient Chinese philosophy, it remains 
problematic to speak of ‘ancient Chinese atheism’, because (poly)theism had been 
suppressed in an early historical stage by the impersonal element of Tian. Until the 
arrival of the Jesuit scholars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the concept 
of ‘God’ was therefore virtually unknown in China.228 As a result, one cannot actually 
speak of ‘atheism’ in an ancient Chinese context, as theism was never fully 
conceptualized within ancient Chinese religion.229 Instead, the history of ‘atheism’ in 
ancient China is basically a matter of attributing (im)personal elements to abstracts 
concepts like ‘Heaven’ or ‘The Way of Nature’ and the (social) acceptance or 
rejection of supernatural beings such as ghosts and spirits.  
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Completely the opposite was the situation in ancient Indian philosophy. Here, theism 
as a concept had been fully developed, paving the way for criticism on organized 
religion and forms of extreme atheism. It should, however, be noted that atheism in 
the sense of denying or rejecting God is a common feature in different Indian 
philosophical schools and religious traditions.230 The Mīmāmsaka, Jainists and 
Buddhists, for instance, do not recognize the existence of God.231 In order to speak of 
‘atheism’ in the context of Indian philosophy, one should not only discern the denial 
of God, but also detect the complete absence of any spiritual approach to the natural 
world.232 These characteristics seemed only present in the Indian school of 
materialism, which better known by the name Chārvāka or the synonym Lokâyata 
(meaning ‘a man of low and unrefined taste’).233  The Chārvāka was reputed for its 
disregard for any divine or supernatural concept in its epistemology, metaphysics and 
ethics; it profiled itself exclusively as materialist and non-theistic.234 No original texts 
of the Chārvāka have survived. The Brahman class, who might have feared the 
religious and social implications of these materialist doctrines, most likely destroyed 
them deliberately.235 Citations have only survived through philosophical opponents, 
who wished to emphasize the extreme materialism the Chārvāka were believed to 
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adhere.236 These sources attest of a disbelief in an afterlife and the existence of the 
gods, which indicates that traditional Hinduistic concepts such as Dharma (ethics), 
Samsara (the cycle of rebirth), Karma (the concept of moral merit within Samsara) 
and Moksa (the means to escape Samsara) were all rejected, except for Kama 
(pleasure) and Artha (wealth as a means to obtain Kama).237  
 
Furthermore, no alternative conceptions of divinity are proposed: life, according to the 
Chārvāka is characterized by meaninglessness. Therefore, justice and morality are 
merely social constructs, similar to the ideas of the sophist Theodorus of Cyrene (ca. 
345 – ca. 270 BC). We should, nevertheless, have some reserve concerning the 
authenticity of these radical opinions, because of the biased nature of the preserved 
sources. We also have reasons to believe that the Chārvāka were no radical hedonists, 
because the concepts of Kama and Artha were not followed blindly, but with the 
intention of minimizing pain and misery as much as possible, similar to the views of 
materialist schools, such as Epicureanism, in ancient Greece.238   
 
But the radical ‘atheist’ doctrines of the Chārvāka in the sense of a denial of the 
existence of ‘God’ cannot be diminished as these are in concordance with other Indian 
schools like the Mīmāmsaka, Jainism and early Buddhism, which all emerged 
between the 7th century and the 2nd century BC.239 Jainism completely rejects the 
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Hindu pantheon of personalized gods and has no notion of a supreme Creator or other 
supernatural entities, because their existence cannot be proven.240 The universe in 
Jainism is not perceived as the result of creation, but as an eternal process, governed 
by the cosmic principles of jiva (‘spirit’) and pudgala (‘matter’).241 The balance of 
both principles secures harmony and pleasure, while imbalance evokes chaos and 
pain. 
 
From its origin on, the Jains developed a rich tradition of atheist attacks on the theist 
teachings concerning divine creation in mainstream Hinduism. A clear example of 
these atheist teachings can be found in a Sanskrit poem called Mahāpurāna (The Great 
Legend) by the 9th century AD Jain Jinasena:  
 
“Some foolish men declare that Creator made the world.  
The doctrine that the world was created is ill-advised,  
and should be rejected. 
If God created the world, where was he before creation? 
If you say he was transcendent then, and needed no support,  
where is he now?” (transl. J. Thrower).242 
 
Similar to Jainism is the situation in traditional Buddhism. Sacrifices and rituals are 
rejected as they serve no purpose to the Hindu concepts of Samsara, Karma and 
Moksa. Personalized deities or a single godhead are also rejected, although the 
concept of Nirvana (‘total bliss by extinction of the self’) could be interpreted as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
supernaturalistic elements, in contrast to Hīnayāna or ‘Early Buddhism’, which, like Jainism, was a 
religion without god. 
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vague and abstract form of godhead in the light of a possible afterlife.243 In traditional 
Buddhist literature the biographical work Buddhacarita or Life of the Buddha by the 
monk Aśvaghosa (80-150 AD) is particularly remarkable due its profound antitheist 
statements concerning the existence of God: 
 
“The idea of God is proved false by rational argument, and all such contradictory assertions should be 
exposed.” (transl. J. Thrower).244 
 
Such antitheist statements are actually not uncommon in early Buddhism and 
especially in the so-called school of Hīnayāna in the 1st and 2nd century AD. Hīnayāna 
(“Small Vehicle” in Sanskrit) substituted the concept of ‘God’ by the teachings of 
Buddha and the principle of Karma until it became overshadowed by the Buddhist 
school of Mahāyāna (“Great Vehicle” in Sanskrit) that still professes the belief that 
through the principle of Nirvana Buddha is transformed into God and should be 
worshipped as such. 245 
 
With the information from Classical Antiquity concerning the destructive power of 
atheism on the social level in mind and based on the examples of Eastern scepticism, 
materialism and antitheism, the idea of philosophical atheism being inextricably 
connected to the notion of modernity becomes difficult to sustain. Although the 
dominant approach to explain the conditions of human life in the ancient world was 
definitely religious, intellectuals from different cultural backgrounds were dealing 
with matters like rationalism, atheism and even antitheism during this historical time 
frame. In the late Classical period, Plato (Laws, X, 886d-886e) condemned the 
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‘thriving’ phenomenon of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν (“to reject the normal way of accepting the 
gods”) and blamed, along with the sophists, the naturalist research by Anaxagoras and 
Archelaus, which had contested the divine character of the heavenly bodies.246 Cicero 
provided an overview of different philosophical arguments concerning the 
(in)existence of the Graeco-Roman gods in his treatise On the Nature of the Gods.   
 
Even in a ‘devout’ time period like medieval Europe, intellectuals such as Peter of 
Cornwall reported that disbelief in God was an existing phenomenon ca. 1200 AD. 
Although Peter might have exaggerated the intellectual impact of this disbelief with 
the intent of discrediting so-called ‘heterodox’ intellectuals, it nevertheless indicates 
that the idea ‘disbelief in God’ was not something incomprehensible in Peter’s days.   
 
Based on these observations, it would be plausible to assume that the rejection of a 
religious understanding of life and the universe does not have to be limited to the 
modern era, which is traditionally situated from the 17th century Enlightenment on. 
Actually, the idea of disbelief is probably as old as human thought itself.  There 
always will be individuals, who are dissatisfied with the answers provided by the 
often theistically conceived religious traditions to which they were exposed to from 
early childhood on.247 Perhaps this statement can be adequately supported by the 
following quotation from Michael J. Buckley concerning the universal contrasts 
between theism and atheism: 
 
‘[T]he affirmation or denial of god touches something so deep and so basic within 
human experience that it involves radical drives for meaning, for unity within 
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experience, for final security, for autonomous freedom and self-determination -
longings which have run through human history and choice.’248 
 
Chapter 6: conclusions 
 
In this first part of the dissertation, we have now attempted to define the different 
characteristics and categories (i.e. positive and negative atheism) of philosophical 
atheism, which could enable us to further determine the historical impact of positive 
atheism in Classical Antiquity. Our research, so far, indicates that both modern and 
ancient (Greek) atheism comprise complex and wide-ranging varieties of 
nonconformist critical reflection on theistic beliefs. Whereas ‘atheism in Antiquity’ 
functions as an overarching expression for all sort of deviant religious behaviour, 
modern atheism acts as a default position to theism and should not be interpreted as an 
alternative belief or religion to the one it criticizes.249 The first atheist member of the 
British parlement, Charles Bradlaugh (1833-1891), formulated it as follows, ‘The 
atheist does not say “There is no God”, but he says: “I know not what you mean by 
God; I am without idea of God; the word “God” is to me a sound conveying no clear 
or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because I cannot deny that of which, by its 
affirmer, is so imperfect that he is unable to define it to me.’250  
 
Therefore, atheism always functions as an antithesis to theism, which claims it 
fundamentally denies. This attitude is not restricted to modern Western atheism, but 
appears to be a universal and timeless phenomenon in cultures where religion is 
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theistically conceived. Examples outside modern and ancient Western atheism can be 
found in different Indian philosophical schools such as the materialist Chārvāka, 
which challenged traditional Hindu doctrines in such a way that it can be identified as 
positive atheism.  
 
An exception in premodern non-Western atheism, on the other hand, seems to be 
ancient Chinese philosophy and religion. Although certain intellectual ideas on the 
nature of the universe can be labeled as ‘atheism’ from a Western point of view, we 
must distinguish ancient Chinese philosophy and religion from a much later 
popularized sense of Chinese religiosity that was more experienced or conceptualized 
in a theistic manner. So, critical religious reflection by ancient Chinese intellectuals 
on early Confucianism or Taoism should not to be strictly labeled ‘atheism’. But still, 
religious concepts like ancestral spirits and ritual could be assessed in an ‘atheist’ 
manner, i.e. reduced to a mere social and ceremonial function, comparable to the 
views of Epicurus, for instance.  
 
Regardless of the fact that philosophical atheism is not restricted to a modern context, 
we must definitely acknowledge the idea that atheism throughout history has always 
been an unpopular intellectual position, dealing with stigmatization, oppression and 
persecution. In Classical & Hellenistic Athens, atheism was interpreted as impiety and 
punishable by means of asebeia-trials. Plato (Laws, X, 885b) proposed a death 
sentence for ‘those who denied the existence of the gods’, while Thomas Aquinas 
defended the idea of a death penalty for atheists in the Middle Ages (Summa 
theologiae, 2-2.I-16).  A self-declared and self-professed atheism that does not face 
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persecution thus only appears feasible when certain social developments have been 
taken place.   
 
In modern times, atheism was only practicable on a secretive level until ca. 1700 
when a gradual shift in social paradigms developed a sense of enlighted citizenship 
and secularism which no longer ordained the persecution of atheists by means of a 
death sentence or imprisonment.251 However, this development did not guarantee that 
atheism was being socially accepted, given the fact that the social and intellectual 
stigmatization of atheists was still a well-accepted phenomenon until the late 19th 
century. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that an openly and publically self-declared and self-
professed atheism is commonly related to recent times, rare traces of individual 
actions, characterized by an unconcealed aversion of belief and cultic practices, can 
be detected in Antiquity, which will be demonstrated in the case studies of Diagoras 
of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene. As classical scholars like Drachmann (1922) and 
Parker (1993 & 2012) already argued, radical (i.e. positive) atheism seems to be the 
rarest manifestation of intellectual criticism on ancient Greek religion and these two 
philosophers might be the only individuals in Antiquity to whom the label of positive 
atheism could be applied. 
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But first, we will undertake an extensive analysis of the characteristics of ancient 
Greek religion and namely those (popular) aspects which became the subject of 
intellectual attacks over time. The social responses to these attacks will demand the 
examination of Greek religious terminology concerning (im)piety and (dis)belief in 
order to determine how deviant religious behaviour, and more precisely 
nonconformist opinions concerning divine existence and interaction was recognized 
and evaluated by ancient Greek communities. This seems to have culminated in 
Classical Athens in the phenomenon of asebeia-trials (between ca. 438/7 and ca. 307 
BC).
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PART 2: deviant religious behaviour  
in the context of ancient Greek religion 
 
The principal aim of this dissertation is to prove the historical presence of positive 
atheism in Classical Antiquity. From an emic point of view, this positive atheism in 
Classical Antiquity can be embedded within a broader concept of ‘deviant religious 
behaviour’ for different reasons. First, ancient Greek society in the period ca. 438 – 
ca. 307 BC did not seem to differentiate the numerous forms of deviant religious 
behaviour (e.g., those who reduced the gods to natural objects, those who denied their 
existence or those who introduced new deities). All forms were labeled ἀσέβεια 
(‘impiety’) and subjected to legal action. Exemplary in this case is the (radical) atheist 
Diagoras of Melos, who was accused of being ἀσέβης (“impious”) by Pseudo-Lysias.1  
Ancient Greek society did also not reserve a different juridical procedure for the 
variety of deviant religious behaviour. Religious offenders were liable to prosecution 
by means of standard procedures, such as εἰσαγγελία (“accusation before the 
Assembly”), γραφή (“accusation in writing”) and ἔνδειξις (“detention on remand”), 
regardless of the nature of their impiety.2  
 
For these reasons, positive atheism in Classical Antiquity will be integrated in this 
part of the research within the broader concept of ‘deviant religious behaviour in 
ancient Greek society’ in order to examine it as a delimited social phenomenon. The 
social assessment of deviant religious behaviour is nevertheless a matter of debate. 
According to different classical studies, deviant religious behaviour was a minor 
                                                      
1
 Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 17.  
2
 Sources which mention these procedures only relate to the period of ca. 438/7-399 BC, but we have 
no indication that later cases of irreligious behaviour were prosecuted by means of different 
procedures. 
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social problem of only minimal concern for authorities within ancient Greek society.3 
Moreover, the cases of asebeis (“impious individuals”) and their consecutive trials 
were rare and scarcely documented in ancient sources to the extent that some scholars 
have doubted the historicity of asebeia-legislation, and more specifically the decree of 
Diopeithes (c. 438/7 BC) and the historicity of early asebeia-trials, especially those 
before the defamation of the Herms and the Mysteries in Athens in 415BC.4   
 
I shall oppose such views in favour of the historicity of the Diopeithes-decree and 
early impiety trials (438/7- 415 BC) in the now following part. The importance of 
these legal measures, in order to counter irreligious behaviour that questioned 
quintessential features of ancient Greek religion, should not be underestimated. It does 
correspond with a communal sense of religious fear in the late 5th century BC 
regarding the impact of such doctrines.5 Moreover, important political factors in the 
430s BC also appear to support the historicity of these legal measures.6  
 
Further key elements of investigation, which should enable a full comprehension of 
the impact of deviant religious behaviour on ancient Greek society, concern the 
different semantic shifts in Greek expressions of irreligious behaviour. This inquiry is 
also closely related to the research problem of contraposing deviant religious 
behaviour to certain manifestations of ancient Greek religion (beliefs or rituals) or 
ancient Greek religion in its entirety (beliefs and rituals). Classical scholarship has 
often identified Greek religious discourse as evolving around the observance of 
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 Lloyd-Jones (1971), p. 134 & Babut (1974), p. 9. 
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 Dover (1988), p.141-144 & Filonik (2013), p. 12, 26-39 &80. 
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 Rubel (2000), p. 13-14. 
6
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rituals, which strengthened Greek communal life.7 As such, this theory entails the idea 
that not disloyalty to belief or a set of religious doctrines did determine socially 
unacceptable irreligious behaviour, but rather any form of nonconformity towards 
ritual action. In the course of this part of the dissertation, we will need to verify 
whether this tenet or any opposing view (or even a combination of both) might enable 
us to fully comprehend how deviant religious behaviour precisely interacted with 
ancient Greek religion. 
 
Reduced to specific questions, we can now summarize this introductory section, as 
follows: ‘[w]hy did deviant religious behaviour occur in ancient Greek society and 
which components of ancient Greek religion did it target?”, “[h]ow did ancient Greek 
societies recognize and identify this type of behaviour?” and “[w]as there (a degree 
of) acceptance and integration of this behaviour or should it be considered 
antagonistic to civic society?”, in order to answer the fundamental question: “[w]here 
religious offenders perceived as being socially harmful to Greek communities?”.  
 
Chapter 7: ancient Greek religion: a matter of ‘belief’ or ‘ritual’? 
 
From our (etic and emic) classifications of ‘atheism in Antiquity’, we can assume the 
idea that intellectual criticism on traditional Greek religion arose ca. 500 BC in the 
writings of Hecataeus and Xenophanes.8 But what did these early intellectuals 
actually wish to accomplish with their critical reflections on traditional Greek 
religion? Did they envision a profound reform of traditional Greek beliefs or rituals or 
Greek religion as a whole? As mentioned earlier, the latter is problematic, because the 
                                                      
7
 See on this matter Versnel (2011), p. 544-545. 
8
 See also Meijer (1981), p. 228-234. 
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concept of ‘Greek religion’ as an integrated religious framework did only develop in 
late Antiquity in direct competition with rivaling religious systems such as 
Christianity.9 
 
It is believed that religion in ancient Greece was determined by mythological, local 
and traditional characteristics.10 Although proselytizing religions, based on doctrines 
and scriptural texts, eventually usurped ancient Greek religion, its lack of doctrinal 
precision provided enough flexibility to exist for more than a thousand years. But 
ancient Greek religion was never a fixed matter11, as it was constantly being adapted 
to new sociopolitical developments (e.g., the introduction of new public cults in 
Athens and the transfer of religious authority from aristocratic classes to the demos). 
 
But applying the term ‘religion’ (or related terminology such as ‘polytheism’) to the 
religious experience of ancient Greece is also problematic to a certain degree, because 
these concern relatively modern terms which were generally transferred to the field of 
Antiquity by 19th century classical scholars.12 Nevertheless, the usage of such 
terminology remains functional in order to relate to the importance of religion and its 
impact on social life in Greek Antiquity.13 In any case, can one even speak of ‘Greek 
religion’ as a unified system or must it be rather interpreted as an amalgam of Greek 
customs and religious practices?  
 
It would be historically more accurate to relate this question to the concepts of ‘Greek 
religiosity’ or ‘Greek religious experience’ in understanding the importance of 
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religion in ancient life.14 Nevertheless, the use of the term ‘religion’ cannot be 
abandoned completely in the field of classical studies, because this would isolate 
ancient historians from any contemporary debate or comparative study concerning the 
history or philosophy of religions.  
 
When investigating the correlation between ancient Greek atheism and ancient Greek 
religion/religiosity, a fundamental question one cannot escape is: “[w]hat did the 
ancient Greeks actually believe?” In order to answer such question, we must 
determine the different dimensions or layers in which ancient Greek belief was active.  
 
A. B. Drachmann, for instance, argued that ancient Greek religion manifested itself in 
three different levels of ‘belief’:15 
 
(a) belief in personalized (anthropomorphic) gods 
(b) belief in divination 
(c) belief in the divine character of the heavenly bodies 
 
Based on Drachmann’s classification of ‘belief’, we should be able to comprehend 
‘atheism’ in ancient Greek Antiquity in the sense of a ‘denial of (traditional) Greek 
beliefs’. Indeed, Xenophanes rejected belief in anthropomorphic gods, and 
Anaxagoras rejected belief in the divine character of the heavenly bodies, so both 
could be considered ‘deniers of (traditional) Greek belief’. Socrates could also be 
considered a denier of traditional Greek belief, due to his accusation of ‘denial of the 
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 See Bremmer (1994), p. 2, who points out that the Greeks lacked a separate word for ‘religion’, and 
described ‘religion’ based on the expression sebesthai tous theous (“to worship the gods”) as can be 
attested by Herodotus (VIII,144,2). See also Bremmer (1998), p. 10 & North (2010), p. 35-36. 
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existence of the gods of the state’, despite the fact that his disciple Xenophon 
dismissed such allegations afterwards, based on the fact that Socrates did make use of 
divination.16 Xenophon does not mention any disbelief in the celestial bodies by 
Socrates, but reports that Socrates consciously avoided any speculation on divine 
matters.17 Epicurus, whom literary traditions also accussed of atheism, also rejected 
the second and third level of belief, although he clearly opposed any affiliation with 
atheism, by promoting participation in rituals, because he viewed these, and I quote 
Obbink, as ‘natural responses to the recognition of divine nature’.18 It appears that 
those intellectuals, who were opposed to traditional Greek beliefs or associated with 
atheos (Anaxagoras, Socrates and Epicurus), did not necessarily consider themselves 
to be atheists, nor did they entirely reject traditional Greek beliefs or reject the cultic 
aspects of ancient Greek religion. 
 
Apparently, Drachmann’s classification of ‘belief’ is not an adequate tool to fully 
detect and identify Greek atheist behaviour, mainly because the latter seems to be 
related to other manifestations of the Greek religious experience as well. In other 
words, ancient Greek religion cannot be approached from the point of ‘belief’ alone, 
but must also include ‘cult practices’. Therefore, ritual aspects of Greek religiosity 
must also be incorporated in order to detect the differentiation of deviant religious 
behaviour. Intellectuals or atheoi, who attacked cultic practices (e.g., Heraclitus’s 
rejection of phallic cults or the divulging of the Eleusian Mysteries by Diagoras of 
Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene), cannot be discerned, based on Drachmann’s three 
levels of ‘belief’.   
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Consequently, a purely cognitive approach, based on the question “What did the 
ancient Greeks believe?” will not result in a comprehensive view on Greek religion, 
because this excludes the significance of cultic practices. A more integrated approach 
to Greek religion, in which belief and religious praxis interact with each other, is 
therefore needed and this could be summarized by the basic question “What 
comprised the Greek religious experience?”  
 
A recent model by Ken Dowden in his article Olympian Gods, Olympian Pantheon 
(2007) could be more appropriate to understand how deviant religious behaviour 
interacted with ancient Greek religion. Dowden approaches ancient Greek religion 
from the concept of ‘gods’ instead of ‘belief’19 : 
 
(a) a dimension of cult pratices 
(b) a dimension of mythology 
(c) a dimension of theology  
 
According to Dowden, the whole of cult practices comprises the primary dimension 
which is expressed by the worship of supernatural anthropomorphic beings that 
interact with mortals by means of reciprocity. The other dimensions are of a lesser 
importance and mainly the domain of poets and philosophers with little significance 
to popular worship. Another observation is the fact that dimension (a) and (b) 
correspond with Greek religion on a social level, while dimension (c) reflects upon 
the godhead from a purely intellectual level (the so-called “God(s) of the 
Philosopher”).  
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 Dowden (2007), p.41-42. 
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Personally, I tend to believe that Dowden’ model is suitable to identify the correlation 
between ancient Greek atheism and ancient Greek religion, because the primary 
dimension of cultic practices seems to characterize more precisely what atheoi such as 
Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene exactly targeted, i.e. the Eleusinian 
Mysteries. Dowden’s model is also more adequate to demonstrate the typical 
interaction between different dimensions of Greek religion when dealing with the 
matter of critical reflection on religion: the gods of mythology (b), forming the basis 
of the gods of cultic practices (a), were primarily the subject of critical reflection by 
Presocratic philosophers such as Xenophanes of Colophon and Heraclitus, who 
rejected the gods as shaped by Homeric tradition (c). At the same time, Xenophanes 
also denied the practice of divination (a) and proposed a more sophisticated 
polytheism that was supervised by a single, supreme God (c).  
 
Still, an element of critique in the model of Dowden is the fact that the aspect of 
‘belief’ is largely neglected, which appears to be a common element in so-called 
‘ritualist’ studies.20 Dowden only mentions ‘belief’ in the gods as a subject of research 
by philosophers or theologicians, similar to the way Greek mythology was a topic of 
interest to poets. Such answer, however, confines ‘belief’ to a mere intellectual 
importance within society and to fails to explain the significance of beliefs within 
daily Greek life and its interaction with other forms of Greek religiosity.21  
 
So, these models by Drachmann and Dowden do actually accentuate either the aspect 
of ‘belief’ or ‘ritual’ within Greek religion, whereas a more integrated approach might 
be needed.  
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In the case of Drachmann, the influence of 19th century German scholars, like Ulrich 
von Wilamomitz-Moellendorff and his emphasis on belief (Glaube) in the gods, is 
clearly noticeable in this mainly ‘theological’ approach to Greek religion.22 Dowden’s 
view, on the other hand, is obviously tributary to the ‘ritualist’ approach, which has 
had a renewed support in the classical field ever since the publication of Walter 
Burkert’s influential book Homo Necans (1972).  
 
7.1) the ‘ritualist’ versus ‘non-ritualist’ approach to ancient Greek religion 
 
Although the so-called ‘ritual turn’ has been faced with a decreasing significance in 
classical studies in recent years, it still remains popular among scholars as the 
appendix ‘Did the Greeks believe in their gods?’ in the monograph Coping with the 
Gods: Wayward Readings in Greek Theology (2011) by Henk Versnel indicates.23 
Versnel offers a coherent overview of the ongoing debate between adherents of what 
can be called a ‘cognitive’ (stress on ‘belief’) and ‘non-cognitive’ (stress on ‘ritual’) 
approach to ancient Greek religion.  Basically, the ‘non-cognitive’ approach argues 
that cult practices and not beliefs dominated ancient Greek religion, because cult 
practices are based on action and action is what determines religious life.24 Such 
assumption makes the issue of ‘What did the ancient Greeks believe?’ simply 
redundant in favour of the question ‘Which kind of cultic practices did the ancient 
Greeks perform?’. This understanding of the topic still proves to be popular, as 
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 Versnel (2011), p. 539-559. 
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 Evans-Pritchard (1980), p. 62. 
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Versnel offers an overview of quotations from various classical studies of the last 
decades, which all defend the ritualist approach to ancient Greek religion.25  
 
This non-cognitive or ritualist approach, which denies the importance of doctrine and 
orthodoxy within ancient Greek religion, is not a recent development within the 
classical field. It was initiated by William Robertson Smith (1846-1894) in his 
influential study Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (1889) and instigated the so-
called ‘ritual turn’ in the late 19th century and early 20th century.26  Smith argued that 
‘belief’ is a changeable and interpretative matter, while ‘ritual’ is fixed.27 What 
caused this turning away from belief in studies of ancient Greek religion near the end 
of the 19th century is not entirely clear, but some scholars have suggested the 
influence of Romanticism and its fascination for folklore and peasant customs, which 
was particularly detectable in the studies of Wilhelm Mannhardt (1831-1880).28 Other 
explanations might be the rise of psycho-analysis and the failure of the positivist 
method to explain the persistence of irrational forms of religious behaviour.  
 
This new approach to Greek religion was soon detectable in the work of other English 
scholars, such as Jane Harrison (1850-1928) and her book Mythology and Monuments 
of Ancient Athens (1890), which introduced anthropology within the classical field, 
and James George Frazer (1854-1941) and his important work on religious 
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 Versnel (2011), p. 544-545: “The central Greek term theous nomizein means not ‘believe in the 
gods’, but ‘acknowledge them’, that is pray to them, sacrifice to them, build them temples, make them 
the object of cult and ritual.” (J. Gould in: Easterling & Muir 1985, p.7). “It was above all the 
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Bremmer (1998), p. 16-24. 
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 Smith (1889), p. 16-18. 
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 Burkert (1979), p. 35-36 & Bremmer (1998), p. 18. 
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phenomena such as magic (cf. The Golden Bough from 1890). German scholars like 
Hermann Usener (1834-1905) would soon adopt this new emphasis on ritual. In the 
studies of Martin Nilsson (1874-1967), Greek religion is almost being reduced to the 
analysis of rituals with no attention for theological beliefs.29 French scholars like 
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), who introduced sociology into the academic world, 
would soon embrace the English view on rituals. Along with Bronislaw Malinowski 
(1884-1942), Durkheim is generally considered to be the founder of the so-called 
sociofunctional approach to religion.30 Durkheim was convinced of the influence 
society exercised upon religion and proposed a new approach on the study of religion, 
based on the distinction between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’. Ever since Durkheim, 
sociologists have been interested in the role of rituals within religion, because the 
performance of cultic rites on a regular basis expresses collective feelings and ideas 
and confirms a sense of unity within a society.31  
 
Rituals were also believed to be one of the most archetypal examples of ‘the sacred’, 
because it corresponds to those aspects of society wich are considered ‘forbidden’ or 
‘taboo’. The flamen Dialis in Rome, for example, was not allowed to pet a dog or to 
consume beans or raw flesh.32 Sacredness is therefore distinguishable from the 
profane world by its negation of ordinary human activities (e.g., the inaptitude of 
laughing or swearing in church).33 But in Durkheim’s opinion, religious rituals are 
more than manifestations of common ideas within a society, based on an exclusion of 
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 Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, X, 15. 
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that Durkheim could not detach himself from a rationalist method, in order to describe irrational forms 
of religious behaviour in non-literate societies. 
     108 
the profane. Rituals also function as a reinforcement of moral values and a 
reassertation of the social fabric in any community. In other words, by performing 
rituals, society recreates itself and strengthens its religious principles.34  
 
Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) further developed the theories of Durkheim on religion 
and ritual, especially in his work The Structure of Social Action (1937). Like 
Durkheim, Parsons associated ritual with ‘action’: ‘Religious ideas are ideas in 
relation to action, not merely to thought. These active attitudes imply the necessity of 
“doing something” about the situation in which they occur. […  ] Thus ritual is the 
expression in action as distinct from thought, of men’s active attitudes toward the 
nonempirical aspects of reality.’35 The wording ‘nonempirical’ is important in 
Parsons’s analysis, because it refers to the nature of ‘ritual’ itself.  Ritual is the 
expression of social action that transcends empiricial reality, resulting in a 
‘transcendental’ or ‘non-rational’ experience.36  
 
This ‘non-rational’ character of ritual becomes more logical once we relate it to the 
concept of myth.37 According to the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinoswki (1884-
1942), mythology should not be regarded as a mere assortment of tales, because it has 
a profound sociological function: it expresses belief and guarantees the efficiency of 
ritual as a form of social action.38  Another important element in the mutual 
relationship of myth and ritual consists of the former providing meaning to the 
                                                      
34
 Durkheim (1912), p. 498. 
35
 Parsons (1967), p. 431-432. 
36
 Goody (1961), p. 154. 
37
 For a comprehensive overview of the different theories on myth and its connection to ritual, see Doty 
(2000), p. 123-302. 
38
 Doty (2000), p. 67-68. 
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latter.39 Ritual on itself appears to be non-sensical. In this context one could mention 
the ritual of immersion, for example, which may relate to a myth of a girl escaping the 
caprices of a god by throwing herself into the sea.40 Once detached from myth, the 
ritual might only appear a meaningless and incomprehensible act. But myth on itself 
lacks the solemn and serious background of ritual and could easily decline into a loose 
narrative with no intrinsic purpose of awe and anxiety about the divine. Veneration of 
Durkheim’s ‘sacred’ will require a combination of both. However, the idea that myth 
only serves as the verbal expression of ritual within ancient Greek religion is most 
likely a too reductionistic view, since only a small number of Greek myths explained 
Greek rituals or had any connection to rituals.41 The actual correlation between myth 
and ritual seems more complex.42 
 
In the classical field, Eric R. Dodds (1893-1979) and Moses Finley (1912-1986) 
would emphasize this importance of mythology in their ritualist approach to ancient 
Greek religion.43 Finley, for instance, argued that Greek religion ‘had little of what we 
                                                      
39
 Doty (2000), p. 130-132. 
40
 Burkert (1979), p. 56-58. 
41
 Doty (2000), p. 337-338. 
42
 See on this matter Torrence (1994), p. 84: ‘Far from being a structureless flux, however, mythic 
variability expresses the creative capacity of human consciousness and speech to assimilate 
unforeseeable experience in logically apprehensible form, not by habituated repetition but by 
innovative recombination; myth, as the mobile complement of ritual, is thus an instrument not 
principally for control of a menacing outside world but for its exploration and transformation; It 
extends the reach of ritual, as word does of act, by transcending the immutability of a divinely given 
past –the sacral moment in which every time and place is the same-through projection, in the forward 
thrust of its narrative, of a potentially transformative future.’ 
43
 Dodds’ most important work on this matter is The Greeks and the Irrational (1951), in which the 
famous tenet of Wilhem Nestle’ work from 1940 (Von Mythos zum Logos: Die Selbstfaltung des 
griechischen Denkens von Homer bis auf die Sophistik und Socrates) is being questioned. Nestle 
argued that Greek thought between the 6th and 4th century BC gradually abandoned mythic thought in 
favour of a rational mind-set, which would also penetrate daily (religious) life. According to Nestle, the 
multiplicity of mythos in Greek thought evolved towards the uniformity of logos, in analogy with 
Heraclitus’s idea (DK 22 B 89) of the dreamworld versus the real world: when we sleep, we all reside 
in our private dreamworld, but, once awake, everyone partakes in one and the same reality. Dodds, on 
the other hand, stressed the persistance of irrational forms of religion (e.g., orgiastic rites, incubation 
and magic) in the Classical Period, as detectable in contemporary sources like Euripides’s Bacchae, for 
example. For the importance of myth in the works of Dodds, see Buxton (1999), p. 5-6 
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should call dogma about it, but was largely a matter of ritual and myth’.44 The ritual 
approach would also receive a new impetus since the 1970s by the studies on 
symbolic anthropology by Victor Turner (1920-1983) and Clifford Geertz (1926-
2006). The most renowned adherent of the ‘ritual turn’ in the classical field was 
undoubtedly Walter Burkert (1931-2015). Ever since the publication of his 
monograph Homo Necans (1972), the dominance of ritual over belief has been 
manifest in studies on Greek religion.45 By the use of the term Homo Necans or ‘The 
Killing Man’, Burkert related the primordial religious experience of mankind to the 
sacrificial killings of animals.46  
 
Burkert was not a radical ritualist, however. In stead of anthropology, Burkert rather 
focused on the significance of biology and evolution theory in the persistence of 
religious traditions. For instance, the importance of ancestral customs within ancient 
Greek religion and the need to maintain these in unaltered form from one generation 
to another can be regarded as biological strategies in the continuation of religious 
traditions.47 These ancestral customs did not only consist of rituals, but also contained 
common religious ideas and beliefs, which children picked up by observing their 
parents.48 Ancient Greek religion is therefore not a matter of ritual only, but a 
combination of ‘speech’ (λεγόµενα) in the form of myths, prayers, hymns and ‘actions’ 
(δρώµενα) in the form of ritual.49  
 
                                                      
44
 Finley (1968), p. 64. 
45
 An English translation by Peter Bing has been published in 1983 under the title Homo Necans: The 
Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth. 
46
 Burkert (1983), p. 2-3. 
47
 Burkert (1983), p. 28. 
48
 Plato (Laws, 887d). 
49
 Burkert (1985), p. 5. 
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Ritualist studies, from Robertson Smith and Jane Harrison on, have nevertheless laid 
the focus on ‘actions’ in stead of ‘speech’.50 How could this aversion for ‘belief’ in 
ancient Greek religion be explained?  Many ritualist studies, which are based on 
anthropological insights, often disregard ‘religion’ and ‘belief’ as generalizing 
(European) concepts, which are not applicable to many primitive religious traditions 
and non-literate societies.51 The ritualist approach also tends to reject the significance 
of theology, religious beliefs and ideas, based on the argument that ancient Greek 
religion was not characterized by the authority of sacred books, creeds, dogmata or 
revealed religion in general. Only primitive beliefs could have played any role of 
importance in Greek religion, according to the ritualist view.52 But should 
cosmological, cosmogonic and theogonic myths and hymns not be considered forms 
of primitive theology?53  Recent studies even suggest that ritual was not devoid of 
theology, which could corroborate the theory that Greek religion cannot be 
characterized in terms of rituals only, but that is was based on the interaction of 
λεγόµενα and δρώµενα in order to sustain the whole of ancestral customs.54 
 
Perhaps this integration was effectively exemplified by the sociofunctionalist William 
J. Goode, who argued that religion is a form of social acting, not a mere set of 
philosophical reflections on a metaphysical reality. Belief is a constituent of religion, 
but this belief is acted out within social contexts.55  
 
                                                      
50
 Versnel (2011), p. 546. 
51
 Goody (1961), p. 142 & 154. 
52
 Nilsson (1967), vol. I, p. 844. 
53
 See Ferguson (1980), p. 90-91 for early theological views by mythographers, such as Hesiod and 
Pherecydes of Syros (floruit 6th century BC). See also Parker (1993)² , p. 736 and Doty (2000), p. 16. 
54
 Ando (2008), p. x-xii  & Van Nuffelen (2010), p. 22-23. Van Nuffelen rightly observes that studies 
like Gerson (1990) & Laks (2002), which diminish the importance of ritual in favour of theology and 
religious ideas, tend to approach the topic almost exclusively from a philosophical angle with little to 
no concern for any actual religious experience. 
55
 Goode (1951), p. 222-223. 
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7.2) ‘belief’: Christian concept? 
 
The ritualist approach has proven to be persistent in its views on the irrelevance of 
theology and belief in ancient Greek religion. This firmness is often accompanied by a 
complementary tenet, namely the idea that the concepts ‘religion’ and ‘belief’ should 
be regarded as products of Christian tradition. This tenet first appeared In The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967) in which William P. Alston described the concept 
of ‘religion’ as a paradigm, characterized by nine different elements.56 
 
Alston envisioned his paradigm mainly within Orthodox Judaism and Roman 
Catholicism and this becomes apparent when analyzing the occurrence of the word 
‘god’ or ‘gods’ in the paradigm. Non-theistic religions like Jainism, Buddhism and 
Confucianism are therefore not covered by it. According to the philosopher Michael 
Martin, this is also the case for ancient religions and non-literate societies.57 
 
Alston’s view soon gained support, when linguistic scholarship began dealing with 
the paradigm of ‘religion’. An example of such study can be found in Rodney 
Needham’s Belief, Language and Experience (1972), which not only claimed that the 
concept of ‘religion’ is not applicable to pre-Christian societies like Ancient Greece, 
but also stated that ancient Greeks had no notion of ‘belief’ due to an absence of the 
                                                      
56 Alston (1967), p.140-145: the nine different elements by which ‘religion’ can be characterized are: 
(1) belief in supernatural beings, (2) a distinction between sacred and profane objects, (3) ritual acts 
focused on sacred objects, (4) a moral code believed to be sanctioned by gods, (5) characteristically 
religious feelings (awe, sense of mystery, sense of guilt) that are aroused in the presence of sacred 
objects and during the practice of ritual. The feelings are connected in idea with the gods, (6) prayers 
and other forms of communication with gods, (7) a world-view of a general picture of the world as a 
whole and the place of the individual therein, (8) a more or less total organization of one’s life based on 
the world view and (9) a social group bound together by the above. 
57
 Martin (2007)², p.219. 
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noun ‘belief’ or the verb ‘believe’.58 According to this view, these terms appear to be 
inherent to a Christian context and cannot be historically transferred to non-Christian 
cultures. By analyzing the historical impact of Christian missionaries on the Nuer, a 
South-Sudanese tribe, and based on comparative historical-linguistic research, 
Needham concluded that ‘belief’ as a religious concept is the product of Christian 
tradition and historically traceable to the Judaic mystical doctrine in combination with 
Greek styles of religious discourse59, which first merged in the Septuagint and the 
Gospels.60  
 
An important argument of Needham is the Greek verb pisteuein, which was used (in 
stead of the verb nomizein) in the 3rd century BC when the Old Testament was being 
translated into Greek. The verb, already appearing in Herodotus’s Histories (I, 24) in 
the sense of “relying on a person”, is derived from the Greek noun pistis (‘trust’ or 
‘reliability’) and was used as the appropriate Greek translation of the Hebrew he’mīn, 
which refers to the exclusive relationship one has with Yahweh, based on loyalty. 
This loyalty is expressed by obedience to the laws and words of God and the prophets 
as it is written down in the Scriptures. In the New Testament, pisteuein still refers to a 
Judaic obedience, but comprises a more personal relationship one has specifically 
with Jesus Christ, from which it further developed into a more general meaning: 
‘accepting the message of Christ’.61 According to Needham’s diagram62, the Indo-
                                                      
58
 Needham (1972), p.14-39, 64-135. 
59
 Needham also argued that in later Greek discourse pisteuein gradually replaced the original verb 
nomizein in the sense of religiosity because the latter only referred to customary elements regarding the 
gods, while pisteuein, derived from pistis, indicates a sense of religious persuasion; “belief” is not self-
evident, one has to be personally convinced and taught as such. According to Needham, pisteuein better 
expressed the essence of (Neo-)Platonist “belief” as can be found in studies by Plutarch, Plotinus and 
Porphyry, namely belief as the result of an education in theological knowledge in combination with 
piety.   
60
 Needham (1972), p.44-50. 
61
 Ibidem. 
62
 Needham (1972), p.42. 
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European root *leubh- from which the modern English verb “believe” (likewise the 
German verb glauben and the Dutch verb geloven) is derived, delivered the 
etymological origin of the notion of ‘belief’, but ideationally relies on the Greek 
pisteuein as it developed within the Judeo-Christian tradition. The classical scholar 
Simon Price (1954-2011) was probably the most fervent supporter of this approach 
and argued that the concept ‘belief’ is ‘forged out of the religious experiences of the 
Apostles and Saint-Paul’, making any attempt to implement ‘belief’ on ancient Greek 
religion a Christianizing attempt.63  
 
But the theory of ‘belief’ as a Christian concept would also be the subject of criticism.  
In response to the theory of Needham, Wilfred C. Smith argued that a translation of 
pistis and pisteuein rather suggests ‘faith’ instead of ‘belief’. The concept of ‘faith’ is 
Scriptural and should not be confused with the neutral ‘belief’.64 Scholars like Donald 
Wiebe in his article The Role of ‘Belief’ in the Study of Religion (1979) affirmed 
Smith and indicated that any religious experience is always embedded in ideas and 
doctrines in order to make the experience meaningful.65 Wiebe concluded that any 
study of religion is impossible without the concept of ‘belief’, because the term can 
enclose multiple meanings like ‘holding a certain opinion’ and ‘pledging alliance’.66  
 
Consequently, ‘belief’ must be interpreted as an overarching term that can be 
associated with commitments, ideas, doctrines and interpretations, making ‘belief’ an 
inescapable aspect within any study of religion. Henk Versnel suggests therefore a 
more ‘generic’ approach to the term ‘belief’ in order to relieve it from any restricting 
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 Price (1984), p. 10. 
64
 Smith (1977), p.78. 
65
 Wiebe (1979), p.244-245. 
66
 Wiebe (1979), p. 236. 
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Christianizing connotations. On this matter, the studies by Yunis (1988), Bremmer 
(1998), and King (2003) can also be consulted. 67  
 
7.3) ‘belief’: a necessary constituent for ‘ritual’ 
 
Although defended by classical scholars such as Simon Price and Robert Garland68, 
the non-cognitive approach, combined with the idea of ‘belief’ being a Christian 
concept, remains problematic within the study of Graeco-Roman religion due to the 
absence of sources that support such views. Instead, it rather draws upon 
anthropological evidence of religiosity from non-literate cultures, which is being 
transferred to the historical context of Graeco-Roman religion.69 Secondly, it 
commonly ignores the intellectual context of late 5th century BC Athens, which was 
characterized by a sophist debate on (dis)belief in the gods.70 Thirdly, combining a 
ritualist view without any concept of ‘belief’ is totally incompatible. The whole 
system of rituals (i.e. sacrifice, prayer) would simply be meaningless without any 
basic ‘belief’ in the existence of gods, due to the fact that the essence of every form of 
ritual is based on belief in divine beings and their reciprocal interest in human affairs.  
 
                                                      
67
 King (2003, p.273: ‘The central element is not the conscious assertion of belief, but rather the 
existence of a conviction in the absence of a need for verification.’), Bremmer (1998, p. 24: ‘Is the 
opposition ‘ritual’ versus ‘belief’ not too absolute? Are rites not also a reflection of beliefs?’), Yunis 
(1988, p.39: ‘The “fundamental religious beliefs” of the Athenians would be (1) the existence of the 
gods, (2) their interest in human affairs, and (3) the relationship based on reciprocity with the gods.’ On 
a ‘generic’ approach to belief: Martin (2007)², p.219-220 advises the paradigm of M. Beardsley & E. 
Beardsley (1965) as a more neutral interpretation of religious experience. This paradigm is based on the 
interaction between human life and the non-human reality, which leads to certain ethical choices that 
result into specific attitudes and practices in accordance with the interaction. 
68
 Price (1984), p. 10-15; Price (1999) p. 36 & Garland (1994), p. ix. See also Beard & Crawford 
(1985), p. 26-27 & Philips (1986), p. 2697-2711. 
69
 Feeney (1998), p. 12. 
70
 Burkert (1985), 311-317. 
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Without a belief in such beings, any ritual act becomes superfluous.71 This is actually 
what Aristophanes aims at in Clouds (423-426): when Strepsiades no longer believes 
in the gods, the need to venerate them by means of sacrifice becomes redundant.72 In 
Aristophanes’s opinion, belief in the existence in the gods is a necessary condition for 
the performance of cultic practices.  
 
Supporters of the ritualist approach like M. Giordano-Zecharya, on the other hand, 
interpret such passages in a reverse manner: ‘non-existence of a god is asserted in 
terms of cultic oblivion’.73 This scholar developed a rather unusual theory regarding 
atheism, based on the Greek phrase οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεύς (“Zeus does not exist”) from 
Aristophanes’s Clouds (827). According to Giordano-Zecharya, the phrase actually 
means “Zeus has been usurped” (in this case by Dinos, the cosmic vortex in Clouds). 
Basically, this would mean that an inexistence of a god must be interpreted as a loss 
of authority, due to cultic practices, which are no longer experienced as valid or 
effective. This theory is somehow problematic because Giordano-Zecharya only 
justifies her theory by an ambiguous translation of Clouds (1468) while the passage 
clearly states “Zeus does not exist”.  Besides this, she also tries to circumvent the 
whole idea of ‘belief’ by presenting the ritual act as the decisive factor regarding the 
existence of a god. But her theory is basically implying that cultic practices can only 
be sustained by a sufficient amount of ‘interest’ or ‘acknowledgment’ of worshippers. 
This ‘acknowledgment’ is actually a matter of belief as a prerequisite of all ritual 
                                                      
71 Derenne (1930), p. 219: ‘On fait remarquer que l’interpretation de τοὺς θεοὺς νοµίζειν dans le sens 
de “honorer les dieux” convient specialement a la nature de la religion grecque depourvue de systeme 
dogmatique et dont l’essencese reduit pour ainsi dire au culte. Mais il ne faut pas oublier que la 
conservation du culte que l’on rendait aux dieux était subordonnée à la croyance à leur existence. Cette 
croyance détruite, le culte ne pouvait se maintenir.’ See also Yunis (1988), p. 39. 
72
 Aristophanes, Clouds, 423-426.  
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 Giordano-Zecharya (2005), p. 335. 
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actions.74 Any deity who loses interest because worshippers no longer ‘believe’ in it 
will consequently end in what she identified as cultic oblivion.  
 
Another problem regarding the ritualist approach is situated on the level of disbelief in 
the gods: if ancient Greek religion was dominated by rites and not theology, it would 
be feasible to assume that ‘atheism’ in the (emic) meaning of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν  
remained a mere theoretical phenomenon that did not interfere with the praxis of 
religion at all. Drachmann already suggested that disbelief in the gods was socially 
acceptable in ancient Greek society on the condition that it was limited to purely 
theoretical views with no actual implications for cultic practices.75 The philosophical 
denier of the existence of the gods was thus left unharmed on the condition that he 
still performed rites in honour of the gods.76 Would such assumption indicate that all 
varieties of deviant religious behaviour, even in its most extreme form, still complied 
with ritual activities?  
 
In the case of the so-called ‘radical atheists’, Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of 
Cyrene, no surviving sources suggest such. On the contrary, in the case of Diagoras of 
Melos, anti-sacrificial elements can be observed within sources. For example, in 
Aristophanes’s Clouds (423-426) the ‘Socrates the Melian’ convinces Strepsiades to 
sacrifice no longer to the Olympians once belief in the gods has been abandoned. 
Another example of an anti-sacrificial stance can be found in Birds (186), where 
Aristophanes uses the phrase λιµός Мήλιος (“the Melian fast”) to refer to the plan of 
Peisetairus and the Birds to starve the Olympian gods to death. Scholiasts and modern 
scholars have commonly explained limos Melios as a reference to the invasion of the 
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 Versnel (2011), p. 552. 
75
 Drachmann (1922), p. 12. 
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 Guthrie (1971), vol. III, p. 227. 
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island of Melos and the consecutive starvation of its inhabitants by Athenian forces in 
416 BC.77   
 
Frank E. Romer suggested, however, in his article Atheism, Impiety and the Limos 
Melios in Aristophanes’ Birds (1994) that limos Melios could actually refer to 
Diagoras of Melos (ca. 470- ca. 400 BC), the sophist who was notorious for his 
blatant atheism which resulted in a death sentence (in absentia) by the Athenian 
Assembly in 415 BC. According to Romer, the outspoken atheism of Diagoras could 
function as an anti-sacrificial weapon against the Olympians.78 If the atheism of 
Diagoras is deployed, the gods will be deprived of any sacrificial meat and will 
consequently starve to death, in order to be replaced by the Birds.79  
 
But perhaps the most authoritative argument against Drachmann’s hypothesis can be 
found in Plato’s Laws (IV, 716d-717a), which deals with the concept of piety in the 
sense of ‘service to the gods’ (θεράπεια θεῶν): 
 
“[a]nd of all rules it is the noblest and truest,—that to engage in sacrifice and communion with the gods 
continually, by prayers and offerings and devotions of every kind, is a thing most noble and good and 
helpful towards the happy life, and superlatively fitting also, for the good man; but for the wicked, the 
very opposite. For the wicked man is unclean of soul, whereas the good man is clean; and from him 
that is defiled no good man, nor god, can ever rightly receive gifts. Therefore all the great labor that 
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 Rogers (1968), p. 147. 
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 Romer (1994), p. 352. 
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 For an alternative ‘atheist’ interpretation of ‘the Melian fast’, see Whitmarsh (2016), p.185: 
Whitmarsh claims to detect a militant atheism by Diagoras in the dramatic literature of the 420s - 410s 
BC (e.g., Euripides’s Bellerophon & Aristophanes’s Birds) in which ‘the idea of aerial flight and armed 
combat against the citadel of Olympus’ recurs. 
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impious men spend upon the gods is in vain, but that of the pious is most profitable to them all. 
“(transl. R.G. Bury).80 
 
According to Plato (Laws, X, 885b), only pious persons can engage in ritual activity. 
Any sacrificial offering from a pious person (e.g., an atheist) causes more harm than 
service to the gods, because of the insincerity of such ritual action. Piety entails 
religiosity and this demands belief in the existence of the gods.81 Atheists cannot 
comply with this criterion and therefore, they should be shunned from any service to 
the gods, according to Platonic morality.82 
 
As a result, we might assume that cultic practices in ancient Greek religion were 
always attached to belief in the gods. Any ritual action could only have been 
meaningful if a (basic) belief in the existence of the gods was present.83 Those who 
denied the existence of the gods would not have had any need to venerate them by 
means of cultic practices and the lack of ritual activity by such deniers in surviving 
sources seems to corroborate this view. Other sources, such as Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia also acknowledge this principle. In passage 1.1.2., Xenophon informs us 
that the statement that Socrates did not believe in the gods was incorrect due to the 
fact that Socrates did sacrifice in honour of the gods and made use of divination as 
much as possible.  
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 Plato, Laws, IV, 716d-717a: ἁπάντων κάλλιστον καὶ ἀληθέστατον οἶµαι λόγων, ὡς τῷ µὲν 
ἀγαθῷ θύειν καὶ προσοµιλεῖν ἀεὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀναθήµασιν καὶ συµπάσῃ θεραπείᾳ θεῶν 
κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον καὶ ἀνυσιµώτατον πρὸς τὸν εὐδαίµονα βίον καὶ δὴ καὶ διαφερόντως 
πρέπον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τούτων τἀναντία πέφυκεν. ἀκάθαρτος γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ὅ γε κακός, 
καθαρὸς δὲ ὁ ἐναντίος, παρὰ δὲ µιαροῦ δῶρα οὔτε ’ἄνδρ᾽ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε θεὸν ἔστιν ποτὲ τό γε 
ὀρθὸν δέχεσθαι: µάτην οὖν περὶ θεοὺς ὁ πολύς ἐστι πόνος τοῖς ἀνοσίοις,  
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 Van Riel (2013), p. 15. 
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 Yunis (1988), p. 39. 
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Based on these sources, we can only conclude that the ritual act in ancient Greek 
religion could not be detached from belief in the gods. Therefore, the tenet that 
ancient Greek religion was in essence ritualist with no relevance to theological beliefs 
in the gods becomes difficult to sustain. 
 
7.4) ancient Greek religion and “the balkanisation of the brain” 
 
An intermediary position in the debate on ‘ritual’ and ‘belief’ within ancient Greek 
religion, however, could be the theory of la balkanization des cerveaux (“the 
balkanisation of the brain”), which was introduced by Paul Veyne in his book Les 
Grecs, ont-ils cru à leurs mythes?: Essai sur l'imagination constituante (1983). 
According to Veyne, different types of beliefs or convictions can coexist in a person’s 
mind independently of each other. This could explain why supposed atheists like 
Antisthenes, Democritus and Epicurus still promoted belief in the gods and cultic 
pratices despite their philosophical arguments against popular religion.84  
 
This paradox is believed to be based on the fact that religion and philosophy are both 
irreconcilable types of thought.85  It should, however, be observed that the mentioned 
‘atheists’, Anthisthenes, Democritus and Epicurus were no self-declared atheists, 
because they all developed alternative conceptions on the gods. In the case of 
Epicurus, ritual performance basically had a cohesive function on the social level, i.e. 
                                                      
84
 On Antisthenes, see Frede (2010), p.62-70: Based on testimonies by Philodemus (On Piety, P. Herc. 
1428, fr. 21) and Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 13 & 32, Antisthenes claimed that many gods 
only exist by convention (κατὰ νόµον), while one god exists by nature (κατὰ φύσιν). According to 
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popular belief and a rejection of civic cult. Frede nevertheless points out that the information of 
Philodemus and Cicero on Anthisthenes is derived from a lost Epicurean account on impiety in which, 
besides Antisthenes, the Stoics are the main focus of criticism. 
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the strengthening of communal life.86 In the apologetic work On Piety the Epicurean 
philosopher and poet Philodemus (ca.110- ca.35 BC) also stressed the respect 
Epicurus displayed for traditional religion. The presentation of the gods within 
Epicurean theology was mainly based on the same anthropomorphic features the gods 
possessed within traditional Greek religion.87 Philodemus, for example, mentions in 
his treatise On Gods that the Epicureans accept the existence of the gods of the 
Panhellenes and even believe that there are more gods.88 They also believe that the 
gods are gifted with reason and converse in the Greek language.89  
 
Besides, the theory of brain-balkanisation is primarily applicable to a Roman context 
and not as such to a Greek context.90 According to Denis Feeney, brain-balkanization 
must be primarily situated in the Post-Classical era and should be interpreted as 
different kinds of assent and criteria of judgment, which mainly the educated Roman 
elite applied in different contexts, to such extent that it may strike modern observers 
as being contradictory.91 This specific type of intellectual thinking can be detected 
especially during the period of the Late Roman Republic. The belief in three types of 
Roman theologies: a poetic, a civilian and a philosophical one, each with its own 
characteristics, according to Varro (40s BC), could be a representative case of brain-
balkanisation. Cicero’s treatise On the Nature of Gods is another example: the 
protagonist Cotta was a religious official, but also profiled himself as an Academic 
Sceptic, who organized a symposium with Epicureans and Stoics on the existence of 
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the Roman gods. The Academic Sceptic Cicero, on the other hand, fulfills the role of 
the neutral observer, who only reveals his philosophical preference (i.e. Stoicism in 
favour of Epicureanism) at the end of the treatise. During the whole debate, the 
Epicurean atomist Vellius and the Stoic Balbus cannot persuade pontifex Cotta with 
their arguments on the (in)existence of the gods, as Cotta himself clearly states: 
 
“I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that you put forward at the 
conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontiff. 
This no doubt meant that I ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down 
to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion. For my part I always shall 
uphold them and always have done so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall ever 
dislodge me from the belief as to the worship of the immortal gods which I have inherited from our 
forefathers. But on any question or religion I am guided by the high pontiffs, Titus Coruncanius, 
Publius Scipio and Publius Scaevola, not by Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius 
Laelius, who was both an augur and a philosopher, to whose discourse upon religion, in his famous 
oration, I would rather listen than to any leader of the Stoics.” (transl. H. Rackham).92 
 
This passage is generally regarded as an example of brain-balkanisation in the Roman 
intellectual mind of the Late Republic: the ambition to critically reflect on organized 
religion opposes the need to engage in religious customs and traditions.93 Charles 
King suggests a different approach on the existence of variations of Roman belief 
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without conflict and relates to this matter by use of the term ‘polymorphism’.94 
According to King, the Roman gods possessed a polymorphous character, which 
means that gods could manifest themselves by multiple names or aspects, based on a 
variable context of worship. Because of this diverse nature, variations or 
interpretations of belief did not conflict with one particular belief.95  
 
In the debate on Greek belief, however, the theory of polymorphism is not applicable. 
King admits that polymorphism is a unilateral Roman concept, by which the Romans 
were able to adopt Greek gods and myths and present these religious innovations as 
part of their own religious traditions, because of the variable nature of Roman 
religion.96 Consequently, the theories of brain-balkinisation and polymorphism are of 
little concern in the debate on ancient Greek ‘belief’ versus ‘ritual’ and deviant 
religious behaviour in ancient Greek society in general. 
 
7.5) conclusions 
 
The significance of ‘belief’ versus ‘ritual’ in ancient Greek religion remains to this 
day a heavily debated academic topic. Although the ritualist approach dominated 
classical studies during the 20th century, the early 21st century now seems to shift 
towards a non-ritualist approach in which the importance of ‘belief’ can no longer be 
denied.97 The common idea that ancient Greek religion had no creed and ‘belief’ did 
not exist outside a Christian context is gradually crumbling away in classical studies. 
The ritualist approach (cf. Robinson Smith and his idea of ‘fixed rituals’) stress the 
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importance of orthopraxy, but such view cannot explain changes within religion over 
time or what could have substituted any absence of ‘belief’.98 ‘Belief’ must be 
interpreted as a generic thought pattern without any attachment to a particular 
religious or cultural tradition. Moreover, ‘belief’ seems to operate as an inescapable 
precondition that gives intrinsic meaning and comprehensibility to any cultic activity. 
Without it, every ritual act would lack any underlying comprehension or meaning.99  
 
With this present consensus of an interaction between belief and ritual in ancient 
Greek religion in mind, we should be able to determine the perception and impact of 
deviant religious behaviour on ancient Greek communities and authorities. In the next 
chapter, we will focus on the organization of religious life in ancient Greece (and 
more precisely, classical Athens). This anaysis will display a large degree of 
symbiosis between Greek religiosity and sociopolitical life, which took the form of a 
communal religion that did not provide much room for personal expressions of 
religious experience. The same statement cannot be said of individual reflection on 
Greek religion, however. Already within the literary output of the Archaic period, 
traces of poetic reflection on the shortcomings of Greek religion can be detected. At 
the dusk of the Archaic period, poetic reflection would eventually take the form of 
critical (i.e. philosophical) reflection. Which aspects of Greek religion were actually 
under philosophical attack and how did Greek society respond to this new form of 
intellectual criticism? These questions will be the focal point of the following 
chapters. 
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Chapter 8: ancient Greek religion: a personal or communal experience? 
 
Now we have discussed how (ancient Greek) irreligious behaviour interacted with 
both the cognitive (‘belief’) and non-cognitive (‘ritual’) aspects of ancient Greek 
religion, we can focus on the public responses to irreligious behaviour. But, in order 
to do so, we must first determine how ancient Greek religion was organized.   
 
In this chapter, I will investigate if polis religion could be assessed a conceivable 
concept to define the organizational structure of ancient Greek religion in the 
Classical period. I shall combine this investigation also with an examination of polis 
religion as an efficient model to deal with deviant religious behaviour in the sense of 
(philosophical) speculation on the gods. 
 
It has become customary to believe that religious life in ancient Greece, at least in the 
Classical period, was controlled by the polis in all its aspects.100 The idea of a polis 
controlled Greek religion was defended by Walter Burkert in his classic work Greek 
Religion (1985).101 Burkert developed the idea –which was already suggested by A.B. 
Drachmann in his Atheism in Pagan Antiquity (1922)102– that the breakdown of 
ancient Greek religion was closely related to the decline of the polis at the dawn of the 
Hellenistic period.103 Burkert argued that Macedonian rule ended the principle of 
independence (autonomia) by which the polis system was largely structured. Due to 
the fact that he identified Greek religion inherent to the existence of the Classic city-
state, his concept of Greek religion could not sustain itself outside the sociopolitical 
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power structures of the polis. This dominant idea of a polis-controlled ancient Greek 
religion led to the conceptualization of ‘polis religion’ as coined by Christiane 
Sourvinou-Inwood in her articles Further Aspects of Polis Religion (1988) and What 
is polis religion? (1991).104  
 
In this model of a polis controlled religion, expressions of a personal religious 
experience are assumed to be lacking. The civic character of ancient Greek religion 
with its emphasis on the expression of piety in public life is believed to have resulted 
in a communal religion with practically no room for independent or individual cult 
activities.105 This concept of Greek religion being only survivable within the polis 
system has been recently challenged nonetheless.106 Based on the fact that many 
manifestations of Greek religion, such as Orphics with its emphasis on individual 
salvation, itinerary mantic art, curse tablets and spells fell out the communal and civic 
setting of a polis-controlled system and also relied on a more personal or private 
religious experience, a more diverse and pluralistic concept of Greek religious 
discourse that was not restricted to the bounderies of the civic city-state could be 
suggested. Supporters of a polis-controlled religion, on the other hand, have pointed 
out that the importance of personal cult activities (e.g., magic rituals) was minimal.107 
But the vast quantity of surviving curse tablets cannot dismiss this religious practice 
as being merely peripheral.108  
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However, the practice of private magic rituals may have been simply tolerated within 
the concept of polis religion as ‘bad (expressions of) religion’, on the condition that it 
did not develop into a dangerous social and religious behaviour, like the charges of 
performing pharmakeia (drugs or potions) in the impiety case of the priestess Theoris 
demonstrates.109 But not only dangerous forms of ‘bad religion’ may have been 
viewed as threatening to a polis-controlled religion. The concept of philosophical 
speculation on the nature of the gods also urged the communal expulsion of such 
‘deviant’ expressions of religious behaviour.110 Due to the predominantly public 
character of ancient Greek religion, critical reflections or alternative interpretations of 
organized religion were experienced as assaults on civic society.111 We do find 
evidence for such assumption in the psephisma of Diopeithes (438/7 BC) and the 
conviction of Diagoras (415 BC) by the Assembly.112 However, we should keep in 
mind that these arguments only apply to Athenian religion and not ancient Greek 
religion as a whole. Although we have epigraphical evidence from different regions of 
ancient Greece on the sanctioning of people who committed asebeia,113 we do not 
have any evidence that a legal procedure for the prosecution of asebeia existed 
outside of Athens.114 On the other hand, we are not informed that deviant religious 
behaviour formed a serious social threat in other Greek city-states than Athens in the 
Classical period. The few non-Athenian inscriptions on asebeia do not seem to 
suggest (philosophical) speculation on divine existence, but rather indicate minor 
(e.g., technical) trangressions against organized religion.  
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So far, we can presume that the concept of polis religion as a means to encompass all 
expressions of ancient Greek religiosity is faced with limitations, but represents 
nonetheless a plausible model to explain the social response to deviant religious 
behaviour. But do these assumptions uphold when we attempt a different, more 
generic approach to ancient Greek religion?  
 
Some scholars have argued that religion should be interpreted as a cultural system of 
language consisting of a set of signs and symbols.115 This allows communication 
between members acquainted with this specific ‘language’ to properly respond to the 
chaos and challenges of the external world. As such, a more symbolic interpretation of 
ancient Greek religion could provide some answers concerning the debate on ancient 
Greek religion, being principally a matter of ‘belief or ‘ritual’.116  
 
The importance of power structures within ancient Greek religion should not be 
overlooked, however, because they (re)generate this ‘religious language’ and its 
symbolic meaning. A clear example can be found in the recasting of tyrant property 
into ritual objects of worship by the Athenians after the restoration of democracy in 
403 BC.117 As the property originally represented the oligarchic power and individual 
wealth of the Thirty Tyrants, the transforming of these artifacts of processional use 
not only symbolically restored democratic rule and communal power but also the 
associating of tyrants with matters of impiety (cf. the killing of the supplicant 
Theramenes albeit the fact that he had sought refuge in a temple118).  
 
                                                      
115
 Geertz (1973), p. 99-108 & Gould (2001), p. 107. 
116
 Kindt (2012), 74-89. 
117
 Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 181). 
118
 Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.3.52-56. 
     129 
Sociopolitical power structures appeared to be closely related to the nature of ancient 
Greek religion, which was not based on a set of universal religious beliefs, but rather 
existed of a religious language (‘belief’) and cultic practices (‘ritual’) in which the 
social hierarchy (family groups and clans) of the city-state was being reflected. As 
ancient Greek religion cannot be interpreted as canonical like the Abrahamic 
religions, which are based on a set of beliefs (e.g., dogmata, creeds, Holy Scriptures) 
and a conscious lifestyle which distinguishes its adherents from any religious 
opponents119, it would be difficult to detect definite structures that determined ancient 
Greek religion.  It is usually interpreted as a system, comprising a common pantheon 
and cult practices which can be characterized by a common Greek identity (τὸ 
ἑλληνικόν)120.  In 4th century BC Athens, these cult practices existed of numerous 
sacrifices and rituals, commonly referred to as ‘ancestral practices’ (τὰ πάτρια), 
‘customary practices’ (τὰ εἰθότα) and ‘traditional rites’ (τὰ νοµιζόµενα).121 On the 
matter of the importance and maintenance of the rites and sacrifices, the orator 
Isocrates reports: 
 
“Our ancestors guarded against the elimination of any of the ancestral sacrifices and against the 
addition of any sacrifices outside the traditional ones. For they thought that piety consisted not in great 
expenditures, but rather in not charging any of those things which their ancestors had handed down to 
them.” (transl. G. Norlin).122 
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Such interpretation clearly corresponds with a polis-centered view on ancient Greek 
religion as a communal and collective endeavour. It was expected that every 
individual displayed piety (eusebia) in order to win the favour (charis) of the gods. 
For the Greeks, the correct method of winning the favour and respect of the gods was 
not the product of divine relevation, but was established by their ancestors in general 
terms and carried on for generations.123  
 
The individual that did not abide by the ancestral customs was considered “impious” 
(asebès).124 Impiety always implied a concrete behaviour or act.125 For instance, not 
participating in the ritual act or performing it in a wrong manner was considered 
impious. Moreover, as the passage of Isocrats indicates, ‘kainotheism’ or the 
introduction of new gods and rituals was also regarded as impious, since it altered the 
ancestral customs.126 The courtesan Phryne, for example, was accused of impiety for 
introducing the cult of a new deity.127 Similar was the case of Socrates, although Plato 
and Xenophon did emphasize in their writings that Socrates participated in traditional 
worship.128 The phenomenon of impiety or asebeia must therefore not be interpreted 
as a form of sin or heresy in the Christian sense, but rather as an offensive and 
provocative act against cultic practices and religious traditions that triggered divine 
anger and endangered the well-being of the city-state.129 
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In the light of these observations, the religious scandals of 415 BC can be mentioned: 
the deliberate mutilation of the Herms, in combination with the profanation of the 
Mysteries, was seen as an ominous affair that jeopardized the outcome of the Sicilian 
Expedition before the military operations even took place.130 These incidents would 
resume near the closing of the 5th century BC a period of increasing suppression of 
intellectuals, who were accused of deviant religious behaviour. Yet, Athenian society 
from ca. 430 BC on could already be associated with a religious crisis131 and a strong 
association of natural philosophy with moral relativism, as embodied by the character 
‘Socrates the Melian’ in Aristophanes’s Clouds.  This comical representation of a late 
5th century BC natural philosopher (with atomist and sophist elements) differed 
considerably from the general perception of any counterparts in the late 6th and early 
5th century BC. Natural philosophers, such as Xenophanes, Heraclitus and 
Empedocles, could also be associated with statements against traditional religion in a 
number of preserved verses, but this mainly concerned criticism on traditional 
mythology and anthropomorphism with the intent of accomplishing a more allegorical 
approach to these aspects of Greek polytheism. These early criticisms, however, do 
not appear to have caused much controversy or scandal at the time.132  
 
But this situation would change significantly in the second half of the 5th century BC. 
Natural philosophers like Anaxagoras and early sophists such as Protagoras are 
believed to have conducted in their prose writings a more scientific and methodical 
research on divine existence to such extent that it was experienced as a threat to the 
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foundations of civic religion and society in general.133 Their close relationship with 
the Periclean establishment almost certainly enhanced this sentiment.134 In this 
context, the psephisma (438/7 BC) of the seer Diopeithes must also be situated. The 
natural philosopher Anaxagoras most likely fell victim of this increasing religious 
intolerance as early as 437/6 BC, while the sophist Protagoras was banished from 
Athens ca. 422 BC for the opening lines of his Peri Theōn.135 Although both 
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intellectuals were (former) associates of Pericles, their nonconformist views on divine 
existence were quite unrelated and, therefore, the philosophical background of their 
impiety cases was dissimilar. But this is not the perception in Aristophanes’s portrayal 
of ‘Socrates the Melian’. In this character, Neo-Ionian elements (and even atomism) 
are merged together with sophist thought in order to personify the prototypical 
disbeliever in the gods. Aristophanes’s Clouds does not only specify that late 5th 
century BC Athenian society did not differentiate the nature of philosophical 
speculation on divine existence, it also reveals that such type of ‘religious relativism’ 
had to be physically removed from society. This is demonstrated in the final lines of 
Clouds (1472-1510): the protagonist Strepsiades is struck by remorse and renounces 
his belief in Dinos, the cosmic swirl. He then begs forgiveness to Hermes, who 
advices him to burn down the school (φροντιστήριον). Trapped in the burning building, 
‘Socrates the Melian’ and his followers are doomed to perish, but Strepsiades justifies 
his deeds by exclaiming the words: 
 
“Strike, smite them, spare them not, for many reasons, 
BUT MOST BECAUSE THEY HAVE BLASPHEMED THE GODS!” (transl. B.B. Rogers).136 
 
This violent conclusion of Clouds has often been described as being atypical for 
Greek comedy and it has evoked a scholarly debate whether this ending was genuine 
or only added in the revised edition of Clouds.137 The latter is possibly the case if we 
take the intensified negative perception of ‘atheist’ behaviour between 423 and 418 
                                                      
136
 Aristophanes, Clouds, 1508-1509: 
δίωκε, βάλλε, παῖε, πολλῶν οὕνεκα, 
µάλιστα δ᾽εἰδὼς τοὺς θεοὺς ὡς ἠδίκουν 
137
 See Konstan (2011)², p. 81-82 for an overview of this debate.  
     134 
BC into consideration. The brutal ending also indicates that Athenian audiences 
expected the explicit extermination of such expressions of irreligious behaviour.138 
 
For these reasons, intellectuals and philosophers must have been aware which forms 
of criticism were allowed.139 In all likelihood, they acted cautiously when interpreting 
or analyzing religious practices in order to avoid public outrage.140 It also appears that 
most intellectuals did not wish to be associated with atheism, although some 
intentionally provoked and stirred controversy in their analysis of religious 
practices.141 As will be demonstrated in the case studies of Diagoras of Melos and 
Theodorus of Cyrene, both philosophers openly attacked religious practices and 
probably viewed themselves as self-declared atheists.142 They are commonly depicted 
in ancient sources as being strange and unconvential characters and this undoubtedly 
reflected how contemporary Athenians experienced them. In the character of 
‘Socrates the Melian’ in Aristophanes’s Clouds (830), we even witness a strong 
association of Melos, as a place name, with atheism in the mind of Athenian theater-
goers.143  
 
The radical atheism of both philosophers was mainly a matter of ridiculing the 
Eleusinian Mysteries. This Athenian ritual with its emphasis on individual salvation, 
initiation and secrecy, fell beyond the control of polis religion.144 But, most likely, this 
lack of civic control was only related to the non-public aspects of the Mysteries. In the 
case of Diagoras and Theodorus, we have no indication that their atheist actions and 
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behaviour concerned the secretive aspects of the Mysteries. Moreover, ancient sources 
do attest the open and public character of their atheism and appear to relate these 
actions to the public aspects of the Mysteries.145 In both cases, Athenian authorities 
eventually intervened and publically condemned both intellectuals by means of 
impiety trials with consecutive death sentences. 
 
We can thus assume that ancient Greek (Athenian) religion did not preserve much 
room for individual experience. Due to its public and civic characteristics, ancient 
Greek religion was basically polis-orientated. But polis religion may on the other hand 
be a too restrictive concept to encompass all forms of Greek religiosity. Some forms 
of religious expression, such as curse tablets, spells or mantic art performed by 
itinerant practitioners, were not determined by a polis-controlled system.146 The same 
assumption, however, cannot be made of deviant religious behaviour in the form of 
(philosophical) speculation on the existence of the gods.147 Even if the reaction 
against it was the result of a personal opinion (e.g., Plato, Laws, X), the proposed 
method to deal with this type of irreligious behaviour was still a communal matter.148  
The negative response of Athenian society (cf. Aristophanes, Birds and Pseudo-
Lysias, Against Andocides) to this phenomenon in the late 5th century BC fully 
endorses the idea that the polis organized the prosecution of nonconformist religious 
behaviour by means of democratic institutions (Assembly, dicasteries) and a set of 
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legal procedures (eisangelia, graphè and endeixis) in order to diminish the threat such 
actions posed to the fundamentals of civic religion and piety.  Perhaps this 
determination to do so is best illustrated by the definition of ancient Greek religion by 
Christiane Sourvinou-Ingwood: 
 
‘Greek religion is, above all, a way of articulating the world, of structuring chaos and 
making it intelligible; it is a model articulating a cosmic order guaranteed by a divine 
order which also (in complex ways) grounds human order, perceived to be incarnated 
above all in the properly ordered and pious polis, and providing certain rules and 
prescriptions of behaviour, especially towards the divine through cult, but also 
towards the human world.’149 
 
The function of the polis was thus twofold: generating religious authority by 
organizing and structuring religious life on a communal level, but it also generated 
social authority by means of political institutions in order to represent the social body 
of citizens. In this way, the divine and human world merged together and reflected 
what was believed to be the natural way.150 Therefore, any transgression against civic 
religion and piety was perceived as an attack on civic society as well, because it 
endangered the natural way of human life. The impiety cases of Socrates and 
Diagoras are probably the most supportive examples herein.151 Even the reform of the 
system of asebeia-trials (e.g., the passing of legal authority from the dikasteria to the 
Areopagus) in the 4th century BC did not fundamentally change the attitude of the 
Athenian community. Transgressions against civic religion and piety in general were 
still recognized as harmful behaviour that endangered the communal well-being and, 
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for that reason, it had to be exorcised. The impiety case of Theodorus of Cyrene is a 
clear example of this policy. 
 
Chapter 9: ancient Greek religion and its criticisms 
 
The vast majority of Greek intellectuals must have been alert to the fact that 
philosophical speculation or scientic research on the nature of the gods could result in 
public consternation. Paradoxically enough, the Greek gods, as conceptualized within 
traditional Greek religion, were particularly vulnerable to intellectual criticisms.  
 
I will investigate in the now following chapter two distinctive characteristics of 
ancient Greek religion, namely extreme anthropomorphism and the unpredictability of 
divine justice. These features were not only the topic of early criticisms due to their 
inconsistent nature, but also evoked alternative approaches to divine existence with 
the main intent of improving the existing Greek religious experience. However, civic 
society in ancient Greece may not have always experienced these intentions as such. 
The degree of rejection or acceptance of these innovative views by Greek society will 
therefore be analyzed correspondingly in the sections of this chapter.  
 
Anthropomorphism and theodicies were already the topic of poetic reflection (cf. 
Theognis, Solon) in archaic literature, but also caused intellectual criticisms from 
early Presocratic thought (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles) from the late 6th 
century BC on. The criticisms of the latter do not seem to have caused much 
controversy at the time.152 A possible explanation might be the fact that the writings 
of these early philosophers on the nature of the gods were primarily perceived as 
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poetic and allegorical contemplations by Greek society.153 Moreover, early natural 
philosophers, such as Xenophanes, were even approached by pious citizens on matters 
of religious advice.154 This situation changed, however, in the second half of the 5th 
century with the arrival of a new generation of natural philosophers (Anaxagoras and 
Diogenes of Apollonia) and the emergence of sophist thought (Protagoras). Not only 
was critical reflection on the nature of the gods now being carried out by means of 
prose writings (cf. Protagoras’s Peri Theōn), but it would also be characterized by a 
much more scientific and methodical approach.155  
 
At the same time, Greek society experienced these new forms of philosophical 
speculation on the nature of divine existence as increasingly threatening. The 
introduction of asebeia- legislation in the 430s BC in order to counter these threats 
seems to embody this religious fear. Anaxagoras was now charged with impiety 
because he defended a reductionist view on the divine nature of the heavenly bodies, 
while Protagoras was supposedly banished from Athens, because he no longer took 
the existence of the gods for granted. Socrates, on the other hand, was accused of 
kainotheism, because his belief in daimonion as a personal divine agent was regarded 
as a means to introduce new deities and cults in Athens. Although these philosophers 
would not consider themselves to be impious persons or disbelievers concerning the 
existence of the gods156, their personal opinions did not automatically reflect the 
perception of civic society.   
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But let us now tackle the main research problem of this chapter by concentrating on 
Greek anthropomorphism and divine justice as catalyzing factors for the earliest forms 
of intellectual criticisms on ancient Greek religion. The question ‘How did these 
criticisms become a growing concern for civic society?’ will form another thread 
throughout this analysis. 
 
9.1) the problematic nature of Greek anthropomorphism  
 
One of the most characterizing features of ancient Greek religion was its polytheistic 
nature, dominated by the actions of personalized, anthropomorphic gods. The Greek 
gods intervened in human life and its future by the concept of divination.157 Although 
the gods were perceived as supernatural, immortal beings, their anthropomorphic 
nature was to be taken quite literally.158 According to ancient sources (Homeric 
Hymn, 2.310-314, Aristophanes, Birds, 186), the gods could even starve to death if no 
sacrifices were being provided by worshippers.159 The Greek gods were also not 
considered to be the creators of the universe, in contrast to the monotheistic 
Abrahamic religions. They were more associated with different aspects of the 
universe and elements of nature.160  
 
Their anthropomorphic nature, as depicted in traditional mythology, made the Greek 
gods particularly vulnerable to human passions and desires, mostly of an immoral 
sort, which contrasted with their supposed function as role models or upholders of 
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divine justice.161 The god Hermes, for example, was venerated throughout Athens by 
means of specific monuments, called Herms. These stone pillars, which consisted of 
the bearded head of Hermes and a fully carved erect phallus162, were placed at 
crossroads and street corners in order to protect passers-by or at the entrance of 
buildings with the purpose of averting any intrusion by unauthorized persons. But 
traditional mythology (cf. The Homeric Hymn to Hermes) also depicted Hermes as a 
scoundrel and a thief. This discrepancy between the emphasis on negative aspects of 
the gods’ anthropomorphism within traditional mythology, and their highly valued 
nature as protective spirits in cultic practices led to early forms of criticisms and 
alternative conceptions on divine existence.  
 
These criticisms would be initiated by the early Ionic naturalists, who mainly attacked 
the extreme anthropomorphism of the gods that had been shaped by traditional poetry. 
Homer, for instance, frequently made use of the concept of theomachia (θεοµαχία), 
which implies the idea of mortals challenging the gods. In numerous lines in The 
Iliad, men physically contest the gods, like Diomedes fighting Apollo (V, 431-435) 
and even wounding Aphroditè (V, 530) and Arès (V, 859). This resistive attitude of 
certain mortals to the gods was basically a result of their extreme anthropomorphism. 
This demanded a constant justification of their immortal distinction (ἀθάνατον ἀρετήν) 
and supernatural power (δύναµις) in their interaction with mortals.163  
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Albert Henrichs argues similarly in his recent article What is A Greek God? (2010) by 
attributing three distinct features to the concept of a Greek god: (a) immortality, (b) 
divine power (dunamis) and (c) anthropomorphism.164 Henrichs relates the extreme 
anthropomorphism of the Greek gods in archaic literature to the importance of 
epiphanies in the Greek religious experience. The manifestation of a certain deity in 
dreams or visions demanded a clear physical presentation in order to properly interact 
with mortals. This distinct physical profile in epiphanies also enabled the Greeks to 
recognize the individual gods and led to the earliest forms of Greek cult images. 
These epiphanies could sometimes be problematic, however. Their humanized nature 
made the gods sometimes unpredictable: gods could deceive mortals by adopting 
other anthropomorphic appearances than their own. Examples of these so-called 
‘divine disguisings’ are quite common in Greek poetry (e.g., The Iliad, III, 395ff., in 
which the goddess Aphrodite approaches Helen in the appearance of an old wool-
comber). 
 
But, even if the gods presented themselves in their actual humanized form to mortals, 
they still took a chance of not being recognized or accepted as gods. The theomachos 
Pentheus in Euripides’s Bacchae, for example, does not accept the young man, who 
wants to introduce the cult of Dionysus in Thebes, to be the actual god Dionysus and 
even has him incarcerated. Only Dionysus’s dunamis eventually makes the difference.  
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This ambiguity and flexibility in anthropomorphism is a common feature in the idea 
of Greek gods as cultural constructs and illustrates the complex, inconsistent and 
paradoxical nature of their identity. Although they were regarded as powerful and 
immortal entities, their anthropomorphism demanded a continuous interaction with 
mortals in dreams, visions, in order to affirm their divine status. Robert Parker has 
coined this condition ‘Gods at Work’.165  Henrichs formulates this condition even 
concisely: ‘[I]n fact most Greek gods were hard at work to justify their existence and 
prove their divinity’.166  
 
The highly personalized and anthropomorphic identities of the gods would 
nevertheless remain a problematic issue within ancient Greek religion. Due to their 
close association with human actions and behaviour, Greek gods had to be identified 
by means of distinctive humanized constructs. This evolution is believed to have 
originated in (Homeric) poetry and accordingly found its way into art and cultic 
practices, although this is now believed not to be a unique Greek phenomenon, since 
analogies can be found in other anthropomorphic pantheons such as the Hetitte 
Pantheon in the Near-East.167 
 
The characterizing anthropomorphic nature of the Greek Gods, as developed by 
Homer and Hesiod, could become more logical once we relate it to reciprocity, which 
is the principle and practice of voluntary requital.168 Archaic Greek societies evolved 
around the principle of reciprocity in order to establish socioeconomic ties between 
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individuals and groups.169 Because of the key function of ritual within ancient Greek 
religion, the purely anthromorphic characterization of the Greek gods could have been 
constructed deliberately by Homer and Hesiod in order to conform the Greek gods to 
the principle of reciprocity. This idea of attaching the gods to sacrificial duties, 
comparable to a contractual bond, would eventually be criticized from an intellectual 
point of view. Especially Theophrastus rejected the idea of sacrifice on a contractual 
basis, because it diminishes the due respect to the gods as superior beings.170  
 
Other theories, however, relate the origin of divine anthropomorphism to the 
importance of physical strength in Homeric society.171 Rulers display their physical 
strength in order to implement respect, similar to the way Zeus dominates the other 
gods by means of brute force.172 The obligations to kinsmen are therefore believed to 
be an important element in the depiction of gods in Homeric society.  
 
As early as late 6th century BC, these contradictions and inconsistencies in Greek 
anthropomorphism seem to have triggered the earliest forms of critical reflection by 
intellectuals, although we could witness already some form of ‘reduced’ 
anthropomorphism as early as Hesiod, who substituted the perception of Zeus as a 
compulsive adulterer in Theogony for a more abstract sky-god who upholds celestial 
justice.173   
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Late 6th century BC intellectual reflection was nonetheless closely connected to 
criticism on Greek mythology, which was believed to be the creative force behind 
anthropomorphism. Ca. 500 BC, Hecataeus of Miletus, one of the earliest Greek 
historiographers, already described in the opening lines of his Genealogies how the 
stories about the Greek gods appeared silly to him.174 Xenophanes of Colophon (ca. 
570 - ca. 475 BC) would nevertheless be the first philosopher to fundamentally 
question Greek anthropomorphism by recommending a more balanced polytheism, 
governed by a supreme God, whom he envisioned as an all-knowing, eternal and all 
moving being with no comparison to man in body and mind175.  
 
According to some scholars, Xenophanes could have imagined the Great God to be of 
spherical shape and identical to the physical universe, but this might be a faulty 
view.176 Despite his attacks on anthropomorphism, Xenophanes can hardly be 
identified with atheism or even monotheism. Xenophanes envisioned most likely a 
more sophisticated understanding of Greek polytheism. In this light, the term 
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‘adevism’ (a term first coined by F.M. Müller in 1889, which refers to the denial of a 
popular notion of religion) is more suitable to describe the nature of Xenophanes’s 
criticisms on Greek anthropomorphism.177  Regarding the latter, the most known 
fragments by Xenophanes are: 
 
“If oxen and horses (and lions) had hands or could draw with their hands and accomplish such works as 
men, horses would draw the figures of the gods as similar to horses, and the oxen as similar to oxen, 
and they would maked the bodies of the sort which each of them had.” (transl. J.H. Lesher).178  
 
“Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black; Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-
haired.” (transl. J.H. Lesher).179 
 
In these criticisms of Xenophanes of popular religion, we may witness one of the 
earliest attempts in Greek philosophy to substitute popular religion by means of a 
philosophical theology. The radical rejection of anthropomorphism has nevertheless 
given Xenophanes the reputation of being the originator of ancient Greek atheism (in 
the etic sense of the wording).180 However, Xenophanes most likely did not intend to 
deny the existence of the gods, but only wished to demonstrate the impossibility of a 
physical or anthropomorphic presentation of the gods.181 The fact that Xenophanes 
envisioned the distinction between gods and men to be intransgressible is 
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demonstrated by an anecdote from Aristotle’s Rhetoric (2.23.27)182: when the citizens 
of Elea address Xenophanes with the request whether they should mourn the deceased 
Leucothea as a citizen or sacrifice to her as a goddess, Xenophanes advises them not 
to mourn her if they thought her a god and not to sacrifice if they thought her a mortal. 
So, the citizens of Elea must decide categorically of the status of the deceased 
Leucothea. Xenophanes does not acknowledge any hybrid form.  
 
But the passage also illustrates Xenophanes’s firm conviction that men cannot partake 
in divinity, in contrast to the opinions of other (Presocratic) philosophers such as 
Parmenides and Empedocles. Although Xenophanes believed that gods and humans 
have fundamental similaties (e.g., ‘bodies’ and cognitive capacities), the nature of 
these similarities are different to such degree that man never can ‘become god’.183 
These differences might also explain why Xenophanes did not believe in divination, 
because the strict bounderies between gods and humans imply the impossibility of any 
communication.184 Still, the gods in Xenophanean thought should be venerated in the 
most respectful way by means of pious action, and a first step in the right direction 
(according to Xenophanes) is the abandonment of any ascribed human characteristic 
or behaviour to the gods. 185 
 
Xenophanes’s ideas on Greek anthropomorphism did not represent an exceptional 
standpoint within Presocratic thought, however. The early philosopher and 
mathematician Pythagoras (ca. 570 – ca. 500 BC) also rejected the physical 
                                                      
182
 Three similar versions of the anecdocte are also reported by Plutarch (=DK 21 A13): On Loving, 18, 
12 (763d), On Isis and Osiris, 70 (379b) & On Superstition, 13 (171e). 
183
 Warren (2013), p.311. 
184
 Cicero, On Divination, I,3. See also Lesher (1992), p. 153. 
185
 Xenophanes (DK 21 A14-18). See also Lesher (1992), p. 85-86, 49-155 & Warren (2013), p. 311-
312. 
     147 
presentation of deities in a human (cf. the Greek pantheon) or animal form (cf. the 
Egyptian pantheon), based on the argument that divine existence can only be 
perceived by the mind.186 The natural philosopher Heraclitus (floruit ca. 500 BC) in 
return rejected the unseemliness of Mysteries and phallic cults, associated with 
Dionysus, as an inappropriate way to venerate the gods187, while the natural 
philosopher Empedocles (floruit ca. 450 BC) rejected the anthropomorphic 
presentation of the gods. Empedocles argued that a divine being is pure mind without 
any humanlike form, so it cannot be seen by human eyes or touched by human 
hands.188 This statement appears to indicate that, like Pythagoras, Empedocles also 
rejected any veneration of the gods by means of idolatry189 and such assumption is, 
most likely, also applicable to the theological views of Heraclitus.190 
 
But later Socratic thought would also incorporate Xenophanes’s criticisms on extreme 
anthropomorphism and traditional mythology.  Plato’s Socrates in The Republic (II, 
377a-378e), for instance, rejects inappropriate forms of traditional mythology (such as 
Hesiod’s account on the castration of Uranus by Chronus) in regard to the education 
of children. The idea of gods fighting and plotting against each other was assessed as 
being incompatible to Socrates’s idea of a harmonious state.  
 
Aristotle also connects a rejection of anthropomorphism with a negative view on 
mythology. In Metaphysics 12, 1074b, Aristotle argues that early Greek religion only 
venerated the heavenly bodies as gods, based on the belief that divinity pervades the 
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whole of nature, but a later tradition added the element of mythology, which 
influenced the masses and functioned as a constitutional and utilitarian condition.  
 
Still, it remains mostly imprecise how the gods of popular belief should be visualized 
in Socratic thought once traditional mythology no longer plays a key function in their 
presentation. Is their corporeal appearance identical to the heavenly bodies or are they 
divine (incorporeal) reflections of Plato’s Demiurge or World-soul? The answer may 
lie in Timaeus (41a): the gods can present themselves in any shape they desire.191 
They can present themselves as traditional gods (in the shape of the anthropomorphic 
gods of traditional worship) or as celestial gods, in the form of the heavenly bodies.192 
Their divine nature allows them to present themselves in the form of their own 
preference. 
 
After Plato, ideas on the physical appearance of the gods were more distinctive, 
however. The Epicureans were convinced that anthropomorphism (as perceived in 
traditional Greek religion) was a quintessential feature of the gods.193 Because the 
gods were considered to be living beings (zoia) with a blessed and carefree existence, 
they had to be endowed with a physical appearance which allowed them to experience 
joy and happiness.  The Epicureans also believed that anthropomorphism enabled the 
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gods to converse with each other (in Greek).194 The Stoics, on the other hand, would 
identify the Greek gods in accordance with Plato’s Phaedrus (246e-253c) with (the 
movement of) celestial phenomena, like the planets and the stars. Stoic theology 
would also reject the traditional anthropomorphism of the gods, because such 
presentation could not comply with the divine quality of perfection.195 
 
It appears that, from the early Ionic naturalists on, different intellectual attempts were 
made to remodel the anthropomorphic presentation of the Greek gods, as perceived by 
traditional mythology, with the main intent of conforming them to a more 
sophisticated ‘cosmological’ theology. This leads us to the question to which degree 
these innovative ideas on traditional anthropomorphism found their way to the 
religious experience of everyday life.  
 
Modifications to traditional worship were not easily accepted by Greek society. When 
the natural philosopher Anaxagoras (ca. 500 – ca. 428 BC) reduced the personalized 
sun to a mass of red-hot metal, he was the first philosopher to be charged with impiety 
in Athens.196 The later naturalist Diogenes of Apollonia (floruit 425 BC), who 
claimed that Zeus was identical to the element air, is believed to have been accused of 
similar charges.197 
 
The discussion on the (non-) anthropomorphism of the gods would definitely remain 
vibrant in Athens during the ‘religious crisis’ of the late 5th century BC, with the 
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impiety case of Socrates in 399 BC as a clear example. According to the prosecutor 
Meletus, the charges of ‘corrupting Athenian youth’ and ‘not acknowledging the gods 
of the state’ revealed Socrates as a disbeliever in the gods, because he would have 
declared to Athenian youth that the personalized sun and moon were mere stone and 
earth.198 Socrates, in response, remarks that Meletus is actually prosecuting 
Anaxagoras based on such allegations, and that Athenian youth should not turn to 
Socrates for such (‘silly’) teachings, because they can easily purchase the doctrines of 
Anaxagoras for a drachma from a booth in the orchestra. The claim of Meletus does 
nonetheless demonstrate that late 5th century BC Athenian religious conservatism 
could interpret a nonconformist interpretation of traditional anthropomorphism of the 
gods as an expression of ‘disbelief in the gods’ (θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν)199, even if these 
doctrines were believed to be common and widespread, especially among youth.200 
The context of Apology (26c-d) does acknowledge this assumption. 
 
But any alteration to the anthropomorphism of the gods of traditional religion was not 
the only form of critical religious reflection that encountered a negative response from 
Greek society. The impiety case of Socrates also reveals another troublesome 
relationship with traditional Greek religion when it is being related to the third official 
charge (‘introducing new deities’).201 This actually involved another aspect of 
traditional religion that underwent early criticisms, namely the conventional approach 
to the concept of theodicy. That is, the idea that the gods carry out justice in the form 
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of punishment. This would also confront (early) Greek intellectualism with many 
inconsistencies. 
 
9.2) the problematic nature of Greek theodicies  
 
The relationship between gods and mortals, as depicted within archaic literature, was 
often a matter of contradiction. This can be demonstrated, for example, by The Iliad, 
III, 350-365. In this passage, Menelaus makes a prayer to Zeus to grant him the killing 
of Paris. The plea seems justified in the eyes of Menelaus, since he was wronged by 
Paris for well-known reasons. But when all his attempts fail suspiciously, a grieved 
Menelaus calls Zeus the most baleful of all gods, because the king of the gods 
obviously obstructed the killing of Paris. These events further unfold in the third book 
when the goddess Aphroditè demands Helen to go visit Paris in order to celebrate his 
rescue by Zeus (by means of the humiliation of Menelaus), but Helen feels offended 
by this request and addresses the goddess with the following words (406-407), which 
in response anger the goddess: 
 
“Go thou, and sit by his side, and depart from the way of the gods,  
neither let thy feet any more bear thee back to Olympus;”(transl. S. Butler).202 
  
These specific lines illustrate the difficult relationship between the Greek gods and 
mortals. The latter can experience their dunamis as a whimsical and shameful form of 
divine justice. This is nevertheless a recurring theme in the literary ouput of the 
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 ἧσο παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ἰοῦσα, θεῶν δ᾽ ἀπόεικε κελεύθου, 
µηδ᾽ ἔτι σοῖσι πόδεσσιν ὑποστρέψειας Ὄλυµπον, 
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Archaic period and it might have been instigated by the absence of well-developed 
legal systems within Homeric societies.203 This absence seems to have justified the 
existence of anthropomorphic deities, who performed a chaotic and irrational form of 
divine justice.204 In archaic literature, we can therefore substitute ‘divine justice’ on 
many occasions with ‘divine arbitrariness’.205 Such notion is confirmable in Greek 
poetry from the 8th to the 6th century BC by means of a fatalistic view on the human 
condition: the life of mortals is characterized by misery and illness, combined with 
divine unpredictability.206 Due to the fact that ancient Greek religion was unfamiliar 
with the notion of opposing forces to the gods (e.g., God versus the devil), the 
misfortune that men befell was, for example, explained by two pithoi from which 
Zeus selected good and bad things that were bestowed upon mortals.207  
 
In contrast to this pessimistic view on the whimsical nature of divine justice, we also 
witness the presence of a more optimistic view in archaic literature. In Hesiod’s 
Works and Days, for instance, divine justice is not arbitrary, but usually takes the 
form of a theodicy, namely divine punishment that is being evoked by (deliberately) 
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inappropriate behaviour of mankind. Hesiodic theodicies can be explained as being 
part of the heavenly justice of Zeus: the gods monitor mortals who commit crimes and 
injustice through a system of “immortal spies in the service of Zeus to watch over 
mortal men’” (Works and Days, 452-453). 
 
In the elegiac poems of the Athenian reformer Solon (ca. 638 – ca. 558 BC) the 
problem of divine justice also takes the form of a theodicy. Similar to Hesiod, Solon 
also applies an optimistic and ‘creative’ approach to the subject. In Solon’s opinion, 
wicked behaviour is always punished by divine justice, but the latter may be 
postponed for reasons unknown to man. This can give the impression that wrongdoers 
escape divine punishment, but “Zeus never forgets”: 
 
“but Zeus surveyeth the end of every matter […] even such is the vengeance of Zeus; He is not quick to 
wrath, like us, over each and every thing, yet of him that hath a wicked heart is He aware alway 
unceasing, and such an one surely cometh out plain at the last. Aye, one payeth to-day, another to-
morrow; and those who themselves flee and escape the pursuing destiny of Heaven, to them vengeance 
cometh alway again, for the price of their deeds is paid by their innocent children or else by their seed 
after them.” (transl. J.M. Edmonds).208 
 
As the end of the passage indicates, Solon’s approach to the concept of theodicy also 
explained what appeared to be unjustified misery that befell innocent people. If these 
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 Solon, Elegy 13. 17-32 (West):  
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος, […] 
τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις, οὐδ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ, 
ὥσπερ θνητὸς ἀνήρ, γίγνεται ὀξύχολος: 
αἰεὶ δ᾽ οὔ ἑ λέληθε διαµπερές, ὅστις ἀλιτρὸν 
θυµὸν ἔχῃ, πάντως δ᾽ ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη: 
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ µὲν αὐτίκ᾽ ἔτεισεν, ὁ δ᾽ ὕστερον: οἳ δὲ φύγωσιν 
αὐτοὶ µηδὲ θεῶν µοῖρ᾽ ἐπιοῦσα κίχῃ, 
ἤλυθε πάντως αὖτις: ἀναίτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν 
ἢ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω. 
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persons were the descendants of evildoers (e.g., Gyges), theodicies would take the 
form of a hereditary curse.  
 
But, in spite of these idealistic views on theodicies, some authors in archaic literature 
did notice the discrepancy between divine justice and the reality of daily life.209 The 
gods could always punish the righteous and reward the wicked with impunity for no 
logical reason. Such poetic reflection on the inconsequent behaviour of Greek 
theodicies can be observed in the elegies of the lyric poet Theognis of Megara (ca. 
mid 6th century BC). In Elegy 741-752, for example, Theognis laments on the passive 
and unresponsive nature of the gods in regard to acts of human injustice: 
 
“I say, would that this were the Gods' pleasure; but alas, the doer escapeth and another beareth the 
misfortune afterward. Yet how can it be rightful, O King of the Immortals, that a man that hath no part 
in unrighteous deeds, committing no transgression nor any perjury, but is a righteous man, should not 
fare aright? What other man living, or in what spirit, seeing this man, would thereafter stand in awe of 
the Immortals, when one unrighteous and wicked that avoideth not the wrath of God or man, indulgeth 
wanton outrage in the fulness of his wealth, whereas the righteous be worn and wasted with grievous 
Penury?” (transl. J.M. Edmonds).210 
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 Theognis of Megara, Elegy, 741-752:  
ταῦτ᾽ εἴη µακάρεσσι θεοῖς φίλα: νῦν δ᾽ ὁ µὲν ἕρδων 
ἐκφεύγει, τὸ κακὸν δ᾽ ἄλλος ἔπειτα φέρει. 
καὶ τοῦτ᾽, ἀθανάτων βασιλεῦ, πῶς ἐστι δίκαιον, 
ἔργων ὅστις ἀνὴρ ἐκτὸς ἐὼν ἀδίκων 
µήτιν᾽ ὑπερβασίην παρέχων µηδ᾽ ὅρκον ἀλιτρόν, 
ἀλλὰ δίκαιος ἐών, µὴ τὰ δίκαια πάθῃ; 
τίς δή κεν βροτὸς ἄλλος, ὁρῶν πρὸς τοῦτον, ἔπειτα 
ἅζοιτ᾽ ἀθανάτους, καί τινα θυµὸν ἔχων, 
ὁππότ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἄδικος καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, οὔτε τευ ἀνδρὸς 
οὔτε τευ ἀθανάτων µῆνιν ἀλευόµενος, 
ὑβρίζῃ πλούτῳ κεκορηµένος, οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι 
τρυχῶνται χαλεπῇ τειρόµενοι πενίῃ; 
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In this passage, Theognis accuses the gods of acting in a reverse manner: they strike 
pious persons with punishment and reward the impious with benevolence. In verses 
373-782, Theognis repeats this thought pattern by stating how Zeus can endure to 
keep wrongdoers in the same position as the just man.   
 
This idea of arbitrary divine justice supports the idea of the Greek gods being 
‘Stronger Ones’ (Homer, The Iliad, IX, 496) in comparison to mortals, because they 
always maintained a natural superiority over humans, comparable to the way 
Mycenaean warlords ruled over their subjects with impunity.211 A consequence of 
such relationship was the fact that divine justice was in first instance a matter among 
gods and their kin that secondly descended upon mortals212, but this was never 
guaranteed due to the unpredictable temperament the gods displayed in their 
reciprocal relationship with humans. Even if prayers, libations or other forms of rites 
were performed flawlessly, gratitude or support of the gods towards mortals was 
never assured. 213   
 
Once the Greek world developed into more legally regulated societies (i.e. the rise of 
the poleis and polis religion), theodical ideas may have become less determined by 
such fatalistic views, but the general idea that Greek societies were particularly 
vulnerable to divine punishment when being inconsiderate to forms of deviant 
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religious behaviour may have kept common belief in theodicies substantial and 
probably instigated the prosecution of individuals for impiety.214  
 
Within early Presocratic thought, the matter of theodicies is nevertheless tackled, 
mainly by the natural philosopher Heraclitus (floruit ca. 500 BC). In his opinion, 
traditional views on divine justice were not only distorted by the inconsistencies in 
Hesiodic anthropomorphism215, but by traditional worship as well. The latter entails 
too much irrationality when addressing divine existence.216 According to Heraclitus, 
divine justice is characterized by indifference to human passions and desires. Zeus 
remains unresponsive to all forms of traditional worship.217 This may result in a 
human perception of Zeus being merciless and violent, but this is actually resulting 
from the human inability to comprehend the Logos of Zeus: divine justice coincides 
with the order of the universe, which is determined by the ongoing conflict between 
opposites (e.g., Dikè versus Strife).218 Misery that befalls men should not be ascribed 
to a capricious form of divine justice, but reflects the natural order of things.219 It is 
inherent to human nature to distinguish justice in terms of just and unjust actions220, 
but divine justice is not a matter of right or wrong.  Divine justice is always fair and 
just.221 Whatever humans experience as injustice is simply a matter of ignorance 
regarding the Logos of Zeus. 
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Clearly, Heraclitean thought challenged traditional Greek theodicies, but not to a point 
that it actually propagated disbelief in the gods. Some scholars have nonetheless 
suggested that the emergence of atheism in ancient Greek society was actually a 
philosophical response to the ancient problem of theodicy.222 Without a doubt, the rise 
of disbelief in the gods in the second half of the 5th century BC cannot be ascribed to a 
single cause, but the concept of theodicy was certainly changelled by those who Plato 
(Laws, X, 885b) labeled ‘atheists’ (literally ’those who do not believe in the existence 
of the gods’). In the so-called ‘atheist argument’ in Plato’s Laws (X, 888b-889e), a 
(fictious) atheist youngster dismisses the gods and justice as inventions of human 
convention.  David Sedley has recently summarized this extensive ‘atheist argument’ 
in a concise diagram that visualizes the ‘atheist’ theory on the origins of the gods and 
(divine) justice most adequately:223 
 
The atheist’s genealogy of gods  
(descending arrows =causation 
descending lines=species) 
 
NATURE (PHYSIS) AND CHANGE (TUCHÈ) 
(the four elements, their patterns of motion) 
 
 
THE WORLD, ANIMALS, PLANTS, SEASONS ETC 
 
. 
     CRAFTS 
 
 
 
serious crafts       non-serious crafts 
(nature-based)      (fictive, non-truth-attaining) 
 
 
medicine  farming  gymnastics  a bit of   painting  music  most politics   legislation 
                     politics                     (nomos) 
               
          
         Justice          GODS 
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Most likely, the ‘atheist younster’ of Plato must have been influenced by the so-called 
‘immoralists’ Callicles and Thrasymachus. The latter was a sophist filosopher (floruit 
ca. 400 BC) who especially contested the concept of justice by stating that the gods 
are not interested in any implementation of justice.224 Therefore, he could be 
categorized in Plato’s second type of ‘impious persons’ (Laws, X, 885b), namely 
‘those who think that the gods take no care of men’ or the ‘deists’. The later deism of 
the Epicureans would also reject theodicies, and the idea of divine intervention in 
human life altogether, because this would interfere with the belief that the gods lead a 
carefree existence in the so-called intermundia.225  
 
But the concept of theodicy in Plato’s writings is nonetheless more complicated than 
the problem of divine justice, since it is also related to the ‘origin of evil’. It would be 
far beyond the scope of this subsection of the dissertation to analyze Plato’s views on 
this relationship exhaustively. Instead, we can summarize it more briefly, based on 
key passages from different dialogues dealing with this matter.226 For instance, Plato 
would perceive the Greek gods as perfect upholders of moral truth by claiming that 
they are incorruptible to any form of ritual bribe (Laws, X, 885b), undoubtedly 
because they cannot perform any other characteristic than goodness (The Republic, II, 
379a & Theaetetus, 151d). Therefore, the existence of evil could no longer take the 
form of a traditional theodicy, like the story of Pandora’s jar in Hesiod’s Works and 
Days (47-105), but had to be situated on another level. In Timaeus (48a & 86d-86e), 
Plato claims that evil is caused by Necessity, the disorderly motion behind matter. 
This condition existed before creation and it already operated beyond any control by 
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God(s). Consequently, evil has no divine origin, but must be situated on the level of 
altering conditions of corporeality.    
 
But the concept of daimones, which Plato (Symposium, 202d-203a) interpreted as 
intermediary agents between gods and mortals, offers a different solution to the 
problem of theodicy.227   The existence of daimones was already known in archaic 
literature: Homer used the term to refer to gods, who manifest themselves in a 
mysterious manner, whereas Hesiod identified daimones as ‘protective spirits’.228  In 
Plato’s writings, we also find references to daimones in the meaning of ‘personal 
protective spirits’. In Apology, for example, Socrates defended himself of different 
charges of asebeia, of which kainotheism or ‘the introduction of new gods’ involved 
his belief in the concept of a personal divine guidance, called daimonion.229 This must 
be regarded as a form of inner voice or alarm of divine origin.230 But daimonion is not 
related to the external interference of a (traditional) god; it is the result of a private 
divine force that resides within a person.231 This idea can already be traced back to the 
natural philosopher Empedocles, who believed that man possesses a portion of 
divinity, which enables him to become an immortal god by improving his divine 
‘inner strength’ (φρήν).232 
 
The philosopher Xenocrates, a pupil of Plato and head of the Academy between 339 
and 313 BC, further elaborated on Plato’s idea of daimones being intermediary agents 
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or messengers between gods and men. For instance, Xenocrates related the nature of 
both daemones and humans to the nature of the gods, based on the order of triangles: 
the ‘perfect’ equilateral triangle symbolizes the ‘unmixed’ and ‘uncontaminated’ 
nature of the gods, while the ‘lesser perfect’ isosceles triangle represents the 
daemones and the ‘imperfect’ scalene triangle mankind.233 But Xenocrates also 
innovated the concept of daimones by claming that, similar to mankind, daimones can 
display diverse degrees of virtue (ἀρετή) and of vice (κακία).234 By arguing so, 
Platonist thought solved the problem of theodicy: injustice and evil are not of divine 
origin, but result from the impetuous nature of both daemones and mankind. 
According to Plutarch’s On Isis and Osiris (25), the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus 
also endorsed this idea, next to the Neo-Pythagoreans and the Neo-Platonists. 
 
But the idea of bad daimones itself is not sufficient to explain the Stoic opinions on 
the problem of theodicy. The Stoics actually related this problem to the distinction 
between ‘moral evil’ and ‘cosmological evil’.235 The former (e.g., theft, murder) is the 
responsibility of man, while the latter (e.g., hunger, disease, natural disasters) is an 
inevitable consequence of the providential activities of the Stoic ‘God’ in the physical 
universe. This will always result in some inevitable amounts of collateral damage. But 
the existence of this type of evil might also serve a beneficial purpose. For instance, 
the Stoic God can impose war on men, but with the sole intent of solving the problem 
of overcrowded cities.236 Moreover, this type of ‘chaotic’ evil also alarms man to 
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undertake certain actions: the irritation from bedbugs wakes people up and the 
presence of mice in households acts as a warning to avoid untidiness.237 
 
In concluding this section on Greek theodicies, we may assume that the concepts of 
divine justice and the origin of evil remained problematic before the arrival of 
Heraclitean and Socratic thought. The latter managed to acquit the gods from any 
moral responsibility on these matters. Later Hellenistic philosophical schools would 
further elaborate on these ideas, but, once again, the question remains to which extent 
these innovative views on the problematic nature of Greek theodicies were integrated 
in the religious experience of daily life. Based on the impiety case of Socrates in 399 
BC on the charge of ‘introducing new deities’ (i.e. the idea of daimonion), the answer 
might be strictly negative. Actually, the influence of these philosophical ideas on 
Greek theodicies was not felt until late Antiquity, when the theories of Xenocrates on 
the existence of good and bad daimones were adopted by Christian theologians. It 
allowed the depreciation of polytheistic deities to the status of bad demons who 
symbolized ‘wickedness’ and ‘sin’ against the will of God.238  
 
We have now discussed the origin of critical reflection on traditional Greek religion, 
based on two distinctive characteristics that were susceptible to (early) intellectual 
criticisms. We can conclude that already from an early period on Greek intellectuals 
(i.e. poets and philosophers) suggested different ideas and methods to counter the 
inconsistencies of anthropomorphism and divine justice in traditional Greek religion. 
Despite their efforts, we have no indication that the Greek religious experience of 
everyday life was ever affected by these poetic reflections or intellectual criticisms in 
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a significant way. Moreover, the perception of Greek societies in regard to these 
religious reflections and proposals appears to be overall negative, as further research 
in this dissertation will demonstrate.  
 
We will now continue our attention in the next chapter on the impact and perception 
of deviant religious behaviour in Greek societies and this by means of the specific 
terminology that referred to (ir)religious behaviour.  In other words, this will require 
an extensive analysis of those ancient sources dealing with Greek expressions of 
(im)piety and (dis)belief. These expressions appear in many different contexts and 
seemed to have undergone various semantic shifts over time, as will be demonstrated 
in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 10: Greek expressions of (ir)religious behaviour 
 
As mentioned earlier in this part of the dissertation, the ancient Greeks did not possess 
a separate word for ‘religion’.239 Instead, religious matters were expressed in terms of 
‘piety’ (εὐσέβεια) and ‘honouring the gods by paying respect to them’ (σεβέσθαι τοὺς 
θεοὺς).240 The degree of respect by which gods were approached was consequently a 
determining factor whenever ancient Greeks discussed their own religious traditions 
or those of neighbouring cultures.241  
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Because of the ubiquitous presence of religion in ancient Greece, belief in the gods 
must have been taken for granted.242 This mind set was reflected in the expression 
θεοὺς νοµίζειν, which could be translated as “accepting the gods in the normal way”243 
The phrase θεοὺς νοµίζειν thus expresses the normal approach, in terms of civic 
obligations, towards the gods as the basis of any religious activity. But the verb 
νοµίζειν did not escape the academic debate of ‘belief’ versus ‘ritual’ throughout the 
20th century. It remains to a certain degree inconclusive whether the intrinsic meaning 
of νοµίζειν, as a derived verb from νόµος, related to ‘worshipping’ or ‘believing’.244  
 
The most recent studies seem to argue now in favour of a cognitive meaning 
(‘believing in (the existence of) the gods’) of the expression θεοὺς νοµίζειν, although 
examples of a non-cognitive approach still exist.245  In analogy with the previous 
chapter and based on a comparative analysis of ancient sources, I will argue that the 
Greek expressions for (im)piety and (dis)belief must be interpreted from a cognitive 
approach. Such assumption, however, does not exclude the element ‘ritual’ altogether: 
ritual activity was also embedded in expressions such as θεοὺς νοµίζειν. Although the 
basic meaning most likely referred to ‘belief’, ‘ritual’ appeared to be the verification 
or visible proof that ancient Greeks did ‘believe’ and displayed piety towards the 
gods.246 
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10.1) the concept of εὐσέβεια 
 
According to the ancient Greek mind, the noun εὐσέβεια and related verbs such as 
σεβέσθαι τους θεοὺς expressed the correct way to approach the gods.247 Both 
expressions contain the meaning of ‘respect’ and ‘fear’ since they can be derived from 
the Indo-European root seb- (meaning, “to retreat in awe”).248  
 
This early Greek religious idea that respect for the gods was closely associated with 
fear and danger was generally interpreted as a guarantee that people would lead a 
virtuous life.249 Eusebeia (literally ‘the appropriate way to retreat in awe’)250 itself 
represented ‘piety’, but its exact content remained rather vague and undefined until it 
was conceptualized into five distinctive characteristics in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro 
(12e-14a). Although eusebeia only entailed reverence to the gods in the Archaic Age, 
the concept was nonetheless further extended to reverence for parents and the dead in 
the Classical period.251  
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Piety within ancient Greek religion could entail many aspects of reverence, but 
mainly, it came down to preserving the ancestral customs (τὰ πάτρια).252 This can be 
observed in the speech Against Nicomachus by Lysias from the late 5th century BC. In 
passage 18-19, Lysias states that, 
 
“But of course, gentlemen of the jury, we are not to be instructed in piety by Nicomachus, but are 
rather to be guided by the ways of the past. Now our ancestors, by sacrificing in accordance with the 
tablets, have handed down to us a city superior in greatness and prosperity to any other in Greece; so 
that it behoves us to perform the same sacrifices as they did, if for no other reason than that of the 
success, which has resulted from those rites. And how could a man show greater piety than mine, when 
I demand, first that our sacrifices be performed according to our ancestral rules,” (transl. W.R.M. 
Lamb).253 
 
The concept of eusebeia was also closely related to the upholding of divine and 
human nomoi to such extent that this became an indispensable condition for being 
considered εὐσεβής, as Sophocles (Electra, 1095-1097) reports.254 
 
A similar mind-set can be found in Lysias (fragment V Gernet & Bizos), who 
describes the impiety of Cinesias and his fellow poets in terms of ‘displaying their 
contempt for the gods and the laws’.255 The due respect and fear for the gods, as an 
essential aspect of εὐσέβια, was thus also embedded in the concept of νόµος, as 
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Xenophon’s Memorabilia (4.4.19) indicates. In this particular passage, the sophist 
Hippias declares to Socrates that,  
 
“I think that the gods made these laws for men. For among all men the first law is to fear the gods.” 
First, it is customary for men to fear the gods.” (transl. E.C. Marchant & O.J. Todd).256 
 
It should, however, be observed that Sophocles connects εὐσέβεια with the adjective 
νόµιµος whereas Lysias and Xenophon relate their notion of εὐσέβεια to a close 
connection with the noun νόµος. Martin Ostwald tackled this issue and argued that 
Greek adjectives and verbs like νόµιµος and νοµίζειν originally referred to the 
performance of religious rites and practices, while νόµος tended to imply general 
regulations and restrictions concerning religious matters.257 Whereas Aeschylus’s 
Seven Against Thebes, 333-335 from 467 BC still applies νόµιµος in the sense of 
religious rites, Sophocles’s Electra, 1095-1097 from ca. 410 BC makes use of νόµιµος 
in the sense of a proper pious behaviour. So, both the adjective νόµιµος and the noun 
νόµος implicated a correct religious behaviour in relation to εὐσέβεια from the late 5th 
century BC on.  
 
The related expression θεοὺς νοµίζειν has underwent a similar evolution in meaning:  
this idiom becomes synonymous with an appropriate pious conduct from the mid-fifth 
century BC on and no longer refers to the general meaning of ‘having respect for the 
gods’, like it is the case in its earliest appearance, namely Aeschylus’s Persians (497) 
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from 472 BC.258 In this specific passage, a negative form of the expression θεοὺς 
νοµίζειν is contraposed to the verbs εὔχεσθαι (“to pray”) and προσκυνεῖν (“to implore”) 
and relates to the historical context of the defeated Persian fleet after the Battle of 
Salamis. The Persians pray to the gods in order to sail homewards, but the looting of 
temples during their military campaign in Greece has demonstrated that they hold no 
esteem for the Greek gods or the religious patrimony of the Greeks in general.259  
 
As early as ca. 440 BC (Herodotus’s Histories, IV, 59,1), the expression θεοὺς νοµίζειν 
develops a more concrete meaning of ‘respecting the gods’. Herodotus discusses the 
religious traditions of the Scythian people by relating θεοὺς νοµίζειν in close 
connection to the verb ἱλάσκεσθαι (“to appease”). Like the related noun νόµος and 
adjective νόµιµος, θεοὺς νοµίζειν now represents a pious behaviour that is based on fear 
and awe for the gods.  
 
As a result, the expression θεοὺς νοµίζειν corresponds more directly to the concept of 
εὐσέβεια and functions as a synonym for the less common σεβέσθαι τους θεοὺς, in the 
same way that its antithesis θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν will express, from the late 5th century 
BC on, irreligious behaviour that is recognized by the concept of ἀσέβεια.260 
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10.2) the concept of ἀσέβεια  
 
While εὐσέβεια stood for a respectful approach towards the gods, ἀσέβεια261 represented 
the opposite behaviour.262 However, it should be observed that asebeia did not 
function as an exact antonym to eusebeia. Eusebeia mainly had a descriptive 
meaning, reflecting the religious norm in terms of respect and appropriate behaviour 
towards the gods, while asebeia predominantly entailed a prescriptive meaning: 
anyone who transgressed a certain (religious) regulation was to be considered 
‘impious’.263  
 
Similar to all other kinds of sacrilege, asebeia was regarded as a form of religious 
pollution (miasma) in man’s relationship to the gods that demanded purification. In 
contrast to other forms of sacrilege, which mostly involved minor religious offences 
(e.g., technical errors) against the gods, asebeia was a severe form of religious 
pollution since it involved a deliberate sacrilegious act that made the whole 
community susceptible to divine wrath.264 Aeschylus’s Seven against Thebes (344), 
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for instance, cites that “Arès polluted reverence” (µιαίνων εὐσέβειαν Ἄρης), indicating 
that even the gods of popular belief could contaminate eusebeia. 
 
A concrete description of the concept of asebeia is being specified in the pseudo-
Aristotelian treatise Virtues and Vices:  
 
Transgression in regard to gods and spirits, or even in regard to the departed and to parents and 
country, is impiety. (transl. H.Rackham).265 
 
Supplementary sources such as Pseudo-Demosthenes’s Against Neaera (59 & 116) 
indicate that performing rituals incorrectly was also considered an act of asebeia.266 
Hyperides’s For Euxenippo (6) identifies asebeia as a crime against “sacred 
institutions” (περὶ τὰ ἱερά).  
 
Concrete forms of asebeia could therefore be very diverse, such as killing supplicants, 
entering temples without permission, using wood from sanctuaries as fuel but also 
parodying mystery cults and holding unorthodox opinions about the gods.267 It should 
however be stressed that impiety always implied a certain behaviour or act.268 
Although holding the wrong opinions about the gods appears to be a theoretical 
example of asebeia, it did actually imply an act, since the noticeable characteristics of 
θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν to Greek society primarily involved a non-performance of ritual 
activity.269 To the pious religious mind, all these acts contested the whole of ancestral 
customs, as can be read in Pseudo-Lysias (Against Andocides, 8), in which the author 
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compares the alleged participation of Andocides in the religious scandals of 415 BC 
with “an absence of ancestral laws”. As the passage illustrates, impiety in the late 5th 
century and early 4th century BC, became more applicable to the context of offending 
ancestral customs, ridiculing or shamelessly imitating revered ceremonies. 
 
10.3) θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν (εἶναι) and θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) ἡγεῖσθαι (εἶναι) 
 
Next to the (less familiar) phrase σεβέσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς, θεοὺς νοµίζειν is the common 
expression used by ancient Greeks to refer to religious matters and duties. A quick 
observation will indicate that the expression is composed of the verb νοµίζειν, 
accompanied by the masculine plural form of the noun θεός in the accusative case. 
The exact meaning and translation of νοµίζειν (“to believe”? or “to worship”? or “to 
acknowledge” in order to entail both ‘belief’ and ‘worship’?270 ) and how this relates 
to θεοὺς has been a matter of debate throughout the 20th and early 21st century. The 
earliest occurrence of the expression θεοὺς νοµίζειν (Aeschylus’s Persians (497) from 
472 BC) does not really facilitate the matter, because the expression (most likely as a 
synonym of σεβέσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς) only appears to have had a general meaning in the 
sense of “honouring the gods” at that point in time.271    
 
Regarding the debate on θεοὺς νοµίζειν and similar expressions, such as θεοὺς νοµίζειν 
εἶναι and θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι, θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι and their negative variants, the most 
extensive research has been done by Burnet (1924), Taylor (1926), Tate (1936 & 
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1937), Fahr (1969), Guthrie (1971), Ostwald (1986), Yunis (1988), Giordano-
Zecharya (2005) and Versnel (1990 & 2011).272 
 
In this chapter, I will untertake an attempt to analyze the semantic evolution of the 
phrase θεοὺς νοµίζειν and its negative forms and by doing so, I wish to disprove some 
of the older arguments. But first, our research will demand a short semantic analysis 
of the verb νοµίζειν without any accompanying noun. 
 
In a fragment (13, Lobel-Page) from the lyric poet Alcaeus from ca. 580 BC, we can 
locate the earliest occurrence of the verb νοµίζειν, which at the time had the meaning 
of ‘to be accustomed to’.273  
 
In Theognis’ Elegiac Poems, I, 141 & 279 from ca. 540 BC, we can already witness a 
new meaning of νοµίζειν in the sense of ‘to consider’, ‘to think’. Theognis is also the 
earliest source in which νοµίζειν is accompanied by a noun in the accusative cause. In 
passage I, 279, the neutral plural τα δίκαια (“what is right”) accompanies the cognitive 
meaning of νοµίζειν (“to consider”), while the neutral plural µάταια (“idle things”) in I, 
141 accompanies νοµίζειν (“to think”) in close connection with εἰδέναι (“to know”).     
 
The double meaning of νοµίζειν becomes much more prominent from the Histories of 
Herodotus on. According to Powell, the verb νοµίζειν appears 71 times in Histories in 
the sense of ‘to consider’ or ‘to believe’, next to 36 appearances in the sense of ‘to be 
accustomed to’ or ‘to use customarily’.274 Perhaps the most interesting and discussed 
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passage from Histories on the interpretation of νοµίζειν, is IV,59,1, in which the 
double meaning of νοµίζειν is exemplified. In this paragraph, Herodotus discusses 
Scythian religious traditions: 
 
“The most important things are thus provided them. It remains now to show the customs which are 
established among them. The only gods whom they propitiate are these: Hestia in particular, and 
secondly Zeus and Earth, whom they believe to be the wife of Zeus; after these, Apollo, and the 
Heavenly Aphrodite, and Heracles, and Ares. All the Scythians worship these as gods; the Scythians 
called Royal sacrifice to Poseidon also” (transl. A.D. Godley).275 
 
Godley rightly translated νενοµίκασι as “(they) worship”, considering the context of the 
passage (i.e. the nearby presence of θύειν). This was also the opinion of Fahr.276 But 
quite different is the case with νοµίζοντες due to the nearby presence of ἱλάσκεσθαι (“to 
propitiate”). This suggests a non-cognitive context and Fahr did indeed translate it by 
means of the German verb huldigen (“to celebrate”), even though Powell considered 
this present particle form of the verb νοµίζειν to have cognitive meaning.277 I tend to 
follow Powell on this matter: we are dealing here with the (cognitive) acceptance of 
Earth as the wife of Zeus, so there is no reason to atrribute a ritual meaning to 
νοµίζοντες .  In general, Fahr seems reluctant to associate νοµίζειν as early as Herodotus 
with cognitive meaning, but Fahr wrongly dismisses the existence of a generic 
cognitive meaning of νοµίζειν from Theognis and Herodotus on, besides the fact that 
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the majority of occurrences of νοµίζειν in Histories must be interpreted in a cognitive 
sense. 
 
Another critical remark concerning Fahr’s arguments about νοµίζειν deals with his 
choice to only attribute cognitive meaning to the expression θεοὺς νοµίζειν from 423-
421 BC on, based on Aristophanes’s Clouds (423) and Euripides’s The Suppliants 
(723). Fahr argues that this change in meaning, in contrast to earlier non-cognitive 
occurrences of the phrase (e.g., Sophocles’s Oedipus Tyrannus (254, 663 & 1360 & 
Euripides’s Andromache (491)) can be explained by the now close relationship 
between (un)belief in the gods and (un)belief in divine justice under sophist 
influence.278 The detectable presence or absence of divine justice in human life is thus 
considered to be a necessary expedient for (un)belief in the gods. So, the supposed 
non-cognitive meaning of θεοὺς νοµίζειν did only change suddenly in the early 420s 
BC, according to Fahr. 
 
This ‘sudden shift’ in meaning is, in my opinion, more related to a semantic 
evolution: from a generic cognitive meaning in Histories (IV, 59,1: ‘recognizing the 
gods’) in ca. 450 BC to a more specific cognitive meaning in the sense of  ‘believing 
in the gods’ in the 420s BC, θεοὺς νοµίζειν could already have had the implication of 
‘(not) acknowledging divine existence’ in the 430s BC under naturalist influence.279  
Fahr neglected this possible semantic evolution, by relying too much on the opinions 
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of Burnet for interpreting the meaning of νοµίζειν in Herodotus’s Histories as 
exclusively non-cognitive.280 
 
The interpretation of θεοὺς νοµίζειν by Burnet in the sense of “to worship the gods” 
was generally accepted for a substantial period of time, but it is now largely 
refuted.281 According to Burnet, θεοὺς νοµίζειν must be associated with “worship” 
because it refers primarily to religious practice (τὰ νοµιζόµενα).282 Taylor followed 
Burnet by translating θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν similarly as (“(not) conforming to the 
cultus”)283 and argued that, based on Plato’s Apology (26b), Socrates’s irreligion was 
of a practical nature, not a theoretical in the sense of “not believing in the gods”.284 In 
other words, these translations point towards a ‘ritualist’ translation of θεοὺς νοµίζειν. 
The matter is however more complicated, due to the fact that Burnet believed to detect 
a difference between θεοὺς νοµίζειν (“to worship the gods”) and θεοὺς νοµίζειν εἶναι (“to 
believe that the gods exist”).285 Indeed, this latter phrase has a purely cognitive 
meaning, as the inclusion of εἶναι rules out any ritual meaning.286 According to Burnet, 
the negative expression should be interpreted as ‘disbelief’, which is restricted to 
‘nonconformity in religious practice, not unorthodoxy in religious belief’.287 
 
The problem, however, remains that Burnet & Taylor did not exactly specify what can 
be understood by ‘nonconformity in religious practice’. Guthrie reports on the matter 
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the following: ‘It may be claimed that all that was necessary was conformity with 
cult-practices, and that thought was free’. 288 As Guthrie states, the religious praxis 
could have been the determining factor in designating atheist behaviour. From this 
point of view, theoretical atheism could have existed freely beside ritual action, as 
Drachmann already argued.289 One could be a disbeliever in the existence of the gods, 
but still participate in sacrificial ceremonies. But we do not possess any ancient 
evidence to corroborate the idea that self-declared atheists still performed ritual 
practices.290 Moreover, it is unlikely that (non)conformity in ritual action was 
disconnected from any notion of (dis)belief.291 Both aspects of Greek religiosity 
cannot be separated, as ‘belief’ acts as a prerequisite of any religious praxis.292  
 
In my opinion, this concept of ‘nonconformity in religious practice’ can only be 
interpreted in two ways. Either it concerns a non-performance of religious practices 
due to disbelief or it involves an altered ritual performance, which was experienced as 
criminal or offensive by the religious community. Concerning this last example of 
nonconformity, one can mention Lysias’s depiction of Cinesias and his “Devotees of 
the Bad Daemon”. The parodying of the Mysteries in 415 BC could also be mentioned 
as a deliberate attempt to alter rituals. In this case, the Mysteries were believed to be 
shamelessly reenacted in private houses with the attendance of non-initiates.293 
Traditional Athenian society reacted with a combination of anger and fear, not only 
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because these deliberate acts were experienced as particular sacrilegious, but because 
they also endangered divine protection on the eve of the Sicilian Expedition.294.  
 
In the case of Andocides, we have clear indications that ‘disbelief’ was deemed to be 
responsible for his ‘nonconformity in religious practice’, as Pseudo-Lysias (VI, 19) 
reports that Andocides “made it plain to all Greeks that he does not believe in the 
gods” (ἐπεδείξατο δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὅτι θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζει), because of his trangressive 
behaviour against “sacred things” (τα ἱερά).295 But Andocides could not avoid divine 
punishment, since the prosecutor further reports that, after years of voyaging at sea, 
“the deity was enticing him” (ὁ δὲ θεὸς ὑπῆγεν αὐτόν) to return to Athens in order to be 
prosecuted. In a comparable manner, belief in the gods in Euripides’s The Suppliants 
(732) is reaffirmed, as soon as divine justice has been experienced. The concept of 
divine justice is thus connected to belief in the gods, similar to the way disbelief is 
related to the inescapability of divine wrath.296 
 
After Burnet & Taylor, the ritualist approach in regard to θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν was 
mostly abandoned due to the extensive research by Tate and Fahr, but Manuela 
Giordano-Zecharya revived it in her article As Socrates Shows, The Athenians Did Not 
Believe in Gods (2005). This author claimed that Plato still made use of a non-
cognitive meaning of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν in Apology. For example, Giordano-Zecharya 
argues that the expression θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν in Apology, 24c is used by the prosecutor 
Meletus in a ritual context and should be translated as “(Socrates) does not worship 
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the gods the city worships, but other new deities.”  One could remark in defence of 
this argument that Meletus’s accusation could indeed refer to the (common) Athenian 
fear that Socrates was secretively introducing a new, foreign cult.297  
 
But thus is not a plausible interpretation, for different reasons. First of all, referring to 
θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν in an exclusively non-cognitive sense had become uncommon in the 
early 4th century BC, since the expression was already frequently used in a cognitive 
meaning from 423 BC on.298 Secondly, Tate and Fahr already argued persuasively 
that θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν and θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν εἶναι always have cognitive 
meaning in Plato’s writings and can be used interchangeably.299 The addition or 
omission of εἶναι has no distinctive function. And thirdly, the main purpose of Plato’s 
Apology is to demonstrate that Socrates was not an atheist, and this primarily demands 
the refutation of any disbelief in the gods by Socrates.300 Any indication that Socrates 
was not performing sacrificial duties to the gods is only of secondary importance to 
Plato, because this would be a logical implication of his disbelief.  
 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia, on the other hand, does not aim to counter the supposed 
atheism of Socrates, but intends to disprove the allegations that Socrates was impious 
with regard to Athenian religion.301 This is not only achieved by the expression θεοὺς 
(οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν in a combined cognitive and non-cognitive sense302, but also by a 
strong focus on a ritual context. For instance, Xenophon concentrates in passage 1.1.2 
on to the public offerings Socrates performed (θύων […] ἐπὶ τῶν πόλεως βωµῶν), while 
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passage 1.2.64 emphasizes his service to the gods (θεραπεύων τοὺς θεοὺς). In 
Xenophon’s Apology of Socrates, the contextual use of θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν is 
similar: paragraphs 10 to 11 focus on the sacrificial activities of Socrates during 
public festivals and on public altars (θύοντα ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δηµοσίων 
βωµῶν). Only when Xenophon is distinctly referring to the beliefs of Socrates, do we 
find the cognitive expression θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν εἶναι. This is the case in 
Memorabilia (1.1.5) where Xenophon discusses Socrates’s beliefs in the context of 
his ‘confidence in the gods’ (πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς).  
 
According to Giordano-Zecharya, the latter passage proves that Xenophon was 
directly influenced by (what she coins) ‘Plato’s semantic turn’.303  This term would 
represent the idea that Plato introduced in Apology the expression θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) 
νοµίζειν εἶναι in a cognitive sense in contrast to θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν. She argues that 
Plato deliberately circumvented the ritual meaning of θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν, used by 
the prosecutor Meletus (Apology, 24c), in the defence of Socrates (Apology, 26c) by 
the addition of εἶναι. By omitting any ritual context in his defence, Socrates can defend 
himself more easily against the charge that concerns orthopraxy. It also forces 
Meletus to prove that Socrates was guilty of ‘not believing in the existence of the 
gods’, in stead of ‘not worshipping to the gods’. Socrates can easily disprove the 
former, based on his belief in daimonia.304  
 
This appears to be a strange theory, because one of the official charges (‘the 
introduction of new deities’) of Meletus in Apology, 24c did concern Socrates’s belief 
in a personal daimonion. Even if Meletus only referred in this charge to the (secretive) 
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worship of unofficial gods, it still implied that Socrates believed in such deities. So, 
shifting the focus from ‘ritual’ to ‘belief’ by a ‘Platonic innovation’ would not have 
added any value to the defence of Socrates. Besides, Plato always applies a cognitive 
meaning to the interchangeable expressions θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν (e.g., Apology, 18c, 
24c & 35b, Euthyphro, 3b & Symposium, 202d) and θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν εἶναι (e.g., 
Apology, 26c, 27c & 29a & Laws, X, 886a).305  
 
But, most of all, it is inaccurate to assume that a cognitive meaning of θεοὺς νοµίζειν 
εἶναι was introduced by Plato, as the phrase already appears with cognitive meaning in 
earlier sources than Plato’s Apology. In the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred 
Disease (I, 9 = VI, 360,4 Littré) from ca. 415 BC, the oldest use of νοµίζειν θεοὺς εἶναι 
can be found. In this specific passage, the author compares self-declared healers with 
impiety and disbelief in the gods, due to the fact that they pretend to possess superior 
knowledge over nature that, in contrast to the gods, enables them to cure illnesses by 
means of purfications and lustrations: 
 
“They appear to me to practice impiety, and either to fancy that there are no gods, or, if there are, that 
they have no ability to ward off any of the greatest evils. (transl. C.D. Adams)” 306 
 
Based on these arguments, we can now dismiss the theory of Giordano-Zecharya that 
Plato introduced the cognitive meaning of θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν by the addition of 
εἶναι.  We may also conclude that there are no reasons to revive the ritualist approach 
regarding θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν: Tate already demonstrated that in Plato’s Apology 
θεοὺς νοµίζειν and θεοὺς νοµίζειν εἶναι can be used synonymously for the expression 
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‘believing in the existence of the gods’.307 In Laws, both expressions are applied 
interchangeably.308 The same can be said of the expressions θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι and θεοὺς 
ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι.309 The phrase θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι first appeared in Euripides’s Hecuba (800-
802), a play from 424 BC in the meaning of “believing in the gods (as determined by 
custom)”.310 Except for one appearance in Aristophanes’s Knights (32), θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι 
only appears in Euripidean drama before being adopted by Plato in Apology (27d) and 
Laws, X, 899c-d, 900b & XII, 948c. The expression θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι is a variant 
that has been introduced by Plato in Laws, X, 885b & 899d. It is most important to 
observe that the verb ἡγεῖσθαι always has a cognitive meaning and therefore cannot be 
associated with any ritual context. 311 
 
But, overall, the problem of any ritual meaning of θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν is the fact that 
it always remains rather vague and speculative. Tate already realized the difficulty of 
Taylor’s interpretation of θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν as “(not) paying the gods the honour 
due to them”, because it is in contrast with the accusation of atheism in Plato’s 
Apology 26b-c & 27b-d. 312 Besides, a man who was unable to perform ritual services 
to the gods, due to circumstances, was essentially liable to Taylor’s interpretation of 
θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν, although he might have been been very remote from any notion 
of atheism. Such assumptions cannot be the case if θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν is translated 
based on the indictment of Socrates in Apology.  
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Moreover, a ritual interpretation of θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) νοµίζειν is not in accordance with 
Plato’s perception of piety and authentic religiosity: both necessitate a correct 
conception of the gods.313 Plato specifies this by connecting the cognitive expression 
θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι to the concept of εὐσέβεια.314 This connection is further unfolded in the 
classification of three different types of asebeis or ‘impious persons’ (Laws, X, 885b). 
All types involve a specific disbelief in the gods (Laws, X, 885d). The first type, 
namely the atheists, will demand proof of the existence of the gods by means of the 
phrase διδάσκειν ὡς εἰσι θεοί (“to demonstrate that there are gods”). This expression is 
repeated on different occasions in Laws (cf.: 888a, 905d, 907b) as an atheist argument 
against belief. In a similar way, the second type of atheists (namely, the deists, who 
are convinced of the idea that the gods do not interfere in human affairs) will demand 
proof of divine justice and the third type (the traditional theists, who bribe the gods by 
means of sacrifices and prayers) will demand proof that the gods are immune to 
bribes.315   
 
It became also uncommon in the late 5th century BC that the expression θεοὺς (οὐ/µὴ) 
νοµίζειν simply referred to “(not) worshipping the gods”. For example, in 
Aristophanes’s Clouds (423-426) from 423 BC θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν can be clearly 
interpreted as “not believing in the gods”, because Strepsiades’s disbelief in the Greek 
gods renders any prayer or sacrifice to them redundant.316 Another example is the plea 
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Against Andocides by Pseudo-Lysias, which must be dated in 400 BC. The religious 
zealousness of the author and his clear antipathy for the orator Andocides, who stands 
trail for his alleged role in the defamation of the Herms and the Mysteries in 415 BC, 
would not correspond with the meaning of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν (in paragraph 19) as a 
mere “not worshipping the gods in a conventional way”. In paragraph 17, Pseudo-
Lysias regards Andocides as a manifest promoter of disbelief in the gods in such a 
way that he is considered even more impious in act than the notorious atheist 
Diagoras of Melos was in speech.  
 
Despite these observations, the views of Burnet and Taylor proved to be influential 
for a substantial period of time. Kenneth J. Dover, for instance, tried to reconcile the 
opinions of Burnet and Tate by taking an intermediate position and translating θεοὺς 
οὐ νοµίζειν by “to accept (to treat or practise) the gods in the normal way”.317 In the  
study by Wilhelm Fahr is the influence of Burnet nevertheless still noticeable, 
especially in his assessment of the meaning of the verb νοµίζειν in Herodotus’s 
Histories. However, Fahr did recognize a cognitive meaning of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν from 
Aristophanes’s Clouds (423) from 423 BC and Euripides’s Suppliants (732) from 421 
BC on. He argued that, from that moment on, θεοὺς νοµίζειν became connected with 
the problem of divine justice and accordingly with the debate on the existence of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
γλῶτταν, τρία ταυτί;  
(Στρεψιάδης)  
οὐδ᾽ ἂν διαλεχθείην γ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς τοῖς ἄλλοις  
οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀπαντῶν:   
οὐδ᾽ ἂν θύσαιµ᾽, οὐδ᾽ ἂν σπείσαιµ᾽, οὐδ᾽  
ἐπιθείην λιβανωτόν. 
(Socrates) “Now then you agree in rejecting with me the Gods you believed in when young, and my 
creed you’ll embrace “I believe in wide space, in the Clouds, in the eloquent Tongue.” (Strepsiades) If I 
happened to meet other Gods in the street, I’d show the cold shoulder, I vow. No libation I’ll pour: not 
one victim more on their altars I’ll sacrifice now.”) (transl. B.B. Rogers).  
317
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gods. Fahr related this evolution to the emergence of the sophist movement, which 
caused a fundamental crisis within ancient Greek religion.318 
 
But perhaps this evolution in meaning of θεοὺς (οὐ) νοµίζειν must even be placed 
earlier in time.  In his monograph From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of 
Law (1986), Martin Ostwald argued that this evolution in meaning was actually the 
result of a process of legal actions and democratic reforms, which already began 
during the government of Cleisthenes. These actions gradually corroded the 
traditional meaning of nomos by which Athenian aristocracy had always identified 
itself.  Based on literary and epigraphical sources, Ostwald concluded that ca. 450 BC 
the original descriptive meaning of the noun νόµος (“custom” or “set of religious 
values”) evolved towards a prescriptive meaning, namely “statute”.319  
 
A clear example of the shift in meaning can be found in Sophocles’s Antigone from 
ca. 441 BC. Whereas Creon symbolizes the new νόµος by passing a law which 
prohibits a proper funeral of Polynices due to his supposed treacherous behaviour, 
Antigone represents the old νόµος by resisting Creon and depending on the traditional 
values regarding funeral practices.  
 
This change in meaning had enormous consequences: from a traditional set of 
ancestral customs that was considered divine, absolute and timeless, νόµος became a 
changeable legal construction, approved by a majority for a limited amount of time.320 
Moreover, the outcome of this process almost coincided with the early sophist 
criticisms on organized religion. The semantic shift had made the new νόµος an 
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obvious product of human convention, vulnerable to a critical analysis from an 
intellectual viewpoint. 
 
Repercussions of these social changes can be found in literary sources from the mid-
fifth century BC: in analogy with the noun νόµος, the verb νοµίζειν, in combination 
with ‘an expression of moral approbation’(e.g., θεοὺς)321 gradually lost the descriptive 
meaning of customary practices or religious rites and began to implicate the 
prescription of a moral conduct to which a person had to abide.322 In the 420s BC, this 
process appears to have reached a point where the expression θεοὺς νοµίζειν no longer 
had any descriptive implication and usually referred to a cognitive meaning.323 The 
emergence of a similar cognitive expression, θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι, regarding the existence of 
the gods, must also be situated in this timeframe.324  
 
We have sofar demonstrated that the original meaning of the verb νοµίζειν implied a 
non-cognitive connotation and that the expression θεοὺς νοµίζειν also referred to 
customary practices when it first appeared in a source.325 But even in its earliest 
appearance the expression inherently demanded a cognitive action towards the gods, 
in the sense of acceptance or acknowledgment of their existence, as a fundamental 
prerequisite to sustain any cultic practice.326 As Yunis stated, the first premise of 
Athenian religion is the belief in the existence of the gods, otherwise their supposed 
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interest in human affairs and any relationship, based on reciprocity, cannot be 
sustained.327  
 
Due to sociopolitical factors in Athens in the course of the 5th century BC, such as the 
decrease of aristocratic power in favour of democratic reform, the meaning of θεοὺς 
νοµίζειν underwent change: from an original non-cognitive, descriptive meaning 
(‘honouring the gods’) with an intrinsic cognitive meaning (‘recognizing the gods’) to 
a predominantly cognitive, prescriptive meaning (‘accepting (to treat and practice) the 
gods in the normal way’328), as literary sources from the 420s BC on indicate. The 
negative use of θεοὺς νοµίζειν with its prescriptive implications of moral misconduct 
clearly has analogy with the prescriptive use of ἀσέβεια.329 Transgressive behaviour 
against the gods is the result of disbelief in the gods, as Pseudo-Lysias’s Against 
Andocides (19) illustrates.330 
 
In this respect, the appearance of the similar late 5th century BC expressions such as 
θεοὺς νοµίζειν εἶναι and θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι with clear cognitive meaning must also be 
observed. In the debate on the cognitive meaning of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν, Plato can 
definitely be regarded as a key source, due to his interchangeable use of the phrase in 
the dialogue Laws with regard to similar cognitive expression as θεοὺς οὐ ἡγεῖσθαι and 
θεοὺς οὐ ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι. From Plato on, θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν (εἶναι) and θεοὺς οὐ ἡγεῖσθαι 
(εἶναι) became cognitive synonyms to express the denial of the existence of the gods.    
Albeit the now primarily cognitive connotation of the expression, it should however 
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be stressed that cases of θεοὺς νοµίζειν in an undoubtedly ritual context still occurred in 
the late 5th and early 4th century BC, as Pseudo-Lysias’s Against Andocides (51) and 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia 1.1.2 demonstrate.331 However, both occurances cannot be 
detached from the impiety cases of Andocides and Socrates. So, we do not witness a 
return to the descriptive meaning of θεοὺς νοµίζειν from the first half of the 5th century 
BC, but we rather detect examples of θεοὺς νοµίζειν with a definitely prescriptive 
meaning, due to its close connection to impiety. The emphasis on ‘ritual’ in these 
occurrences of θεοὺς νοµίζειν is commonsensical, because impiety always involved an 
act.332 Therefore, θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν did not merely correspond to a theoretical denial of 
the existence of the gods, but implied the consequent absence of performing rituals, as 
a result of disbelief in the gods. Those accused of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν were in essence 
guilty of the charge of not believing in the gods. Then again, this disbelief was only 
visible to civic society by the lack of participation in cultic practices. So, Xenophon 
(Memorabilia, 1.1.2) denied the charge that Socrates was guilty of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν, 
based on the fact that he sacrificed to the gods. These sacrificial activities provided, 
according to Xenophon, the visible proof that Socrates did believe in the gods and for 
that reason, he was not impious in regard to Athenian religion. 
 
We can now conclude this subsection on Greek expressions of (ire)religious 
behaviour with the idea that the distinction between ancient Griek beliefs and rituals 
was not a strict one. Jan Bremmer already made an interesting appeal on this matter: 
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ancient Greek religion is actually a combination of both, providing that ‘belief’ 
always remains the determining factor.333  
  
10.4) θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν and its correlation with ἀσέβης 
 
Now the phrase θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν and related expressions have been analyzed as having 
primarily cognitive meaning from the late 5th century BC on, these observations 
should be related to the general perception of disbelief within ancient Greek religion. 
In this perspective, we can assume that disbelief was closely associated with impiety. 
 
In Laws (XII, 967d) Plato describes how the phenomenon of ἀθεότης is opposed to a 
state of god-fearing reverence or piety, which is defined by the noun θεοσέβεια, a 
variant of the more common εὐσέβεια. According to Plato, ἀθεότης is misleading, 
because it does not recognize the primordial and immortal nature of the (World-)soul 
and therefore, it contests piety.334 This antithesis of atheism to piety is not an 
innovation by Plato, however, as it first occured in the Hippocratic treatise On the 
Sacred Disease (I, 8 & 9), in which disbelief in the gods is already being compared to 
impiety.  
 
As mentioned above, the oldest appearance of the expression θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν in 
connection with ἀσέβεια   –in this case the less common variant δυσσεβία- can be found 
in the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease, which dates from ca. 415-414 BC. 
This source is also believed to be the oldest appearance of the phrase θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν 
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εἶναι, which can only express a cognitive meaning.335 In passage I, 8, diviners are 
regarded simultaneously as practitioners of impiety and disbelievers in the gods, 
because they pretend to have superior knowledge for curing diseases. As such, they 
demonstrate no belief in the gods, but rather act as their replacements.336  
 
The connection between θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν and δυσσεβής in On the Sacred Disease is 
thus our earliest evidence to associate disbelief in the gods with impiety. But 
historically speaking, the association is likely older, as the association between 
disbelief in the gods and impiety already resonates in the so-called Diopeithes-decree 
from ca. 438/7 BC. According to the only direct source on the matter, i.e. the 
biography of Pericles (32,2) by Plutarch, this decree ordered that those who did not 
respect “divine” or “heavenly things” should be brought to trial for impiety.  
 
Some scholars, like Kenneth Dover and Isidor Feinstein Stone have argued that, 
because of the lack of any contemporary sources, the Diopeithes-decree should be 
dismissed as an invention of Old Comedy.337 Although these arguments can be 
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countered (see section 11.1), ancient comic poets did indeed only describe the 
character of Diopeithes without any concrete reference to his decree. Aristophanes, 
for example, depicts Diopeithes in Knights (1085), Wasps (380) & Birds (988) as a 
soothsayer, while other comic poets like Ameipsias (F10 K/A), Teleclides (F6 K/A) 
and Phrynichus (F9 K/A) describe him as a fanatic or a drummer in the Corybantic 
rites.   
 
Most likely, Diopeithes was a sooth-sayer or chresmologos who issued the decree 
circa 438/7 BC, possibly because of the animosity Anaxagoras’s naturalist theories 
caused in conservative religious and political circles and as a means to indirectly 
attack Pericles.338 Typical about decrees from 440 BC on is the fact that they 
restricted Athenian satire on the level of incorporating public and personal 
vilification, which could explain why comic poets made no specific reference to the 
Diopeithes-decree.339 Another supporting argument for the historicity of the decree is 
the fact that it appears to have been the legal impetus for the asebeia-trials from 
Anaxagoras on.340 Information from Plutarch’s Nicias (23) seems to acknowledge 
this, 
 
“They did not tolerate the natural philosophers and star-gazers, as they called them, dissolving divinity 
into irrational causes, blind forces and necessary properties. Protagoras was banished, Anaxagoras put 
                                                                                                                                                        
Diopeithes was also a buff for comic poets, similar to Anaxagoras. See section 11.1 for a more 
extended analysis in favour of the historicity of the Diopeithes-decree. 
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under restraint and with difficulty saved by Pericles, and Socrates, though in fact he had no concern in 
such matters, lost his life through his devotion to philosophy.” (transl. B. Perrin)341 
 
This specific passage refers historically to the correlation between θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν 
and ἀσέβεια as early as 437 BC when Anaxagoras was accused of impiety, based on 
the Diopeithes-decree. The banishment of Protagoras was believed to have occurred 
in 415 BC, probably shortly after the public consternation caused by the religious 
scandals, but this theory is now refuted.342 The impiety trial of Protagoras must be 
situated ca. 422 BC, shortly before his death. The fact that Plutarch mentions 
Protagoras along with Anaxagoras, when discussing the persecution of naturalist 
philosophers should not be surprising. In the late 5th century BC, the distinction 
between naturalist and sophist philosophers was actually non-existing.343 Both were 
associated with religious scepticism and teaching, and religious authorities probably 
regarded this combination as dangerous and impious. This could be corroborated by 
Diodorus Siculus (XII, 39, 9), who did not only identify Anaxagoras as a scientific 
writer, but as a paid teacher as well. Therefore, the application of the word σοφιστής 
when Diodorus refers to Anaxagoras, becomes logical: 
 
“Furthermore, they (i.e. the enemies of Pericles) falsely accused the sophist Anaxagoras, who was 
Pericles' teacher, of impiety against the gods; and they involved Pericles in their accusations and 
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malicious charges, since jealousy made them eager to discredit the eminence as well as the fame of the 
man”. (transl. C.H. Oldfather)344 
 
Despite the fact that both Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch could be regarded as (late) 
sources from the Roman period to support this observation, a more contemporary 
source like Aristophanes also suggests a late 5th century BC perception in which 
naturalist and sophist thinking had merged on the level of disbelief in the gods.345 In 
Clouds, the character of ‘Socrates the Melian’ is definitely a combination of sophist 
(Prodicus), atomist (Democritus) and naturalist ideas (Diogenes of Apollonia), in 
order to symbolize disbelief in early 420s BC Athens.346  Through a sophist use of 
reasoning, called ‘Right Logic’ versus ‘Wrong Logic’, this ‘Socrates the Melian’ 
claims that Zeus is non-existing and must be replaced by a cosmic vortex, called 
Dinos.  
 
Now, even if the correlation between θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν and ἀσέβεια must be situated as 
early as 437 BC, it cannot be denied that Greek intellectuals still reserved a fairly 
amount of intellectual freedom. This statement can be supported, not only by the 
reference to the ‘Socrates the Melian’ in Clouds (830), but also by the fact that 
(atheist) philosophers such as Prodicus were not subjected to persecution in the 420s 
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BC. Sources that nonetheless mention any prosecution of Prodicus are late and 
spurious.347   
 
But this situation would drastically change with the affair of the Herms and the 
Mysteries in 415 BC as terminus ante quem. Religious intolerance gradually captured 
Athenian minds after the death of Pericles.348 This evolution can be observed in the 
Nicias-passage by Plutarch: from restraining matters in the days of Anaxagoras (ca. 
437 BC) to the banishment of Protagoras (ca. 422 BC), finally reaching a height in the 
execution of Socrates in 399 BC. The well documented indictment of Socrates does 
indicate that late 5th century Athenian society did no longer display a great degree of 
toleration regarding the phenomenon of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν and definitely regarded the 
matter as a punishable act of impiety.349 
 
10.5) θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν and the impiety case of Andocides 
 
The second oldest occurrence of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν in combination with a context of 
ἀσέβεια, appears in the plea Against Andocides by Pseudo-Lysias from 400 BC. In this 
plea, Pseudo-Lysias identifies himself as the grandson of a priest of the Mysteries and 
accuses the Athenian citizen Andocides of disbelief in the gods.  
 
This particular plea by Pseudo-Lysias is actually a response to a defence by 
Andocides himself, preserved under the name On the Mysteries. Both pleas must be 
situated in the year 400 BC, when Andocides stood trial for his alleged involvement in 
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both the parodying of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms in 415 BC.  He 
had been imprisoned shortly after the scandals, but he was eventually released for 
being the principal informer who earned amnesty and immunity under the Isotimides-
decree. Thucydides (6, 27) implicitly mentions the decree of Isotimides which 
allowed immunity for citizens, metics and even slaves willing to give concrete 
information on the scandals.  
 
However, as this decree was further expanded with an exclusion of former informants 
from public places such as temples and the agora, it actually forced these informants 
into voluntary exile.350 After his return to Athens under the general amnesty rule of 
403 BC, Andocides was believed to have participated in the Eleusinian Mysteries, 
resulting in a resurfacing of the impiety-allegations of 415 BC.351  
 
Based on the frequent use of ἀσέβεια or related words, the tone of the plea Against 
Andocides is primarily referring to the transgressive religious behaviour of Andocides, 
who is portrayed as the ultimate offender of the Mysteries. But, most of all, it is 
completey obvious to Pseudo-Lysias that Andocides does not believe in the gods: 
 
“He (Andocides) has made it clear to the Greeks that he does not acknowledge the gods.” (transl. S.C. 
Todd) 352 
 
In this paragraph, the use of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν must definitely be interpreted as having 
cognitive meaning, because we further on read that Andocides, as a merchant, 
frequently travelled by sea. If the phrase θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν is translated by “not revering 
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the gods” instead of “not believing in the existence of the gods”, it looses its rhetorical 
strength, because not fearing any divine vengeance, due to a disbelief in the gods is 
actually what has enabled Andocides to travel the seas undisturbed, according to 
Pseudo-Lysias.353 
 
In paragraph 4, the author already warned the members of the court not to acquit the 
accused. Otherwise, the vengeance of Demeter and Korè may descend upon them. 
Pseudo-Lysias also illustrates that -when acquitted- Andocides could even be elected 
king-archon. As such, Andocides could become in charge of the Eleusinian 
celebrations. According to Pseudo-Lysias, this would have a devastating effect on the 
participants of the Mysteries, because they would always associate such kind of king-
archon with impious deeds. In paragraphs 8 to 19, Pseudo-Lysias then summarizes the 
impiety of Andocides, which is characterized by his transgressive behaviour against 
ancestral laws. This leads to Pseudo-Lysias’s conclusion that Andocides “does not 
believe in the gods” (θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζει). 
 
Also noteworthy is the use of ἀσεβέστερος, a comparative of ἀσέβης by Pseudo-Lysias 
in paragraph 17, in regard to the impiety of Andocides. By the use of ἀσεβέστερος, the 
author tries to argue that the impiety of Andocides must be evaluated even worse than 
the impiety of Diagoras of Melos. Pseudo-Lysias further develops his argument by 
demonstrating that Diagoras was only ‘impious in speech (λόγῳ) regarding the sacred 
things and celebrations of a foreign place, whereas Andocides was impious in act 
(ἔργῳ) regarding the sanctities of his own city’.354  
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It is in this respect somehow remarkable that the orator Andocides never mentions the 
phrase θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν in his own defence plea On the Mysteries. Moreover, he 
frequently detaches himself from any inclination to impiety by proclaiming that the 
death sentences of those guilty of impiety in regard to the Mysteries and Herms were 
justified (paragraph 29). Furthermore, Andocides portrays himself as an extremely 
pious person with a high decree of respect and reverence for the Mysteries. This 
becomes evident while presenting his evidence (paragraphs 113-123): he claims that 
only by the interference of the Two Goddesses (i.e. Demeter and Korè) his death 
sentence had been prevented.  
 
Another element Andocides mentions is the fact that he never suffered any shipwreck 
while he frequently travelled at sea (paragraphs 137-139). Thomas Harrison has an 
interesting theory on these comments by Andocides that are accompanied by the 
rhetorical remark that the gods probably saved his life to see him stand trial in Athens. 
The fact that his prosecutor (Pseudo-Lysias, 19-20 & 31-32) also argued as such, 
could demonstrate the versatility of Greek religious practice within literary sources.355 
Although the gods appear to leave Andocides’s alleged impiety unpunished, they 
actually punish him by refusal of death. Considering his lifetime of misfortune and 
exile, a quick and painless death would have actually been a relief to Andocides.  
 
Consequently, the message of Pseudo-Lysias, to those who had become inconsiderate 
to the gods (ἀθεωτέρους), is simple: Andocides’s long life saved from death is actually 
no reward, but rather punishment because it only prolongs the agony he continuously 
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experiences. A short life lived in freedom and without suffering becomes desirable 
over a long life marked by distress. 
 
Although the plea of Andocides implicitly acknowledges these moralizing elements, 
Andocides is nevertheless convinced of the fact that the gods have saved him because 
of his innocence and non-involvement in any act of impiety. Other sources such as 
Thucydides (6,60) and Plutarch (Alcibiades, 20 (2-3)-21) nevertheless suggest a more 
active involvement of Andocides and refer to political motives for his imprisonment, 
stressing the suspicion of an oligarchic conspiracy against Athenian democracy.  
 
Epigraphical sources, however, seem to disprove any involvement of Andocides. In a 
comprehensive article, the Attic Stelai, Part I (1953), William K Pritchett analyzed 
eleven stelai from the Eleusinion on which the sale of confiscated property of fifteen 
profaners of the Mysteries and mutilators of the Herms was recorded. Andocides’s 
name is not mentioned on any of these stelai. Based on specific references to calendar 
dates, Pritchett situated the dating of this epigraphical evidence in 414 BC.356 This 
would imply that the stelai were produced only shortly after the events took place. 
Therefore, they must be the oldest surviving sources on the scandals. They do not 
suggest any concrete involvement of Andocides, which seems to corroborate Plutarch 
(Alcibiades, 21), who reports that Andocides was primarily suspected of participation 
in the scandals, because the Herm that stood near his house was one of the few 
undamaged.  
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Also significant is the fact that all fifteen names, which appear on the stelai, also 
surface in the account On the Mysteries by Andocides. In this literary account, four 
lists of perpetrators (by Andromachos, Teukros, Agariste and Lydos) are mentioned in 
regard to the profaning of the Mysteries357 and two lists (by Teukros and Andocides 
himself) concerning the mutilation of the Herms.358 Based on the lists that Andocides 
provides, thirty-two persons were involved in the parodying of the Mysteries and 
twenty-two persons were responsible for the mutilation of the Herms.359 From each 
list, corresponding names can be retrieved from the inscriptions, indicating a certain 
degree of accuracy between these stelai and Andocides’s On the Mysteries.  
 
The epigraphical evidence also confirms the repressive tenor in Andocides’s account 
in the aftermath of the scandals. The hopelessness of the accused and the actual threat 
of execution (Andocides, On the Mysteries, 58-59) illustrate a climate of social havoc 
and religious frenzy. This corroborates with the inscriptions, which mention the 
confiscation of all property of at least fifteen executed offenders. 
 
So, we might conclude this section with the assumption that Greek sources in the late 
5th century BC seem to connect the phenomenon of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν primarily with 
impiety. It was perceived as a social phenomenon that demanded legal action and 
prosecution in the form of asebeia-trials, because it embodied a form of religious 
pollution (miasma) that affected the well-being of the whole civic community.360  
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10.6) θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν and its correlation with ἄθεος 
 
The expression θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν does not only appear within Greek sources in close 
connection to ἀσέβης, but can also be linked to adjectives such as ἄθεος and its related 
noun ἀθεότης. In the plea Against Andocides (32) of Pseudo-Lysias from 400 BC, we 
encounter the earliest occurance of ἄθεος as a synonym of ἀσέβης in the context of 
θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν (17). But similar to ἀσέβης, ἄθεος is still being evaluated by social 
norms. The ‘godless’ or ‘impious’ actions of Andocides become logical to his 
prosecutor, due to the fact that “he does not believe in the existence of the gods”.361 
 
The phrase θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν (εἶναι), which –as argued earlier in this dissertation– 
primarily had cognitive meaning from the late 5th century BC on, can be translated 
consequently as “not believing in the gods” or “not believing that the gods exist”.362 
In this meaning, the expression also appeared as a synonym of ἄθεος in Plato’s 
Apology (26c) from ca. 395 BC. In the Apology, however, ἄθεος does not have the 
implication yet of ‘being an atheist for philosophical reasons’ (as it is definitely the 
case in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 63) and must still be analyzed in a 
socioreligious context, since it refers to the impiety trial of Socrates. It still functions 
as a form of religious misconduct and therefore, it should be regarded as an equivalent 
to ἀσέβης.363  
 
As this early example illustrates, ἄθεος appears to be a complex adjective to interpret, 
because its meaning depends heavily on contextuality.364 It also displays a high degree 
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of semantic variability within ancient literary traditions. Although the English word 
‘atheism’ in the sense of ‘being without a belief in God(s)’ is derived from the Greek 
word ἄθεος, we cannot automatically identify ἄθεος with atheism or a mind-set of 
critical reflection on divine existence, since the adjective underwent different 
semantic shifts throughout its existence. In other words, the meaning of ἄθεος in 
ancient sources can differ significantly, depending on chronology. For example, the 
original use of the adjective has no connection with atheism whatsoever. The earliest 
use of ἄθεος can be found in the 11th Epinician Ode of the lyric poet Bacchylides and 
must be dated ca. 480 BC.365 
 
“Stretching his hands to the rays of the steed-swift sun, and asked her to deliver his children from their 
deranged miserable madness. “I will sacrifice to you twenty unyoked red oxen.” And the huntress, 
whose father is the highest god, heard him praying. She persuaded Hera, and stopped the god forsaken 
mania of the bud-garlanded girls.” (transl. D. Arnson Svarlien)366 
 
In this passage ἄθεος is connected with µανία (‘rage’ or ‘madness’) and must be 
interpreted as ‘being forsaken by the gods’. Similar to the stronger µισόθεος (‘being 
hateful to the gods’), which appears in this context in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon 
(1090), ἄθεος represents a criminal attitude that ignores the gods, but also results in 
being ignored by the gods, as Sophocles’s Oedipus Tyrannus (661) indicates. In this 
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particular verse, the character, who is ἄθεος, is also identified by the adjective ἄφιλος 
(‘being friendless’ or ‘being hostile to friends’).367 
 
In Bacchylides’ Epinician XI, ἄθεος represents a mental state, which is the result of 
certain inconsiderate actions to the gods.  It relates to the characters of Lysippe, 
Iphinoe and Iphianassa. These three daughters of Proetus, a mythical king of Argos 
and Tiryns, had evoked the anger of Hera by pretending to be more beautiful than the 
goddess and, for that reason, they were all transformed into raging lunatics. In this 
state of insanity, the daughters could no longer rely on any support or guidance by the 
gods and became a danger for their surroundings, ravaging the Peloponnesus and even 
killing their own children. King Proetus eventually addressed the goddess Artemis to 
intervene and avert this state of god-forsaken insanity.368 
 
A slightly later passage in which the word ἄθεος is also being used already shows 
some evolution in meaning. In the 4th Pythian Ode of the lyric poet Pindar, which 
must be dated in 462 BC, we can read the following: 
 
“But already the aged portion of life attends me, whereas your flower of youth is just cresting; and you 
are capable of removing the anger of those in the underworld. For Phrixos orders us to go the halls of 
Aietes to bring back his soul and to recover the thick-fleeced hide of the ram, by which he was once 
preserved from the sea and from the impious weapons of his stepmother.” (transl. W.H. Race)369 
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In this passage, ἄθεος is connected with βέλος (meaning ‘spear’ or more general 
‘weapon’) and does no longer refer to a mental state, but to a certain criminal 
behaviour. The ‘impious’ or ‘godless’ weapons of Ino, the stepmother of Phrixus and 
Helle, refer to her attempts to kill her stepchildren, which only cause the resent of the 
gods. According to Diodorus Siculus (Historical Library, IV, 47), Ino secretly 
approached the peasants of her husband, king Athamas, with the request to destroy 
their sowing seeds. This led to a wasted farmland. Unaware of his wife’s actions and 
despaired of this unproductiveness, Athamas consulted the Delphic Oracle only to 
receive the instruction to sacrifice Phrixus, which Ino had conjured up herself.370  Her 
intention to kill Phrixus and the forging of the oracle are clear examples of impious 
behaviour that can only invoke the wrath of the gods.  
 
So, in both passages, atheos comprises a pejorative meaning. From a mental state to a 
criminal attitude, the word refers to a situation in which an individual has become 
isolated from the gods due to a certain immoral behaviour. For example, in Eumenides 
(149-154) Aeschylus uses atheos in connection with cruelty to parents, while 
Euripides in his Andromache (486-493) associates ἄθεος with ἄνοµος (‘being lawless’).  
 
The earliest use of the adjective ἄθεος in the sense of ‘having no belief in the gods’ or 
‘denying the existence of the gods’, appears in Plato’s Apology, which must be dated 
ca. 395 BC, although the slightly older account by Pseudo-Lysias (Against Andocides, 
19) from 400 BC already seems to associate atheos with unbelief in the gods. In 
Apology (26c) ἄθεος is mentioned for the first time in combination with the phrase 
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θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν εἶναι. In the actual passage Socrates rejects the indictment of ‘not 
believing in the gods’ which classifies him as an atheos, according to his accusers.  
 
“I can’t understand whether you are saying that I teach them (the younger people of Athens) to accept 
some gods – and I myself, after all, do believe there are gods, and I am not at all an atheist, and I’m not 
an offender in that way-but not the particular gods the city accepts but others, and that’s what you 
charge me with, “other gods”; or whether you’re saying that I both absolutely do not myself believe in 
gods and teach other people accordingly.” (transl. H.N. Fowler)371 
 
Apology 26c is arguably the earliest source, which makes use of ἄθεος as a synonym 
of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν. By doing so, the tone was set by Plato to create proper 
terminology to adequately detect and recognize all sorts of unbelief in (the existence 
of) the gods by means of ἄθεος (and later on, by means of ἀθεότης), which become 
evident in the 10th and 12th book of his last dialogue Laws.  
 
Prior to Plato slightly older sources, like Aristophanes (Clouds, 423) from 423 BC, 
the Hippocratic Corpus (6: On the Sacred Disease, I,9 = VI, 36, 3-4 Littré) from ca. 
415 BC and Pseudo-Lysias (Against Andocides, 19) from 400 BC already mentioned 
the phrase θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν in the context of disbelief in the gods. However, in these 
sources, unbelief as expressed by θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν is still closely associated with 
impiety (e.g., the use of δυσσεβέειν in the Hippocratic Corpus in combination with 
θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν). This is definitely also the case throughout Plato’s literary output, 
but, conversely, we do witness that the socioreligious implications of atheos (and 
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atheotès) gradually develop within a more philosophical subtext. This process appears 
to be fully realized from the Roman period on.372  
 
The use of the adjective ἄθεος by Plato in order to recognize ‘atheist’ behaviour is 
somehow evident: similar to the lyric poets, Plato associates the term with an isolated 
position in society. The atheist thinker has not only removed himself from the gods, 
but also from the community he lives in. Consequently, the identified atheos is an 
immoral person, who is deprived of any common sense and does not deserve any 
sympathy. Moreover, if one is atheos with an unjust nature, one cannot reenter society 
and should be put to death (Plato, Laws, 908e). In the light of these observations, the 
fierce rejection of any charges of being atheos by Socrates in Apology (26c) becomes 
evident.  
 
Chapter 11: Greek impiety trials (438/7 -307 BC) 
 
In the second half of the 5th century BC, the association of θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν with 
ἀσέβης appears to have resulted in a legal prosecution of individuals by Athenian 
authorities through the means of impiety trials. The whole concept of asebeia-trials, 
however, is cloaked with obscurity as we do not posses any concrete legislation. Even 
the venue of prosecution is uncertain. It must have been alloted jury courts 
(dikasteria) for the early cases373 (or even the Assembly in the case of Diagoras of 
Melos)374, because only the later cases specify the Areopagus as location.375 The 
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ancient sources, on the other hand, do report various legal terminology regarding 
asebeia, namely εἰσαγγελία (literally a “reporting”, but in the context of asebeia an 
“accusation before the Assembly”), γραφή (“accusation in writing”) and ἔνδειξις 
(“detention on remand”, according to Athenian legislation, this procedure involved 
the arrest of a denounced offender by magistrates, who had the prerogative to do so, in 
order to await trial before a jury court).376 Plutarch (Pericles, 33) informs us that the 
normal procedure for impiety, based on the Diopeithes-decree, was an eisangelia and, 
according to ancient sources, all cases of impiety before Socrates involved an 
eisangelia. Only in the case of Socrates, we have literary evidence that it concerned a 
graphè, whereas Andocides is the only known offender who was faced with 
endeixis.377  We could assume that the procedure of graphè was an innovation near 
the end of the 5th century BC, coinciding with the codification of Athenian law.378 But 
it has been suggested that graphè was already the standard procedure for asebeia in 
the 5th century BC, since a graphè was introduced in Athenian legislation as early as 
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Solon.379 Another argument to support this view is the fact that a graphè would have 
been a more uncomplicated and less timeconsuming procedure, because, unlike an 
eisangelia, it did not have to pass before the Assembly, since any willing citizen, who 
could also act as prosecutor, could submit it.380  
 
Based on the preserved sources, it might be safer to assume that eisangelia became 
replaced by graphè (asebeias) at the end of the fifth century BC by the reinscribing of 
the Athenian law code by Nikomachus in 403 BC.381 This may have also substituted 
the Diopeithes-decree, since no furter mentionings of eisangelia appear in 4th century 
BC impiety cases.  
 
11.1) the historicity of impiety trials and the Diopeithes-decree 
 
One of the most debated topics in the study of deviant religious behaviour in ancient 
Greece is most likely the phenomenon of impiety trials. Since the study The Freedom 
of the Intellectual in Greek Society (1976) by Kenneth Dover, doubts have been raised 
about the historicity of some of these trials. Views have radicalized ever since, 
especially in the research by Isidor F. Stone, who believes the trial of Socrates to have 
been a unique case and therefore he dismisses all other impiety trials as fabrications 
from the Hellenistic and Roman period in order to remodel the lives of famous 
philosophers to that of Socrates.382 A similar claim is made by Mary R. Lefkowitz and 
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Stefan Krauter, who both consider the majority of impiety trials to be a Hellenistic 
invention, fitting the literary genre of philosophos bios.383  
 
Often in these studies, doubts about the existence of impiety trials are also closely 
related to doubts on the historicity of the Diopeithes-decree. The most common 
arguments are the silence in contemporary sources and the fact that Plutarch (Pericles, 
32) is the only (late) source on the decree. According to Plutarch, the seer Diopeithes 
brought in a bill (in the 430s BC) demanding the public impeachment of those who 
did not believe in gods or taught doctrines regarding the heavens. Plutarch also 
mentions that the decree aimed to direct suspicion against Pericles by prosecuting 
Anaxagoras. 
 
Plutarch also reports in this passage that around the same time an impiety trial was 
conducted against the courtisane Aspasia. The comic writer Hermippus would have 
acted as prosecutor. According to Isidor F. Stone, the actual idea of Hermippus being 
a prosecutor would have been experienced in Athens as a ludricous action and it has 
fueled the argument that both the impiety trial of Aspasia and the Diopeithes-decree 
could have been be an invention of Old Comedy (possibly a lost play of Hermippus) 
which Plutarch erred for an historical fact.384   
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This is nonetheless an unusual argument, because Plutarch seems perfectly aware that 
certain allegations against Pericles were based on (questionable) information from 
comic poets, since he refers on different occassions in the biography of Pericles (13,5; 
13,6 & 13,10) to comic poets (e.g., Cratinus) as the main source of such information. 
So, it is unlikely that Plutarch, while being cautious of information derived from 
comic poets, would be fooled in Pericles (32) in such a way that he mistakenly 
interprets the plot of a comic play by Hermippus to be a genuine impiety trial. 
Besides, even if the main source for Pericles (32) concerned a comic play, why does 
not a single Alexandrine or Byzantine scholiast seem to be familiar with it, despite the 
familiarity of Alexandrine and Byzantine scholarship with Old Comedy?385  
 
This negative assessement of Pericles (32) might be related to the ‘traditional’ 
perception of Plutarch as being an uncritical and erratic author. This has been a 
common view in the 19th century and early 20th century scholarship and it can even be 
detected in recent studies.386 This view has nevertheless been adjusted in the last 
decades by research that emphasizes a critical attitude, extensive references to literary 
sources and the verbatim use of documentary sources by Plutarch throughout his 
literary output.387  
 
Moreover, the suggestion (of Isidor F. Stone) that a comic poet, who acts as 
prosecutor, would have been considered a ridiculous and nonveracious idea for the 
majority of Athenian citizens might be a modern assumption, because (if graphè was 
already the standard procedure in impiety cases as early as 438 BC) every citizen 
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could file an accusation of impiety (in writing) and act as prosecutor. The poet and 
tragedian Meletus, parenthetically, also acted as the prosecutor of Socrates, so we 
should be aware that the concept of freedom acted on many different levels in ancient 
Greece: one might be liberal on an artistic and intellectual level, but conservative on a 
religious or political level. This seems certainly the case for comic poets such as 
Hermippus. According to Plutarch (Pericles, 33,7) Hermippus’s Fates made a stance 
in favour of Cleon, the most prominent representative of radical democracy and also a 
renowned figure for his religious conservatism in the early 420s BC. But then again, 
comic poets maintained a rather dubious relationship with ‘men in power’.388 
 
Perhaps the lack of contemporary sources might be a convincing argument to raise 
doubts on the historicity of the Diopeithes-decree? But this could be simply a matter 
of preserved sources. The Atthidographer and seer Philochorus (floruit after 300 BC), 
for instance, might have mentioned the Diopeithes-decree in his lost treatise on 
asebeia-trials. Based on FGrHist 328 F121, 123 & 124, in which Philochorus situates 
the impiety trial of Phidias in 438/7 BC, resulting in his flight to Olympia, we may 
assume that Philochorus must have been familiar with the decree (which must be 
situated in the very same year) as the legal impetus to prosecute Phidias.389 Besides, 
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the argument that no contemporary sources concerning the Diopeithes-decree exist 
could be refuted by Aristophanes’s Wasps (377-380), which makes a cautious allusion 
to the Diopeithes-decree (‘fill your heart with Diopeithes in order to inculcate the 
psephismata of the gods’)390 and Pseudo-Lysias (Against Andocides, 10),391 which 
also suggest the existence of legislation as early as the 430s BC to deal with asebeia. 
 
And yet people say that Perikles once advised you about those who committed impiety: that you should 
apply not only the written laws in their case, but also the unwritten ones according to which the 
Eumolpidai conduct their exegesis-laws which nobody has ever had the authority to abolish, or has 
dared to speak against, and people do not even know the one who established them-for he believed that 
they would in this way pay the penalty not simply to humans but to the gods.” (transl. S.C. Todd)392 
 
The passage seem to indicate that legislation concerning impiety was existing in 
Athens in the 430s BC and, if this referred to the Diopeithes-decree, it could have 
been the earliest legislation in Athens to penalize impiety.393 But the passage also 
informs us that, in cases of religious pollution (miasma), so-called ‘sacred laws’ were 
expounded by exegeteis like the Eumolpidai (the Eleusinian priesthood who provided 
the hierophant (‘revealer of sacred objects), while the priesthood of Kerykes provided 
the dadouchos or ‘torch-holder’). They were most likely consulted as a sort of 
advisory body.394 Pseudo-Lysias also confirms that the Eumolpidai possessed true 
enforcing authority when religious pollution involved transgressions against the 
Eleusinian Mysteries.  
                                                      
390
 Bauman (1990), p. 49. 
391
 Momigliano (1973)², p. 565. 
392
 Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 10: καίτοι Περικλέα ποτέ φασι παραινέσαι ὑµῖν περὶ τῶν 
ἀσεβούντων, µὴ µόνον χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραµµένοις νόµοις περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀγράφοις, 
καθ᾽οὓς Εὐµολπίδαι ἐξηγοῦνται, οὓς οὐδείς πω κύριος ἐγένετο καθελεῖν οὐδὲ ἐτόλµησεν 
ἀντειπεῖν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸν τὸν θέντα ἴσασιν: ἡγεῖσθαι γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὺς οὕτως οὐ µόνον τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς διδόναι δίκην. 
393
 Ostwald (1986), p. 528-532. See also Parker (1996), p. 208, n. 40. 
394
 Parker (2004), p. 64. 
     210 
There are no indications in the ancient sources, however, that Diopeithes was a 
member of the Eumolpidai, but his importance as a religious authority figure is 
nevertheless mentioned in multiple passages and fragments of Old Comedy.395 
According to Aristophanes (Birds, 988) he was an influential chresmologos or seer in 
the vein of Lampon. But Aristophanes (Knights, 1085) also depicts him as an intrusive 
character, who was closely affiliated with radical democrats such as Cleon and willing 
to take bribes. He also must have reached a considerable age, on the condition that he 
is the same Diopeithes who was consulted as a chresmologos by Lysander while 
visiting Sparta in 398 BC.396  
 
According to one of the latest studies on impiety in Classical Athens, namely Vincent 
Azoulay’s Pericles of Athens (2014)397, there is no reason to assume that Diopeithes 
would have passed a decree on impiety, because seers like Diopeithes and naturalists 
such as Anaxagoras were equally ridiculed in Old Comedy. This view does not seem 
to correspond with the idea of a polarizing Athenian society in the 430s BC. But a 
reoccurring problem in studies, which reject the Diopeithes-decree or impiety trials 
altogether is the overall neglect of the political intentions of these impiety trials and 
the Diopeithes-decree.398 Momigliano already stressed the difference between 
intellectual and political liberties in Athens during the second half of the 5th century 
BC. The latter form of liberty was of much more importance.399 This might explain 
why Diopeithes did not target Pericles directly, but only associates, such as 
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Anaxagoras.400 As a chresmologos (seer) and a contemporary of Lampon, Diopeithes 
must have felt threatened by the naturalist explanations of Anaxagoras and his 
political alliance with Pericles. 401   
 
Besides, different ancient sources report certain political ambitions of seers like 
Diopeithes. According to Thucydides (2, 21, 3), chresmologoi were numerous and in 
great demand at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Plato (Statesman, 290d-290e) 
acknowledged their social importance, but experienced them as supercilious at the 
same time and even labeled them ‘atheists’ (Plato, Laws 908a-910d), similar to the 
way the Hippocratic Corpus (On the Sacred Disease, I, 8) viewed them as ‘impious’ 
for their pretence of possessing superior (i.e. ‘divine’) knowledge.402  Nevertheless 
this, politicians, such as Nicias and Alcibiades, made frequent use of their services, 
which must have made chresmologoi self-aware of their political importance.403 
Garland rightly observed that the portrayal of chresmologoi in Old Comedy (e.g., 
Aristophanes’s Knights, 1085) as intrusive characters might indicate that they did not 
comply with a passive attitude of waiting to be consulted by politicians, but they 
likely undertook (political) action themselves.404 
 
                                                      
400
 The historicity of the impiety trial of Anaxagoras has been established by the elaborate studies by 
Mansfeld (1979) & Mansfeld (1980). Mansfeld (1980), p. 80-89 situates the trial of Anaxagoras in 
437/6 BC (based on information from Demetrius Phalereus and Apollodorus, see Mansfeld (1979), p. 
53-65) and the Diopeithes-decree in 438/7 BC (based on Philochorus). Mansfeld (1980), p. 48 points 
out that the common date of c. 432-430 BC (e.g., Burkert (1985), p. 467) of the decree is based on 
attempts to coincide the Diopeithes-decree, which targeted Anaxagoras, with the Dracontides/Hagnon-
decree, which accused Pericles of “the theft of sacred moneys”.  See also Ostwald (1986), p. 194-198. 
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against chresmologoi after the disappointing military expedition. 
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 Garland (1984), p. 82. 
     212 
Based on these arguments, I believe that the Diopeithes-decree and the phenomenon 
of impiety trials should not be dismissed as a fabrication or invention from the 
Hellenistic and Roman period, but must be accepted as authentic. Both do correspond 
with a process of an increasing political, religious and intellectual polarization in 
Athens from the 430s BC on that resulted in the alignment of religious professionals 
(e.g., Diopeithes, Lampon) and comic poets (Hermippus) with radical democratic 
forces (Cleon), in order to counter a growing scepticism among intellectuals 
(Anaxagoras, Protagoras), who were also closely aligned with the political 
establishment of Athens (Pericles).405 The effects of the Peloponnesian War and the 
Great Plague in Athens in the early 420s BC would only enhance this ongoing process 
of polarization, culminating in the affairs of the Herms and the Mysteries in 415 BC. 
It seems therefore very unlikely that the Diopeithes-decree or the trials of Anaxagoras, 
Protagoras and Diagoras must be simply dismissed as the gibes of Old Comedy. Or, to 
put it into the words of Alexander Rubel, it would demand a very authoritative 
argument to deny the authenticity of the Diopeithes-decree.406 
 
11.2) synopsis of the (atheist) impiety cases 
 
In this concluding section of the chapter, I shall provide an overview of the cases of 
impiety in ancient Greece concerning the charge of ‘atheism’, in the etic sense of the 
wording. More precisely, this will include those individuals (philosophers and non-
philosophers as well) who were accused of different (etic) forms of atheism. This 
mostly concerns charges of adevism (the denial of any popular presentation of the 
gods) and kainotheism (the introduction of new deities). Other forms of atheism, such 
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 See on this matter O’Sullivan (1995), p. 22: Pericles embodied, according to Protagoras, the ideal 
sophist statesman, based on Plato’s Protagoras (319e-320a). 
406
 Rubel (2000), p. 93,  n.148. See also Lenfant (2002), p. 153. 
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as agnosticism (Protagoras) or antitheism (Diagoras and Theodorus) concerning the 
charge of asebeia are discussed in other sections throughout the dissertation.  
 
I will also oppose in the section the idea of Peter Garnsey that the core of impiety 
trials must be situated in the period of the Peloponnesian War with the execution of 
Socrates as its climax.407 Finally, I will extend this synopsis with additional research 
on possible sociopolitical factors, which might have contributed to the eventual 
demise of the phenomenon of impiety trials near the end of the 4th century BC. 
  
One of the earliest asebeia-trials involved the natural philosopher Anaxagoras, the 
sculptor Phidias and the courtesan Aspasia, who all were commonly regarded as 
protégés of Pericles.408 Therefore, the system of impiety trials seems to have 
functioned from the beginning on as a political tool to indirectly discredit the 
reputation of prominent Athenian statesmen. In the case of Phidias, the actual charge 
of asebeia involved his likeness and that of Pericles on the depiction of the ‘Battle 
against the Amazons’ on the shield of Athena Parthenos.409 According to Plutarch, 
Phidias died of sickness in prison, although it was rumoured that ‘enemies of Pericles’ 
had poisoned him.410 In the case of Aspasia, the actual charge of asebeia is not 
specified by Plutarch, but modern scholarship believes it to be the defilement of 
temples by her presence as a courtesan and pander.411 Plutarch (Pericles, 32,3), on the 
other hand, does mention that Pericles shed copious tears at her trial and was able to 
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 Plutarch, Pericles, 31,4, but Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 121, 123 & 124) reports that Phidias had 
made the golden statue of Athens that was erected in the great temple, but that he had cheated with the 
accounts of the ivory used for the plaques. He was therefore accused of impiety, but he went into exile 
at Elis, where he accepted the contract to construct the statue of Zeus. He was eventually slain by the 
Eleans for similar reasons. See also Mansfeld (1980), p. 40-47 on this matter. 
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persuade the jurors to acquit Aspasia, but he also “feared for Anaxagoras so much that 
he sent him away from the city”. 
 
The charges against Anaxagoras (500-428 BC), another protégé of Pericles, 
concerned the first case of asebeia against a philosopher and must be situated in 437/6 
BC.412 Diogenes Laertius (II, 12-14) is the most elaborate source on the actual charge, 
in contrast to the brief account by Diodorus Siculus (XII, 29, 2), which only informs 
that Anaxagoras was falsely accused of impiety against the gods. According to 
Diogenes (based on Sotion’s Succession of the Philosophers), Cleon indicted 
Anaxagoras on the charge of declaring the sun to be a mass of red-hot metal and 
Pericles, being his pupil, defended him. The sentence eventually was a fine of five 
talents and banishment from Athens. Based on Satyrus’s Lives, Diogenes also reports 
that an opponent of Pericles, named Thucydides, was the actual prosecutor and 
accused Anaxagoras of ‘treasonable correspondence’ with Persia along with the 
charge of impiety. According to this source, Anaxagoras was condemned to death in 
absentia.  
 
Albeit the inconsistencies within the account by Diogenes, the actual charge of 
impiety appears to be in accordance with information provided by Plutarch (Pericles, 
32,1). Plutarch mentions the decree (psephisma) brought in by the seer Diopeithes 
concerning those “who did not believe in the gods or taught doctrines against the 
heavens”.413   The natural philosophy of Anaxagoras, which regarded the sun as a 
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 See Mansfeld (1980), p. 40-47 for the dating of the trial of Phidias (438/7 BC); p. 76-80 for the 
dating of the trial of Aspasia (438/7 BC) & p. 80-89 for the dating of the trial of Anaxagoras (437/6 
BC). 
413
 Dover (1988), p. 28-34 considered the Diopeithes-decree to be a fabrication of Attic comedy, while 
Ostwald (1986), p.196-198 and Bauman (1990), p. 39 defended its historicity, based on an older 
argument by Derenne (1930), p. 22 that the list of psephismata by Craterus is more likely to have been 
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mere mass of red-hot metal, could have been interpreted as a denial of the divine and 
personalized character of the heavenly bodies and was therefore liable to prosecution 
based on Diopeithes’ psephisma. As we have discussed previously in this chapter, the 
decree appears to have been the legal impetus for later cases of impiety.414 For 
example, Protagoras would have been faced with charges of impiety ca. 422 BC for 
the introductory words of his treatise On the Gods (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 52) and 
was reputedly exiled or sentenced to death in absentia.415  
 
The impiety case of Diagoras of Melos was probably also liable to the Diopeithes-
decree, as Aristophanes’s Clouds (826- 830) depicts him as early as 423 BC as a 
natural philosopher who substituted Zeus by a cosmic vortex, called Dinos. But, more 
likely, the trial of Diagoras of Melos concerned the divulging and ridiculing of the 
Eleusinian Mysteries rather than doctrines ‘against the heavens’.416  
 
Nevertheless, the Diopeithes-decree could also have been applicable to both 
Protagoras and Diagoras, although their statements on divine (in)existence did not 
immediately involve naturalist doctrines. It has been suggested by Derenne (1930) 
and Rudhardt (1960) that the Diopeithes-decree must have underwent an early 
adaptation (possibly under the archonship by Eucleides in 403/402 BC) in order to 
detect and prosecute inappropriate doctrines concerning divine matters more 
efficiently, as the original decree only targeted atheist doctrines from a naturalist 
                                                                                                                                                        
the primary source for Plutarch on the Diopeithes-decree instead of Attic comedy. See also Higbie 
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signature.417 According to Derenne and Rudhardt, the biographer Plutarch (Pericles, 
33,1) reconstructed the original decree by referring to the neutral plural τὰ θεῖα (µὴ 
νοµίζειν) (“not believing in the divine (character of the heavenly) objects”) in stead of 
the masculine plural τοὺς θεούς (µὴ νοµίζειν) (“not believing in (the existence) of the 
gods”). The latter expression appears in earlier sources such as Xenophon‘s 
Memorabilia 1.1.1. and Plato’s Apology 26c (with the addition of εἶναι), but also in 
sources after Plutarch (e.g., Favorinus’s Metron which has been preserved in 
Diogenes Laertius, II, 40).418 Beside these sources on the indictment of Socrates, the 
expression τοὺς θεούς (οὐ) νοµίζειν in the sense of ‘not believing in the gods’ also 
appears in Pseudo-Lysias’s Against Andocides, 19, regarding the indictment of 
Andocides.  
 
In the original decree the charges ‘not believing in the heavenly objects’ and ‘teaching 
doctrines against the heavens’ are compatible, because the former is a logical outcome 
of the latter. The case of Anaxagoras examplifies this: his naturalist teachings 
regarding the sun did imply that he denied the divine character of this heavenly body 
as dictated by traditional worship.  
 
After Anaxagoras philosophical doctrines on divine matters would become more 
methodical and radical as the impiety cases of the sophists Protagoras (ca. 422 BC) 
and Diagoras (415 BC) indicate. What could be labeled ‘impiety for holding the 
wrong ideas’ now no longer concerned natural philosophy and astronomy exclusively, 
given the fact that no natural philosopher or astronomer was charged with asebeia 
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after 420 BC.419 But the exact nature of the prosecution of Protagoras remains unclear, 
whereas Diagoras’s conviction by the Assembly concerned an exceptional impiety 
case.420 
 
Another plausible reason for adapting the original Diopeithes-decree during the legal 
reforms under the archonship of Eucleides could be found in the need to substitute an 
εἰσαγγελία as the official indictment for asebeia by a written equivalent in the form of 
a γραφή to have more legal strength of character.421 This argument appears to be 
acknowledged by the actual indictment of Alcibiades (as preserved in its original form 
by Plutarch in Alcibiades, 22.3). 
 
“His impeachment is on record, and runs as follows: ‘ Thessalus, son of Cimon, of the deme Laciadae, 
impeaches Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, of the deme Scambonidae, for committing crime against the 
goddesses of Eleusis, Demeter and Cora, by mimicking the mysteries and showing them forth to his 
companions in his own house, wearing a robe such as the High Priest wears when he shows forth the 
sacred secrets to the initiates, and calling himself High Priest, Pulytion Torch-bearer, and Theodorus, of 
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 Concerning the natural philosopher, Diogenes of Apollonia (460-390 BC), a contemporary of 
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the deme Phegaea, Herald, and hailing the rest of his companions as Mystae and Epoptae, contrary to 
the laws and institutions of the Eumolpidae, Heralds, and Priests of Eleusis.” (transl. B. Perrin)422  
 
Although still identified as an εἰσαγγελία, the indictment already takes the form of a 
γραφή. The actual outcome of the indictment is retrievable through Thucydides 
(6,61,1-7) who reports that the Athenians were convinced that Alcibiades’s 
involvement in the religious scandals was part of a conspiracy to overthrow 
democracy (τῆς ξυνωµοσίας ἐπὶ τῷ δήµῳ).423 They eventually condemned him to death 
in absentia, because he had fled to the Peloponnese prior to his defence against the 
charges. Plutarch (Alcibiades, 22,4) adds to the charge the confiscation of 
Alcibiades’s property. Such juridical measure is attested by epigraphical evidence 
regarding other Athenians citizens condemned for their involvement in the religious 
scandals of 415 BC.424 Another indication of Alcibiades’s social ostracism, according 
to Plutarch (Alcibiades, 22,4), was the public cursing of his name by priests and 
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priestesses, which was only refused by the priestess Theano who claimed to be a 
praying, not a cursing priestess.  
 
This perception of late 5th century BC Athenian democracy adopting a more 
repressive policy on political, religious and intellectual matters contrasted 
considerably with the reputation of a religiously tolerant and intellectually open-
minded and enlightened city-state under Periclean rule.425 The classification of atheoi 
and asebeis by Fahr (1969) seems to indicate that impiety trials culminated ca. 400 
BC in the denunciation of Andocides (the only known impiety case based on ἔνδειξις) 
and the execution of Socrates (the only known impiety case based on γραφή). Both 
were Athenian citizens and, according to some studies, this was no coincidence: late 
5th century BC Athenian society witnessed an inseperable interaction between piety 
and patrotism.426 This view should nonetheless be moderated to some extent.427  
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 Only in two (well documented) cases (i.e. Andocides and Socrates) we possess any actual 
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severe prosecution of later defendants of asebeia (e.g., in the fourth century BC the priestesses Theoris 
of Lemnos and Nino(n) were both executed following charges of performing unauthorized forms of 
magic, while the hierophant Archias was executed on the charge of wrongly performing rituals). In the 
cases of Andocides and Socrates, the (radical) democratic animosity in Athens ca. 400 BC against 
those aligned with oligarchic tendencies could also be an indication why prosecutors such as Pseudo-
Lysias and Meletus were eager to find Andocides and Socrates guilty of asebeia. The indictment of 
Alcibiades (preserved by Plutarch) in 415 BC does already indicate how quickly secular courts adapted 
religious legislation to deal with crimes against organized religion. This demonstrates the fast pace by 
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Although Andocides was faced with ἔνδειξις, he was eventually acquitted, presumably 
because the accusation of his involvement in the religious scandals of 415 BC 
concerned an old matter, which was also largely based on a personal feud.428 Besides, 
Andocides had already been pardoned by the amnesty of 403 BC. 429 This, however, 
was not the case for Socrates, who was only confronted with γραφή, but nevertheless 
condemned to death and executed. Although the Amnesty prohibited that Socrates 
was prosecuted on charges of being a traitor and a teacher of oligarchic leaders such 
as Alcibiades and Critias, the prosecutor Meletus circumvented this measure by a 
more ambiguous charge of impiety. This involved the combination of atheism and 
kainotheism: by accusing Socrates of ‘not acknowledging the gods of the state’ beside 
the charge of ‘corrupting the youth’, combined with the charge of ‘introducing new 
deities’, Meletus could still incorporate in this merged indictment enough political 
overtones to suggest anti-democratic behaviour on the part of Socrates.430  
 
After 399 BC charges of asebeia no longer resulted in any concrete legal procedures. 
Indeed, official terminology such as εἰσαγγελία, γραφή or ἔνδειξις, aimed at individuals 
associated with impiety, appears to be lacking in ancient sources from the 4th century 
BC on. Should this indicate that asebeia evolved to a sort of formality with no actual 
form of prosecution? Such an assumption, however, could be misleading.  
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Although we do not possess any concrete and detailed information regarding the 
prosecution of cases of asebeia after the trial of Socrates in 399 BC, different ancient 
sources do report the execution of a number of asebeis in the period 355-350 BC. For 
instance, Pseudo-Demosthenes (Against Neaera, 59, 116) mentions the execution of 
the hierophant Archias ca. 355 BC on the charge of performing an unauthorized 
sacrifice, while Demosthenes (Against Aristogiton, 79-80), Harpocration (Philochorus 
(FGrHist 382 F 60)) and Plutarch (Demosthenes, 14,4) report the execution of the 
priestess Theoris of Lemnos ca. 350 BC. Demosthenes, who appeared to have been 
the actual prosecutor of her trial, informs that she and her entire family were executed 
on the charge of producing drugs and performing sorcery, while Plutarch describes a 
‘dimeanouring behaviour’ in the sense of teaching slaves to practice deceit.431 A 
similar case to the one of Theoris concerned the priestess Nino(n), who, according to 
Demostenes (On The False Embassy, 281), was executed ca. 349/8 BC for providing 
drugs, whereas the Scholia on Demosthenes’s On The False Embassy, 281 and 
Josephus (Against Apion 2, 267) report that she was executed for kainotheistic 
reasons, namely the initiation of Athenians in the mysteries of foreign gods.432  
 
A later case of impiety (ca. 345 BC) concerns the trial of the courtesan Phryne. The 
actual charge of impiety is unknown, but Athenaeus (The Deipnosophists, XIII, 59) 
seems to suggest that it could be related to recurring incidents during religious 
festivals where Phryne used to undress herself in public, in order to bath in the sea. 
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One event was even witnessed by Praxiteles, who would have modeled his Aphrodite 
of Cnidus after the body of Phryne.  
 
Eudore Derenne (1930), on the other hand, provides a more plausible explanation, 
based on preserved information from Harpocration and a fragment from an 
anonymous treatise on Attic rhetoric (which actually quotes the indictment by the 
prosecutor Euthias): Phryne tried to introduce a new deity in Athens, called Isodaitès, 
who was habitually worshipped by courtisans, and she organized ceremonies in 
honour of this deity in the Lyceum.433  
 
The orator Hyperides, who was believed to have been one of her lovers, defended 
Phryne during her trial. A famous anecdote by Athenaeus describes how Hyperides 
removed her cloths before the Areopagus in order to evoke pity.434 The whiteness of 
her skin and breasts was believed to have caused a sense of compassion from the 
judges, which resulted in her acquittal.  Modern scholarship has denounced this event 
to be a fabrication, arguing that the actual reason of the acquittal of Phryne can be 
found in a play by the comedian Posidippus of Cassandreia (316 -250 BC).435 In his 
Ephesia (as quoted by Athenaeus, IV, 150), Posidippus reports that Phryne herself 
appealed to the judges to save her life by clasping the hand of every single judge.  
 
If the actual charge against Phryne, like Derenne suggested, had been kainotheism, it 
no longer appears to have been severe enough to be sentenced to death, as a later case 
of asebeia in 324 BC seems to corroborate. This case concerns the orator Demades, 
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who was accused of kainotheism, because he wished to add a deified Alexander the 
Great to the Dodekatheon as a new, thirteenth god.436 He was eventually condemned 
to pay a vast fine of ten talents.  
 
One year later, Eurymedon, the hierophant, accused Aristotle of impiety for similar 
reasons.437 According to Diogenes Laertius (V, 5-6), the charge was based on the 
composition of a hymn to Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus, whose concubine Aristotle 
was able to marry. Diogenes quotes the actual hymn in its entirety, and especially the 
last lines appear to have triggered the charge: 
 
“Therefore shall his deeds be sung, and the Muses, the daughters of Memory, shall make him immortal, 
exalting the majesty of Zeus, guardian of strangers, and the grace of lasting friendship.” (transl. R.D. 
Hicks).438 
 
Similar to Phryne and Demades, the charge of impiety against Aristotle also 
concerned a matter of kainotheism as the hymn to Hermias was clearly composed to 
justify the deification of the deceased Hermias. In the same paragraph, Diogenes also 
reports that Aristotle eventually escaped prosecution (and execution), because 
hemlock was unavailable at the time due to draught. Another ancient source (Aelian, 
Various Histories, III, 36), seems to acknowledge the danger Aristotle was facing, 
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stating that Aristotle fled Athens while saying “that he would not allow Athenians to 
sin twice against philosophy”.  
 
In the cases of Demades and Aristotle, political factors could have been more decisive 
in the charge of impiety rather than accusations of kainotheism as both were closely 
aligned with Macedonian rule. This assumption could also include Theophrastus, 
who, despite his metic status, had been allowed to acquire land by means of support 
from his personal friend, Demetrius of Phaleron.439 When he was accussed of impiety 
by Agnonides (the reason remains unknown440) between 319-315 BC, his popular 
status in Athens was deemed so highly that Agnonides almost faced prosecution 
himself.441 Diogenes Laertius also relates this outcome to the political support 
Theophrastus enjoyed from Cassander and Ptolemy I.  
 
Political intervention from (pro-)Macedonian rule can also be put forward in the cases 
of the last known philosophers faced with asebeia. This concerned Stilpo (Diogenes 
Laertius, II, 115) and Theodorus of Cyrene (Diogenes Laertius, II, 101). This 
presumably limited their sentences to mere expulsion. Despite the fact that 
philosophers like Stilpo and Theodorus could rely on political protection, the general 
animosity in Athenian society with regard to matters of atheism and impiety does not 
appear to have vanished near the end of the 4th century BC. This assumption can be 
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confirmed by testimonies in which Stilpo and Bion of Borysthenes reflect upon public 
odium and the intellectual discretion that should be taken into consideration when 
discussing the (in)existence of the gods openly.442  
 
The actual dates of the impiety trials of Stilpo and Theodorus are difficult to pinpoint, 
but they must definitely be situated during the rule of Demetrius Phalereus (317-307 
BC). In any case, the impiety trial of Stilpo must be situated earlier than that of 
Theodorus, because the latter publicly contemplates on the trial of Stilpo.443 This 
indicates that Theodorus was still present in Athens when Stilpo was put on trial.  
O’Sullivan argues that the trial of Theodorus belongs to the second half of the 
Phalerean regime (between 312-307 BC) while Winiarczyk is more confident to 
situate the trial at ca. 309 BC.444 Based on information from Diogenes Laertius (II, 
115-117), I am more inclined to pinpoint the impiety trial of Theodorus at 308 BC.445 
 
From the case of Demades on, asebeia appears to have been reduced to a political 
instrument which conservative democratic forces in Athens employed to criminalize 
associates of the (pro-)Macedonian government, but after the trial of Theodorus of 
Cyrene the phenomenon of asebeia-trials seems to have lost its impact, in all 
probability, because Macedonian rule eventually prevailed and introduced a new 
phenomenon, namely the institution of ruler-cult.446  This loss of effectiveness most 
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likely resulted in the disappearance of asebeia as a legal procedure, considering the 
fact that no cases have been reported after ca. 307 BC. It is also quite safe to assume 
that, if asebeia would still have been punishable in Athens after 300 BC, Epicurus 
would have certainly been subjected to prosecution, considering the ‘hostile’ attitude 
of Epicureanism with regard to many aspects of popular Athenian religion (e.g., 
disbelief in divination and the divine character of the heavenly bodies).447 
 
The fact that philosophers associated with atheism were no longer found guilty of 
asebeia could only be the result of the political tool asebeia had become in the last 
quarter of the 4th century BC. Once the struggle between conservative democrats and 
Macedonian supporters ended after 307 BC, the juridical procedure of asebeia had 
become obsolete. The Macedonian kings installed oligarchic regimes, which 
systematically eliminated key democratic institutions such as the People’s Courts and 
expelled large numbers of low-class citizens, who traditionally formed the back-bone 
of conservative democracy.448 The city-state of Athens would lose all political and 
military importance after 307 BC and remained mainly a cultural and philosophical 
center.449 Many philosophical and rhetorical schools thrived and therefore, a 
revitalization of the procedure of asebeia-trials, which often targeted philosophers and 
orators, would probably not have been considered to be a beneficial policy of 
Athenian authorities.450 
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Another important development in early Hellenistic Athens appears to have been a 
shift in the nature of asebeia. Charges of impiety no longer concerned transgressions 
against the gods (of the state), but rather offences against the ruler-cult. The most 
apparent example of this evolution is ‘the divine’ Demetrius Poliorcetes, the 
Antagonid who ruled Athens from 307 BC (after the expulsion of Demetrius of 
Phaleron) until 301 BC (while returning to power from 294 to 287 BC). From 304 BC 
on, he seems to have taken the divine honours bestowed upon him quite literary by 
identifying himself ostentatiously with Dionysus451. As such, Demetrius Poliorcetes 
ordered religious measures, which most Athenians must have experienced as plainly 
provocative. For instance, he resided in the temple of Apollo Delios and demanded 
that the schedule of the Eleusinian Mysteries would by adapted to his own 
convenience.452  
 
Nevertheless, the multiple divine honours that were attributed to Demetrius 
Poliorcetes indicate that Athenians were willing to recognize him as a god, but this 
might have been the simple result of public fear and intimidation.453 Once Demetrius 
disappeared from the Athenian political scene, divine honours were quickly 
withdrawn.454 
 
We can conclude this section with the assumption that the core of impiety trials 
should not be limited to the period of the Peloponnesian War or its immediate 
aftermath, as Peter Garnsey argued. After the trial of Socrates, the efficiency of 
asebeia did not diminish in the course of the 4th century BC. One could even argue 
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that once asebeia became a matter of the Areopagus (ca. 355 BC) in stead of the 
People’s Courts, the verdicts might have become more severe, given the death 
sentences of Archias, Theoris and Nino(n).455 But then again, the outcome of asebeia-
trials appears to have been always susceptible to arbitrariness. If a defendant could 
display enough inventiveness and persuasion or rely on a sufficient amount of 
political support, the eventual verdict of the Athenian juridical institutions could be 
less severe.    
 
Moreover, the general tendency within Hellenistic philosophy to endorse 
philosophical theology resulted at most in a ‘soft atheism’ that did not principally 
conflict with religious orthodoxy or orthopraxy. This did not stimulate the 
reinstallment of impiety trials. The old argument of Drachmann that the theoretical 
denial of the gods could have been tolerated near the end of the fourth century BC, on 
the condition that public worship was not neglected is in this regard no longer 
defensible, in my opinion.456 According to Drachmann, the distinction between a 
theoretical and a practical denial of the existence of the gods had to be situated in a 
strict distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘ritual’. So, one could uphold a disbelief in the 
gods of the Athenian city-state, but as long as such a (theoretical) disbeliever 
participated in ritual activities, impiety legislation should not have been implemented. 
But we simply have no evidence to support such theory. Moreover, ancient sources 
appear to contradict this hypothesis: the participation in worship by those associated 
with impiety was undesirable.457 Drachmann’s argument, which is based on the fact 
that Carneades did not face any prosecution -although he used dialectical arguments 
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against the existence of the gods-, is not particularly valid.458 Carneades was not 
believed to be an atheist, but rather an anti-dogmatist with regard to (mainly) Stoic 
‘pantheist’ theology.459  The case of Carneades once again demonstrates that 
accusations of atheism had become a philosophical issue in the Hellenistic period with 
no apparent implications on the social level.  
 
In my opinion, the lack of a unified and autonomous body of juridical organisms to 
deal with impiety in Athens in the early Hellenistic period in combination with a shift 
in the approach to atheism, namely from a social dimension (being a punishable act 
against eusebeia) to a more philosophical one (atheism being a recurrent issue in early 
Hellenistic philosophical debate and polemics) is what could have caused the 
disappearance of impiety trials.460 Whereas Plato still examined atheism as a form of 
impiety, which he compared with disease and pollution461, atheism after 300 BC must 
be considered a purely intellectual topic with no immediate social implications. Only 
Hellenistic philosophical schools would now deal with the matter of atheism and any 
indication of ‘atheist’ or irreligious opinions outside the philosophical scope (e.g., 
religious relativism of a non-intellectual nature like Lysias’s description of Cinesias 
and his “Fellowship of the Bad Daemon”) seems to be lacking from the early 3rd 
century BC on.   
                                                      
458
 It has been recently suggested by Sedley (2013), p. 147-150 that Carneades might have been a 
positive atheist, because of his dialectical arguments on the non-existence of the gods (see Cicero, On 
the Nature of the Gods, III, 18 & Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 182-183) and the 
fact that we have no indication in sources that he had any theological beliefs himself.  But (as Sedley 
himself admits) it might be more plausible to classify Carneades as a negative atheist or agnostic, 
because his silence on the nature of the gods could indicate that he did not wish to speculate upon this 
matter, comparable to Protagoras and the Academic (Sceptic) principle of epochè (“suspension of 
judgment”). 
459
 Cicero, On the Nature of The Gods, III, 44. 
460
 See also Rubel (2000), p. 173-175, who relates, in opposition to Dover (1988), the phenomena of 
impiety trials to the concepts of xenophobia and religious fear in the period of the Peloponnesian War. 
In Rubel’s opinion, the impiety trials of sophists must be regarded as a reaction to a religious crisis in 
the late 5th century BC. A common fear of the impact of sophists on the demos through education of 
Athenian youth characterized this crisis. 
461
 Plato, Laws, X, 888b; 889e-890b; 900a-900b & 908c. 
     230 
This, however, should not lead to the conclusion that Greek or Athenian society 
displayed more tolerance of irreligious behaviour after 300 BC. In this context, we 
can once again refer to a passage from Demonax (11) by Lucian, which illustrates that 
Athenian society would remain hostile to (negative) atheism (in the case of Demonax) 
or irreligious behaviour in general, even centuries after the disappearance of a 
juridical system that condemned such ‘inappropriate’ behaviour. 
 
Chapter 12: conclusions 
 
I have attempted, in this second part of the dissertation, to analyze deviant religious 
behaviour as a social phenomenon in relation to ancient Greek religion. Without a 
doubt, its perception in ancient Greek religion and society was negative. Due to the 
association with asebeia, unorthodox religious doctrines and behaviour conflicted 
with the very fundamentals of Greek piety, i.e. the preservation and continuation of 
ancestral customs, which was translated as reverence for one’s parents, the dead and 
the gods, as can be observed in Lycurgus’s creed (Against Leocrates, 94).  
 
Whether it concerned the antitheism of Diagoras and Theodorus, the kainotheism of 
Socrates and Aristotle or the naturalism of Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia, all 
forms of speculation on the nature or existence of the gods were experienced as an 
altering of ancestral customs and thus interpreted as not accepting the gods in the 
proper way that tradition dictated. The logical outcome of such attitude was an official 
charge of impiety to be carried out by conservative prosecutors such as Meletus (in 
the case of Socrates) or Pseudo-Lysias (in the case of Andocides), but this conviction 
also resonates in literary accounts like On The Sacred Disease in the Hippocratic 
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Corpus.  Although this treatise aims at the elimination of superstition concerning 
‘divine’ diseases in favour of natural causes, it did associate the phenomenon of θεοὺς 
οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν (εἶναι) or ‘not believing in the existence of the gods’ with ‘impiety’. The 
analysis of the various Greek expressions, dealing with irreligious behaviour, does 
furthermore indicate that θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν and similar expressions from the late 5th 
century BC on mostly referred to ‘disbelief’462 and not to ‘nonconformity in cultic 
practices’, as some scholars have defended.463  
 
It should nevertheless be noted that this dichotomy between ‘disbelief’ and 
‘nonconformity in cultic practices’ was not a strict one. The absence of cultic 
participation was regarded as an indication that one did not believe in the existence of 
the gods. Ritual performances acted as the visible proof to civic society that belief in 
the gods was present in its individual members. This prevalence of a cognitive 
approach on θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν over a non-cognitive approach should not only be 
attributed to the fact that in the current debate within classical studies the ritualist 
approach to ancient Greek religion is crumbling away464, but also to the compatibility 
displayed in Plato’s Laws between θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν (εἶναι) and purely cognitive 
expressions such as θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ ἡγεῖσθαι (εἶναι), which Plato relates to a atheist mind-
set of naturalist and sophist signature.465 
 
Like Plato, ancient Greek (i.e. Athenian) society experienced this intellectual type of 
irreligious behaviour as dangerous, especially towards youth, and also it associated 
with religious vandalism and anti-democratic or oligarchic aspirations (cf. Alcibiades 
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and Andocides). Aristophanes’s play Clouds in the 420s BC already recognized this 
sophist mind-set as being very attractive to youth, but unproductive in educating a 
future generation of Athenian citizens. The only merit of the ‘school of Socrates the 
Melian’ in Clouds appears to be the teaching of reversed nomoi, resulting in 
disrespect for parents (e.g., the justification of a son beating his father), which 
conflicts with the basic principles of Greek piety.  
 
The fact that sophist philosophers were eventually targeted and charged of impiety by 
Athenian authorities seems to be a logical outcome of the perception of sophist 
thought and its association with θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν. But, in all probability, not only 
sophists were accused of disbelief in the gods. Aristophanes’s character of the 
‘Socrates the Melian’ is most likely a mixture of sophist, atomist and naturalist 
thought. Ionic naturalism was associated with disbelief, because it questioned the 
divine character of the heavenly bodies, similar to the way the mechanistic physics 
and cosmology of atomism were associated with the exclusion of divine impulse. The 
Diopeithes-decree, the legal impetus for the system of impiety trials, however, seems 
to have targeted initially only naturalist philosophy for professing ‘inappropriate 
opinions about the heavenly things’ of which Anaxagoras could have fell victim as 
early as ca. 437/6 BC. Literary accounts seem to indicate that eventually all forms of 
nonconformist opinions concerning divine existence were liable to the Diopeithes-
decree.  
 
Notwithstanding this, it cannot be denied that the initial system of asebeia-trials might 
have been a political instrument to undermine the authority and popularity of Pericles 
and, as such, it could have faded away quite unnoticed in the late 5th century BC. Due 
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to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, however, and most definitely because of 
the impact of the religious scandals of 415 BC, impiety trials would now become the 
ideal means in Classical Athens to vindicate all inappropriate views on divine 
existence.466 As the different cases from 415 BC on indicate, all deviant ideas about 
traditional Greek belief were now suitable to prosecution, until the system of impiety 
trails eventually became defunct in Hellenistic Athens from the early 4th century BC 
on, due to fundamental sociopolitical changes the city-state experienced under 
Macedonian rule.467 
 
Due to the loss of autonomous legislation to deal with expressions of irreligious 
behaviour, the matter of ‘atheism’ would become more an intellectual topic with little 
implications on the social level, but this shift is also related to the changing nature of 
atheism during the Hellenistic period, as will be discussed in the fourth part of the 
dissertation. 
 
By concluding this part on the social perception of deviant religious behaviour and, 
with our description of positive atheism in Antiquity in mind, we should now be able 
to determine the concrete significance and impact of this extreme type of atheism on 
Greek society and philosophy, based on the following case studies of two distinctive 
atheoi, Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene. Their actions and writings fit the 
label ‘positive atheism’ most credibly, as will be demonstrated in the now following 
part of the dissertation. 
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PART 3: Case studies of positive atheism in Antiquity  
 
In this third part, I shall systematically analyze the historical sources and different 
modern theories regarding two distinctive atheoi in Classical Antiquity, namely 
Diagoras of Melos (ca. 470 – ca. 400 BC) and Theodorus of Cyrene (ca. 345 – ca. 275 
BC) in order to evaluate their actions and writings as examples of positive atheism in 
Antiquity. Both case studies will essentially have an identical structure. Firstly, I shall 
reconstruct the life and doctrines of both philosophers by paying attention to their 
atheist actions and writings. Secondly, I will focus on the interaction between the 
philosophical doctrines of each atheos and the sociopolitical context in which their 
atheism was ventilated.  
 
But first of all, I want to clearify an ongoing debate on the precise interpretation of the 
epithet ὁ ἄθεος in the case of Diagoras. Must we speak of Diagoras ‘the Atheist’ or 
Diagoras ‘the Godless’?1  
 
Chapter 13: ‘the Atheist’ or ‘the Godless’? : The meaning of the epithet  
ὁ ἄθεος (ho atheos) 
 
In addition to the fact that both Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene are often 
interrelated within ancient sources, they are also the only two philosophers who were 
characterized in Antiquity by the distinctive epithet ὁ ἄθεος (ho atheos). In popular 
books on general history, science and philosophy, Diagoras of Melos is often 
                                                      
1
 Sedley (2013), p. 141. See also Winiarczyk (2016), p. 61-62. 
     235 
considered to be the first self-declared atheist in (Western) history.2 This opinion has 
been derived from the field of classical studies, which identifies Diagoras of Melos 
(and to a lesser extent Theodorus of Cyrene) as the archetypal atheist.3 This is not 
even a recent view: Marsilio Ficino, a Florentine humanist, already reported in 1454 
in his Tractatus de deo et anima vulgaris (129-130) that, 
 
“Only Diagoras among all philosophers denies explicitly that God exists. Protagoras and Theodorus did 
not overtly deny God but doubted whether he existed or not. For this reason Diagoras was called by the 
name ‘The Atheist’ (sanza Dio), and Protagoras was exiled and his books burned. Leucippus, 
Democritus, Epicurus, Hermachus, Menoeceus, Aristippus, Metrodorus, and Lucretius admitted that 
God existed, but was thought to be in such tranquility that he neither orders nor cares for anything 
outside himself.” (transl. D.J.-J. Robichaud)  
 
This particular passage does indicate that Ficino already distinguished different forms 
of ancient Greek atheism, namely radical atheism (Diagoras), agnosticism 
(Protagoras) and deism (Atomists and Epicureans). The reasoning behind the 
identification of Theodorus as an (Protagorean) agnostic, rather than an extreme 
atheist, by Ficino could be the simple fact that both philosophers produced a similar 
literary output: both wrote a Peri Theōn in which the (in)existence of the Gods was 
discussed. 
 
But another striking element in the passage by Ficino is the translation of the epithet 
ho atheos. It is important to observe that the Greek adjective ἄθεος (or its Latin variant 
atheus) did not have a translation in any 15th century European vernacular language. 
Therefore, Ficino translated Diagoras ho atheos as sanza Dio (literally ‘the Godless’). 
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Modern scholars like Woodbury, Winiarczyk, Dunbar and, most recently, Sedley have 
suggested that Diagoras ho atheos in fact meant ‘the Godless’ and not ‘the Atheist’ in 
the sense of ‘not believing in the gods’.4 Sedley even claims that Diagoras was known 
as ho atheos by his contemporaries in the later fifth century BC.5 Unfortunately, 
Sedley does not verify this claim by any ancient source. This is not so surprising in 
my opinion, because there simply is no ancient evidence to support this claim.  
 
But let us first turn to Drachmann and Winiarczyk, who have both defended the idea 
that ‘atheism’ in the sense of a distinctive philosophical disbelief in the gods did not 
exist in the days of Diagoras ho atheos.6 This would implicate that Diagoras was not a 
denier of the existence of the Greek gods, but merely a denier of popular religion or a 
ridiculer of religious traditions, comparable to Lysias’s depiction of the nonconformist 
poet Cinesias. Any historical (late 5th century BC) reference to Diagoras ho atheos 
should thus be interpreted as ‘the Godless’ in stead of ‘the Atheist’. In my opinion, 
this is not a very solid argument for different reasons.  
 
Firstly, contemporary sources from the late 5th century BC were not familiar with the 
epithet ὁ ἄθεος. Aristophanes, for instance, never mentioned it in any reference to 
Diagoras. The epithet is indubitably a later attribution of which the earliest 
(preserved) references can be found in Diodorus Siculus’s Historical Library (XIII, 6) 
and Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods (I, 63). Cicero definitely applied the epithet ὁ 
ἄθεος in the philosophical sense of denying the existence of the gods and most likely 
                                                      
4
 Woodbury (1965), p.208-211; Winiarczyk (1980), p.73; Dunbar (1995), p. 581 & Sedley (2013), 
p.141. 
5
 Sedley (2013)², p. 331. 
6
 Drachmann (1922), p. 32-33 & Winiarczyk (1980), p.73. 
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relied on (lost) sources such as the atheist catalogues of Clitomachus (late 2nd century 
BC) , which possibly relied on Philochorus (early 3rd century BC).7 
 
Secondly, Greek literature in the 5th century BC was indeed familiar with the adjective 
ἄθεος, but it meant ‘godless’ in the sense of being ‘cruel’ or ‘depraved’ in regard to 
ancestral customs (i.e. parents, the dead and the gods).8 In this sense, it appeared in 
tragedies by Aeschylus (Eumenides, 151), Sophocles (Trachiniae, 1036) and 
Euripides (Andromache, 491), but also in the form of the adverb ἀθέως in the pleas 
(Against the Stepmother for Poisoning, 21 & 23 and First Tetralogy, 13) of the early 
Attic orator Antiphon (ca. 480- ca. 411 BC).   
 
As early as Pseudo-Lysias’s Against Andocides from 400 BC, we can, however, detect 
a shift in the meaning of atheos from ‘being godless (against ancestral customs)’ to 
‘denying the existence of the gods’. In this plea, the Athenian citizen Andocides is 
being accused of participation in the religious scandals of 415 BC. In passage 17, the 
impiety of Andocides is being compared to that of Diagoras of Melos by the use of  
ἀσεβέστερος (“more impious”), most likely because of the fact that Andocides was an 
Athenian citizen, while the impiety of Diagoras did not pose a real treat to the 
respectability of Athenian ancestral customs, due to his metic status.9 The impiety of 
Andocides is consequently experienced as being more severe than the impiety of 
Diagoras, because it involved impiety against one’s own city-state.10  
                                                      
7
 See Müller (1967), p. 158 & Winiarczyk (1976), p. 37-38 on this matter. 
8
 On this matter, see the creed by Lycurgus, as dicussed in Mikalson (1998), p. 11-14 & Pseudo-
Aristotle, Virtues and Vices, 1250b2-1251a2. 
9
 Janko (2001), p. 10. 
10
 Furley (1996), p. 109. See also Dover (1988), p. 137, who argues that the impiety of Diagoras being 
less heinous than that of Andocides is an example of the Greek tendency to fuse patriotism and piety.  
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But this is not the only possible comparison between Andocides and Diagoras. In 
paragraph 32, we detect the occurrence of ἀθεωτέρος the comparative of ἄθεος in stead 
of ἀσεβέστερος. Although Diagoras is not mentioned in paragraph 32, the summarizing 
of different regrettable facts from Andocides’s life (e.g., being an exile and outlaw11) 
has striking analogies with the life of Diagoras.  
 
Why did Pseudo-Lysias now make use of ἄθεος instead of ἀσέβης? In my opinion, the 
answer is situated in paragraph 19.  In this paragraph, the author once again makes an 
implicit comparison between Diagoras and Andocides, by arguing that the Athenians 
cannot, on the one hand, outlaw an alien offender (like Diagoras) by means of a 
reward of one silver talent for his capturing, but, at the same time, acquit a domestic 
offender, who “has made it plain to all Greeks that he does not believe in the gods” 
(ἐπεδείξατο δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὅτι θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζει). In the translation of Against 
Andocides by Maidment (1962 edition), θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν is interpreted as ‘not 
revering the gods’, possibly in analogy with the context of Lysias (Against 
Eratosthenes, 9), in which Peison, one of the Thirty Tyrants (according to 
Xenophon’s Hellenica 2.3.2), is depicted as being deceitful, because “he does not 
honour gods or men” (οὔτε θεοὺς οὔτ’ ἀνθρώπους νοµίζει).  
 
The context of the plea against Andocides and the different comparisons with 
Diagoras does not allow such interpretation.12 Rather, it must be translated in 
correlation with Aristophanes’s Clouds (819), in which Strepsiades commands his 
atheist son Pheidippides “to believe in Zeus” (τὸν ∆ία νοµίζειν).13 Bearing in mind that 
                                                      
11
 Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 19 & 29. 
12
 In passage 42, Andocides is being compared to Batrachos, a ruthless informer of the Thirty, 
operating in 404-403 BC. The gods have as much value for Andocides as human life had to Batrachos.  
13
 Fahr (1969), p. 105. 
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the asebeia-trial of Andocides in 400 BC actually concerned his involvement as a 
young man in the religious scandals of 415 BC, the analogy with atheist youngsters, 
such as Pheidippides, becomes evident: as a young man, Andocides behaved in such 
manner that he must have assumed that there were no gods.14  Identifying Andocides 
by the adjective ἄθεος, does not merely indicate that he is ‘godless’ in the sense of 
being depraved in regard to ancestral customs. He is an actual denier of the existence 
of the gods.15  
 
Moreover, the analogy with Diagoras could not be convincing if ἄθεος still referred to 
the element of disrespect for ancestral customs, because his religious offence was 
alien (ἀλλότριόν) to the Athenians. Pseudo-Lysias does not regard θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν and 
ἄθεος both as detached forms of religious offences. The accused Andocides is guilty 
of ‘not believing in the gods’, because his similarities with the ἄθεος Diagoras makes 
Andocides ἄθεος as well.16 The only difference is that Pseudo-Lysias (17) interprets 
the atheism of Diagoras as a verbal phenomenon (λόγῳ), while the atheism of 
Andocides had a practical nature (ἔργῳ).  
 
In Plato’s Apology (26c), from ca. 395 BC, ἄθεος, without a doubt, would now mean 
‘denying the existence of the gods’, while in Laws (XII, 966e-967c) from ca. 360 BC, 
the coined term ἀθεότης represents an intellectual (i.e. naturalist and sophist) mind-set 
in which the gods, heavenly bodies, divine justice and providence are being denied in 
favour of a mechanistic worldview.  Moreover, in Apology (26c), ἄθεος and θεοὺς οὐ 
νοµίζειv (εἶναι) have identical semantic implications and can be utilized synonymously, 
                                                      
14
 Fahr (1969), p. 106. 
15
 For the different expressions of ancestral custom (πάτριοι νόµοι, τὰ πάτρια, τὰ νοµιζόµενα), with 
references to ancient (literary and epigraphical) sources, see Yunis (1988), p. 53, n.34. 
16
 Janko (2001), p. 10. 
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but the first attempt herein can be detected as early as Pseudo-Lysias. Earlier sources 
such as Aristophanes, for instance, would not have been able to fully describe the 
nature of the philosophical atheism of Diagoras of Melos due to a lack of adequate 
‘atheist’ terminology as the semantic meaning of atheos would only gradually begin 
to encompass a philosophical subtext from 400 BC on.  
 
So, we can conclude that ca. 400 BC the adjective ἄθεος did already mean ‘atheist’ in 
the sense of ‘not believing in the existence of the gods’ instead of the more general 
meaning of ‘godless’.17 From this, we can deduce that any reference to Diagoras ho 
atheos signifies Diagoras ‘the Atheist’, in the sense of ‘The Disbeliever’, bearing in 
mind that the epithet is a later attribution (3rd - 1st century BC at the latest) that 
enabled writers to identify the specific nature of Diagoras’s actions and behaviour in 
regard to divine matters more adequate, because contemporary sources mostly lacked 
the specific terminology to do so.18 
 
Chapter 14: Diagoras of Melos (ca. 470 – ca. 400 BC) 
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the most fitting candidates to be labeled a ‘positive 
atheist’ in Classical Antiquity is arguably Diagoras of Melos. Although an obscure 
philosopher at first sight19, he is commonly identified as the quintessential atheist in 
Antiquity.20  
                                                      
17
 See also Ostwald (1986), p. 274, n. 281, who translates the semantic shift of ἄθεος from “forsaken 
by the gods” to “forsaking the gods”. 
18
 Ostwald (1986), p. 274. 
19
 Diagoras of Melos has no entry in Diels-Kranz’ Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. He appears to be the 
only Presocratic philosopher associated with atheism that is omitted in Diels-Kranz. A possible reason 
could be the common 19th-20th century idea to consider Diagoras as a lyric poet in stead of a genuine 
philosopher. Contrastively, the politician and poet Critias does have an entry in Diels-Kranz. 
20
 Jacoby (1959), p.16; Fahr (1969), p.91 & Drozdek (2007), p. 119. 
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This extensive case study will provide a complete analysis of the life, actions and 
writings of Diagoras with the intent of the determining the precise nature of his 
atheism. Does this meet the requirements of ‘positive atheism’ or does it rather 
concern a mere denial of the popular expressions of ancient Greek religion? But in 
order to reach these objectives, we first need to examine the diversity of historical 
sources on Diagoras more closely. 
 
14.1) systematic analysis of the historical sources on Diagoras 
 
More than one hundred historical sources, ranging from contemporary (late 5th 
century BC) sources to 11th century Byzantine and Arab sources, have been preserved 
with specific information about the life and actions of Diagoras of Melos.  
 
All these testimonies, along with the historical sources on the life and atheism of 
Theodorus of Cyrene, have been classified by Marek Winiarczyk in his source book 
Diagorae Melii et Theodori Cyrenaei Reliquiae (Teubner 1981), which has been a 
most helpful instrument for this part of the research. Nevertheless its importance for 
retrieving all preserved sources on Diagoras and Theodorus, Winiarczyk’ source book 
is primarily arranged in a thematical order (e.g., De Diagorae verbis Samothracae 
factis or De Herculis statua a Diagora in focum iacta), with only secondary attention 
to the different literary traditions that have handed down or even shaped the existing 
(and sometimes inconsistent and conflicting) information on Diagoras.  
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In this chapter, I will systematically analyze and evaluate the different literary 
traditions that have preserved concrete information on Diagoras, which will enable us 
to reconstruct his life and atheist actions in the subsequent chapter of the case study.   
 
 14.1.1) contemporary sources on Diagoras 
 
Scarce, but essential information on the nature of the atheism of Diagoras can be 
retrieved from the contemporary sources. Information from these sources is 
particularly important, because it can support the idea that the extreme nature of 
Diagoras’s atheism was not an invention of a later (Hellenistic) historiographical or 
biographical tradition.  
 
We can divide the contemporaneous sources on Diagoras basically into two types of 
sources: we have information from a) comic playwrights such as Hermippus and 
Aristophanes, and we possess b) one logographical account, namely a plea (Against 
Andocides) by Pseudo-Lysias.  
 
The comic playwright Hermippus is the oldest source on Diagoras. In a fragment from 
his play Fates (F43 K/A, preserved in Suda Ι 15: Ἴακχος) from 430 BC, Diagoras is 
associated with τερθρεία (‘trickery’), which could be a possible reference to a sophist 
profession.21 Another allusion by Hermippus appears to be the unusual tallness of 
Diagoras. Hermippus compares the height of Diagoras with that of a ‘fast growing 
person’.22  
                                                      
21
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, I, 17 & II, 30. 
22
 On this matter, see Jacoby (1959), p.9 who doubts the idea that Cleon could have been ‘the fast 
growing person’, based on Plutarch (Pericles, 33,7) who appears to suggest such by quoting another 
passage from Fates. 
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Aristophanes mentions Diagoras in three different plays: Clouds (830) of which the 
earliest version must be situated in 423 BC and its revised edition in 418 BC, besides 
Birds (1073) from 414 BC and Frogs (320) from 403 BC. In Clouds, Diagoras is 
referred to as ‘Socrates the Melian’, the headmaster of a sophist school, who claims 
that ‘Zeus does not exist’ (οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεύς).23 An allusion to the dead warrant of 
Diagoras can be found in Birds: ‘A talent for him who shall kill Diagoras of Melos’ 
(ἢν ἀποκτείνῃ τις ὑµῶν ∆ιαγόραν τὸν Μήλιον,λαµβάνειν τάλαντον), while Frogs contains a 
reference to the ridiculing of the Eleusinian Mysteries by Diagoras in the form of 
wordplay (δι᾽ἀγορᾶς). Based on this passage, we might assume that Athenian 
audiences still had vivid memories of Diagoras’s atheism more than 10 years after his 
departure from Athens. 
 
In the logographical account (Against Andocides, 17) by Pseudo-Lysias from 400 BC, 
we find confirmation of the metic status of Diagoras.24 In the same passage, the 
atheism of Diagoras is identified as asebeia and compared to the impiety of the 
accused Andocides, an Athenian orator, who was believed to have participated in the 
religious scandals of 415 BC.25 Pseudo-Lysias considers the impiety of Diagoras to be 
of lesser evil, because it was not aimed at his own city and only concerned impiety in 
                                                      
23
 Aristophanes, Clouds, 828. 
24
 On the possible identity of Pseudo-Lysias, see Marr (1971), p. 334, n.1 & Furley (1996), p. 104 who 
both believe it to be one of the four prosecutors Andocides explicitly mentions in On the Mysteries, 92-
95. This could either be Meletus, Epichares or Agyrrhius, but certainly not Cephisius, as the latter is 
described by Pseudo-Lysias in paragraph 42 as a dubious character. In any case, the author reveals in 
paragraph 54 that he is the grandson of Diocles, son of Zacorus, the hierophant. Therefore, it seems 
likely that he was a member of the Eumolpidae, the priesthood of the Mysteries, which could explain 
his religious zelotism.  
25
 The age of Andocides at the time of the Scandals of 415 BC can be derived from Against Andocides 
46, which mentions the fact that Andocides is ‘more than forty years old’ at the time of his trial in 
400BC, meaning that he was about twenty-five years of age when the scandals took place. See also 
Furley (1996), p. 49 on this matter. 
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speech (λόγῳ) and not in act (ἔργῳ).26 Because impiety was always considered to be 
an act, the reference to λόγῳ should not imply that late 5th century BC Athenians 
considered the atheism of Diagoras to be a mere eccentric theory with no practical 
implications.27 The statement of Pseudo-Lysias could be interpreted as follows: 
Diagoras did not participate in the religious scandals, but he nevertheless could have 
inspired the perpetrators with his atheist logos.28  
 
 14.1.2) Hellenistic sources 
 
The Hellenistic sources on Diagoras must be treated with caution due to the different 
nature of these sources, developed over a course of multiple centuries. We can 
roughly divide these sources into 2 groups: 
 
  14.1.2.1) early historiographical sources 
    
The Atthidographer Melanthius (ca. 350 BC – ca. 270 BC) and the historiographer 
Craterus (ca. 321 BC – ca. 270 BC) have only been preserved in Σ. Ar. Av. 1073 and 
Σ. Ar. Ra. 320.29 They offer crucial historical information in regard to the offending of 
the Eleusinian Mysteries by Diagoras and his consecutive conviction by the 
Assembly. Melanthius mentions a ‘ridicule of the Mysteries and a discouraging of 
many from initiation’, while Craterus reports in his collection and commentary of 
Athenian decrees that Diagoras ‘revealed the Mysteries to all, making them common 
                                                      
26
 On the prominent aristocratic (Kerykes) background of Andocides, see Plutarch, Alcibiades, 21,1 & 
Pseudo-Plutarch, Andocides, 1) See also Davies (1971), p. 27-32; Ostwald (1986), p. 546-547 & Furley 
(1996), p. 49-52. 
27
 Mikalson (1983), p.92 & 137, n.6. 
28
 Dover (1988), p. 137. 
29
 On the lives of Melanthius and Craterus and their use of inscriptions (especially stelai), see Higbie 
(1999), p. 46-52. 
     245 
property and ridiculing them’.30 The preserved fragments of Melanthius (FGrHist 342 
F3) and Craterus (FGrHist 326 F16) in the Scholia in Aristophanem belong to the 
Scholia Vetera and must be situated in the early Hellenistic period (See 14.1.7: 
Scholia in Aristophanem).  
 
  14.1.2.2) philosophical and doxographical sources 
 
Eudemus of Rhodos (ca.370 BC – ca. 300 BC), a Peripatetic, could have been the 
oldest source that associated Diagoras with the philosophical meaning of ἄθεος in his 
lost book Περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἱστορία (History of Theology).31 Another Peripatetic, 
Aristoxenus of Tarentum (floruit 335 BC) is considered to be the second oldest source 
(c. 300 BC) that reflected on the atheist book of Diagoras, the so-called Ἀποπυργίζοντες 
λόγοι, while Epicurus is believed to be the oldest source to mention an atheist book by 
Diagoras ca. 310 BC.32 The former fragment is also preserved by Philodemus (On 
Piety, P.Herc. 1428, col XI-XII), but is believed to have been derived from the book 
Μαντινέων ἐγκώµιον (Praise of the Mantineans).33 Like Diogenes of Oenoanda (2nd 
century AD), the information on Diagoras’s atheism by Philodemus (ca. 110 – ca. 35 
                                                      
30
 Dunbar (1995), p. 581-582. 
31This can be attested by Diogenes of Oenoanda (fragment XI, col I-II Chilton= Fr. 16 I-III 14 Smith 
=Winiarczyk 1981 Diagoras T62): καὶ [τοὺς χρηστο]τάτους ὡς Ἀ[ναξαγόρα]ν κατατρέ[χουσιν· 
διὸ]  δὴ καὶ γενή[σεται δῆλον] ὡς οὐχὶ ἡ[µεῖς ἀναιρο]ῦµεν τοὺς [θεοὺς ἀλλ᾽ ἓτ]εροι. vacat 
[∆ιαγόρας µὲ]ν οὖν ὁ [Μήλιος ἐν] τῇ παρὰ [Εὐδήµῳ τῆς] δόξης [ἀποδείξει], ἄντι[κρυς εἶπε µὴ 
εἶν]αι θε[οὺς, σφόδρα δὴ] τοῖς [ἄλλα νοµίζουσιν] µαχεσάµενος. (“and they vehemently 
denounce persons like Anaxagoras as atheistic. And in fact it will become evident that it is not we who 
deny the gods, but others. Thus Diagoras of Melos, according to Eudemus, followed this theory and 
categorically asserted that the gods do not exist and vigorously attacked those who thought 
otherwise.”). See Jacoby (1959), p.15 & Winiarczyk (1976), p.37-38, who follows the edition of 
Chilton and argues that Eudemus of Rhodos’ treatise Περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἱστορία (On the history of 
religion) could have been the source for Diogenes of Oenoanda on the atheism of Diagoras.  For a 
different opinion, see Barnes (1979), vol. II, p.306 (n.11), who contests any reference to Eudemus and 
the edition by Smith (1993), p. 174, which does not restore the name of Eudemus in the epigraphical 
account. See also Smith (2003), p. 72-73. 
32
 This information is also preserved in Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col. 82, 1-18 (19, 519-
536). 
33
 Wehrli (1967), p.22 & 63 (fragment 45, I). 
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BC) must be classified as ‘doxographical’, because they primarily reflect the authentic 
opinions of Epicurus on the matter of radical atheism.34 These doxographical sources 
are indispensible in pointing out the extreme nature of the atheism of Diagoras (based 
on the expression θεοὺς/ θεῖον ἀναιρεῖν).35  
 
Philodemus, for example, attacked in P. Herc. 1428 Stoic theology, which reduces the 
gods to merely cosmological elements. Therefore, it is even worse than the supposed 
radical atheism of Diagoras, which could have been nothing more than a joke (ἔπαιξεν) 
to Aristoxenus.36 Apparently, Aristoxenus knew of the existence of a prose work with 
(radical) atheist content by Diagoras, but he could have believed it to be of a spurious 
nature, based on some pious poems of Diagoras he had discovered while visiting 
Mantinea.37 Aristoxenus deemed it illogical that a pious poet, who wrote an 
encomium for the citizens of Mantinea and who praised divine will in favour of 
Nicodorus of Mantinea, would have written a treatise that completely denied the 
existence of the gods.38  
 
As will be demonstrated in the historical reconstruction of the life of Diagoras, 
Aristoxenus is probably responsible for the fusion of two historical persons by the 
name ‘Diagoras of Melos’ (a mid 5th century BC lyric poet and a late 5th century BC 
sophist philosopher). Even the encomium for Nicodorus should not necessarily refer 
                                                      
34
 On Philodemus, see Obbink (1996) & Hordern (2001)², On Diogenes of Oenoanda, see Smith (1993) 
& Smith (2003). 
35
 In fr. 16 (Smith), Diogenes of Oenoanda equalizes the agnosticism of Protagoras with the radical 
atheism of Diagoras, which has led to criticism (Barnes (1982), p. 449-450) on Diogenes (supposed) 
poor ability to recognize atheism, but, as Smith (1993), p. 131 & Smith (2003), p. 72-73 rightly 
observes, from an Epicurean point of view, denying the gods was presumably regarded as severe as 
doubting of the gods. Even though the Epicureans did not believe in reciprocity between gods and men, 
they did emphasize the importance of worshipping the gods for reasons of moral emulation. 
36
 Hordern (2001)², p. 33. 
37
 Parker (1996), p. 208, n. 37. 
38
 See Whitmarsh (2016), p. 183 for a different opinion on this matter. 
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to the late 5th century BC sophist philosopher Diagoras, who wrote the constitution of 
Mantinea, as this could have been an encomium or even an epinician for the young 
boxing champion Nicodorus, written by the mid 5th century BC lyric poet Diagoras.39 
The fragment of Philodemus does not mention that the poem was composed in the 
later years of Nicodorus, when he was a lawgiver.40 According to Aelian (Various 
Histories, II, 23), Nicodorus asked the philosopher Diagoras to write a new 
constitution, probably between 425 and 418 BC.41 This early merging of two different 
persons by the name of Diagoras of Melos by Aristoxenus eventually led to the late 
Hellenistic tradition of an atheist ‘conversion’ of Diagoras that explained why a pious  
poet became a notorious atheist eventually.  
 
In another fragment (On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col. 82, 1-18 (19, 519-536)), in which 
Philodemus acknowledges the radical atheism of Diagoras, the earliest ‘list of 
atheists’ can be found. This was derived from the lost treatise On Nature (Book XII) 
by Epicurus. Carl W. Müller and Marek Winiarczyk, on the other hand, have argued 
that a contemporary of Epicurus, namely the Atthidographer Philochorus (floruit after 
300 BC) could also have provided an early index atheorum (e.g., Anaxagoras, 
Protagoras, Diagoras, Socrates, Theodorus) in the form of a treatise on various 
Athenian asebeia-trials.42  
 
                                                      
39
 Hordern (2001)², p. 3 suggests the poem to be an epicinian. 
40
 For an opposing view, see Winiarczyk (2016), p. 44, n. 13 & 48, n. 35. Winiarczyk’s argument 
depends entirely on the idea that von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1900), p. 80-83 situated the acme 
(468 BC) of Diagoras of Melos later, in order to save the literary tradition that Diagoras wrote the 
poems for a young Nicodorus and also rewrote the constitution of Mantinea for an old Nicodorus. 
Winiarczyk believes that the poems were written by Diagoras for an old Nicodorus during his stay in 
Mantinea between 425 and 418 BC, but he does not adopt the theory of Beloch (1916),vol.II², p.375 
that Aristoxenus might have confused the atheist and writer of the constitution with an earlier poet, also 
called Diagoras of Melos, who might have composed the poems for a young Nicodorus. 
41
 Winiarczyk (1979), p. 208-210. 
42
 Müller (1967), p. 158 & Winiarzyk (1976), p. 37-38. 
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The information on Diagoras’s atheism from Eudemus, Aristoxenus, Epicurus and 
Philochorus could have been borrowed by the Academic Sceptic Clitomachus (floruit 
127-110 BC).43 His (lost) treatise, Περὶ ἀθεότητος, is generally considered to be the 
first atheist catalogue.44 However, this theory is not without dispute: some scholars 
have suggested that the earliest atheist catalogue must more likely be attributed to the 
Stoic Posidonius (135 – 51 BC), namely his treatise Περὶ θεῶν, which would also have 
been the main source for the later indices by Cicero and Sextus Empiricus.45 Cicero 
(On the Nature of the Gods, I, 123) seems to suggest such, but Winiarczyk refutes this 
hypothesis and argues that both authors rather relied on Academic Sceptic sources 
instead of Stoic sources. Cicero probably relied on (lost) information from Philo of 
Larissa (154 – 84 BC), a pupil of Clitomachus of whom Cicero attented a lecture in 
Rome (Cicero, Brutus, 89.306), while Sextus Empiricus could have relied on (lost) 
information from Antiochus of Ascalon (ca. 125 – 68 BC), a pupil of Philo of 
Larissa.46  So, both Cicero and Sextus Empiricus appear to rely indirectly on the lost 
catalogue by Clitomachus.  
 
 14.1.3) Roman sources 
 
In this literary tradition, the oldest accounts are of important value due to their 
historical accuracy and significance. Diodorus Siculus, whose Historical Library was 
                                                      
43
 Winiarczyk (1976), p. 36-38 & 45. 
44
 Hermann Diels was the first scholar to suggest in his Doxograephi Graeci (1879) that Clitomachus 
was the author of a κατάλογος ἀθέων and also the main source for indices atheorum by Cicero (On 
the Nature of the Gods, I, 42) and Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians, IX, 50). Diels’ 
opinion is based on information by Theophilus (To Autolyckus, III, 7), which convinced some that a 
possible treatise by Clitomachus, called Περὶ ἀθεότητος, is the actual κατάλογος ἀθέων, but the 
theory is surely debatable. See Diels (1965), p.58-59,  Nestle (1940), p. 416, Fahr (1969), p. 176 & 
Winiarczyk (1976), p. 34.  
45
 Vick (1902), p. 232-248. 
46
 Winiarczyk (1976), p. 34-35. 
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published before 30 BC, is a vital source for stipulating the date of the conviction of 
Diagoras by the Athenian Assembly (415 BC).47  Concretely, Diodorus reports that, 
 
“While these events were taken place, Diagoras, who was dubbed “The Atheist”, was accused of 
impiety and, fearing the people, fled from Attica; and the Athenians announced a reward of a talent of 
silver to the man who should slay Diagoras. (transl. C.H. Oldfather)” 48 
 
The account by his older contemporary Cicero is the earliest (surviving) source that 
associates Diagoras with the epithet ἄθεος, most likely based on (lost) information by 
Clitomachus through Philo of Larissa. Cicero, on the other hand, also portrays a 
Diagoras characterized by a witty, whimsical and almost ‘Cynic’ behaviour,  
 
“But sometimes good men come to good ends. Yes, and we seize upon these cases and impute them 
with no reason to the immortal gods. Diagoras, named “the Atheist”, once came to Samothrace, and a 
certain friend said to him, ‘You who think that the gods disregard men’s affairs, do you not remark all 
the votive pictures that prove how many persons have escaped the violence of the storm, and come safe 
to port, by dint of vows to the gods?’ ‘That is so’, replied Diagoras; ‘it is because there are nowhere 
any pictures of those who have been shipwrecked and drowned at sea.’ On another voyage he 
encountered a storm which threw the crew of the vessel into a panic, and in their terror they told him 
that they had brought it on themselves by having taken him on board their ship. He pointed out to them 
a number of other vessels making heavy weather on the same course, and inquired whether they 
supposed that those ships also had a Diagoras on board.” (transl. H. Rackham) 49 
                                                      
47
 According to Meiggs (1972), p. 452-458 & Kopff (1990), p. 324, n. 19, Diodorus relied on Craterus 
and Melanthius in this passage, and, more generally, on the chronologies of Ephorus of Cyme (ca. 400 
– ca. 330 BC) through books XI to XVI.  
48
 Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, XIII, 6-7: Τούτων δὲ πραττοµένων ∆ιαγόρας ὁ κληθεὶς 
ἄθεος, διαβολῆς τυχὼν ἐπ᾽ ἀσεβείᾳ καὶ φοβηθεὶς τὸν δῆµον, ἔφυγεν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς· οἱ δ᾽ 
Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ ἀνελόντι ∆ιαγόραν ἀργυρίου τάλαντον ἐπεκήρυξαν. 
49 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, III, 89: At non numquam bonos exitus habent boni.’ Eos quidem 
arripimus attribuimusque sine ulla ratione dis immortalibus. At Diagoras cum Samothracam venisset, 
ἄθεος ille qui dicitur, atque ei quidam amicus ‘Tu, qui deos putas humana neglegere, nonne 
animadvertis ex tot tabulis pictis quam multi votis vim tempestatis effugerint in portumque salvi 
pervenerint?’ ‘Ita fit’ inquit, ‘illi enim nusquam picti sunt qui naufragia fecerunt in marique perierunt.’ 
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The accounts of Diagoras on the Samothrace offerings and the perils at sea, however, 
could have more in common with the Cynicism of Diogenes of Sinope than the 
atheism of Diagoras of Melos, as Diogenes Laertius seems to suggest.50 
 
Another historical value of the accounts by Cicero, apart from being the earliest 
preserved attestation of the epithet ὁ ἄθεος, is the fact that he is the oldest (preserved) 
source to connect Diagoras of Melos with the later Theodorus of Cyrene (floruit 300 
BC), which initiated a tradition of interlinking both atheists. This is the case in three 
separate paragraphs from (the 1st book of) On the Nature of the Gods: 
 
“As regards the present subject, for example, most thinkers have affirmed that the gods exist, and this is 
the most probable view and the one to which we are all led by nature’s guidance; but Protagoras 
declared himself uncertain, and Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene held that there are no gods 
at all.” (transl. H. Rackham)51 
 
“And what about Diagoras, who was called “the Atheist”, and later Theodorus who (both) openly 
denied the divine existence?” (transl. H. Rackham)52 
 
“As for freedom from superstition, which is the favourite boast of your (epicurean) school, that is easy 
to attain when you have deprived the gods of all power; unless perchance you think that it was possible 
                                                                                                                                                        
Idemque, cum ei naviganti vectores adversa tempestate timidi et perterriti dicerent non iniuria sibi illud 
accidere qui illum in eandem navem recepissent, ostendit eis in eodem cursu multas alias laborantis 
quaesivitque num etiam in iis navibus Diagoram vehi crederent.  
50
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VI, 59: Θαυµάζοντός τινος τὰ ἐν 
Σαµοθράκῃ ἀναθήµατα, ἔφη “πολλῳ ἂν ἦν πλείω εἰ καὶ οἱ µὴ σωθέντες ἀνετίθεσαν·” οἱ δὲ 
τοῦτο ∆ιαγόρου φασὶ τοῦ Μήλιου. (“When some one expressed astonishment at the votive offerings 
in Samothrace, his (i.e. Diogones of Sinope) comment was: “There would have been far more, if those 
who were not saved had set up offerings.” But others attribute this remark to Diagoras of Melos.”) 
(transl. R. D. Hicks). 
51
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 1: Velut in hac quaestione plerique (quod maxime veri simile 
est et quo omnes duce natura venimus) deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino 
Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. 
52
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 63: Quid, Diagoras, ἄθεος qui dictus est, posteaque Theodorus 
nonne aperte deorum naturam sustulerunt? 
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for Diagoras or Theodorus to be superstitious, who denied the existence of the gods altogether.” (transl. 
H. Rackham)53 
 
From Cicero on, it became common to interlink Diagoras with Theodorus of Cyrene, 
not only for Post-Hellenistic writers like Plutarch (On Common Conceptions (Against 
the Stoics), 1075a), Pseudo-Plutarch’s Epitome in Aetius (The Opinions of the 
Philosophers, I, 17)54 and Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians, IX, 53 & 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, III, 218-219), but also for Christian writers like Clement of 
Alexandria (Protrepticus, II, 24, 2-4) Minucius Felix (Octavius, VIII), Arnobius 
(Against the Heathen, IV, 29), Lactantius (Treatise on the Wrath of God, IX) and 
Theodoretus (A Cure of Greek Maladies or Knowledge of the Gospel Truth from the 
Greek Philosophy, II, 112  & III, 4) 
 
 14.1.4) Christian sources  
 
In contrast to Hellenistic writers, who sought historical, biographical or philosophical 
explanations for the typical atheism of Diagoras, the references to the atheism of 
Diagoras in Christian sources clearly serve apologetic purposes.55 Notwithstanding 
                                                      
53
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 117: Nam superstitione, quod gloriari soletis, facile est liberari 
cum sustuleris omnem vim deorum; nisi forte Diagoram aut Theodorum qui omnino deos esse negabant 
censes superstitiosos esse potuisse; 
54
 On a detailed analysis of the atheist catalogue of Aetius (epitomized by Pseudo-Plutarch), see Runia 
(1996), p. 542-576. 
55
 The Christian sources on Diagoras must be analyzed with caution, especially for their apologetic 
motifs. For example, the burning of the wooden statue of Heracles by Diagoras for the use of boiling 
his vegetables is mentioned for the first time by Athenagoras, according to Winarczyk (1981), p. 10. 
But this is could be contested, because the Scholia Vetera in Aristophanem, compiled by Symmachus, 
could predate Athenagoras by half a century. Perhaps the anecdote is an invention of early 
commentaries like Callimachus, Lycophron or Eratosthenes to illustrate the open and public character 
of Diagoras’s atheism? Winiarczyk (2016), p. 101, in contrast to Scheer (2000), p. 232-234, also 
believes that the anecdote of the wooden statue originated in the Hellenistic period, in analogy with the 
other anecdotes on Diagoras. However, the anecdote clearly serves a Christian apologetic purpose. 
Besides, Athenagoras is the only source to mention turnips (τὰς γογγύλας) being boiled by Diagoras, 
while the Scholia Vetera and all later sources mention lentils (τὸν φακόν).   The use of the burning of 
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the fact that the central theme in all Christian apologetic treatises is the attack on 
pagan deities56, we can distinguish an evolution in these attacks on polytheism. Early 
apologists like Tatian (120- 180 AD) tend to emphasize the rejection of idolatry and 
sacrifice, beside the moral and ethical evaluation of the behaviour of the Graeco-
Roman gods. For example, Tatian (Address to the Greeks, 27) mentions Diagoras in 
the context of the Eleusinian Mysteries, which he ridicules in the early chapters of his 
treatise.  
 
Later apologists, from Athenagoras of Athens (133 – 190 AD) on, aim their attention 
at the refutation of philosophical approaches on divine existence, especially those 
theories which identify divinity with natural forces or deny its existence. This 
assessment of the ‘subversive’ nature of the philosophical atheism of Diagoras 
reverberates in Minucius Felix’ Octavius VIII (ca. 200 AD) and Lactantius (Treatise 
on the Wrath of God, IX) (ca. 240 – ca. 320 AD).  
 
Then again, we can detect a less hostile evaluation of Diagoras’s atheism in Christian 
apologetic writings from Clement of Alexandria (ca.150 – ca. 217 AD) on. According 
to Clement, the philosophical atheism of Diagoras demonstrates the absurdity of 
polytheism and Graeco-Roman religion in general. The same opinion can be detected 
in Arnobius (floruit 270 AD) and Theodoretus (ca. 393 – 457 AD). 
                                                                                                                                                        
the wooden statue by Athenagoras could nevertheless serve the apologetic purpose of rejection of 
idolatry, but could also be interpreted as a euhemerizing account (referring to the human origins of 
Heracles), which can explain the atheist connection between Diagoras and Euhemerus, as stated in an 
index atheorum by the 2nd century AD doxographer Aetius (Opinions of the Philosophers, I, 7), which 
has been preserved in Pseudo-Plutarch’s Epitome. The Christian apologist Arnobius (Against the 
Heathen, IV, 29) also states that Diagoras, like Euhemerus, viewed the gods as men of origin.  
56
 On Christian apologists and their attacks on Graeco-Roman polytheism, see the recent study by 
Lanzillotta (2010). Lanzillotta traces the main apologetic motifs back to the first (Judeo-Christian) 
apologetic treatise The Preaching of Peter (which must be dated between 80 and 120 AD). The study 
by Scheer (2000), p. 232-234 deals with the burning of pagan statues, such as the burning of the 
wooden statue of Heracles by Diagoras, as an important Christian argument to indicate the 
powerlessness of images of the Graeco-Roman gods. 
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 14.1.5) Byzantine sources 
 
Information on Diagoras (Α 3493, Ι 15, ∆ 524, ∆ 526 & Π 3200) in the Suda, a 10th 
century encyclopedic work, is largely derived from a 6th century source (Biographical 
Dictionary of Learned Men) by Hesychius of Miletus. It must, however, be treated 
with extra caution. First, the Suda contains a lot of chronological inconsistencies57 and 
unhistorical statements58 regarding Diagoras. Second, the references to the title of the 
atheist book by Diagoras, Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι, can only be found in Byzantine 
sources, such as the Suda (in addition to Hesychius of Miletus). No earlier sources 
report a specific title for the alleged book with the exception of Tatian, who called the 
atheist book Φρυγίοι λόγοι. Nevertheless, the Suda is an important source regarding 
Diagoras, since the earliest source on Diagoras, namely the fragment by Hermippus, 
has only been preserved in a quotation from the Suda.  
 
Finally, a third Byzantine source consists of Johannes Tzetzes (1110- 1180 AD). This 
author is basically a commentator on the comic plays of Aristophanes. Considering 
the similarities between his work and certain passages from the Scholia, he could have 
actually been one of the Byzantine scholiasts that contributed information to the 
Scholia Recentiora in Aristophanem.59   
 
  
                                                      
57
 These are based on the early (4th century BC) doubling of Diagoras of Melos by Aristoxenus: the 
Suda mentions Diagoras as a lyric poet and an atheist philosopher, flourishing in the time of Pindar and 
Baccylides (468 BC), but living in Athens at the time of the sack of Melos (416 BC), which is 
chronologically speaking impossible. 
58
 The Suda mentions (a) Diagoras being a slave of Democritus and (b) singing the Iacchus: (a) must be 
regarded in a tradition that derived all atheists from the atomism of Democritus and (b) is a 
misinterpretation of Aristophanes, Frogs (320). The interpretation of Aristophanes, Birds (1073) is also 
faulty in the Suda. 
59
 See Koster (1974); Holwerda (1991), & Chantry (2001) on this matter. 
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 14.1.6) Arab sources 
 
Ibn Durayd (837 -933 AD)60: 
 
“While he (i.e. Diagoras of Melos) was busy cooking, the wood was being consumed by flames. Then 
he said to Heracles, who was standing next to him (i.e. as a wooden statue): “Hercules, I presume you 
have performed twelve labours, perform now your thirteenth labour”, and he grabbed him and put him 
in a pot. Now let it be clear that Heracles, who had performed twelve famous labours, was the king of 
the Greeks and the Greeks once worshipped his image as that of a god”61 
 
This account by the Arab lexicographer Ibn Durayd has actually little significance in 
research on the sources on Diagoras, since it is merely an Arab variant of Christian 
sources such as Athenagoras and the Scholia on Aristophanes. Of much more 
significance is a later Arab source by Al-Mubaššir. 
 
Al-Mubaššir (11th century AD)62: 
 
“In the time of those men (i.e. philosophers like Zeno of Elea, Leucippus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, 
Melissus, Protagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates and Democritus) the impious Diagoras lived in the city of 
Athens and travelled throughout Attica. When he persisted in his sacrilegious and impious behaviour 
against the gods, the wise and well respected inhabitants of Attica requested the Athenian archon, 
called Charias, that he should be executed, and he ordered that it should be pronounced to the people: 
“he who captures and kills Diagoras of Melos shall receive a large sum of money.” When he heard of 
                                                      
60
 On Ibn Durayd, see also Rosenthal (1958), 29-54 & 150-183. 
61
 Ibn Durayd, Kitāb al-mugtanā (Winiarczyk 1981 Diagoras T33): cum coqueret, lignum flammis 
consumptum est. tum Herculi (Irāqlis) dixit, qui iuxta eum stabat: “Hercules, te duodecimo facinora 
fecisse puto; fac (nunc) tredecimum (facinus)”. et eum cepit et sub ollam posuit. Hercules autem rex 
Graecorum clarus fuit, qui duodecimo facinora celebria fecit. cuius imaginem tamquam deum (Graeci) 
colebant. 
62
 On Al-Mubaššir, see also Rosenthal (1937), p. 21-67; Rosenthal (1960/1961), p. 132-158; Bremmer 
(2007), p.18 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 36-38.  
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this he left Attica and went to the city of Pellene and resided there. Then a long lasting war started 
between the inhabitants of Attica and those of Lacedaemonia. During the war, he became forgotten and 
he remained (in Pellene) for 54 years. After his death, a book was found, written in the language of the 
Phrygians, which was full of divulgations regarding divine matters”. (transl. G.J. van Gelder apud J. 
Bremmer)63  
 
This 11th century Arab biographer offers some unique information in his Life of Zeno 
the Eleatic. For example, Al-Mubaššir informs us that the atheist book by Diagoras 
was posthumous, only to be discovered after his death. No older surviving source does 
mention this specific fact. But Al-Mubaššir also delivered information that is 
historically highly improbable (e.g., the idea that the atheist book was written in the 
Phrygian language). There is absolutely no reason why Diagoras would have written 
his atheist book in this particular language. This is, most likely, a misinterpretation of 
Tatian (Address to the Greeks, 27), who claimed that Diagoras was the author of a 
book called Φρυγίοι λόγοι (Phrygioi logoi).  
 
Besides, Al-Mubaššir claimed that Diagoras lived for 54 years as a refugee in Pellene. 
Considering the fact that he is already mentioned in sources as early as 430 BC, he 
must have reached, at least, an age of over 100 years, on the condition that the 
statement of Al-Mubaššir is correct. Such a high age is quite implausible within the 
                                                      
63
 Al-Mubaššir Ibn Fatik, Muhtār al-hikam wa-mah āsin al-kalim (Winiarczyk 1981 Diagoras T10): 
eorum tempore (i.e. Zeonis Eleatae, Leucippi, Heracliti, Empedoclis, Melissi, Protagorae, Anaxagorae, 
Socratis, Democratis=Democriti) Diagoras impius ( ̄Diyāgūrās al-māriq) vivebat et in urbe Attica 
(Atīqā) versabatur. Cum autem in sacrilegio (nifāq), impietate (kufr) et maledicto in deum (ta’tīl) 
permaneret, quaerebant eum Sultān, sapientes et principes Atticae, ut eum interficerent, et Sultān –qui 
Charias, archon (Hārūs al-Arkūn) fuit- hominibus pronuntiari iussit: “qui Diagoram Melium (Diyāgūrās 
al-ladī min Milūn) ceperit et interfecit, pecuniam magnam accipiet.” is autem hoc audivit et profectus 
est terram Achaeam (Ahāyā), in urbem, que Pellene (Bālīn) appellatur, et sedem ibi collocavit. tum 
exortum est bellum, quod incolae Atticae cum incolis Laconiae (Lāqūniā) diu gerebant. is tempore belli 
in oblivionem venit et postea 54 annos manebat. post eius mortem inventus est apud eum liber, qui 
lingua incolarum Phrygiae (Ifrīgyā) est conscriptus et maledictorum in res divinas (mafāhaš fī ‘l-umūr 
al- ilāhiyyat) plenus fuit.  
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context of Antiquity. As Jacoby confidently argued, the period of 54 years must rather 
be interpreted as the actual age of Diagoras at the time of the flight to Pellene.64 
 
The recent publication by Winiarczyk on Diagoras of Melos also lists two lesser 
known Arabic sources on Diagoras: the Christian Qūsta ibn Lūqā (ca. 820 – ca. 912) 
who made an Arabic translation of Pseudo-Plutarch’s Epitome in Aetius and Pseudo-
Al-Ğāhiz, possibly a Nestorian Christian from the 9th century, who commented on the 
refutation of Epicurus and Diagoras by Aristotle and other philosophers.65 
   
 14.1.7) Scholia in Aristophanem 
 
A separate category of historical sources on Diagoras is formed by the Scholia in 
Aristophanem. We can retrieve specific information on Diagoras from the Scholia 
Vetera in Aristophanem (Nubes 830, Aves 1073 & Ranas 320) and the Scholia 
Recentiora in Aristophanem (Nubes 830). The Scholia Vetera are believed to be the 
result of early Hellenistic scholarship, possibly going back as far as early Alexandrian 
scholarship, when Callimachus (ca.305 – 240 BC), Lycophron (floruit ca.280 – ca.250 
BC) and Eratosthenes (276 – 195 BC) already provided comments on the plays of 
Aristophanes.66 Didymus Chalcenterus (63 BC – 10 AD) eventually combined these 
various annotations into a single commentary in the first century BC. This 
commentary was further elaborated by Symmachus in the 1st half of the 2nd century 
AD. The Scholia Recentiora (Nubes 830) must be situated in the Byzantine period and 
consist of annotations by the early 14th Byzantine scholar Demetrius Tricilinius.67  
                                                      
64
 Jacoby (1959), p. 15. 
65
 Winiarczyk (2016), p. 40-41. 
66
 Dickey (2007), p.29. For an opposing view, see Winiarczyk (2016), p. 31-35. 
67
 Ibidem. 
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Due to the prolonged period in which they were composed, the Scholia Vetera are the 
product of different literary traditions. Firstly, the information from the 
Atthidographer Melanthius (FGrHist 342 F3), who was also a member of the 
aristocracy of Eleusinian priests, must be dated between 350 and 270 BC.68 The 
Macedonian historiographer Craterus (FGrHist 326 F16) must be situated between 
320 and 270 BC.69 Both writings, On the Eleusinian Mysteries (Περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι 
µυστηρίων) of Melanthius and A Collection of Athenian Decrees (Συναγωγὴ τῶν 
ψηφισµάτων) of Craterus, were probably lost early, since no other source apart from 
the Scholia in Aristophanem have preserved their testimonies on Diagoras. For this 
reason, we must assume that the information referring to Craterus and Melanthius 
belongs to the Old Scholia on Aristophanes.70  
 
Secondly, the attribution of the epithet ὁ ἄθεος to Diagoras in the Scholia might be an 
added element in the 1st century BC by Didymus (or Symmachus in the early second 
century AD at the latest). Based on our literary evidence, the earliest appearance of 
the epithet is situated in the 1st century BC (Cicero and Diodorus Siculus), but the 
epithet is presumably older, as it could have already been mentioned in Clitomachus’s 
κατάλογος ἀθέων (2nd century BC) or even Philochorus (early 3rd century BC).  
 
Thirdly, the idea that experienced injustice led to the extreme atheism of Diagoras 
could have originated in historiographical and biographical traditions from the Roman 
                                                      
68
 Jacoby (1950), vol. IIIb, p. 199. 
69
 Jacoby (1954), vol. IIIb1, p. 196-197. 
70The fragments by Melanthius and Craterus can only be retrieved from the Scholia Vetera on 
Aristophanes’s Birds (1073) and Frogs (320). The Scholia Recentiora (from the Byzantine Period) 
have no reference to Melanthius or Craterus and appear to contain only a selection of information from 
the Scholia Vetera. Winiarczyk (1981) even omits the Scholia Recentiora all together as they do not 
add any substantial information to the historical figure of Diagoras. See Koster (1974), p. 120-121, 
Holwerda (1977), p. 167-168, Holwerda (1991), p.164-165, Chantry (2001), p.52-54; Chantry (2001)², 
p. 60 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 31-35. 
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period on, when explanations for the conversion of the ‘pious poet’ Diagoras to 
atheism were being sought. For example, Sextus Empiricus mentions that Diagoras 
experienced an unidentified injustice that was left unpunished by the gods after the 
wrongdoer swore on oath. The Scholia in Aristophanem, on the other hand, are the 
only sources that identify the injustice as theft of money. Later sources, such as 
Hesychius Miletus and the Suda, also adopted this information, but both identified the 
injustice as a paean that was stolen. 
 
On the historical sources on Diagoras, we can now conclude that the key sources must 
be situated between the late 5th century BC and the 1st century AD and these comprise 
the contemporaneous sources, the doxographical accounts and the Scholia Vetera on 
Aristophanes. These sources do attest an active atheism of an extreme nature (e.g., the 
phrase θεοὺς/ θεῖον ἀναιρεῖν, Diagoras actively hindering persons from getting initiated 
in the Mysteries and his association with λιµός in regard to the gods71). These sources 
conflict with the view of Winiarczyk that the radical atheism of Diagoras was an 
invention of Hellenistic tradition.72  
 
It is nevertheless a fact that the Roman historiographical and biographical traditions 
(e.g., Cicero, Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius) have added legendary 
elements to the historical figure of Diagoras.73 In the cases of Cicero and Diogenes 
Laertius, confusion can be detected with the later Cynic Diogenes of Sinope on the 
votive offerings at Samothrace. This misunderstanding might have originated from the 
perception that the radical atheism of Diagoras and the Cynicism of Diogenes both 
                                                      
71
 Romer (1994), p. 355-358 & Whitmarsh (2016), p. 185, based on Aristophanes, Birds, 186. 
72
 Winiarczyk (1980), p.67-70 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 130. 
73
 Winiarczyk (2016), p. 129. 
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had an irreligious character that was characterized by irony and sarcasm towards 
organized religion.74  
 
In the writings of Sextus Empiricus, Diagoras is also the subject of confusion.75 
Apparently, the early (4th century BC) doubling by Aristoxenus of two different 
persons by the name Diagoras of Melos, namely the mid 5th century BC lyric poet and 
the late 5th century BC sophist thinker, still surfaced. This doubling started a tradition 
until the Byzantine period of finding explanations for this atheist conversion of a 
reputed pious poet.76 The latest research on Diagoras still neglects this doubling, 
however, and considers the atheist conversion of Diagoras to be a fabrication of 
Hellenistic and Byzantine biographers, along with the atheist book and the three 
anecdotes on Diagoras (the burning of the statue of Heracles, Diagoras’s peril at sea 
and the votive offerings at Samothrace).77 Winiarczyk is most likely right regarding 
the anecdoctes and the atheist conversion78, but I do not follow his argument on the 
                                                      
74
 On the association of Cynicism with irreligious humour, see Whitmarsh (2015), p. 160-161. On a 
more general view on the association of Diagoras with Cynicism, see Winiarczyk (2016), p. 103-111. 
75
 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 53.   
76
 Hesychius of Miletus, On Famous Men, 17 & Suda (Α 3493: Ἀποπυργίζοντας λόγους & ∆ 523: 
∆ιαγόρας). 
77
 Winiarczyk (2016), p. 48-50.  
78
 The atheist conversion is probably the result of Aristoxenus’s confusion regarding the pious poems 
he discovered in Mantinea. These might have belonged to an unrelated mid 5th century lyric poet BC, 
whom was also called ‘Diagoras of Melos’. This probably led to the story of an atheist conversion that 
was already a popular theme by the time Sextus Empiricus reports it. The three anecdoctes seem to 
originate in Roman and Christian sources. The votive offerings at Samothrace and the peril at sea were 
first mentioned in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, III, 89. The anecdote at Samothrace was later 
adopted by Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VI, 59 and also ascribed to 
Diogenes of Sinope. This is not the only anecdotal link between both philosophers, however. The 
burning of the wooden statue of Heracles by Diagoras also has a Cynic connection: the boiling of 
turnips (or lentils, in most versions of the anecdote) represents the food of the poor or the Cynic ideal 
of simplicity. See also Winiarczyk (2016), p. 104, n. 211 for further information.  According to Scheer 
(2000), p. 232-234, the anecdote might be a Christian invention, because it first appeared in 2nd century 
AD Christian sources like Athenagoras of Athens’s Plea for the Christians, IV & Clement of 
Alexandria’s Protrepticus, II, 24, 2-4. The purpose behind the anecdote might be the idea that pagan 
idols were in essence powerless artefacts, but Winiarczyk (2016), p. 101 is more inclined to situate the 
invention of the anecdote in the Hellenistic period, because the two other anecdotes originated from 
this period. The anecdote of the votive offerings at Samothrace is most likely a fabrication to associate 
the ridiculing of the Eleusinian Mysteries by Diagoras with the transgression against other Mysteries. 
See also Athenagoras of Athens’ Plea for the Christians, IV on this matter. The peril at sea is probably 
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apocryphal character of the atheist book, because it is largely based on a selective 
reading of Philodemus’s On Piety P. Herc. 1077, col. 82, 1-18 (19, 519-536) & P. 
Herc. 1428, cols. XI-XII.79 Theories which diminish the atheism of Diagoras to a 
merely rejection of popular religion80, comparable to later Hellenistic philosophers 
such as Stilpo, should also be considered to be implausible. They disregard multiple 
references in sources to the existence of a radical type of atheism in the late 5th 
century BC81, which only evolved towards a more moderate (‘soft’) atheism in the 
Hellenistic period.82  
 
14.2) historical reconstruction of the life and atheism of Diagoras of Melos 
 
 14.2.1) The life of Diagoras 
 
The historical reconstruction of the biography of Diagoras is a difficult task to 
undertake, because we immediately encounter different chronological inconsistencies 
within the ancient sources. He is supposed to have flourished in 468 BC as a 
contemporary of Bacchylides and Pindar83, but other ancient sources mention the fact 
                                                                                                                                                        
the product of a popular motive in Greek literature: the gods condemn persons, who endangered the 
well-being of their communities by means of impious deeds, to death by shipwreck. This idea already 
surfaces in Andocides, On the Mysteries, 137-139 & Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 19-20 & 31-
32 and a death by shipwreck was ascribed in literary traditions to both Protagoras (Diogenes Laertius, 
On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX, 55; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 56 
& Philostratus, Life of the Sophists, I, 10) and Diagoras (Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, XIII, 611b). 
See also Harrison (2007), p. 375-380 on the concept of divine punishment in Greek literature. 
79
 Winiarczyk (2016), p. 25 & 124-125. 
80
 For studies on the atheism of Diagoras of Melos as a mere rejection of popular religion, see von 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1900), p.84; Geffcken (1907), p.169; Zeller (1922), p.376; Gomperz 
(1925),vol. II, p. 190 & 547; Gomperz (1927), p.162; Dudley (1937), p.105; Wehrli (1961), p.123-126, 
Woodbury (1965), p.208; Winiarczyk (1979), p. 71-74; Winiarczyk (1990), p.2 & Winiarczyk (2016), 
p. 111-115. 
81
 Plato, Laws, X, 885b; 889e-890a & 899c-899e.  
82
 Bremmer (2007), p.12.  
83
 Σ. Ar. Ra. 320; Eusebius, Hieronymi Chronicon p.110, 4 Helm ad Ol. 78, 1 (468 BC)= Winiarczyk 
1981 Diagoras T5A; Suda s.v. ∆ιαγόρας 523. 
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that he was convicted of impiety and therefore fled Athens in 415 BC.84  Such a 
lifespan seems virtually impossible, since it would mean that Diagoras of Melos must 
have reached an age of over 90 years.85 For this reason, it is commonly accepted that 
468 BC is not the floruit of Diagoras, but his actual date of birth.86  
 
However, the chronological confusion concerning Diagoras of Melos does not end 
there. The 11th century account by Al-Mubaššir, for example, mentions the fact that 
Diagoras resided 54 years in Pellene after his conviction in 415 BC.87 This means that 
he eventually would have died in 361 BC. Now, if we combine the source of the 
floruit with Al-Mubaššir, Diagoras should have reached an age of ca. 150 years. 
Needless to say this is completely absurd; therefore Jacoby suggested the date of 468 
as a date of birth.88 As mentioned earlier, the account of Al-Mubaššir which refers to 
the 54 years stay of Diagoras in Pellene, obviously reflects the actual age of Diagoras 
at the time of his conviction, because a supposed date of birth (468 BC) minus 54 
years equals the year 415/414 BC that corresponds with the date of the archonship of 
Charias, which Al-Mubaššir explicitly mentions as Hārūs al-Arkūn.89  
 
So far, we can leave the chronological inconsistencies concerning Diagoras behind, 
but there is also the matter of biographical inconsistencies. A quick analysis of Paulys 
Realencyclopädie90 informs us that three different persons in Classical Antiquity can 
be recognized by the name ‘Diagoras’: (1) a champion from the early 5th century BC, 
                                                      
84
 Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, XIII, 6, 7 & Al-Mubaššir = Winiarzyk 1981 Diagoras T10. 
85
 Winiarczyk (1979), p. 196 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 44. 
86
 Jacoby (1959), p.15. 
87
 Woodbury (1965), p.188: Al-Mubaššir is believed to have derived his information indirectly from the 
History of Philosophy by Porphyry of Tyre, which seems to have used Diogenes Laertius as a source 
for the vitae and Eratosthenes of Cyrene and Apollodorus of Athens as sources for the chronologies. 
88
 Jacoby (1959), p.15. 
89
 Ibidem. 
90
 Wellmann (1905), cols. 309-311. 
     262 
named Diagoras of Rhodos, (2) the dithyrambic poet and atheist Diagoras of Melos 
from the late 5th century BC and (3) a physician from the late 3rd century BC, named 
Diagoras of Cyprus.91 Not much biographical confusion is to be expected between 
these three historical persons, except for a possible debat whether Hermippus’s Fates 
(FR43 K/A) from 430 BC ridicules the size of Diagoras of Melos or of Diagoras of 
Rhodos.92 However, two additional references to a historical ‘Diagoras’ can be given: 
(a) the politician Diagoras of Eretria from the late 6th century/ early 5th century BC, 
who had a tomb erected in Corinth93, which is also believed to have been the place of 
death of Diagoras of Melos.94 Another reference to ‘Diagoras’ could be the so-called 
‘Diagoreioi’, Pro-Spartan oligarchs who governed the tripolis of Rhodos, but who 
were eventually overthrown by a pro-Athenian, democratic coup in 395 BC.95 The 
connection between Diagoras of Melos and these oligarchs might be found in 
Aristophanes’s Birds (1073), which associate Diagoras with tyranny and oligarchy. 
But the most common biographical misunderstanding concerning Diagoras of Melos 
might actually be the general idea that he was a late 5th century BC dithyrambic poet 
and an atheist philosopher as well. 
                                                      
91
 According to Aristotle (Politics, 6, 1306a), Diagoras overthrew an oligarchy of knights in Eretria and 
eventually died in Corinth. See also Jacoby (1959), p.13; Woodbury (1965), p.178; Winiarczyk (1979), 
p. 198; Hordern (2001)², p. 35 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 46 & 58. 
92
 The fragment by Hermippus has been preserved in Suda Ι 15: Ἴακχος: 
ὕµνος εἰς ∆ιόνυσον. ᾄδουσι τὸν Ἴακχοv, ὥσπερ ∆ιαγόρας. τοῦτον φασιν Ἄθεον κεκλῆσθαι. 
γέγονε δὲ καὶ ἕτερος, κωµῳδούµενος ἐπὶ µεγέθει. Ἕρµιππος ἐν Μοίραις· 
 µείζων γὰρ ἢ νῦν δή᾽ στι, καὶ δοκεῖ γέ µοι 
 ἐὰν τοσοῦτον ἐπιδιδῳ τῆς ἡµέρας 
 µείζων ἔσεσθαι ∆ιαγόρου τοῦ Τερθρέως. 
“A hymn to Dionysos. "They sing the Iacchos, like Diagoras. "They say that this man was called "the 
atheist." There was also a second [Diagoras], who was ridiculed for his size. Hermippos in Fates 
[writes]:  
 "for he was larger [than] he is now, and indeed it seems to me, if one adds [more] of the day, 
 he will be bigger than Diagoras , who is called "The Quibbler".” (transl. D. Whitehead) 
This matter is nonetheless solved by Jacoby (1959), p. 9 who provides substantial evidence that 
Hermippus refers to Diagoras of Melos and not Diagoras of Rhodos. 
93
 Heraclides Lembus, Constitution of the Elians, F 40 Dilts = Winiarczyk 1981 Diagoras T90. 
94
 Suda (∆ 523: ∆ιαγόρας). 
95
 Hornblower (2008), vol. III, p. 878-879, based on a papyrological account (P. Oxy. Hist. ch. 18.2 
Chambers). 
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This brings us to a still undetermined matter within modern research on the life and 
actions of Diagoras of Melos: should he be considered to have been a (lyric) poet or a 
Presocratic philosopher, or a combination of both? Most modern scholars defend the 
combined theory96, while the recent research by Winiarczyk describes Diagoras not as 
a Presocratic philosopher or a sophist97, but as ‘a second-rate lyric poet’ only.98 This 
is a rather remarkable statement by Winiarczyk, especially when we take his usual 
inclination to dismiss many (Hellenistic and Roman) sources on the atheism of 
Diagoras, because of their late character, into consideration.99 This methodological 
approach contrasts nonetheless with his theory that Diagoras was a lyric poet only, 
because no contemporary source on Diagoras actually identifies him as a poet. On the 
contrary, Hermippus (FR43 K/A) relates to Diagoras by means of a comical demotic 
that refers to the sophist use of ‘hairsplitting reasoning’100, while Aristophanes, 
Clouds (830) depicts Diagoras in the comical character of ‘Socrates the Melian’ as a 
philosophical amalgam of Ionian naturalism, atomism and sophist thought. Other 
important sources such as Cicero and Diogenes of Oenoanda clearly refer to Diagoras 
in a strict philosophical context and make no allusion whatsoever to poetry.  
 
For these reasons, I defend the idea of recognizing Diagoras of Melos as a Presocratic 
philosopher and sophist and not a lyric poet.101 Actually, the main source to associate 
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 See Ostwald (1986), p. 276; Janko (2001), p. 6; Whitmarsh (2015), p. 113 & 120. The studies by 
Romer (1994), p. 351-365 & Romer (1996), p. 393-401 do not associate Diagoras with philosophy or 
poetry, but only identify him as ‘an atheist’, while Hordern (2001)², p. 33-38 mainly identifies Diagoras 
as a ‘writer of poems’. 
97
 Winiarczyk (2016), p. 50. 
98
 Winiarczyk (2016), p. vii. 
99
 Winiarczyk (2016), p. 63, 65, 75, 114, 128 & 130. 
100
 Janko (2001), p. 7. 
101
 Fahr (1969), p. 89-92 analyzes Diagoras of Melos in the context of sophist thought only. This 
contrasts with Winiarczyk (2016), p. 123 who unconvincingly dismisses any association of Diagoras 
with sophist thought and philosophy in general. In contrast to Janko (2001), p. 8 &13, Winiarczyk does 
also deny any connection of ‘Socrates the Melian’ with natural philosophy (Diogenes of Apollonia) or 
atomism (Democritus). In his opinion, Socrates was only named ‘the Melian’, because any association 
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Diagoras with lyric poetry is Hesychius of Miletus (On Famous Men, 17) from the 6th 
century AD, which reverberates in the 10th century Suda (Α 3493: Ἀποπυργίζοντας 
λόγους & ∆ 523: ∆ιαγόρας), although an early clue of Diagoras being a poet can be 
situated in the Hellenistic period (c. 300 BC) in a fragment from Aristoxenus that has 
been preserved in Philodemus’s treatise On Piety (P. Herc. 1428, col. XI-XII), In this 
fragment, Aristoxenus dismisses the idea that Diagoras was an atheist, based on pious 
poetry of Diagoras he had discovered in Mantinea during research.102 
 
On this matter, I refer to a theory that was first developed by Karl Beloch in his 
Griechische Geschichte and later adopted by Drachmann and Fahr.103 It cannot be 
ruled out that the name ‘Diagoras of Melos’ referred to two different persons: a pious 
lyric poet from the mid 5th century BC, who was a contemporary of Bacchylides and 
Pindar, and a sophist from the late 5th century BC, who was a contemporary of 
Prodicus, Socrates and Critias. This theory does not only clearify this biographical 
duality, but the higher mentioned chronological inconsistencies as well.  
 
Felix Jacoby, nonetheless, rejected this theory: Diagoras “the poet” and Diagoras “the 
atheist” could be the same person by considering the floruit of 468/7 BC to be the 
actual date of birth of Diagoras.104 However, this would not explain the inconsistency 
                                                                                                                                                        
with the impious poet made Socrates also associated with impiety.  Diagoras was only called a 
philosopher, because he was considered to be an atheist (i.e. an impious poet). This argument supports 
entirely on the assumption of Woodbury (1965) that Diagoras was an impious poet in the vein of 
Cinesias. However, the research by Dover (1993), p. 241-242; Dunbar (1995), p. 660-661 & Kidd 
(2004), p. 92, n.21 now rule out any historical association of Cinesias with impiety and atheism. 
102
 The Gomperz edition from 1866 of P. Herc. 1428, col. XI alludes to the atheist book of Diagoras, 
while the 1974 translation by Henrichs & the Schober edition from 1988 of P. Herc. 1428, col. XI 
dismisses any reference to an atheist book and views Diagoras as an impious poet only. Parker (1996), 
p. 208, n. 37 proposes an alternative reading of P. Herc. 1428, cols. XI-XII in favour of a (spurious) 
atheist book by Diagoras, while the latest edition on Aristoxenus (Kaiser 2010) now follows the 
Gomperz edition from 1866 
103
 Beloch (1916), vol.II², p.375;  Drachmann (1922), p.33 & Fahr (1969), p.90. 
104
 Jacoby (1959), p. 37, n.103. 
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Aristoxenus experienced between the atheism and the pious poems of Diagoras he had 
discovered during research in Mantinea. Despite arguments in favour of the theory of 
Beloch, Drachmann was still reluctant to acknowledge the existence of two different 
‘Diagorases’, because the death sentence of Diagoras, to which Aristophanes referred 
in Birds (1072-78) in close connection with long deceased tyrants, could already have 
been an old matter in 415/4 BC, which might also suggest that Diagoras was deceased 
at the time Birds was performed for the first time.105 This hypothesis of Ulrich von 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff can be refuted by testimonies of the historians Melanthius 
(FGrHist 326 F3) and Craterus (FGrHist 342 F16), which explicitly mention a reward 
for the killing or alive capturing of Diagoras in 415 BC. 
 
Still, the suggestion of a deceased Diagoras in 415/4 BC and Drachmann’s idea that 
Birds (1073) referred to an old decree induced the controversial idea of Jacoby to 
situate the conviction of Diagoras by the Athenian Assembly as early as 433/2 BC 
(based on the Diopeithes-decree). The decree of 415/4 BC, as mentioned by the 
Scholia on Birds, 1073, would be a mere renewal of the orginal psesphisma of 433/2 
BC.106 According to Jacoby, the comical intention of Aristophanes in coupling 
Diagoras with dead tyrants does not indicate that Diagoras was no longer alive in 
415/4 BC, but refers to a situation in which both were out of reach of the Athenians: 
                                                      
105
 Drachmann (1922), p. 33, based on a suggestion by von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1921), p. 426, 
n.4. 
106
 Jacoby (1959), p. 23. Athenian decrees could be overruled by the court by means of a graphè 
paranomon (γραφὴ παρανόµων), which Hansen (1974), p. 17 identifies as ‘an indictment for 
unconstitutional proposal’. It is not known (but at the same time, it would have been unlikely) that the 
decree on Diagoras was ever the subject of graphè paranomon. For all known examples of graphè 
paranomon, see Hansen (1974), p. 28-43. 
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the dead tyrants for obvious reasons and Diagoras due to the fact that he might have 
permanently resided in the Peloponnesus ever since the mid 410s BC.107   
 
The theory of Jacoby has met with little support and has now been generally 
refuted.108  The actual dates of birth and death of Diagoras of Melos remain 
nonetheless difficult to determine. The Polish scholar Marek Winiarczyk has done the 
most extensive research on this matter. He concluded that the date of birth of Diagoras 
must be situated between Olympiad 74 (484-481 BC) and Olympiad 78 (468-465 
BC).109 Olympiad 74 corresponds with sources as Eusebius (Hieronymi Chronicon 
p.109, 3 Helm ad Ol. 74, 3 (482 BC)) and Cyril of Alexandria (Against Julian, I, 13). 
Olympiad 78 corresponds with Eusebius (Hieronymi Chronicon p.110, 4 Helm ad Ol. 
78, 1 (468 BC)) and the Suda (s.v. ∆ιαγόρας 523). Winiarczyk argues that Olympiad 
74 is too early to be a plausible date of birth. Most likely, this date of birth reflects the 
γέγονη of Protagoras in an effort to link two early atheists with each other.110 
Olympiad 78 may also be inaccurate, because 468 BC is not a random date: it 
represents the year in which the poet Simonides died, so 468 BC should be interpreted 
as a date of succession, either ἀκµή (floruit) or birth.111 The former idea (a floruit of 
Diagoras in 468 BC) is highly unlike, due to the fact that he would have been about 
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 Jacoby (1959), p. 18-20. Jacoby (1959), p.24 believes the atheist book by Diagoras, written 
(according to Jacoby) no later than 433/2 BC to be the actual reason for the psephisma of 433/2 BC. It 
resulted, in his opinion, in a first denunciation of Diagoras with a renewal of the impiety case in 
415/414 BC during the turmoil of the religious scandals.  
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 Jacoby’s arguments for situating the impiety trial of Diagoras as early 433 BC have only been 
(recently) supported by Hubbard (1991), p. 158-192, mainly based on the argument that Diagoras 
played no role of importance in the religious scandals of 415 BC.  Jacoby’s theory, however, had 
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impiety trial at 415/414 BC is now generally accepted. On this matter, see Fahr (1969), p. 90; Guthrie 
(1971), vol. III, p. 237, n.1; Winiarczyk (1979), p.199-204; Ostwald (1986), p.275, n. 286; Romer 
(1994), p.352, n.4; Rubel (2000), p. 167; Hordern (2001)², p. 34-35 & Janko (2001), p. 10.   
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 Winiarczyk (1979), p. 197. See also Woodbury (1965), p. 188. 
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 Ibidem. 
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100 years old at the time of his conviction by the Assembly in 415 BC.112 So, the 
theory of Jacoby to interpret the year 468 BC as γέγονη instead of ἀκµή is most likely 
correct. 
 
Fahr, however, is more cautious on this matter and situates the date of birth in the 
period 468/465 BC, by calculating a degree of error and by relying on the idea that the 
life of the philosopher Diagoras must be largely situated in the second half of the 5th 
century BC.113 The exact date of birth of Diagoras of Melos remains undetermined, 
but I believe it safe to assume that it must be situated between 470 and 465 BC, based 
on the interpretations of Jacoby and Fahr, regarding the Suda and Al-Mubaššir. So, 
the date of birth of Diagoras of Melos corresponds approximately with the date of 
birth of Socrates. Additional information that can be traced regarding the birth and 
childhood of Diagoras, is the fact that he was a native of the island Melos114 and a son 
of Teleklytos or Telekleides.115  
 
Concerning the youth and education of Diagoras, we have only very limited 
information. Jacoby and Winiarczyk argued that Melanippides might have been his 
music teacher.116 During his stay in the Peloponnese, the young Diagoras might have 
befriended a boxing champion called Nicodorus, who later on became the lawgiver of 
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 The theories of von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1900), p. 80-83 & Drachmann (1922), p. 156 in order 
to save the tradition of an early acme of Diagoras are largely based on the idea that he had already died 
in 415 BC, because Aristophanes, Birds, 1073 associates Diagoras with ‘dead tyrants’ or that the decree 
involved an old offence of Diagoras. The idea of ‘birth’ of Diagoras in 468 BC was proposed by 
Jacoby (1959), p. 37, n.103 and is now generally accepted. See also Winiarczyk (2016), p. 44, n. 13 for 
further information. 
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 Fahr (1969), p. 90, n.8. 
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 Σ. Ar. Nub. 830; Σ. Ar. Av. 1073 & Σ. Ar. Ra. 320.  
115
 Σ. Ar. Ra. 320 & Suda s.v. ∆ιαγόρας 523. 
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 Jacoby (1959), p. 13 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 48, n. 35, based on an alternative reading of  Suda s.v. 
∆ιαγόρας 523. 
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Mantinea.117 In this position, Nicodorus requested Diagoras to compose a more 
democratic constitution for Mantinea, which is believed to have been written between 
the years 425 and 418 BC.118 According to Jacoby and Winiarczyk, Diagoras also 
composed an encomium for Nicodorus the lawgiver in this period.119  Both scholars 
rejected the older idea of von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff that this poem actually 
concerned an epinikion that was composed for the young boxing champion.120 
Apparently, the biographical duality of ‘Diagoras of Melos’ also lingers on in modern 
research on the relationship between Nicodorus and Diagoras.121 Jacoby and 
Winiarczyk rightly criticized the theory of von Wilamowitz-Moelendorff concerning a 
50 year lasting collaboration between Nicodorus and Diagoras (468 until 418 BC), in 
order to save the literary tradition on the early floruit of Diagoras. This is indeed 
highly improbable, because Diagoras and Nicodorus were no actual peers, based on 
an ancient source that claimed Nicodorus to be the former ἐραστής of Diagoras.122 Of 
course, this might concern ancient gossip in order to search reasons behind the 
affiliation of the well-respected lawgiver with the notorious atheist.123 But ancient 
tradition at least denies the idea that Nicodorus and Diagoras were contemporaries, 
who befriended early on and collaborated over a period of 50 years. The idea of an 
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 Winiarczyk (1981), p.VI-VII. 
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 Drachmann (1922), p.32; Jacoby (1959), p. 18 (n.136); Winiarczyk (1979), p.206: in 426 BC 
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epinikion becomes on the other hand more plausible, once we take the theory of the 
two ‘Diagorases’ into consideration.  
 
Maybe it would be feasible to assume that the young boxing champion Nicodorus was 
admired and praised by the lyric poet Diagoras in an epinikion in the year 468 BC. 
Being a lawgiver later in life, Nicodorus probably appealed to the services of the 
philosopher Diagoras in the years 425 to 418 BC. This may seem farfetched, but 
Aelian in his Various Histories (II, 23) clearly suggests by the use of the adverb ὀψὲ a 
long passage of time between Nicodorus’s career as a boxing champion and his appeal 
to Diagoras to rewrite the Mantinean constitution. Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff at 
least suggested that over 50 years must have passed between the victorious young 
Nicodorus and the appeal of an old Nicodorus to rewrite the new constitution of 
Mantinea124, so it is highly improbable that a mid 5th century BC poet Diagoras of 
Melos with a floruit in 468 BC would have composed the legislation.  
 
Nevertheless, Drachmann firmly criticized the idea that Nicodorus would have hired a 
notorious atheist such as Diagoras to write the constitution for a Peloponnesian city-
state, which he considered an unlikely initiative for the late 5th century BC.125 Clearly, 
Drachmann disregarded a precedent, namely Protagoras, who composed legislation 
for Thurii in 444 BC126, despite the fact that he was reputed for doubting the existence 
of the gods.127  
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 von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1900), p.83. 
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 Drachmann (1922), p.32-33. 
126Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX, 50. See also Burkert (1985), p.312. 
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     270 
So, unorthodox views on organized religion may not have posed much restriction on 
the recruitment of sophists by foreign city-states for educational and intellectual 
purposes.128 Apparently, a clear distinction was made between their rhetorical abilities 
and their unconventional opinions on religious matters. In the case of Diagoras, it 
must be said that political reasons could also have played a role in his hiring for the 
rewriting of the Mantinean constitution in 425 BC, because Diagoras was a Dorian 
and Mantinea was by tradition a pro-Spartan, Peloponnesian city-state129, even though 
Mantinea joined Athens in 426 BC in order to maintain control over parts of 
Arcadia.130 These sociopolitical and ethnological matters will be discussed in further 
sections of this case study.131   
 
In any case, it seems improbable that Nicodorus would not have been familiar with 
the unconventional religious views of the sophist Diagoras. But his theoretical 
atheism had probably not yet radicalized ca. 425 BC, so Nicodorus might have been 
indifferent to this aspect of Diagoras’s intellectualism.132  
 
Before Diagoras came to Mantinea, it is believed that he resided a number of years in 
Athens.133 As mentioned earlier, Jacoby argued that Diagoras could have been 
condemned a first time in the 430s BC, based on the decree of Diopeithes.134 Jacoby 
considered his conviction in 415 BC to be a renewal of the alleged conviction of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Drachmann (1922), p. 31 (with note) & 39. The assumption by Davison (1953), p. 37 that the impious 
content of the Peri Theōn resulted in the banishment of Protagoras from Athens ca. 458 BC is 
definitely too early to situate an official case of asebeia that was based on philosophical speculation on 
divine existence. 
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 On the close connection between piety and patriotism, see Garnsey (1984), p. 4 & Dover (1988), p. 
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 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 5, 29, 1. 
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 Bremmer (2007), p. 18. 
134
 Jacoby (1959), p.23. 
     271 
433/2 BC by reinterpreting Birds (1073), in which the conviction of Diagoras is 
mentioned in the context of old decrees on (deceased) tyrants. Another argument of 
Jacoby is based on the Scholia on Clouds (820) and Birds (1073). These sources 
mention the capture of Melos (416 BC), which might be asserted as a terminus ante 
quem for any religious intolerance Diagoras could have experienced as early as 433 
BC.135 Also, Al-Mubaššir’s accounts of ‘a war that broke out between the Athenians 
and the Peloponnesians, because of Diagoras’s impiety’, was interpreted by Jacoby as 
a clue that Diagoras was already prosecuted before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian 
War.136  
 
Woodbury has convincingly refuted this rather loose hypothesis.137 This scholar 
situated the denunciation of Diagoras by the Assembly in 415 BC, based on the 
accurate chronological information of Diodorus Siculus (and to a lesser extent Al-
Mubaššir), instead of a first conviction as early as 433 BC. 138 
 
Besides, Diagoras was of no political importance in 433 BC.139 A conviction, as early 
as 433/2 BC, could also not explain why he returned to Athens in 418 BC, most likely 
after the Battle at Mantinea. If Diagoras was already persona non grata in Athens in 
433/2 BC, he would have chosen another city-state to reside. His return to Athens, 
however, makes perfect sense when we take certain political factors into 
consideration. Although the animosity between Mantinea and Athens decreased in the 
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420s BC and both city-states sealed a political and military alliance in 420 BC140, a 
residence in Mantinea may have been too hazardous for the composer of the 
democratic constitution after the Battle of Mantinea in 418 BC.141  So, the return to 
Athens in 418 BC might simply have been a logical step in his sophist career.  
 
Despite the fact that the theory of a first conviction in 433/2 BC is now commonly 
abandoned by modern research142, the philosopher Diagoras must nevertheless have 
been a public figure in Athens ca. 430 BC. Around this period, he appeared for the 
first time in a fragment (F43 K/A) from the comic play Fates by Hermippus, which 
has only survived through Suda s.v. Ἴακχος 15.  In this fragment we are informed 
about a certain ∆ιαγόρας ὁ Τερθρεύς (commonly translated as “Diagoras the 
Quibbler143” or “Diagoras the Windbagger144”). The Suda clearly states that ∆ιαγόρας  
ὁ Τερθρεύς ‘who was ridiculed for his (great) size’ is not Diagoras ‘the Atheist’ and 
Woodbury agrees on this matter, arguing that there is no indication for such 
identification. The ‘windbaggery’ may, according to Woodbury, simply refer to a 
trivial opinion (of an unknown Diagoras) instead of sophist reasoning.145  
 
I strongly disagree with Woodbury and Whitehead on this matter. First of all, the idea 
that we are dealing with an unknown Diagoras seems very unlikely, because Athenian 
audiences must have recognized the character Diagoras as a public figure when Fates 
was performed circa 430 BC. Secondly, the arguments of Jacoby concerning the 
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identification of Diagoras of Melos with ∆ιαγόρας ὁ Τερθρεύς are more methodical and 
convincing, because they exclude the only other possible candidate for the character 
of ∆ιαγόρας ὁ Τερθρεύς, namely Diagoras of Rhodos.146 For instance, we cannot assume 
that the allusion to the size of Diagoras by Hermippus refers to the famous champion. 
His height is described in another ancient source (Scholia on Pindar’ Olympian 7) as 
being δَ πηχῶν καὶ εَ δακτύλων (i.e. “4 elbows and 5 thumbs”, which corresponds to 
approximately 5ft 3 or 1,60m).  
 
We also do not have any proof that Diagoras of Rhodos ever visited Athens. So, it is 
very doubtful that he would have been portrayed in a comic play at Athens around 
430 BC, when he (presumably) already had been deceased for some time.147 We can 
also detect no derogatory remarks regarding Diagoras of Rhodos in Pindar’s 
Olympian 7. He appears to have been a well-respected and celebrated champion in the 
first half of the 5th century BC. Besides, the derogatory reference to ‘quibbling’ or 
‘windbaggery’ in Hermippus (F43 K/A) can only be applied to the sophist 
philosopher Diagoras of Melos.148  
 
A final argument that Hermippus is relating to the philosopher Diagoras can be found 
in the personal background of Hermippus. We are informed in the biography of 
Pericles by Plutarch (Pericles, 32, 1-3) that Hermippus accused the courtisan Aspasia 
of ἀσεβεία and acted as the prosecutor during her trial. According to Plutarch, the 
natural philosopher Anaxagoras was also targeted during this asebeia-case. Although 
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148
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both impiety trials were already an old matter at the time Fates was performed149, 
Hermippus might have stirred up the old asebeia-cases against Aspasia and 
Anaxagoras in this comic play. We know that Aspasia had been the target of many 
comic playwrights and this was most likely also the case in Fates.150 But the main 
attack in Fates might not have been aimed at Aspasia, but more (indirectly) at Pericles 
and his associates (Protagoras, Anaxagoras).151 This is definitely the case, according 
to Plutarch (Pericles, 32, 3).152 So, Fates probably symbolized not only a political 
statement against Pericles, but also a conservative slander against philosophical 
speculation on religious matters153, comparable to Aristophanes’s Clouds.154  
 
This comic poet gives us the second contemporary source on the philosopher 
Diagoras. In Clouds (830), we encounter the character Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος  (‘Socrates 
the Melian’). Being an Athenian citizen, Socrates did not have any connection with 
the island of Melos, but it is commonly accepted among modern scholars that 
‘Socrates the Melian’ actually refers to Diagoras of Melos.155 Clouds was performed 
for the first time in 423 BC, while a revised edition of the play dates from 418 BC.156  
It remains uncertain, however, whether Diagoras appeared in the original version of 
Clouds or only in the revised version. Because of the pivotal role of the character 
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‘Socrates the Melian’ in the comic play, we could assume the former. But we should 
also not forget that Diagoras was supposedly living in Mantinea in 423 BC, where he 
rewrote the constitution.157 Despite the fact he had left Athens already in 425 BC, he 
still must have been a familiar figure for Athenian audiences, who recognized 
Diagoras in the character of Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος.158  
 
This would not be the only time Aristophanes mentioned Diagoras in a play at a time 
he was not residing in Athens: in the play Birds159 from 414 BC Diagoras is explicitly 
mentioned in a reference to his recent conviction. By that time, Diagoras had already 
fled Athens to find refuge in Pellene, where the inhabitants refused to extradite him to 
the Athenians.160  
 
A last reference to Diagoras of Melos in the comic plays by Aristophanes can be 
found in Frogs (320). This comic play dates from 405 BC, at a moment Diagoras of 
Melos had left Athens for almost a decade. Still, his memory lingered on in the minds 
of the Athenians. In the actual passage Aristophanes makes, according to Apollodorus 
of Tarsus (Σ. Ar. Ra. 320), use of the phrase δι᾽ἀγορᾶς (‘through the market-place’) to 
refer to Diagoras. It is difficult to determine if Diagoras was still alive at the time 
Frogs was performed, although the scholar James Hordern believed that the passage 
from Frogs (320) contained an actual clue concerning the recent death of Diagoras. 161 
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Hordern’s hypothesis is nevertheless based on an unconvincing and farfetched reading 
of τὸν Ἴακχον ὅνπερ ∆ιαγόρας in favour of τὸν Ἴακχον ὅνπερ δι᾽ἀγορᾶς.162  
 
Regarding any valuable information on the date of death of Diagoras, we can only 
turn to the account of Al-Mubaššir, who relied on Porphyry of Tyre (ca. 234 - ca. 305 
AD), who in return made use of Apollodorus of Athens (ca.180 - ca.120 BC) as a 
source.163 This source informs us that Diagoras lived for a substantial period of time 
(54 years) as a refugee in Pellene and eventually died under the archonship of Charias 
in 415/4 BC.164  As mentioned earlier, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff suggested that 
415/4 BC could function as a terminus ante quem for the date of death of Diagoras, 
based on Aristophanes’s Birds (1073).165 This hypothetical date of death seems rather 
fragile, because it must deny the testimonies by Melanthius and Craterus. Both report 
that a reward was given for the life capture of Diagoras, but the citizens of Pellene 
were unwilling to extradite him.  
 
In my opinion, the date of death (near the end of the 5th century BC) that Winiarczyk 
suggested is preferable over the idea that Diagoras died in the aftermath of the 
religious scandals of 415 BC. Based on the account by Al-Mubaššir, which suggests 
that Diagoras lived for some considerable time after his conviction by the Assembly, 
                                                                                                                                                        
might suggest a comical reference, in the sense that the poems of Diagoras are now being sung in the 
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Winiarczyk argued that Diagoras must have died circa 400 BC, at the closing of the 
5th century BC. By then, he should have reached an age of approximately 70 years.166 
Unfortunately, we have no substantial evidence to support this presumable date. The 
Suda is the only source to mention any place of death, by stating that Diagoras died in 
Corinth. 167 We must, however, consider the fact that the Suda could have mistaken 
Diagoras of Melos for Diagoras of Eretria. The latter had a grave monument in 
Corinth.168  The only alternative place of death, based on literary information, is 
Pellene. According to the account by Al-Mubaššir, Diagoras died there as a refugee 
after a residence of 54 years. As argued earlier, this information must rather be 
interpreted as Diagoras arriving in Pellene at the age of 54 in the year 415/414 BC, 
but Al-Mubaššir’s account does not seem to suggest that Diagoras died shortly after 
his arrival at Pellene.  
 
The cause of death is only attested by Athenaeus’s The Deipnosophists, which reports 
that Diagoras died by shipwreck.169 This information induces quite some scepticism, 
because it connects the ‘atheist’ Diagoras with the ‘atheist’ Protagoras, who was also 
believed to have perished at sea.170 It appears to be a Hellenistic invention, resembling 
the stories about the alleged whit and irony of Diagoras on the Samothrace offerings 
and the experienced peril at sea.171 Besides, a death by shipwreck seems a fitting 
ending for a notorious offender of the gods, whose conduct excluded him from divine 
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protection regarding a safe seafaring.172  No other ancient source informs us further on 
the death of Diagoras. Therefore, the actual cause of death remains unknown. In any 
case, the contemporary sources regarding Diagoras of Melos end in 400 BC with a 
reference in the speech Against Andocides by Pseudo-Lysias173. In this speech, the 
logographer relates the impiety of Diagoras to the one Andocides displayed in the 
scandals on the Mysteries and the Herms. Pseudo-Lysias considered Andocides’s 
behaviour as being of a more impious nature, because Diagoras was merely an alien 
whereas Andocides was an Athenian citizen. Consequently, his irreligious behaviour 
had much more implications to the public eye. This passage indicates that, despite the 
fact that Diagoras had alredy left Athens for about 15 years in 400 BC, the memory of 
his exceptional atheism was still very alive. But the impact of Diagoras’s atheism 
would not stop there: throughout Greek and Roman Antiquity, Diagoras would keep a 
reputation high of being the archetypal atheist, which some scholars have exemplified 
by use of the coined phrase ἄθεος κατ᾽ἐξοχήν174 
 
 14.2.2) The atheism of Diagoras 
 
Following the historical reconstruction of the life of Diagoras, this section of the case 
study will now focus on the nature and impact of his atheist actions. In a first section, 
the perception of Diagoras’s atheism in late 5th century BC Athens will be analyzed, 
based on the research questions: “How did Athenian society experience (radical) 
atheism?” and “Did Athenians of the late 5th century BC experience this atheism to be 
an exceptional form of deviant religious behaviour?”.  
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A second and third section will deal with the actual atheism of Diagoras. What was so 
unusual and unprecedented about this atheism and why is Diagoras believed to be the 
most notorious atheist throughout Classical Antiquity, whose atheist actions can only 
be compared to the later Theodorus of Cyrene? Based on the information available 
from the contemporaneous sources, we will reconstruct the impact of Diagoras’s 
atheism. In doing so, the atheist actions of Diagoras will be divided into two 
distinctive periods: a period in which his atheism incorporated elements from different 
philosophical doctrines and gradually developed into a mind-set that embodied the 
denial of the existence of the gods. This period can be defined as a phase of 
‘theoretical’ atheism. We can situate this phase between 430 BC (the earliest 
occurrence of Diagoras in an ancient source) and 418 BC (when the play Clouds of 
Aristophanes was revised).175 A second period in which his atheism clearly had the 
aim to attack the praxis of organized Greek religion must be situated between 418 BC 
(the revised edition of Clouds) and 414 BC (the first performance of Birds). This 
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period is characterized by an ‘active’ atheism in which the Mysteries of Eleusis are 
divulged and ridiculed by Diagoras. Most likely, this period of ‘active atheism’ must 
even be narrowed down to 416 BC (the siege of Melos) and 415 BC (the religious 
scandals).176 But before we begin our analysis of the atheism of Diagoras, I shall 
discuss the perception of atheism in late 5th century BC Athens in the now following 
section. This preliminary segment of the atheism of Diagoras will focus on the pivotal 
question: “Did contemporary Athenians experience the atheism of Diagoras as an 
exceptional expression of deviant religious behaviour or was it rather perceived as a 
side-effect of the so-called ‘religious crisis’in Athens during the late 5th century BC?”. 
 
  14.2.2.1) Diagoras of Melos and the perception of atheism in late 5th 
  century BC Athens 
 
It has often been suggested that Athenian society in the second half of the 5th century 
BC was faced with a profound form of ‘religious crisis’.177 This assumption, however, 
should not lead to the idea that traditional religion was largely neglected by the 
majority of the populace. The idea of ‘religious crisis’ rather entails that, for the first 
time, Athenian society experienced scientific research on religious traditions as a 
threat. The instigation of the Diopeithes-decree in the 430s BC seems to symbolize 
this religious fear.  
 
But late 5th century BC critical and scientific statements on the nature of divine 
existence should not automatically be equated with atheism in the sense of disbelief in 
the gods. Critical and scientific reflection on traditional religion could actually 
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embody an appeal for religious reform. In the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred 
Disease from ca. 415 BC natural and human causes, instead of divine causes, are put 
forward in order to explain the origin of diseases, but at the same time, expressions of 
traditional religion are associated with impiety and disbelief in the gods. This is the 
case for the mantic art (passage I, 8-9) and its claims of having superior knowledge of 
curing diseases. According to the author of the treatise, such attitude encourages 
disbelief in the gods. But even if diviners did acknowledge belief in the gods, they are 
still being accused of practicing impiety. On the one hand, they claim that diseases 
and other forms of evil are inflicted by the gods, but, on the other hand, they are 
convinced that the gods cannot ward off the effects of these evils.178  
 
So, some nonconformist views on traditional Greek religion did not promote disbelief 
in the gods in any way, but rather aimed the opposite: attacking what was being 
perceived as impious forms of traditional theism.179 Still, public opinion in the late 5th 
century BC seems to have been particularly concerned with the dangerous potential of 
unorthodox views on traditional religion and associated such behaviour primarily with 
moral relativism and civic disobedience.180 Especially Athenian youth was believed to 
be vulnerable to these types of impious behaviour as can be confirmed by late 5th 
century BC sources, such as Aristophanes’s Clouds and Pseudo-Lysias’s Against 
Andocides: impious behaviour is the endresult of a moral relativism that Athenian 
youth adopt once they engage in disbelief in the gods. This type of behaviour is 
communally perceived as a threat for the continuance of civic religion and society in 
general.  
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The negative response from Athenian society to this sort of undesirable behaviour 
became visible for the first time in the 430s BC by means of the Diopeithes-decree 
which targeted the scientific research of natural philosophers such as Anaxagoras.181 
Their scientific approach on organized religion did not endorse atheism, however, but 
suggested a more sophisticated understanding of polytheism combined with the 
proposal of naturalist alternatives for the popular presentation of the Greek gods. In a 
similar way did the neo-Ionian philosopher Diogenes of Apollonia identify the god 
Zeus with the primary element ‘air’.182 These philosophers still acknowledged a 
degree of divine consciousness in natural elements183, but religious doubts and 
criticisms would become much more radical with the arrival of the sophist 
movement.184 Playwrights like Aristophanes, Euripides and Critias not only depicted 
in plays like Clouds, Bellerophon and Sisyphus a Zeitgeist that was determined by 
disbelief in the gods, but also portrayed protagonists, who conducted their lives 
accordingly.185  
 
Another infamous case of unorthodox religious behaviour that was associated with 
disbelief and moral relativism involved the late 5th century BC (young) poet and 
musician Cinesias, who was a member of an impious social club, called ‘Devotees of 
the Bad Moon’ which was specialized in sacrilegious behaviour. According to the 
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scholiast on Aristophanes’s Frogs (366), Cinesias was responsible for defecating on 
the statue of the goddess Hecate. By the early 4th century BC, Cinesias had become a 
rich sycophant and accused a certain Phanias for passing an illegal decree.186 Lysias, 
who wrote the defence speech for Phanias, reminded Cinesias of his earlier impious 
behaviour:  
 
“Apollophanes and Mystalides and Lysitheus, did they not join him (Cinesias) in festivities, 
deliberately held on an ominous day and giving themselves in stead of the name “Devotees of the New 
Moon”, the name ‘“Devotees of the Bad Daemon”.  They have not only proven themselves worthy of 
such a name, but they also revealed another meaning to their intention, namely displaying their 
contempt for the gods and the laws.” (transl. S.C. Todd)187 
 
The case of Cinesias is also remarkable, because it illustrates the concept of ‘divine 
justice’, which dominated late 5th /early 4th century BC Athenian mentality on matters 
of impiety.188 The gods eventually punish those who have committed impiety.189 The 
impious may escape at the hands of human justice, but they cannot escape the ultimate 
justice of the gods. In the case of Cinesias, it appears that all his associates had 
already succombed to various physical illnesses. Lysias sees in these circumstances an 
obvious intervention by the gods and reminds the Athenian audience of the 
importance of piety: 
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 Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, XII, 76. See also Todd (2000), p.358 & Kidd (2004), p. 90. 
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 Lysias, Against Cinesias (fragment V Gernet & Bizos), 2: Ἀπολλοφάνης καὶ Μυσταλίδης καὶ 
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 Mikalson (1983), p.104. 
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“Each of the others perished as you would expect such men to, but the gods put Cinesias, who was 
known to very many people, into such a condition that his enemies preferred that he live rather than 
die. The gods made him an example for other men, so that they might see that the gods do not put off 
the punishment of those who are excessively insolent towards divine matters upon their children, but 
they destroy miserably the sinners themselves by afflicting them with greater and harsher misfortunes 
and diseases than other men suffer. All of us by nature share in death and disease, but to continue in 
such a bad state so long and to be unable every day to end ones’ life by death befalls only those who 
have commited such sins as Cinesias has.” (transl. J.D. Mikalson)190 
 
The dithyrambic poet Cinesias in this depiction by Lysias basically represents a 
provocative form of impiety. 191  We can hardly apply the notion of critical thought on 
(organized) religion for philosophical purposes to his actions. Based on the 
information by Lysias, his impious conduct should be interpreted in terms of anti-
establishment statements, as Woodbury suggested.192 A similar behaviour is ascribed 
to the perpetrators of the parodying of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms 
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in 415 BC and, more presicely, to the Athenian orator Andocides, who eventually 
stood trial in 400 BC for his alleged involvement in these religious scandals.193   
 
We can conclude this section on the late 5th century BC perception of atheism that 
Athenian society did not make a fundamental distinction between all forms of 
nonconformist religious behaviour.194 The plea against Andocides (17) by Pseudo-
Lysias indicates that in light of the religious crisis of the late 5th century BC 
philosophical speculation on divine existence was publically denounced in the same 
way religious mockery or vandalism was. All were regarded as heinous assaults on 
civic society and therefore liable to public retribution by means of proper asebeia-
legislation.195 This can be attested by contemporary sources that primarily associated 
the atheism of Diagoras with ἀσέβεια and, in all probability, only secondary with 
disbelief in the gods by means of the expression νοµίζειν οὐ θεοὺς.196 
 
  14.2.2.2) the atheism of Diagoras and the modern debate 
 
Despite the fact that contemporary sources only recognized the atheism of Diagoras as 
a form of impiety, Diagoras of Melos is nonetheless perceived in preserved indices 
atheorum from later literary traditions as a representative of an extreme type of 
atheism that destroyed all belief in the gods.197 The historicity of these claims has 
been heavily debated, however. 
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In modern research on the atheism of Diagoras of Melos, we can even detect a 
distinctive dichotomy: scholars like Jacoby and Guthrie have acknowledged Diagoras 
as a radical atheist, while other scholars like Woodbury and Winiarczyk have firmly 
rejected such idea. 198 Between these two visions, we can also detect an ‘intermediate 
position’ with scholars like Fahr and Barnes. Fahr supposed the atheism of Diagoras 
of Melos to be genuine, but he did not believe it to be radical, arguing that this would 
not have been compatible with an intellectual mind-set of the late 5th century BC.199  
 
Jonathan Barnes argued that the atheism of Diagoras originated from the idea that 
injustice prevailed in society. This idea already appeared in the elegiac poems of 
Theognis and surfaced afterwards in the ‘immoralist’ doctrines of Thrasymachus.200 
According to Barnes, Diagoras could have been the first intellectual to develop a 
philosophical argument against theism, namely the conclusion that (c) the gods do not 
exist, based on the premises that (a) the gods are supposed to love and endorse justice 
and that (b) injustice appears to prevail in the world.201 But Barnes does not mention 
the atheism of Diagoras to be ‘radical’ of any sort.  
 
Felix Jacoby, who produced the most elaborate study concerning Diagoras of Melos 
to date, was the first to assume a radical atheism of Diagoras of Melos, which he 
believed to be extreme and uncompromising, not only by the standards of Antiquity, 
but by modern standards as well.202  
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With his view Jacoby refuted older opinions, which assessed the atheism of Diagoras 
of Melos as an exaggeration of the gibes of the Old Comedy by later Hellenistic 
writers.203 The main historical argument for sustaining this radical atheism was, 
according to Jacoby, the alleged atheist book or pamphlet by Diagoras, the so-called 
Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι, which Jacoby translated as “Fortifying Arguments”. Jacoby 
argued that both Aristoxenus and Epicurus (through the doxographical treatise On 
Piety by Philodemus204) attest the radical nature of the document concerning the gods. 
An epigraphical fragment from The Epicurean Inscription by the doxographer 
Diogenes of Oenoanda also attests the radical nature of Diagoras’s atheism.205  
 
Leonard Woodbury, however, criticized the idea of a radical atheism in the article The 
Date and Atheism of Diagoras of Melos (1965). Woodbury rejected this radical 
atheism, based on the claims that (a) the epithet ἄθεος did not encompass the meaning 
of ‘not believing in the existence of the gods’ until the Hellenistic period and (b) the 
authencity of the atheist book is doubtful.206 According to Woodbury, no 
contemporary evidence attests its existence, only information that can be derived from 
later Hellenistic traditions.207  Instead, Woodbury viewed Diagoras as an impious poet 
whom he compared with the poet Cinesias. As an impious poet, Woodbury argued 
that Diagoras, like Cinesias, must have belonged to so-called κακοδαιµονισταί, which 
can be translated as “the Devotees of the Bad Daemon”.  
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There is, however, not a single ancient source that can corroborate this view. 
Therefore, the theory is improbable. Another, in my opinion, farfetched idea by 
Woodbury is the explanation of the ‘conversion’ of Diagoras from a pious poet to an 
impious one. Woodbury states that in order to desecrate something, one must in the 
first place know what is sacred.208 Impious and sacrilegious poetry cannot emerge 
without the prior existence of pious, god-fearing poetry.  
 
So, in the opinion of Woodbury, the transition of Diagoras could be understood as an 
abandonment of conventional pious poetry, based on a sense of liberty and a 
deliberate attempt to shock the establishment. This theory has some serious flaws too. 
Firstly, this theory is entirely based on the fact that Aristoxenus mentions some 
fragments of pious poetry by Diagoras, which most likely belonged a the mid 5th 
century lyric poet Diagoras and not the late 5th century BC philosopher Diagoras.209 
Secondly, W.K.C. Guthrie in his History of Greek Philosophy already criticized 
Woodbury for applying an inaccurate interpretation of ἄθεος.210  Woodbury argued 
that ἄθεος did not gain the meaning ‘atheist’ until the Hellenistic Age, but this is 
incorrect. In Plato’s Apology, and most likely as early as Pseudo-Lysias’s plea Against 
Andocides from 400 BC, did ἄθεος already have the semantic implication of ‘not 
acknowledging the existence of the gods’.211   
 
The later study Diagoras von Melos-Wahrheit und Legende (Forsetzung) by Marek 
Winairczyk approved the view of Woodbury and also rejected the idea of a radical 
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atheism.212 Winiarczyk argued that the contemporary sources do not attest a radical 
atheism of Diagoras of Melos.213 Winiarczyk therefore believed the 
‘uncompromising’ atheism to be a fabrication of later Hellenistic philosophical and 
biographical traditions.214  
 
However, Winiarczyk did largely ignore the significance of an ancient source that 
does acknowledge Diagoras as a radical atheist, namely a fragment from 
Philodemus’s On Piety, in which we can read that “Epicurus reproached those who 
eliminate the divine, like Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias among others, saying that 
that rave like lunatics.”215 This doxographical account specifies the identification of 
Diagoras with radical atheism at least as early as Epicurus, so it definitely antedates 
Hellenistic tradition.216  Philodemus’s On Piety, along with The Epicurean Inscription 
by Diogenes of Oenoanda, is not only of doxographical significance, but also 
functions as an apologetic source, because it summarizes and refutes the (mainly 
Stoic) allegations that Epicurus was a genuine (radical) atheist.217   
 
The new translation and commentary of Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc.1077, col. 82, 
1-18 (19, 519-536) by Dirk Obbink seems to support the idea of radical atheism of 
Diagoras of Melos once again. But this is not reflected in the most recent view on 
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Diagoras, which is provided by Winiarczyk in Diagoras of Melos: A Contribution to 
the History of Ancient Atheism (2016). In this latest study, Winiarczyk reaffirms his 
older arguments on Diagoras: Diagoras was not a radical atheist or even a 
philosopher, but only a minor poet who became associated with radical atheism 
because of his impious actions against the Mysteries and the fact that only later 
(Hellenistic and Byzantine) traditions considered him to be the author of an atheist 
book.218 Therefore, this atheist book should be dismissed as being apocryphal. But 
Winiarczyk’s argument on this matter relies once more on a selective reading of 
Philodemus’s On Piety.219 The important evidence of P. Herc.1077, col. 82, 1-18 (19, 
519-536) for instance, is almost completely ignored in favour of Henrichs’s (not 
unanimously accepted) 1974 translation of P. Herc. 1428, cols. XI-XII 220, which does 
not acknowledge the existence of an atheist book by Diagoras.221 
 
Another short-coming in this new publication on the dismissal of Diagoras as a radical 
atheist is his association with other late 5th impious poets like Cinesias and his club of 
so-called ‘Devotees of the Bad Daemon’ (κακοδαιµονισταί). Clearly, Winiarczyk still 
relies on Woodbury for this thesis,222 but this impious depiction of the poet Cinesias is 
almost certainly a deliberate construction of Lysias.223 Moreover, Winiarczyk does 
now acknowledge the presence of radical atheism in late 5th century BC Athens in the 
form of a denial of any existence of deity and supernatural forces within a (not further 
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identified) ‘small group of people’.224 What this precisely embodied in philosophical 
terms or which intellectuals could be associated with this kind of ‘genuine’ 
philosophical atheism remain open ended questions nonetheless. We could conclude 
that Winiarczyk undertakes a good, but unconvincing attempt in maintaining his 
earlier arguments on the atheism of Diagoras, beside a concise and narrow view on 
late 5th century BC radical atheism that leaves the topic once more fragmentated in the 
current debate. 
 
If we aim to detect any radical atheism within the actions of Diagoras, in contrast to 
this latest opinion of Winiarczyk, we must again rely on the contemporary sources for 
a close reading and detailed analysis. This will allow us to detect a certain 
development within the atheism of Diagoras: from a theoretical atheism to a more 
active atheism, characterized by an increased radicalism.  
 
  14.2.2.3) the ‘theoretical’ atheism of Diagoras: 430-418 BC 
 
In this section on the atheism of Diagoras, we will thus focus on a first ‘atheist’ phase 
from 430 to 418 BC in which his thought has not yet developed into an active level 
that publically and openly challenged Athenian beliefs and rituals.  
 
This assumption will be based on the analysis of two contemporary souces on 
Diagoras that indicate a mere ‘theoretical’ atheism of Diagoras: the oldest reference 
Hermippus’s Fates (Hermippus F43 K/A) from 430 BC and Aristophanes’s Clouds 
(830), from 423-418 BC. These sources can be distinguished from later sources, such 
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as Aristophanes’s Birds (1073) & Frogs (320), with additional information in the 
Scholia in Aristophanem from Melanthius and Craterus, which indicate a second 
phase in the atheism of Diagoras, namely one that is characterized by a more 
radicalized nature and determined by an open and public defamation of the Mysteries.  
 
A final contemporary source to underline this second phase will be Pseudo-Lysias’s 
Against Andocides (17). But let us now begin our analysis of Diagoras’s atheism with 
the earliest reference to his actions and life in general. 
 
   14.2.2.3.1) Hermippus’s Fates 
 
As mentioned before, the earliest reference to Diagoras of Melos can be found in 
Hermippus’s Fates from 430 BC, which mentions the comical demotic ∆ιαγόρας ὁ 
Τερθρεύς (“Diagoras the Quibbler” or “Diagoras the Windbagger”).225  
 
In the Greek-English Lexicon, compiled by Liddell and Scott the noun τερθρεία can be 
translated as ‘use of extreme subtlety’ or ‘hair-splitting’ and typically has 
philosophical undertone.226 For instance, in his Prologue (I, 17), Diogenes Laertius 
associates τερθρεία, in the sense of ‘verbal jugglery’, with the Dialecticians or 
Megarian School, of which Euclid of Megara (ca. 435- ca. 365 BC) and Stilpo of 
Megara (360 - 280 BC) were the main representatives. Diogenes Laertius (II, 30) also 
makes use of the similar γλισχρολογία (meaning ‘fussy rhetoric’ or ‘hair-splitting 
reasoning’) in The Life of Socrates, when referring to the eristic reasoning of the 
Megarians and the Sophists. The noun τερθρεία also seems to correspond to λεπτολογία, 
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which literally means ‘subtle reasoning’. In this context it appears as the verb 
λεπτολογεῖν in Aristophanes’s Clouds (153) as a typecasting for the character of 
‘Socrates the Melian’, which is a comical reference to Diagoras of Melos.227 
 
Beside the allusion that Diagoras practiced ‘very subtle reasoning’ in relation to 
philosophical matters, no other concrete information on Diagoras surfaces in 
Hermippus (F43 K/A). We can only conclude that Hermippus must have regarded 
Diagoras as a sophist thinker or even a Protagorean sceptic on religious issues.228 The 
specific use of the comical demotic ὁ Τερθρεύς suggests a negative perception of 
sophists and philosophy in general on the part of Hermippus. This could be supported 
by his active involvement in the legal procedure of asebeia-trials, due to the fact that 
Hermippus performed the task of prosecutor in the impiety trial of Aspasia.229  
 
   14.2.2.3.2.) Aristophanes’s Clouds 
 
The second contemporary source on Diagoras, Aristophanes’s Clouds (830) from 423 
BC, is more informative on the atheism of Diagoras. As mentioned earlier in the 
reconstruction of the life of Diagoras, Aristophanes refers to Diagoras in Clouds by 
means of the character Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος (‘Socrates the Melian’).230 Aristophanes 
targets in this comic play the sophists and more specifically their educational 
principles, which are characterized by excessive fees for teaching and the distraction 
of Athenian youth from traditional beliefs. Diagoras (and not Socrates) is portrayed by 
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Aristophanes as their main representative.231 Socrates himself opposed the acceptance 
of fees for educational purposes, as can be read in Plato’s dialogue Meno.232 For this 
reason, it is implausible to identify the character of ‘Socrates the Melian’ with the 
historical Socrates. 
 
The dialectic approach between Socrates (i.e. seeking ethical truth) and the sophists 
(i.e. transferring inferior arguments into superior arguments and vice versa) also 
differed completely. But the reason why Aristophanes specifically identifies ‘The 
Melian’ with Socrates and not Diagoras in Clouds could be the simple fact that 
Socrates already appeared to be a rather comical figure to the public eye, due to his 
unusual appearance as a bald-headed, barefooted, pot-bellied and Silenus-like 
vagabond, constantly roaming the streets in search for moral truth.233  Moreover, 
Aristophanes may have considered the physical appearance of Diagoras (e.g., his 
tallness) to be unsuitable for comedy, if we can rely on such information on Diagoras 
from Hermippus. 
 
The main character of the play is Strepsiades, an older Athenian citizen, who sends 
his son Phidippides to a sophist school, led by Socrates the Melian.234 Being a 
representative of the ‘old’ ancestral ideas on religion, Strepsiades does not favour the 
‘new’ ideas of the sophists at all, but necessity compels him. Due to the fact that he is 
in serious debt, Strepsiades hopes his son can learn the typical sophistic logic, which 
could enable him to outmaneuver his debt collectors in court. Phidippides does 
succeed in learning, but far beyond the expectations of his father: he has not only 
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 Rogers (1968), 262-263 & Janko (2006), p. 56. 
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 Plato, Meno, 91b-91c. 
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 Rogers (1968), 262-263. See also Lapatin (2006), p. 110-155 for an extensive study on the physical 
imagery of Socrates from Antiquity to the Modern Age. 
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 See Konstan (2011)², p. 77-79 for a more detailled content of Clouds. 
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acquired the sophist dialectic method, but also doubts religious matters and any form 
of paternal authority, much to the dislike of Strepsiades.  
 
The passage 826-830 tells about Strepsiades recruiting Phidippides for the school. The 
encounter with the school’s head Socrates and his unorthodox views on the gods has 
baffled Strepsiades somehow. 235 When father and son meet again, Strepsiades is still 
under the influence of Socrates’s words and immediately responds, when Phidippides 
uses the phrase ‘by Olympian Zeus’, that “there is no Zeus” (οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεύς). Dinos, a 
sort of cosmic vortex, has expelled Zeus and rules instead.236 Phidippides is offended 
by the remark and asks who has told him such foolishness, by which Strepsiades 
replies: “Socrates the Melian” (Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος). Phidipiddes then reluctantly enters 
the school and learns the sophist ways of reasoning.   
 
The fact that Phidippides is taught to doubt religious values, convinced some scholars 
that Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος represented a Protagorean sceptic.237 I do not support this idea, 
because it does not explain the cosmic function of Dinos. The passage in which 
Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος is mentioned rather suggests a combination of Ionic naturalism and 
atomism.238 This naturalism is displayed in the function of Dinos, which acts as a 
natural substitute for the traditional Zeus and can be compared to the element of air 
(ἀήρ), which Diogenes of Apollonia identified with Zeus. The cosmic presentation of 
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 Aristophanes, Clouds (363-383). 
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Dinos being a swirl seems to refer to the atomism of Democritus and the belief in the 
origin of the universe.239   
 
Any explicit connection between Diagoras and Democritus, however, only appears in 
Byzantine sources such as Hesychius Milesius (On Famous Men, 17) and the Suda (∆ 
523: ∆ιαγόρας). No actual philosophical connection between Diagoras and Democritus 
is mentioned, only the idea that Democritus bought Diagoras as a slave after the 
destruction of the island of Melos and the abduction of its inhabitants into slavery in 
416 BC. This opinion might be interpreted as an attempt to explain the origins of 
Diagoras’s atheism by relating it to (the atomism of) Democritus. 
 
But the correlation between both philosophers could also be more aetiologically 
based. Democritus was probably the first Greek philosopher to develop the idea of 
religion as a byproduct of human invention.240 His cosmogony displayed a profound 
anthropological character: the universe came into existence, life was formed and man 
founded human institutions with the intent to guide him during his existence.241    
 
This concludes the information that can be derived from Aristophanes’s Clouds (830). 
Let us now turn to additional information, provided by the Scholia on Clouds (830). A 
first observation regarding these sources stipulates that much caution is needed when 
the phrasing Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος is being used. For example, three scholia on Clouds 
(830)242 refer to Aristagoras of Melos as the person behind Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος. This is 
an otherwise completely unknown person, so the name Aristagoras is definitely a slip 
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 In atomist cosmology (Democritus DK 68 A67, 68, 69), a world order forms when random atoms 
begin the form a circular swirl. See also Taylor (1999)², p. 186 & n. 13. 
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 Democritus (DK 68 B30). See also Ostwald (1986), p.283. 
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 Barnes (1979), vol II, p. 149. 
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for Diagoras by the scholiast(s).243 Hordern in his short article Aristagoras of Melos 
has a plausible theory on this ‘slip’: clearly, the scholiast(s) misread the Scholia on 
Aristophanes’s Frogs (320)244 in which Aristarchus reports on the impiety of 
Diagoras.245  
 
Other examples of scholiastic faultiness regarding Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος is the suggestion 
that Aristophanes refers to the besieging and starvation of Melos by the use of  ὁ 
Μήλιος. This is historically impossible: Clouds, even in its revised edition from 418 
BC, antedates the events in Melos, which took place in 416 BC.246 The explanation 
that Socrates was a pupil of Diagoras is yet another flaw of the scholiast(s). Like 
Woodbury, Hordern describes this assumption as ‘pure scholiastic fantasy’.247 As a 
sophist, the philosophical methods and rhetoric approach of Diagoras must have 
differed completely from those of Socrates.  
 
On the other hand, the idea that the real Socrates is depicted by Aristophanes as an 
‘atheist’ (i.e. ‘a denier of the existence of the gods’) has also been suggested.248 We 
are informed by Plato and Xenophon that Socrates was accused of θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν 
(“not believing in the existence of the gods”), next to the charges of δαιµόνια καινά 
(“introducing new deities”) and τοὺς νέος διαφθείρειν (“corrupting the youth”).249  The 
overthrow of Zeus by Dinos, however, cannot be interpreted as an introduction of 
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δαιµόνια καινά by Socrates, because ‘Socrates the Melian’ seems to substitute Zeus for 
Dinos as a form of ἀνάγκη (“natural law”).250 But another argument to associate 
Socrates with atheism can be found in a scholion on Clouds 830(a), which mention 
that Aristophanes viewed Socrates as an atheist.251 The reasoning behind this 
assumption might be the fact that Socrates had tutored alleged atheists like Critias and 
Alcibiades.252 
 
Regarding the radical atheism of Diagoras, there are no signs that the atheism of 
Diagoras of Melos already reached a radicalized level at the time of Clouds. No 
defamation of the Mysteries by Diagoras is reported as early as 423 BC.253 If the 
atheism of Diagoras was still theoretical at this moment, namely a combination of the 
sophist (conventional) distinction between φυσίς and νόµος and the anthropological 
views of Democritus and Prodicus on religion254, it could explain why Nicodorus had 
no objections whatsoever in hiring the sophist Diagoras for the rewriting of the 
constitution of Mantinea. Because his religious relativism still had a purely theoretical 
character, Diagoras’s reputation ca. 423 BC should not have differed that much in 
comparison to other sophists like Prodicus, who hade delivered many epideictic 
speeches in Athens, or Protagoras, who had also written legislation.255  
 
After his return to Athens, however, Diagoras must have developed this atheism into a 
more active level between 418 and 415 BC. Perhaps Diagoras endeavoured a more 
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social implementation of the aetiological theories of Prodicus?256 If Demeter and 
Dionysus could be historically reduced to the invention of bread and wine, a public 
defamation of the Eleusinian Mysteries could be a logical result of any 
implementation of Prodicus’s theories.  
 
Of course, the question remains what could have triggered his thought to a more 
radical level. In order to answer this, the sociohistorical context of the 420s BC in 
Athens must be examined more closely.257 For now, we can conclude that the 
theoretical atheism of Diagoras must be situated ca. 430-418 BC with a “Mantinean” 
intermezzo between 425 and 418 BC and a period of a more ‘active’ atheism, which 
must be situated between 418 and 414 BC.  
 
  14.2.2.4) the ‘active’ atheism of Diagoras: 418 – 414 BC 
 
As mentioned earlier in the reconstruction of the life of Diagoras, we can assume that 
Diagoras returned to Athens after the Battle of Mantinea and that he must have been 
present in the city-state by the time Clouds was revised a second time in 418 BC. 
From this period on, we detect an atheism that is no longer restricted to a theoretical 
form, but openly attacks one of the most revered Athenian rituals, namely the 
Eleusinian Mysteries. This is attested by Σ. Ar. Av. 1073, which contains testimonies 
by the Atthidographer Melanthius (ca. 350 BC – ca. 270 BC) and the historiographer 
Craterus (ca. 321 BC – ca. 270 BC): 
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“About Diagoras of Melos […] he made the Mysteries vulgar in such a way that many people could not 
be initiated. So the Athenians had this publically announced and written on a bronze stele, like 
Melanthius has mentioned in his book On the Mysteries.[…] It was pronounced, as such, that anyone 
who would kill him would receive one talent; anyone who would capture him would receive two 
talents. This was publically announced because it concerned an act of impiety on his behalf, for he had 
made the Mysteries public to all, ridiculed them and discouraged those who wished to be initiated, 
according to the historian Craterus. It was decreed almost exactly at the time of the capturing of Melos, 
but nothing prevents this (=the dating of the decree) to be earlier.”258 
 
The scholiast of Σ. Ar. Av. 1073 reports that Diagoras divulged the Mysteries in such 
a manner that numerous people could not be initiated. The exact nature of this 
divulging is not described. Did it involve a revealing of the secrecy? If so, this must 
indicate that Diagoras was once initiated himself. We do not posses a single source 
(apart from an indirect suggestion by Lucian, the Life of Demonax, 11) that suggests 
such.259 Moreover, revealing the secrecy in public would have been an extreme 
hazardous action, which Diagoras undoubtedly realized himself. Rather the 
“ridiculing” of the Mysteries might have concerned a more radicalized interpretation 
of Prodicus’s theories on the origin of Demeter and her rituals260, which Diagoras 
could have revealed to participants and bystanders.  
 
In any case, this ridiculing must have been regarded as a severe transgression, since 
we are informed of a public denunciation of Diagoras. The historiographer Craterus 
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(FGRHist 342 F16) provides additional information on the nature of the transgression 
and the charges against Diagoras: besides exposing and openly mocking the 
Mysteries, Diagoras also discouraged people from getting initiated.261 Craterus 
(FGrHist 342 F16) further informs that the public denunciation was preceded by a 
vote of the Assembly. It stipulated that the killing of Diagoras would be rewarded 
with a silver talent, while his live capturing would be rewarded with two silver talents.  
This reward is also mentioned by Melanthius (FGrHist 326 F3), but with the 
additional information that the denunciation was publicized on a bronze stele. 262 
Melanthius (FGrHist 326 F3) also reports a duplicate of the bronze stele on which 
was engraved that the citizens of Pellene (where Diagoras presumably had taken 
refuge after fleeing Athens) refused to extradite him, although Craterus states that the 
Athenians persuaded other Peloponnesian city-states to have Diagoras also outlawed 
by means of a similar reward.263  
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It remains somehow peculiar that the conviction of Diagoras was an exclusive matter 
of the Assembly, while other impiety trials were carried out by means of allotted jury 
courts.264 For example, the Athenian youngsters from the upper class, who had 
parodied the Mysteries in 415 BC, were put on trial by the use of dikasteria.265 The 
complete lack of judicial terminology in Σ. Ar. Av. 1073 suggests nonetheless that 
Diagoras was not brought to court. Sommerstein had a plausible explanation for this 
difference in repressive measures by Athenian authorities: the attacks of Diagoras on 
the Eleusinian Mysteries were not linked to the profanation of the Mysteries.266 The 
decree of Syracosius (Scholia on Aristophanes’s Birds (1297) = Phrynichus F27 K/A) 
clearly forbade any explicit reference of comic playwrights to persons involved in the 
scandals of 415 BC.267 The explicit reference of Aristophanes to the conviction of 
Diagoras by decree could therefore indicate that he was not involved in the scandal 
and consequently not put on trial.   
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But even if the denunciation by the Assembly was preceded by some form of 
preliminary verdict (e.g., προβολή), Diagoras had probably already fled Athens before 
any legal action had been undertaken against him.268 It has even been suggested that 
he was no longer a resident of Athens when the mutilation of the Herms and the 
parodying of the Mysteries occurred.269 Aristophanes (Birds, 1073) might also suggest 
this. 
 
   14.2.2.4.1) Aristophanes’s Birds 
 
In the comic play Birds, which was performed for the first time in 414 BC, 
Aristophanes depicts an Athenian called Peisthetaerus, who tries to persuade all the 
birds in the world to build a sky-city, which can isolate the Olympian gods from 
mankind, so the Birds can ultimately replace them. In one passage (1073) the Birds 
proclaim at the City Dionysia270 several ‘outlaws’: the first proclamation is a reward 
for the killing of Diagoras of Melos, the second proclamation is a reward for the 
killing of dead tyrants. The first proclamation is a clear reference to the conviction of 
Diagoras, which can be corroborated from different sources and has to be situated in 
the year 415/414 BC.271  
 
Concerning the connection of Diagoras with the dead tyrants, presumably the 
Peisistratids272, much speculation has been done. The oldest theory on the passage can 
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be derived from the Suda, but it has no significant meaning whatsoever.273 From the 
position of modern research, Drachmann interpreted the passage as (a) Diagoras had 
already passed away for some considerable time in 415BC or (b) the conviction of 
Diagoras was an old one at the time Birds was performed for the first time.274 This is 
nevertheless a very weak theory, because it has to deny the detailed information from 
Melanthius and Craterus. Both testimonies do attest that Diagoras was alive in 
415/414 BC by stating that his killing or alive capture was decreed shortly after the 
fall of Melos, but foiled by the citizens of Pellene who refused to extradite Diagoras. 
Based on the information by Melanthius and Craterus, which must be situated in the 
years 416 to 415 BC, the theory of Drachmann is shown to be incorrect. 
 
But speculation on the connection between Diagoras and the dead tyrants would not 
stop there. Jacoby argued that τεθνηκότων is a reference to an older conviction of 
Diagoras, probably as early as the 430s BC in the context of the Decree of 
Diopeithes.275 Woodbury, on the other hand, has convincingly disproved this theory 
of Jacoby by arguing that the connection with the dead tyrants must be placed in the 
context of the events of 415 BC, namely the defamation of the Herms and the 
common fear of oligarchy.276 The comical feature in this passage could be the simple 
fact that the situation of Diagoras and the ‘dead tyrants’ is alike: both are out of reach 
of the Athenian juridical system. Diagoras cannot be apprehended, because of the 
refusal of the inhabitants of Pellene to extradite him and the tyrants cannot be brought 
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before justice, due to their long-time demise. This idea, however, seems rather 
obvious and does exclude a more complex explanation of the comical purpose of the 
passage.  
 
Another clue for the linking of Diagoras with dead tyrants could be found in 
Thucydides (8.44.1) concerning the tripolis of Rhodos joining the Spartans in the 
Peloponnesian War ca. 412 BC. Most likely, the tripolis at that time was characterized 
by an oligarchic regime. We do know from a papyrological account (P. Oxy. Hist. ch. 
18.2 Chambers) that the ‘Diagoreioi’, who governed the tripolis of Rhodos were 
eventually overthrown by a pro-Athenian, democratic coup in 395 BC.277 So, the 
linking of Diagoras of Melos with the Peisistratids might be explained as the 
outlawing of oligarchic forces, which were hostile to radical Athenian democracy. 
Given the recentness of the religious scandals at the time Birds was produced and the 
political character of the defamation of the Herms as being symbols of radical 
democracy, this might be a plausible assumption.278 
 
F.E. Romer proposed nonetheless a more complex theory on the comical purpose. 
Similar to Woodbury, this author states that the denunciation of the dead tyrants must 
indeed be seen in a public annual curse of tyranny, now accompanied by a public 
curse on Diagoras. It might also illustrate that the Birds are not interested in both 
proclamations, because a reward for the killing of long-dead tyrants is as significant to 
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the Birds as the outlawing of a denier of the Olympian gods, who in return are 
challenged by the Birds.279 Both do not pose any threat to them. Besides this, the 
passage is further connected to Philokrates ‘the Sparrovian’, an alleged bird-catcher, 
who is publically condemned by the Birds. Some scholars have argued that 
Philokrates is a purely fictional character of Aristophanes.280 This could be possible, 
but we must consider the fact that the Athenian audience must have somehow 
recognized this character and this is only feasible if there is any connection to an 
existing person. Therefore, this ‘Philokrates’ might be a reference to the Athenian 
general Philokrates, who was victorious against the Melians during the siege of 416 
BC.281 If so, this could mean that Aristophanes considered the Birds to be even 
sympathetic to Diagoras. Romer shares this opinion based on another passage from 
Birds that speaks of λιµός Μήλιος (‘Melian fast’).282  In this particular passage, 
Peisthetaerus convinces the Birds to build their city in the sky, so they can rule “men 
instead of locusts and destroy the gods by a Melian fast”. From the scholiastic 
tradition on283, it is commonly believed that λιµός Μηλίος refers to the siege of Melos 
and the onwards starvation of the Melians in 416 BC.284  
 
Romer, however, has another opinion, which does not only give a better 
understanding of the comical meaning of Birds 1073, but it can also support the idea 
that Diagoras was a genuine positive atheist. Romer argues that the comical purpose 
of λιµός Μηλίος refers to Diagoras of Melos. This ‘Melian fast’ involves the strategy of 
the Birds:  by depriving the Olympian gods of their κνῖσα (“sacrificial meat”) the 
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‘Melian fast’ will lead to their deaths by starvation. This will allow the Birds to act as 
replacements of the gods. Because the Birds, unlike the Olympians, are not depending 
on κνῖσα for their sustenance, the atheism of Diagoras poses no threat to them.285  
 
Consequently, the ‘Melian fast’ acts like a form of atheist λιµός: it destroys sacrifice as 
the most essential veneration of the gods. So, the three proclamations of the Birds 
represent no actual danger for them: Diagoras is rather their ally286, the dead tyrants287 
form no threat to them and the infamous bird-catcher will have no power whatsoever 
over the Birds, once they have seized power over the gods.  
 
We can thus detect in Birds 186 elements that can support the hypothesis that 
Diagoras of Melos was indeed a radical atheist.288 His opinions regarding the gods did 
not only deny their existence, but also suspended any form of sacrifice, which was a 
quintessential aspect of their worship. This can also explain why Diagoras of Melos is 
one of only four identified intellectuals associated with the very rare expression θεοὺς/ 
θεῖον ἀναιρεῖν (“dissolving the gods/divinity”).289  
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Based on the lines 186 & 1073 from Birds and the additional information by 
Melanthius and Craterus from the Scholia, we can now conclude that the active period 
of radical atheism of Diagoras of Melos must be concentrated in the years 418 to 415 
BC, i.e. between the revision of Clouds and the first performance of Birds. But it is 
even possible to narrow these years down to a ‘core period’, namely after the capture 
of Melos by the Athenians.  
 
Both Scholia on Clouds (830) and Birds (1073) suggest that the attacks on the 
Mysteries by Diagoras were related to the sack of Melos, which occurred in 416 BC. 
Jan Bremmer supports this idea by suggesting that the bad treatment of his home 
island by Athens’s military force must have caused the active and open attack on the 
Eleusinian Mysteries by Diagoras.290  This would mean that the core period of active 
radical atheism must be limited to approximately one year (416-415 BC). It could 
indeed clarify why Athenian authorities did not react against this radical atheism at 
first, given the brief period of time in which it occurred.  
 
The mutilation of the Herms and the parodying of the Mysteries in 415 BC (in which 
Diagoras was most likely not personally involved291) and the overall negative impact 
of these events on public opinion must have nevertheless urged the necessity of 
prosecution. Diagoras must have realized that his stay in Athens became unattainable, 
not only because of any possible linking of these scandals to his public actions against 
the Mysteries, but also for the ominous effect these scandals caused in regard to the 
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impanding Sicilian Expedition.292 But it is uncertain that Diagoras was still in Athens 
at the time the religious scandals took place.293 Moreover, his name is not mentioned 
in any list of perpetrators, so both cases of impiety may have been regarded as 
unrelated matters.294  
 
   14.2.2.4.2) Aristophanes’s Frogs 
 
Eventhough Diagoras eventually fled Athens ca. 415 BC, his actions against the 
Mysteries would have a lasting effect. This can be confirmed by a last reference to 
Diagoras in a comic play by Aristophanes, i.e. Frogs (320), which was performed for 
the first time in 405 BC. Frogs deals with the adventures of the god Dionysus in 
search of the dead Euripides in the Underworld, while the Chorus consists of initiated 
participants of the Eleusinian Mysteries. They are continuously singing hymns and 
songs like the ‘Song of the Dead Frogs’, hence the name of the play.  
 
In line 320 we can read ᾁδουσι γοῦν τὸν Ἴακχον (“they sing the Iacchus”, i.e. a hymn to 
Dionysus) followed by ὅνπερ ∆ιαγόρας. In the 1924 Loeb edition of Frogs by B.B. 
Rogers, this is translated as “which Diagoras made”. Clearly, Rogers based his 
translation on (a) the Suda295 that states: ὕµνος εἰς ∆ιόνυσον. ᾄδουσι τὸν Ἴακχοv, ὥσπερ 
∆ιαγόρας (“a hymn to Dionysus. They sing the Iacchos, like Diagoras”) and (b) the last 
part of Σ. Ar. Ra. 320 which mentions the idea that “Diagoras was a dithyrambic poet, 
who continuously sang the Iacchus or he was a dithyrambic comedian, that is to say 
he wrote plays for Dionysus”. In a footnote, Rogers confirms this, not only by the 
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translation “which Diagoras made”, but also by stating that Diagoras was a lyric poet, 
clearly suggesting that Diagoras actually composed the Iacchus.296  
 
This view is nonetheless faulty; it results from the opinion of the grammarian 
Aristarchus of Samothrace (ca 216 – ca. 144 BC297) that ∆ΙΑΓΟΡΑΣ, as stated in the 
original manuscript, referred to the name ‘Diagoras’ in Σ. Ar. Ra. 320. The Scholia 
seem to suggest that Aristophanes deliberately tried to stir up emotions of the 
Athenian audience by juxtaposing the god-mocking Diagoras with the sacred hymn of 
Dionysus.  
 
Another version of Σ. Ar. Ra. 320 delivers a more plausible explanation of passage 
320: the grammarian Apollodorus of Tarsus (perhaps 1st century BC298) viewed 
∆ΙΑΓΟΡΑΣ as a word group in stead of a personal name, resulting in the phrase 
δι᾽ἀγορᾶς (“through the market-place”). This would mean that line 320 consists of the 
following: ᾁδουσι γοῦν τὸν Ἴακχον ὅνπερ δι᾽ἀγορᾶς (“they sing the Iacchus which leads 
them through the market-place”). Giving the context of the passage, this is a more 
plausible interpretation of ∆ΙΑΓΟΡΑΣ. But does this mean that Aristarchus was 
completely wrong and no reference to Diagoras whatsoever can be found in line 320? 
It seems that ∆ΙΑΓΟΡΑΣ functions as a form of word play: when the participants are 
following the Sacred Way towards Eleusis, which starts at the Athenian market-place 
and leads them to Eleusis, the reminiscence of Diagoras, the ultimate divulger of the 
Mysteries lingers in their minds, even a decade after his departure from Athens.  
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The line does not only indicate that the memory of Diagoras had not faded over a 
period of time, but also reminds us of the sensitivity regarding any form of divulging 
or ridiculing of the Mysteries, wich can be regarded, beyond any doubt, as one of the 
major taboos within ancient Greek religion. 299 
 
Notwithstanding this, most sourcebooks prefer the reading τὸν Ἴακχον ὅνπερ ∆ιαγόρας 
over τὸν Ἴακχον ὅνπερ δι᾽ἀγορᾶς.300 Kenneth Dover nonetheless remarked that the joke 
loses its comical strength if the reading τὸν Ἴακχον ὅνπερ ∆ιαγόρας (“the Iacchus which 
Diagoras sang”) is preferred, because a reference to Diagoras as an atheist and 
divulger of the Mysteries would induce a much stronger humorous response of 
Athenian audiences than an obscure reference to lyric poetry.301  
 
Another argument for the reading τὸν Ἴακχον ὅνπερ δι᾽ἀγορᾶς is the importance of the 
agora during the festivities.302 It was in the market-place that the initiates assembled 
in the morning of Boedromion (September) 19 to form the procession to Eleusis, 
which was characterized by the singing of hymns (such as the Iacchus).303 So, when 
the initiates left the market-place, they were reminded of the fact that Diagoras once 
discouraged participants along the route to Eleusis, according to Craterus (FGrHist 
342 F16).  
 
Based on the reading τὸν Ἴακχον ὅνπερ δι᾽ἀγορᾶς of Frogs (320), the agora could be the 
actual place where Diagoras tried to prevent participants from initiation (τοὺς 
βουλοµένους µυεῖσθαι ἀποτρέπων), although the procession of initiates was stopped 
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constantly for prayers, sacrifices, libations and hymns along the 15 miles route to 
Eleusis, thus offering enough opportunities for Diagoras to approach initiates for 
means of divulging.304 Another plausible location might have been the bridge over the 
river Cephisus.305 
 
Aristophanes’s Frogs (320) thus alludes that the initiates and priests, who untertook 
the procession from Athens to Eleusis, known as Pompè or Iacchus, were painfully 
reminded of Diagoras’s actions.306 Later writers, such as Cicero, would associate 
Diagoras also with the cynical mocking of the Mysteries of Samothrace.307 Cicero 
also initiated a tradition of connecting Diagoras with witty anecdotes, in addition to 
the profanation of other mystery cults besides Eleusis.308 Athenagoras of Athens’s A 
Plea for the Christians, IV, for instance, describes him as a divulger of the Mysteries, 
the Cabiri and Orphic logos. But these reports on the divulging of other mystery cults 
besides Eleusis do not seem to contain much historical credibility.309 In my opinion, 
these can all be traced back to the original misinterpretation by Cicero. The radical 
atheism of Diagoras of Melos (and Theodorus of Cyrene310) could easily be confused 
with the Cynicism of Diogenes of Sinope, based on the fact that their public actions 
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were determined by an irreligious character and because of their open display of irony 
and sarcasm against organized religion.311 
 
In this respect, the testimonies of the historiographers Craterus and Melanthius, which 
must be situated around 300 BC and which only survived through the Scholia on 
Aristophanes’s Birds (1073) & Frogs (320), are indispensible. Not only do these 
testimonies represent an early attestation of the divulging and ridiculing of the 
Mysteries of Eleusis by Diagoras, but they are the only sources that provide concrete 
information on the historical circumstances of these events. Their importance 
regarding the active atheism of Diagoras can therefore not be overlooked. As the 
original works by Melanthius and Craterus, on which the scholiast(s) of Birds (1073) 
and Frogs (320) drew, were probably lost early on, the fragments cannot belong to the 
recent (Byzantine) Scholia, but must be part of the old Scholia on Aristophanes, going 
back to the beginning of Alexandrian scholarship.312  
 
Apparently, the Athenians did tolerate his active atheism against the Mysteries for a 
certain amount of time313, but they must have eventually considered the transgression 
to be an evident case of impiety. Wilhelm Fahr, nonetheless, interpreted the divulging 
of the Mysteries as a form of theoretical atheism, based on the testimony of Pseudo-
Lysias (Against Andocides, 17) which describes the impiety of Diagoras as λόγος 
(‘thought’) and not ἔργος (‘act’).314 This is, however, very unlikely, because the 
divulging and ridiculing in the Scholia on Aristophanes’s Birds (1073) definitely take 
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the form of an act and contemporaneous Athenians would not have considered the 
atheism of Diagoras to have been a mere deviant theory.315  
 
So, the ‘active atheism’ of Diagoras, based on the testimonies by Melanthius and 
Craterus, can be summarized as the divulging and ridiculing of the Mysteries, 
accompanied by an active attempt to discourage the initiation of participants in the 
Mysteries. Melanthius also reports that Diagoras made the Mysteries vulgar in such a 
way that many could not be initiated, which should not necessarily indicate that 
Diagoras revealed aspects of the secrecy.316 Rather, he might have openly ridiculed  
and defamed the Mysteries for intellectual reasons (having a radicalized ‘Prodicean’ 
view on the Mysteries) or political reasons (i.e. viewing the Mysteries as a symbol of 
Athenian imperialism).317 
 
Other scholars like Leonard Woodbury have nonetheless suggested that the atheism of 
Diagoras must be regarded as a form of impious poetry in the vein of Cinesias. 
According to Woodbury, his divulging of the Mysteries should be interpreted as as a 
sort of comical statement, comparable with the ‘Devotees of the Bad Daemon’. This is 
also highly unlikely due to the specific nature of the Mysteries. Its reverence, and 
especially its secrecy, demanded such respectability and solemnity that a mere 
comical attack as an artistic statement is historically implausible.318 The divulging of 
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the Mysteries had severe consequences (i.e., a death sentence) of which any potential 
divulger must have been aware.319  
 
Divulging the Mysteries exclusively out of a scientific or philosophical interest might 
be a more plausible assumption, but apart from the audacious attempt by Theodorus 
of Cyrene, we have no information of any other philosopher, who openly criticized or 
divulged them and the personal experience of the Cynic Demonax might be 
exemplary herein.320  
 
Moreover, in the case of Diagoras of Melos exceptional sociopolitical conditions 
appear to have provoked his divulging of the Mysteries, rather than purely scientific 
or philosophical purposes, as will be demonstrated further on in this case study. But 
even if Diagoras did not reveal aspects of the secrecy, but only ridiculed the Mysteries 
(as a cultural hoax, for example), his actions would have certainly been experienced 
as a form of religious provocation and ritual pollution (miasma) that jeopardized the 
well-balanced relationship between gods and men.321 Similar to the case of the 
profanation of the Mysteries in private houses, not the parodying or the divulging 
itself might have been the main concern for the religious community in Athens, but 
the idea that non-iniates were being exposed to secret aspects of the Mysteries outside 
the appropriate ritual context.322  
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What this secrecy actually embodied is very difficult to determine. It most likely 
involved a series of initiation rites and gifts dedicated to Demeter, because Isocrates 
gives us a small clue in one of his speeches: 
 
“Now, first of all, that which was the first necessity of man's nature was provided by our city; for even 
though the story has taken the form of a myth, yet it deserves to be told again. When Demeter came to 
our land, in her wandering after the rape of Kore, and, being moved to kindness towards our ancestors 
by services which may not be told save to her initiates, gave these two gifts, the greatest in the world—
the fruits of the earth, which have enabled us to rise above the life of the beasts, and the holy rite which 
inspires in those who partake of it sweeter hopes regarding both the end of life and all eternity.” (transl. 
G. Norlin)323  
 
Clearly, Isocrates remains very allegorical in his information and, based on this 
passage, we cannot even determine if he was initiated or not. On the other hand, the 
passage seems to suggest that (symbols of) grain played a role in the secrecy. The 
reference to ‘services’ by Isocrates could imply the introduction of bread of which 
Demeter was believed to be the inventor, not only within traditional Greek religion, 
but also from a sophist point of view. Prodicean theory, for instance, focussed on an 
anthropological explanation of the ‘gift of the godess Demeter’. According to 
Prodicus, Demeter was believed to be a deified symbol of the foodstuff, grain or an 
historical inventor of the skill of breadmaking.324 Isocrates does explicitly refer to the 
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mythological aspects of the story, which could reflect a degree of acceptance of the 
theory of Prodicus.  
 
Besides, the Mysteries itself consisted of two parts, a public aspect that included the 
proclamation, the sacrifice of piglets and the singing of the Iacchus.325 These public 
rituals have been documented in different ancient sources, like Aristophanes’s Frogs 
(324) and did not cause any consternation. The private aspect of the Mysteries (and 
especially the secrecy), on the other hand, demanded absolute reverence.326  
 
Yet the smallest allusion to secretive aspects of the Mysteries was out of the question, 
because even well-respected and conservative writers, like Aeschylus, were once 
accused of violating the secrecy. According to tradition, Aeschylus nearly escaped 
death when he unintentionally divulged too much of the secrecy in one of his plays.327 
The exact circumstances are uncertain and even the play in question (possibly 
Oresteia)328 is unclear, but the (unconfirmable) story goes that Aeschylus took refuge 
in the temple of Dionysus, in order to escape death. Regardless of the authenticity of 
this story, it demonstrates the harsh penalties for revealing even vague allusions to the 
secrecy.329  
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Even in later (Roman) times, caution about the secretive aspects of the Eleusinian 
Mysteries did not change fundamentally. Livy mentions a story of two Akarnanian 
youngsters, who entered the Sanctuary by mistake and were taking into custody and 
put to death for violating ancestral laws.330 The 2nd century AD geographer Pausanias 
actually applied a sort of self-censorship when he deliberately omitted any concrete 
information regarding the Eleusinian rituals in his Description of Greece:  
 
“After I had intended to go further into this story, and to describe the contents of the sanctuary at 
Athens, called the Eleusinium, I was stayed by a vision in a dream. I shall therefore turn to those things 
it is lawful to write of to all men […]. My dream forbade the description of the things within the wall of 
the sanctuary, and the uninitiated are of course not permitted to learn that which they are prevented 
from seeing.” (transl. W.H.S. Jones & H.A. Ormerod)331 
 
Lucian also mentions the Cynic philosopher Demonax from the 2nd century AD, 
According to the following passage, an Athenian crowd was informed that Demonax 
(in his capacity as negative atheist?) did not wish to participate in any cultic activity 
and refused to be initiated in the Eleusinian Mysteries, 
 
“Besides his candour and independence, there had been found Anytuses and Meletuses to repeat the 
historic charges: he had never been known to sacrifice, and he made himself singular by avoiding 
initiation at Eleusis. […] On the count of never having sacrificed to Athene, 'Men of Athens,' he said, 
'there is nothing wonderful in this; it was only that I gave the Goddess credit for being able to do very 
well without sacrifices from me.' And in the matter of the Mysteries, his reason for not following the 
usual practice was this: if the Mysteries turned out to be bad, he would never be able to keep quiet 
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 Livy, History of Rome, XXXI, 14. 
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 Pausanias, Description of Greece, I, 14.3 - I, 38.7: πρόσω δὲ ἰέναι µε ὡρµηµένον τοῦδε τοῦ 
λόγου καὶ †ὁπόσα ἐξήγησιν †ἔχει τὸ Ἀθήνῃσιν ἱερόν, καλούµενον δὲ Ἐλευσίνιον, ἐπέσχεν ὄψις 
ὀνείρατος: ἃ δὲ ἐς πάντας ὅσιον γράφειν, ἐς ταῦτα ἀποτρέψοµαι […] τὰ δὲ ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους 
τοῦ ἱεροῦ τό τε ὄνειρον ἀπεῖπε γράφειν, καὶ τοῖς οὐ τελεσθεῖσιν, ὁπόσων θέας εἴργονται, δῆλα 
δήπου µηδὲ πυθέσθαι µετεῖναί σφισιν.  
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about it to the uninitiated, but must dissuade them from the ceremony; while, if they were good, 
humanity would tempt him to divulge them.” (transl. A.M. Harmon)332 
 
The references to the accusators of Socrates, Anytus and Meletus, clearly imply that 
the Cynic Demonax was publicly accused of impious behaviour. Demonax was 
nevertheless able to persuade the angry mob by assuring that his refusal had nothing 
to do with disbelief or impiety against the gods, it was actually a precautionary 
measure: being an intellectual he would never be able to uphold the secrecy of the 
Mysteries once being initiated. Therefore, he was better exempted from initiation. 
This witty answer seemed to have appeased the furious crowd. 
 
Moreover, this passage bears some striking resemblances with the testimonies by 
Melanthius and Craterus concerning the divulging and dissuading of initiates by 
Diagoras. Demonax was almost certainly familiar with the actions of Diagoras and, by 
refusing any involvement, he was able to appease the enraged crowd that he would 
not become a transgressor and divulger like Diagoras had been once.333 Therefore, 
this passage by Lucian could actually be the sole source, which indirectly suggests an 
initiation of Diagoras in the Mysteries, but this assumption is only based on a 
circumstantial interpretation of the passage and cannot be corroborated by any other 
source. 
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 Lucian, The Life of Demonax, 11: καί τινες ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν συνέστησαν Ἄνυτοι καὶ Μέλητοι τὰ αὐτὰ 
κατηγοροῦντες ἅπερ κἀκείνου οἱ τότε, ὅτι οὔτε θύων ὤφθη πώποτε οὔτε ἐµυήθη µόνος 
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πρὸς τοὺς µηδέπω µεµυηµένους, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποτρέψει αὐτοὺς τῶν ὀργίων, ἄν τε καλά, πᾶσιν αὐτὰ 
ἐξαγορεύσει ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας:  
333
 Whitmarsh (2015), p. 220. 
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Only a later Christian source, however late and tendentious this may be for apologetic 
reasons, gives any concrete information on the secrecy of the Mysteries.334 The 3rd 
century AD Christian writer Hippolytus reports in his Refutation of All Heresies:   
 
“The Athenians, when they conduct Eleusinian Mysteries, reveal in silence to the initiates the great, 
wonderful, most perfect initial mystery, an ear of grain. This ear of grain is for the Athenians, the great 
initiatory light-bringer from that which is unformed, just as the hierophant himself, not castrated like 
Attis, but made impotent with hemlock and detached from his whole material being, at night in Eleusis 
celebrating the great and unspeakable mysteries with much fire, cries aloud and says: “The lady Brimo 
has brought forth a holy son, Brimos.”(transl. S. Price)335 
 
At first sight, the report by Hippolytus seems rather cryptic, but it does shed some 
light on the secrecy. It appears that initiates were shown sacred objects like an ear of 
grain. This artifact most likely functioned as a symbol of the first fruits of harvested 
grain.336 Furthermore, the word ‘light-bringer’ does not only refer symbolically to the 
ear of grain, but can also suggest that initiations were performed in near darkness with 
little torchlight337, presumably in the presence of the hierophant. This religious official 
alone could enter the so-called anaktoron, the dark room in the sanctuary (telesterion) 
were sacred objects like the ear of grain were being kept. Epigraphic evidence also 
seems to suggest that the sacred objects were shown to the initiates separately.338 This 
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 Bremmer (2014), p.1. 
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 Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, V, 8, 36: καὶ µετὰ τοὺς Φρύγας καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι µυοῦντες 
Ἐλευσίνια, καὶ ἐπιδεικνύντες τοῖς ἐποπτεύουσι τὸ µέγα καὶ θαυµαστὸν καὶ τελειότατον 
ἐποπτικὸν ἐκεῖ µυστήριον, ἐν σιωπῇ τεθερισµένον στάχυν. Ὁ δὲ στάχυς οὗτός ἐστι καὶ παρὰ 
Ἀθηναῖοις ὁ παρὰ τοῦ ἀχαρακτηρίστου φωστὴρ τέλειος µέγας, καθάπερ αὐτὸς ὁ ἱεροφάντης, 
οὐκ ἀποκεκοµµένος µὲν, ὡς ὁ Ἄττις, εὐνουχισµένος δὲ διὰ κωνείου, καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπηρτισµένος 
τὴν σαρκίνην γέγεσιν, νυκτὸς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι ὑπὸ πολλῷ πυρὶ τελῶν τὰ µεγάλα καὶ ἄρρητα 
µυστήρια βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγε λέγων, “ἱερὸν ἔτεκε πότνια κοῦρον Βριµὼ Βριµὴ,” 
336
 Price (1999), p. 106. 
337Mikalson (2005), p.87: the torchlight also refers to the Hymn of Demeter in which the goddess 
carries torches in search of her daughter Persephone. 
338
 Price (1999), p. 105, based on IG I³ 6 c.26-30. See also Bremmer (2014), p. 13-14 for more 
information on the role of the hierophant during initiation. 
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might explain why Hippolytus describes the hierophant as being ‘made impotent by 
hemlock’: due to the fact that female initiates also appeared before the hierophant in 
the telesterion, it could have prevented any inappropriate behaviour on his part by 
‘being detached from his whole material being’.339  Finally, the name Brimo must be 
interpreted as an alternative reference to Demeter340, while the name Brimos refers to 
Demeter’s son Πλοῦτος or Plutus, the god of wealth.341 Both names seem to attest the 
importance of (agricultural) fertility and abundance within the ritual setting of the 
Mysteries.342  
 
Hippolytus seems to be the only source that actually reveals any details of the secrecy 
of the Mysteries. This would signify that for a period of nearly two thousand years, 
during which the Mysteries were celebrated, the general attitude of reticence in regard 
to the secrecy remained unchanged.343  
 
In the light of these observations, one can imagine the exceptional nature of the 
divulging of the Mysteries by Diagoras of Melos, because he is the only known 
(philosophical) transgressor, along with Theodorus of Cyrene. The question why 
Diagoras openly attacked the Mysteries by preventing initiation of participants and 
revealing the secrecy remains a challenging one. Undoubtably, Diagoras must have 
been aware of the religious sensitivity and the possible consequences of any 
transgressive action, but apparently something must have driven him intellectually, 
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 Notwithstanding the fact that these Christian sources provide the sole information regarding the 
private aspects of the Mysteries, the lateness and hostile character of sources like Clement of 
Alexandria and Hippolytus only allow (what Bremmer (2014), p. 1 coins) a ’thin’ description of the 
Mysteries. 
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 Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus, II, 15, 1. 
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 According to (Liddell & Scott) A Greek-English Lexicon, p.1423: πλοῦτος originally meant ‘wealth 
in corn’. 
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 Bremmer (2014), p. 17. 
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 Mylonas (1974), p. 226. 
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morally, or even politically. The answer could even be a combination of reasons. The 
political reasons, for instance, appear to be intertwined with an underlying moral 
motivation.344 
 
   14.2.2.4.3) Pseudo-Lysias’s Against Andocides 
 
Let us now investigate the last contemporary source concerning Diagoras, namely 
Pseudo-Lysias from 400 BC.345 Perhaps it can provide further information on the 
‘active’ atheism of Diagoras. In paragraph 17 of the plea Against Andocides, Diagoras 
is explicitly mentioned: 
 
“And mark how far more impious this man has shown himself than Diagoras the Melian; for he was 
impious in speech regarding the sacred things and celebrations of a foreign place, whereas Andocides 
was impious in act regarding the sanctities of his own city. Now where these sacred things are 
concerned you should rather be indignant, men of Athens, at guilt in your own citizens than in 
strangers; for in the one case the offence is in a manner alien to you, but in the other it is domestic. 
(transl. K. Maidment)” 346 
 
Diagoras is being compared in this paragraph with Andocides, an aristocratic 
Athenian, who had been arrested for his involvement in the religious scandals of 415 
BC. Under a guarantee of immunity, Andocides testified that he had witnessed the 
scandals and delivered the names of all perpetrators. Despite his testimony as an 
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 See, on this matter, section 14.3.3 of the dissertation. 
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 The most recent commentary of Against Andocides is provided by Todd (2007), p. 399-475. Todd 
(2007), p. 399 suggest the date of 400 BC in favour of 399 BC, for his argumentation, see Todd (2007), 
p. 409, n. 42 & p. 410, n. 44. 
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 Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides 17: τοσοῦτο δ᾽ οὗτος ∆ιαγόρου τοῦ Μηλίου ἀσεβέστερος 
γεγένηται· ἐκεῖνος µὲν γὰρ λόγῳ περὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἱερὰ καὶ ἑορτὰς ἠσέβει, οὗτος δὲ ἔργῳ περὶ 
τὰ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει. ὀργίζεσθαι οὖν χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς ἀστοῖς ἀδικοῦσι µᾶλλον ἢ 
τοῖς ξένοις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά· τὸ µὲν γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀλλότριόν ἐστιν ἁµάρτηµα, τὸ δ᾽ οἰκεῖον. 
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eyewitness of the events, his immunity was limited due to the decree of Isotimides, 
which forbade all those who had confessed any involvement in the scandals to enter 
the temples or the market-place.347 Therefore, Andocides went into voluntary exile 
and eventually returned to Athens in 402 BC after the general amnesty of 403 BC.348 
His participation in the Eleunisian Mysteries in 400 BC, however, brought the old 
allegations against him back to the forefront. His opponents tried to have him finally 
condemned as a subject of the decree of Isotimides.  
 
What is striking in this passage is the fact that the impiety of Andocides is considered 
to be worse than that of Diagoras. Being an Athenian citizen, Andocides’s parodying 
of the Eleusinian Mysteries is regarded to be more impious than the ridiculing of the 
Athenian cult by the metic Diagoras. Furthermore, Pseudo-Lysias describes a 
different atheist modus operandi by Diagoras, who performed verbal impiety (λόγῳ), 
whereas Andocides was performing active impiety (ἔργῳ). 349 Much speculation has 
been done concerning the interpretation of this comparison by Pseudo-Lysias. 
According to Dover, it demonstrates how patriotism and piety were closely linked in 
late 5th century BC Athens.350 The impiety of the metic Diagoras is considered to be 
less harmful than impiety committed by an Athenian citizen. The meaning of λόγῳ 
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 Cawkwell (1993), p. 87 & Evans (2010), p. 218. 
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 Evans (2010), p. 219. 
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 I follow Dover (1988), p. 137 on this matter. The comparison between the ‘impious acts’ of 
Andocides versus the ‘impious speeches’ of Diagoras might refer to the idea that the (radical) atheist 
Diagoras ‘figuratively destroyed the gods’ by ridiculing the Mysteries, while Andocides, as a supposed 
perpetrator, ‘literally destroyed the gods’ by mutilating their images. In any case, I do not support the 
view of Romer (1996), p. 395, n. 9 & Janko (2016), Review on Battling the Gods: Atheism in the 
Ancient World by Tim Whitmarsh, (Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2016.06.20), accessible via 
bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2016/2016-06-20.html that λόγῳ refers to the atheist book of Diagoras. This is an 
implausible view for different reasons. For instance, the plea must be situated in 400 BC at a moment 
that Diagoras may have been still alive, while the account by Al-Mubaššir reports that the atheist book 
was published posthumously. This can be corroborated by the fact that the only known references to 
the atheist book (by Epicurus and Aristoxenus) must be situated in the late 4th century BC.  
350
 Dover (1988), p.137. See also Garnsey (1984), p. 4 & Parker (2005), p. 454. The latest analysis has 
been done by Todd (2007), p. 453. Todd reaffirms Dover and argues that, although the gods were Pan-
Hellenic, worship was closely connected to communal duties and citizenship, which did not apply to 
the metic Diagoras.  
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versus ἔργῳ, however, should not be interpreted as a comparison between a 
‘theoretical atheism’ of Diagoras and an ‘active atheism’ of Andocides. As impiety 
always involved a certain act, it would be very implausible that late 5th century BC 
Athenians regarded the attempts of Diagoras to divulge and ridicule the Mysteries as a 
bizarre atheist doctrine and not a concrete form of sacrilege.351 Moreover, both cases 
of impiety were probably regarded as similar exponents of the religious crisis that 
struck Athens during this critical phase of the Peloponnesian War.352 
 
But why does Pseudo-Lysias actually differentiate both forms of impiety into an 
‘impiety in speech’ and an ‘impiety in act’? In my opinion, Pseudo-Lysias might have 
applied this comparison only in the context of any involvement in the religious 
scandals of 415 BC. The name of Diagoras never occurs in any list of perpetrators of 
the scandals that has been preserved in literary and epigraphical accounts.353 Most 
likely, the scandals and the religious offences by Diagoras were separate matters.354 
This could mean that Diagoras did not participate in the parodying of the Mysteries or 
the mutilation of the Herms, but merely performed ‘verbal’ protests against the 
Mysteries.355  However, the public and open character of his divulging and ridiculing 
of the Mysteries was surely perceived by the Athenians as an active form of sacrilege. 
But Pseudo-Lysias might have compared the verbal sacrilege of the metic Diagoras 
with the material sacrilege of the Athenian citizen Andocides in order to have a strong 
rhetorical argument at the expense of Andocides.   
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 Mikalson (1983), p. 137, n. 6 who refutes Fahr (1969), p.89-92 that Diagoras of Melos was 
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 Rubel (2000), p. 171-172 & Evans (2010), p. 217. 
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 On the literary evidence, see Andocides, Against the Mysteries, 12-13; 15; 16; 18; 34-35 & 67. On 
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We can also look at the rhetoric used throughout the plea. The speech itself seems 
rather poorly developed, which led to the conclusion that Against Andocides is not 
even an authentic plea of Lysias.356 Also the religious zeal with its clear focus on a 
conviction of Andocides357 makes it obvious that Pseudo-Lysias merely wants to 
convince his audience that Andocides must be condemned, because his impious 
actions are of a comparable or even worse nature than the sacrilege of Diagoras, 
which some Athenians may still remember vividly in 400 BC.  
 
The fact that Andocides participated in the Mysteries after his involvement in the 
parody in 415 BC, -which led to the secrecy being exposed to non-initates- is what 
particularly seems to aggravate the religious anger of Pseudo-Lysias. The resuming of 
public rituals by a notorious blasphemer like Andocides appears suspicious in the 
mind of Pseudo-Lysias. Therefore, his message is simple: the present piety of 
Andocides cannot be an excuse for his former impiety.358 By comparing him with a 
convict and heinous offender of the Mysteries like Diagoras, an acquittal of 
Andocides for his involvement in the scandals of 415 BC would seem less evident. 
 
Andocides, however, defended himself in a plea called On The Mysteries, which 
successfully persuaded the court that the arguments of his opponents regarding his 
past were flawed. A major argument in his defence speech focused on the idea that the 
gods would not have spared him during times of great peril if he was truly guilty of 
impious behaviour: 
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358Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 11-12: another example of the sudden piety of Andocides 
involves him accusing a certain Archippus of impiety against the Herm of his house.  
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“I for one cannot believe that if the gods considered me guilty of an offence against them, they would 
have been disposed to spare me when they had me in a situation of the utmost peril-for when is a man 
in greater peril than on a winter sea-passage?- Are we to suppose that the gods had my person at their 
mercy on just such a voyage, that they had my life and my goods in their power, and that in spite of it 
they kept me safe? Why, could they not have caused even my corpse to be denied due burial?” (transl. 
K. Maidment) 359 
 
Andocides also emphasized that he had bettered his life in regard to his tarnished past 
with the following confession: 
 
“Think, furthermore, what a citizen you will have in me, if you give me your protection. I was once, as 
you know, a man of great wealth. Then to begin with, through no fault of my own, but through the 
disasters which overtook Athens, I was plunged into utter penury and want. I then started life afresh, a 
life of honest toil, with my brains and my hands to help me. Nay more, I not only know what it is to be 
the citizen of a city such as this; I know what it is to be an alien sojourning in the land of  neighbouring 
peoples; I have learnt the meaning of self-control and good sense; I have learnt what it is to suffer for 
one’s mistakes.” (transl. K. Maidment)360 
 
Considering the eventual acquittal of Andocides, we can conclude that the indignation 
concerning the religious scandals was not so vibrant anymore after fifteen years of 
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 Andocides, On The Mysteries, 137-138: ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐκ ἀξιῶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοιαύτην 
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τοιαύτης πολίτην εἶναι, εἰδότα δὲ οἷόν ἐστι ξένον εἶναι καὶ µέτοικον ἐν τῇ τῶν πλησίον, 
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πρᾶξαι κακῶς, 
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sociopolitical turmoil.361 The comparison in the rhetoric of Pseudo-Lysias between 
Andocides and the notorious ἀσεβής Diagoras also proved to be ineffective. Clearly, 
the impact of Diagoras’s atheism was beginning to fade away in the Athenian minds 
in 400 BC, notwithstanding the fact that Aristophanes had alluded to the memory of 
Diagoras in Frogs, only a few years earlier. With this testimony by Pseudo-Lysias we 
can terminate the analysis of the contemporary sources regarding Diagoras’s atheism.  
 
Now mainly reduced to a shadowy figure from the past, Diagoras would not only 
become the subject of many stories and anecdotes in the course of Hellenistic and 
Roman times, but also of many inconsistencies and contradictions (e.g., the ‘atheist’ 
conversion of a pious poet) that recreated his exceptional atheism. 
 
Based on the contemporary and early Hellenistic sources, I conclude that the impact 
of Diagoras’s exceptional atheism, in the sense of ‘denying the existence of the 
gods’362 on late 5th century BC Athenian society should not be reduced to a Hellenistic 
fabrication or a mere denial of Volksreligion as Woodbury & Winiarczyk did suggest. 
I tend to reaffirm the vision of Jacoby, who assessed the atheism as ‘complete’ and 
‘straight-forward’, comparable to the idea of ‘radical’ or ‘positive’ atheism.  
 
There are multiple indications to support this vision. Firstly, we can detect a 
radicalizing evolution in the atheism of Diagoras in the contemporaneous and early 
Hellenistic sources: from the ‘theoretical’ atheist in Clouds 830, who ‘does not 
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 See also Evans (2010), p. 226, who believes that the acquittal of Andocides could be explained by 
the fact that he did not return to Athens during the reign of the oligarchs. For this reason, the Athenian 
jury might have been convinced that the loyalty of Andocides to the democracy was genuine. As Evans 
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 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 1, 63 & 117; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, 
IX, 53. 
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believe that Zeus exists’, to the ‘active’ atheist in the Scholia in Aristophanem, who 
prevents the initiation of participants in the Mysteries and openly ridiculed one of 
Athens’s most revered rituals.  
 
Secondly, the arguments of Woodbury and Winiarczyk are not convincing. 
Woodbury’s idea of Diagoras as a comical offender of the Mysteries in the vein of 
Lysias’s depiction of Cinesias is highly implausible, considering the highly revered 
character of the secrecy and the fact that it cannot be corroborated with ancient 
sources. Winiarczyk, then again, overlooks important doxographical evidence by 
Philodemus, which attest a radical atheism of Diagoras.363  
 
Thirdly, the phrase θεοὺς/ θεῖον ἀναιρεῖν, which is applicable to Diagoras in different 
ancient sources, does not suggest a mere denial of popular religion, comparable to, for 
example, the criticism on anthropomorphism by Xenophanes of Colophon or 
Empedocles.364 Besides, not a single ancient source mentions any alternative 
conception on the Greek gods by Diagoras of Melos. For these reasons, a rejection of 
popular religion in favour of a more sophisticated understanding of Greek polytheism 
and piety seems to be most unlikely in the case of Diagoras. 
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364
 From an Epicurean point of view, the expression θεοὺς/ θεῖον ἀναιρεῖν either refers to (a) 
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associate of Cleanthes, according to Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII, 
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 14.2.3) The atheist writings of Diagoras 
 
The atheism of Diagoras can be reconstructed not only from his public actions against 
civic religion in Athens, but from his writings as well. Notwithstanding the fact that 
not a single word, besides the alleged titles of these works, has survived, we do have 
different ancient sources from the late 4th century BC, which refer to the specific 
nature of these writings.  
 
The earliest account is a passage from Epicurus’s treatise On Nature (ca. 310 BC) 
concerning the atheist book by Diagoras, which has been preserved in the 
doxographical account On Piety of the Epicurean philosopher and poet Philodemus 
(ca. 110 – ca. 35 BC). Epicurus discusses the writings (παραγραµµίζ[ουσι]) of three 
‘atheists’ (Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias) and compares its radical nature to madness: 
 
“And those who eliminate the divine from existing things Epicurus reapproached for their complete 
madness, as in book 12² he reapproaches Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias among others, saying that they 
rave like lunatics, and he likens them to Bacchant revellers, admonishing them not to trouble or disturb 
us. For indeed they explain the names of the gods by changing letters, just as Antisthenes substituting 
the most common, ascribes the particular to imposition and even earlier through some act of deceit.” 
(transl. D. Obbink)365 
 
Epicurus relates Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias in the fragment to Antisthenes (ca. 
445 – ca. 365 BC), the founder of Cynicism, because ‘they respell the names of the 
                                                      
365 Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col. 82, 1-23 (19, 519-541): 
καὶ πασᾶν µ[ανίαν Ἐ]πίκουρος ἐµ[έµφα]το τοῖς τὸ [θεῖον ἐ]κ τῶν ὄντων [ἀναι]ροῦσιν, ὡς κἀ[ν 
τῶι] δωδεκάτω[ι Προ]δίκωι καὶ ∆ια[γόραι] καὶ Κριτίαι κἄ[λλοις] µέµφ[εται] φὰς 
πα[ρα]κόπτ[ει]ν καὶ µ[αίνεσ]θαι, καὶ βακχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς [εἰ]κά[ζει, κε]λεύσ[ας µ]ὴ πρᾶγµα 
ἡµεῖν παρέχειν οὐδ᾽ ἐνοχλεῖν. κα[ὶ γὰρ] παραγραµµίζ[ουσι] τὰ τ[ῶ]ν θεῶν [ὀνόµα]τα, 
[κα]θάπερ Ἀν[τισ]θέ[νης] τὸ κοινό[τατον] ὑποτείνων ἀν[αφέρει] τὰ κατὰ µέρος [τῆι θέ]σει καὶ 
διά τι[νος ἀπά]της ἔτι πρότ[ερον] 
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gods’ (in order to explain the origin of belief in them).366 Most likely, Epicurus refers 
in this fragment to the aetiological theories on the origin of the gods (e.g,. Prodicus’s 
theory on the correlation between the origin of religion and agricultural innovations 
and the Sisyphus-fragment of Critias). Antisthenes attested a similar theory by stating 
that by convention (κατὰ νόµον) many gods exist, but by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) only 
one.367  If Antisthenes viewed the many gods in Greek religion indeed as inventions of 
cultic history and reduced them to one natural principle, he also demolished the gods 
from existing things (ἐκ τῶν ὄντων) and denied their role in the origin of religion and 
the order of things.368 Therefore, he could also be labeled a ‘radical atheist’ according 
to Epicurean doxography. 
 
A second, slightly younger source, which alludes to the writings of Diagoras can also 
be found in the treatise On Piety by Philodemus, based on information from the 
Peripatetic philosopher Aristoxenus of Tarentum (floruit 335 BC).369 In this account 
Philodemus does not explicitly mention a prose book or pamphlet by Diagoras,370 but 
                                                      
366
 Obbink (1996), p. 143 (n. 5). 
367
 Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1428, fr. 21 (Gomperz 1866) & Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, 
I, 13&32. See also Obbink (1996), p. 362.  
368
 On Antisthenes, see Frede (2011), p. 62-70. 
369
 For sources on Aristoxenus, see the editions by Wehrli (1967) & Kaiser (2010). 
370
 Jacoby (1959), p 5, 14 & 26 (based on Gomperz’ reading of τοῦτ’ [αὐτ]ο[ῦ] ἐστ[ι]ν in P. Herc. 
1428 from 1866, see also Wehrli (1967), p. 22 & Guthrie (1971), vol.III, p. 236, n. 2) interpreted this 
fragment as a direct reference to an atheist book by Diagoras. Henrichs (1974), p. 28, on the other 
hand, follows the reading of τοῦθ’ ὑ[γ]ιές ἐστ[ι]ν as suggested by Adolf Schober in his dissertation 
from 1923 (see Schober (1988), p. 67-125). Based on this new reading and a new translation and 
interpretation of P. Herc. 1428, Henrichs criticizes Jacoby’s arguments on the attestation of an atheist 
book by Aristoxenus. Henrichs views Diagoras, at most, as an impious poet, based on Pseudo-Lysias, 
Against Andocides, 17. But Parker (1996), p.208, n. 37 remarks that the use of ἐµ[έµφα]το by 
Philodemus in P. Herc. 1077, col. 82, 2-3 (19, 520-521) would contrast with the denial of an authentic 
atheist book by Henrichs in P. Herc. 1428. Parker also argues that ὑ[γι]ές from col. XI,10 in P. Herc. 
1428 might actually be read [ἀληθὲ]ς. I tend to follow Parker on this matter for different reasons. First, 
the reading of [ἀληθὲ]ς instead of the rather unusual ὑ[γι]ές makes more sense within the 
philosophical context of the fragment and second, the reading of [ἀληθὲ]ς does not contradict with the 
earlier attestation of an atheist book by Philodemus (on authority of Epicurus), in contrast to Henrichs’s 
interpretation of P. Herc. 1428. This indicates that Philodemus (on authority of Aristoxenus) does 
believe in an authentic book of Diagoras, containing atheistic doctrines, but he does not exclude the 
possibility that Aristoxenus considered it to be a spurious writing, comparable to Diogenes Laertius (II, 
39) and based on the pious poems of (the lyric poet?) Diagoras he had discovered in Mantinea. This 
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he compares the atheism of Diagoras with the prose writings of Stoic philosophers 
(τοῖς [σ]υνγράµµασιν ἐπονοµάζοντε[ς]) and dismisses it as a joke (ἔπαιξεν), based on 
some pious poems (of Diagoras) Aristoxenus had discovered in Mantinea during 
research371,  
 
(XI) “Those (=Stoic) men do not acknowledge the gods in human shape, but as being air, wind and 
aether, so that I would dare to say that these men were more wrong than Diagoras. He joked, that is if 
this was a sane thing to do, but, as Aristoxenus said in his Mantinean customs, he added in the poetry, 
which is only thought to have been really written by him, nothing impious, but he was devout as a poet 
towards the divine, as also testifies what was written to Arianthes of Argos: “God, oh God, guide the 
thoughts for all human labour in the most sublime way and to Nicodorus of Mantinea that everything 
for humans is accomplished according to divine will and fate!” (XII) “The encomium of Mantinea 
contains these things about him. These (=Stoic) men, who mention the gods in their (prose) writings, 
destroy them in a very meticulous way and with care, so that they become more servile than (in the 
writings of) Philippus and others, who simply destroy the gods.” 372 
 
The context of this passage is polemical: Philodemus accuses the Stoics of ‘destroying 
the gods’ by reducing them the status of mere cosmological phenomena, while 
                                                                                                                                                        
would indicate that Aristoxenus did believe in the existence of an atheist book, but one that was falsely 
attributed to Diagoras in his opinion. See also Kaiser (2010), p. 5 (who accepts the reading of 
Gomperz) and Winiarczyk (2016), p. 25 (who follows Henrichs on this matter). 
371
 Hordern (2001)², p. 33. 
372
 Philodemus, On Piety, P.Herc. 1428, col XI-XII: 
(XI) 
(…) ἀνθρωπ[ο]ε[ι]δεῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοί γε <οὐ> νοµίζουσιν ἀλλὰ ἀέρας καὶ πνεύµατα καὶ αἰθέρας, 
ὥστ᾽ἔγωγε [κ]ἂν τεθαρ[ρ]ηκότως εἴπαιµι τούτους ∆ιαγόρου [µ]ᾶλλον πληνµελεῖν· ὁ µὲν γὰρ 
ἔπαιξεν, εἴπερ ἄρα καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὑ[γι]ές ἐστ[ι]ν ἀλλ᾽οὐκ ἐπενήνεκται, καθάπ[ερ ἐ]ν τοῖς 
Μα[ν]τινέων Ἔθε[σ]ιν Ἀριστόξενός φησιν, ἐν δὲ τῆι ποιήσει τῆι µόνηι δοκούσῃ κατ᾽ἀλήθειαν 
ὑπ᾽αὐτοῦ γεγράφθαι τ[ο]ῖς ὅλοις οὐ[δ]ὲν ἀσεβὲς παρενέφ[ην]εν ἀλλ᾽ἔστιν εὔφηµος ὡς 
[π]οιητὴς εἰς τὸ δ[α]ιµόνιον, καθάπερ ἄλλα τε µαρτυρεῖ καὶ τὸ γεγρα[µ]µένον εἰς Ἀριάνθην 
τὸν Ἀργεῖον· ‘θεὸς θεὸς πρὸ παντὸς ἔργου βροτείο[υ] νωµᾶι φρένα ὑπερτάταν’ καὶ τὸ εἰς 
Νικόδωρον τὸν Μαντινέα ‘κατὰ δαίµονα καὶ τύχαν τὰ πάντα βροτοῖσιν ἐκτελεῖσθαι. τὰ 
παραπλήσια δ᾽ αὐτῶι 
(XII) 
περι[έ]χει [καὶ τ]ὸ Μαντινέω[ν] ἐνκώµιον. οὗτοι δὲ θεοὺς ἐν τοῖς [σ]υνγράµµασιν 
ἐπονοµάζοντε[ς] ἀνήιρουν ἐξεργαστ[ι]κῶς τοῖς πράγµασι[ν] καὶ µετὰ σπουδῆς, 
ἀ[νε]λευθερώτεροι γινόµενοι Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἁπλῶς τὸ θ[εῖο]ν ἀ[ν]αιρούντων. 
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Diagoras was only joking. The atheism of the Stoics is thus worse than that of 
Diagoras, especially when we consider that this was wrongly attributed to him, 
according to Aristoxenus.373 Philodemus seems to suggest that Aristoxenus did not 
believe that Diagoras was a denier of divine existence, based on devout poems he had 
discovered during research in Mantinea. But the account by Philodemus cannot hide 
its real intent: the ‘atheist’ theology of the Stoics should be regarded as being far 
worse than the extreme atheism of Diagoras. It remains, on the other hand, unclear 
why Philodemus makes use of the information from Aristoxenus on Diagoras in this 
‘atheist’ comparison.  
 
In my opinion, the atheist comparison can only be convincing if (a) Philodemus 
recognizes the radical atheism of Diagoras, in order to make any comparison with 
Stoic theology that also ‘destroys the gods’ even possible, and (b) the extreme 
character of the atheism of Diagoras is somehow diminished, by depicting it as a form 
of satire in comparison to the more devout poems Diagoras was believed to have 
composed. A similar reasoning can be detected in Pseudo-Lysias’s Against 
Andocides, 17, where the author assessed the atheism of Diagoras to be less harmful 
than the impiety of Andocides and Plutarch’s On Common Conceptions Against the 
Stoics, 31 (1075a-c), in which the theological views of early Stoics like Cleanthes and 
Chrysippus are considered to be more damaging than the atheism of Diagoras, 
Theodorus and other atheoi.374 So, the use of ἔπαιξεν in P. Herc.1428 could indicate 
that Philodemus might have viewed any radical atheism of Diagoras (as defended in 
prose writing) as a practical joke.375 This is doubtful, however, due to the fact that 
                                                      
373
 Hordern (2001)², p.33. 
374
 For a critical analysis of this passage by Plutarch, see section 15.2.2 of the dissertation. 
375
 Hordern (2001)², p. 33. 
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there are no futher references to the atheist book being a form of practical joke by 
Philodemus or any other ancient source. 
 
For this reason, I would suggest another option than (b): Philodemus might have 
believed that not the radical atheism of Diagoras was a joke, but rather his ‘pious 
poetry’.376 Philodemus suggests this by the phrase οὐ[δ]ὲν ἀσεβὲς παρενέφ[ην]εν (“he 
added nothing impious”). The reason might have been simple: Philodemus was 
probably familiar with the fact that Diagoras rewrote the constitution of Mantinea 
between 425 and 418 BC.377 In Philodemus’s opinion, Diagoras could have identified 
himself as a pious poet to the people of Mantinea, in order to camouflage his 
‘impious’ and ‘godless’ reputation and with the sole intent of assuring his hiring by 
Nicodorus of Mantinea. By arguing so, the comparison between Stoics and Diagoras 
becomes more logical: the atheism of the Stoics is worse than the atheism of 
Diagoras. At least, he made an effort to conceal his atheism from the public by 
composing poetry that maintained a traditional presentation of the gods, while the 
Stoics meticulously ‘destroy the gods’ in their prose writings.378  
 
Although this appears to be a plausible interpretation of the ‘duality’ of Diagoras in 
Philodemus in P. Herc. 1428, cols XI-XII, it is probably at most a figment of 
Philodemus and not a historical fact. In all likelihood, the sophist Diagoras did not 
write the pious poetry Aristoxenus discovered while conducting research in Mantinea 
                                                      
376
 See Obbink (1996), p. 353 who argues that ἔπαιξεν may refer to a symposiastic poem by Diagoras 
& Whitmarsh (2016), p. 183, who assesses the idea that an atheist could not have written religious 
poetry as ‘a rather naïve one’. 
377
 Aristotle, Politics, 6, 1318b & Polybius, History, VI, 43. 
378
 Philodemus (On Piety, P. Herc. 1428, col. XII) also makes the comparison between ‘simply 
destroying the gods’ like some philosophers have done in their prose writings and ‘destroying the gods, 
in orde to make them docile’ as the Stoics do. Considering the philosophical context of the fragment, 
we could assume that Philodemus refers to the main Epicurean accusation of atheism against the Stoics, 
namely the Stoic tendency to reduce the gods to inanimate objects. 
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ca. 300 BC. Rather, Aristoxenus wrongly attributed the pious poetry to the late 5th 
century BC sophist, while it might have belonged to a different person by the name 
‘Diagoras of Melos’. Possibly, this involved a lyric poet from the mid 5th century BC 
(floruit 468 BC), who was a contemporary of Simonides, Pindar and Bacchylides.379  
  
Nothwithstanding this, both doxographical accounts by Philodemus do not only 
include an early confirmation of a radical atheism by Diagoras380, but also indicate 
that his writings or opinions on radical atheism must have survived until the late 4th 
century BC in order to be commented upon by both Epicurus and Aristoxenus. 
Therefore, these could not have been entirely lost as the result of (public) book 
burnings, although some ancient sources seem to suggest that similar ‘atheist’ 
treastises were the subject of such official reprisals.381 In any case, I do not support 
the idea of Wehrli and Winiarczyk that an anonymous sophist could have published 
the atheist book under the name ‘Diagoras’ in the first half of the 4th century BC, 
based on (a misinterpretation of) Plato (Laws, X, 886b-886c), who alludes to the 
existence of  ‘atheist writings’.382  I also do not follow the opinion of Romer and 
Janko that the atheist book was already published in the late 5th century BC, because 
Pseudo-Lysias mentions that Diagoras was ‘impious in speech (λόγῳ) in regard to 
                                                      
379
 Σ. Ar. Ra. 320 & Eusebius, Hieronymi Chronicon, p. 110, 4 Helm ad. Ol. 78, 1 (468 BC) = 
Winiarczyk 1981 Diagoras T5A. 
380
 Obbink (1996), p. 353. 
381 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 23.6 and Diogenes Laertius, On The Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers, IX, 51-52 mention the ‘atheist’ book by Protagoras (Περὶ θεῶν) being the subject of 
public book burning and persons who possessed copies were supposedly tracked down by a herald. No 
contemporaneous sources report on the phenomenon of public burnings, only the wish to “reduce his 
writings to ashes” (Timon of Phlius in the 2nd book of his Silli, as preserved in Sextus Empiricus, 
Against the Mathematicians, IX, 56-57. Moreover, this does not corroborate with the image Plato 
portrays of a well-respected Protagoras, whose intellectual views (e.g., Protagoras-myth) were in 
accordance with traditional views on piety. Still the phenomenon of Greek book burnings could be 
historically plausible according to Dover (1988) p.143-145 & 157 (additional note), but Dover does not 
defend the idea of public book burnings. See also Wallace (1996), p. 226-240 & Filonik (2013), p. 37-
38. 
382
 Wehrli (1961), p. 126;  Winiarczyk (1980), p. 68; Yunis (1988), p. 61, n. 6 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 
86. See also section 14.2.3.2 why this idea should be dismissed.  
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foreign rites and festivals’.383 This theory conflicts with the supposed posthumous 
character of the atheist book, as attested by Al-Mubaššir. Moreover, all surviving 
sources on the atheist book must be situated in the late 4th century BC. 
 
So far, we can conclude this preliminary observation of the atheist writings of 
Diagoras. Let us now analyze the literary output of Diagoras more in detail, by 
focusing on the authenticity of the preserved titles and by presenting a number of 
arguments on its content and preservation.  
 
  14.2.3.1) Preserved titles of the atheist writings  
 
Regarding the atheist writings by Diagoras, ancient sources attest two different titles, 
namely Φρυγίοι λόγοι and Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι. This should not imply that these titles 
correspond to two separate atheist books, more likely we are dealing with two 
separate titles for one atheist book.384  
 
Besides, authors in Antiquity did not necessarily give their treatises a proper title. 
Later readers often provided distinctive titles, in order to specify the content or topic 
of the treatise.385 As a result, ancient sources could report more than one title for a 
specific book. One particular treatise of Protagoras, for example, was referred to as 
                                                      
383
 Romer (1996), p. 395, n. 9, based on Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 17. In all probability, 
Pseudo-Lysias is referring to the divulging of the Mysteries by Diagoras as a form of ‘verbal sacrilege’ 
and not an atheist book.  See also Dover (1988), p. 137. Janko (2001), p. 7, situates the writing of the 
atheist book between Clouds I (423 BC) and Clouds II (418 BC), but this is largely based on the 
controversial theory of Diagoras and Melos and Diogenes of Apollonia as possible authors of the 
Derveni-papyrus. The theory of Janko (2001) has now been rejected by Betegh (2005), p. 373-380. 
384
 19th century scholars like Fritzche (1845), p.183 & Münchenberg (1877) p.23-25 argued that 
Φρυγίοι λόγοι as an atheist book of Diagoras must be separated from the so-called Ἀποπυργίζοντες 
λόγοι. The first would have only concerned the defamation of the Mysteries of Eleusis, while the 
second focused on the denial of divine existence. The evidence for this argumentation is only indirectly 
based on the testimony of Tatian and therefore very weak.  
385
 On this matter, see Schmalzriedt (1970), p. 20-23 & Lee (2005), p. 24. 
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Ἀλήθεια (‘Truth’) by Plato (Theaetetus 152c) or Καταβάλλοντες λóγοι (‘Knockdown 
Arguments’) by Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians, VII, 60), while 
Diogenes Laertius (III, 37 & 57) identified it as Ἀντιλογικά (‘Opposing Arguments’).  
 
   14.2.3.1.1) Φρυγίοι λόγοι 
 
The oldest source that mentions a title for the atheist writings of Diagoras of Melos is 
Tatian, a Christian apologist from the 2nd century AD. In his plea Address to the 
Greeks (27), Tatian states: 
 
“Diagoras was Athenian, but you took vengeance on him when he burlesqued the Athenian Mysteries 
and , although you read his Phrygian tales, you hate us.” (transl. J.B. Rives)386 
 
The title Φρυγίοι λόγοι, which Tatian attributes to Diagoras, is historically speaking 
problematic. At first, there seems to be confusion with a treatise, named Φρυγίος λόγος 
by Democritus. However, the only notion of Φρυγίος λόγος attributed to Democritus 
appears in an appendix on the catalogue of Democritus’s works by Diogenes Laertius 
(IX, 49). The content and nature of this treatise remains nonetheless unknown. 
Although a similar work, Χαλδαϊκὸς λόγος (On Chaldaean logos), is listed, the other 
works in the appendix are of a much different nature, 
 
“Some include as separate items the following works taken from his notes: ‘On the sacred writings [or 
hieroglyphics] in Babylon’, ‘On those in Meroë’, ‘Periplus of the Ocean’, ‘On History’, ‘Chaldean 
                                                      
386
 Tatian, Address to the Greeks, XXVII: ∆ιαγόρας Ἀθηνοῖς ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἐξορχησάµενον τὰ 
παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις µυστήρια τετιµωρήκατε καὶ τοῖς Φρυγίοις αὐτου λόγοις ἐντυγχάνοντες ἡµᾶς 
µεµισήκατε. 
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logos’, ‘Phrygian logos’, ‘On fever and those whose illness makes them cough’, ‘Legal causes’, 
‘Chernika(?), or Problems’.” (transl. R.D. Hicks)387 
 
This information led to the conclusion that these works are of a spurious nature, which 
were already disregarded as being authentic by the grammarian Thrasyllus (1st century 
AD)388, despite the fact that Democritus supposedly undertook many voyages to 
Egypt, Persia and Chaldea.389 From these voyages Democritus could have absorbed 
the necessary information for writings on Phrygian antiquity and language, but such 
assumption is improbable due to the overall low interest in Phrygian culture, which 
was deemed barbaric in the Graeco-Roman world.390  
 
Furthermore, it would be more plausible to interpret the adjective Φρυγίος not 
necessarily as a reference to Phrygian culture at all. It probably fulfilled a more 
proverbial use, pointing out the examination of the ancient origins of Egyptian or 
Lybian divine myths.391 Besides this, Phrygian logos as a literary genre, seems to 
appear not earlier than the 3rd century BC under Ptolemaic rule, when the cult of Isis 
was identified with the cult of the Phrygian dea mater.392  
 
So, Democritus can be neglected as the author of Phrygian logos. But how does this 
explain the authorship Tatian ascribed to Diagoras, a contemporary of Democritus? A 
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 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX, 49: Τάττουσι δέ τινες κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ἐκ 
τῶν Ὑποµνηµάτων καὶ ταῦτα: Περὶ τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἱερῶν γραµµάτων. Περὶ τῶν ἐν Μερόῃ. 
Ὠκεανοῦ περίπλους. Περὶ ἱστορίης. Χαλδαϊκὸς λόγος. Φρύγιος λόγος. Περὶ πυρετοῦ καὶ τῶν 
ἀπὸ νόσου βησσόντων. Νοµικὰ αἴτια. Χειρόκµητα [ἢ] προβλήµατα. 
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 Winiarczyk (1980), p. 59. 
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 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX, 35. 
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 Rives (2005), p.238. 
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 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, III, 42; Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris, 29 (362b); Plutarch, On the 
Decline of the Oracles, 10 (415a) & Plutarch, De Daedalis Plataeensibus, fr.157, preserved through 
Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, III, 1.1. 
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 Winiarczyk (1980), p. 60 & Rives (2005), p. 231-232. 
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possible explanation could be the linking of the atheism of Diagoras with the 
materialism of Democritus; in Byzantine literary tradition, such linking can be 
attested.393  
 
In the context of examining divine myth, Φρυγίοι λόγοι can also be interpreted as a 
euhemerizing account. This idea is, on the other hand, also problematic, because there 
are no indications of a Phrygian logos as a euhemerizing account having antedated 
Hellenistic Times.  
 
Therefore it cannot be historically attributed to an author like Diagoras of Melos. This 
‘attribution’ is likely the result of a later (Christian) tradition that made use of 
euhemerizing accounts to point out the absurd nature of polytheism and ‘pagan’ 
religion in general. On this matter, the writer Leon of Pella, who had written a 
euhemerizing account on the Egyptian gods was particularly inspiring for Diodorus 
Siculus, the most elaborate source on Euhemerus of Messene, and Christian apologists 
like Tatian.394  
 
                                                      
393
 A connection between Diagoras and Democritus can also be found in the legend that Democritus 
bought Diagoras as a slave and made him his pupil. However, this legend does not appear until the 6th 
century AD in a Byzantine source by Heschychius Miletus (On Famous Men, XVII). The 10th century 
Suda is a literal copy of this account. (Suda (∆ 523: ∆ιαγόρας): ∆ιαγόρας, Τηλεκλείδου ἢ 
Τηλεκλύτου, Μήλιος, φιλόσοφος καὶ ᾀσµάτων ποιητής· ὃν εὐφυᾶ Θεασάµενος ∆ηµόκριτος ὁ 
Ἀβδηρίτης ὠνήσατο αὐτὸν δοῦλον ὄντα µυρίων δραχµῶν καὶ µαθητὴν ἐποιήσατο) (“Diagoras, 
Son of Telekleides or Teleklytos; a Melian, a philosopher and a lyric poet; whom Democritus from 
Abdera, seeing that he was naturally talented, bought -- since he was a slave -- for ten thousand 
drachmas and made a pupil.”) (transl. D. Whitehead). Probably Byzantine scholars tended to trace back 
the atheism of Diagoras to the materialism of Democritus. See Barnes (1979), vol. II, p.154-159. The 
claim that Diagoras was a slave in these Byzantine sources could be an alternative interpretation of the 
Scholia on Aristophanes’s Clouds and might refer to the abduction of the Melians into slavery after the 
fall of Melos in 416 BC. 
394
 Winiarczyk (2002), p. 150-53. 
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From Tatian on, a tradition started of interlinking euhemeristic writers and (radical) 
atheists395, like Diagoras and Theodorus as can be read in the Protrepticus of Clement 
of Alexandria (ca.150 – 215 AD), a contemporary of Tatian.  
 
“Wherefore (for I must by no means conceal it) I cannot help wondering how Euhemerus of 
Agrigentum, and Nicanor of Cyprus, and Diagoras, and Hippo of Melos, and besides these, that 
Cyrenian of the name of Theodorus, and numbers of others, who lived a sober life, and had a clearer 
insight than the rest of the world into the prevailing error respecting those gods, were called Atheists; 
for if they did not arrive at the knowledge of the truth, they certainly suspected the error of the common 
opinion.” (transl. A. Roberts & J. Donaldson)396 
 
The connection between Euhemerus and the radical atheist Diagoras, as mentioned by 
Clement, is evident: both exposed the false nature of the ‘pagan’ gods. Consequently 
it would not have been surpising for Christian writers to associate Diagoras with any 
euhemerizing Phrygian logos. A similar observation can be found in Arnobius’s 
Against the Heathen, IV, 29:   
 
“And here, indeed, we can show that all those whom you represent to us as and call gods, were but 
men, by quoting either Euhemerus of Acragas, whose books were translated by Ennius into Latin that 
all might be thoroughly acquainted with them; or Nicagoras the Cyprian397; or the Pellaean Leon; or 
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 Winiarczyk (1980), p. 64-65 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 96-98. 
396
 Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus, II, 24, 2: ὧν δὴ χάριν ῾οὐ γὰρ οὐδαµῶς ἀποκρυπτέον̓ 
θαυµάζειν ἔπεισί µοι ὅτῳ τρόπῳ Εὐήµερον τὸν Ἀκραγαντῖνον καὶ Νικάνορα τὸν Κύπριον καὶ 
∆ιαγόραν καὶ Ἵππωνα τόν Μήλιον τόν τε Κυρηναῖον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκεῖνον ῾ὁ Θεόδωρος ὄνοµα 
αὐτᾦ καί τινας ἄλλους συχνούς, σωφρόνως βεβιωκότας καὶ καθεωρακότας ὀξύτερόν που τῶν 
λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἀµφὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τούτους πλάνην, ἀθέους ἐπικεκλήκασιν, εἰ καὶ τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν αὐτὴν µὴ νενοηκότας, ἀλλὰ τὴν πλάνην γε ὑπωπτευκότας, 
397
 The obscure Nicanor of Cyprus is a supposed atheos (Fahr (1969), p.181), who is only mentioned 
by Arnobius in his list of intellectuals with similar views as Euhemerus on the origin of the Graeco-
Roman gods, in addition to Clement (Protrepticus, II, 24, 2), who refers to ‘Nicanor of Cyprus’ in a list 
of atheoi. It remains unclear why Arnobius would have corrected the name ‘Nicanor’ (if Clement was 
used as a source) into ‘Nicagoras’, because the name is not mentioned elsewhere (See Kroll (1936), 
col. 216 and Gisinger (1956), col. 363). Perhaps Arnobius argued that the index atheorum of Clement 
needed some modifications, because Clement did incorrectly refer to Hippo of Rhegium by the use of 
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Theodorus of Cyrene; or Hippo and Diagoras of Melos; or a thousand other writers, who have 
minutely, industriously, and carefully brought secret things to light with noble candour.” (transl. A. 
Roberts & J. Donaldson).398   
 
Notwithstanding the sense for rhetorical exaggeration (vel auctoribus aliis mille), 
Arnobius sees no distinction between different generations of atheoi and their 
corresponding views on the origins of Graeco-Roman gods. They all shared 
euhemeristic opinions in refutation of pagan religion.  
 
The notorious anecdote on the burning of the wooden statue of Heracles by Diagoras, 
which Clement adopted from a slightly older Christian source (i.e. Athenagoras399), 
could be interpreted as a euhemerizing effort from a Christian point of view: although 
the statue represents the deified hero Heracles, Diagoras discards the divine character 
of this ‘pagan’ idol by reducing it to a mere piece of wood, only suitable for boiling 
his vegetables.400 Consequently, it would not have been unusual for Christian writers 
to associate Diagoras with euhemerizing Phrygian logos. 
 
For reasons of chronology and content, we can conclude that Φρυγίοι λόγοι is not a title 
that could historicially refer to a treatise by Diagoras of Melos. The ascription by 
                                                                                                                                                        
Μήλιος in stead of  Ῥηγῖνος in his list of atheoi. A late 16th century theory by Johannes Meursius 
(Criticus Arnobianus, 1598) nonetheless identified Nicanor of Cyprus with Nicanor, a biographer of 
Alexander the Great, as mentioned by Lactantius, Divine Institutes, I, 6, 8, whom Fahr (1969), p. 181 
situates around 300 BC. If both represent one and the same ‘Nicanor’, we could assume that Nicanor of 
Cyprus was identified as an atheos for reasons of kainotheism, because he might have deified 
Alexander in his writings, similar to the case of the orator Demades. This remains nevertheless 
completely hypothetical due to a lack of sources. For further information, see Winiarczyk (2003), p. 
148-149. 
398
 Arnobius, Against the Heathen, IV, 29: Et possumus quidem hoc in loco omnes istos nobis quos 
inducitis atque appelatis deos, homines fuisse monstrare, vel Agragantino Euhemero replicato, cuius 
libellos Ennius, clarum ut fieret cunctis, sermonem in Italum transtulit; vel Nicagora Cyprio, vel 
Pellaeo Leonte, vel Cyrenensi Theodoro, vel Hippone ac Diagora Meliis, vel auctoribus aliis mille, qui 
scrupulosae diligentiae cura in lucem res abditas libertate ingenua protulerunt. 
399Athenagoras of Athens, A Plea for the Christians, IV. 
400
 Ibidem. 
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Tatian is merely the result of a Christian tradition that combined euhemeristic writers 
and atheist philosophers of different periods with the sole aim of refuting pagan 
deities and averting accusations of atheism against Christians by pagans.401  
 
   14.2.3.1.2)  Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι 
 
Perhaps another preserved title for the atheist writings by Diagoras has more historical 
value, namely the so-called Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι. This title clearly bares resemblance 
with other titles of prose works by sophists like Καταβάλλοντες λόγοι (“Knock-down 
Arguments”) of Protagoras and Ὑπερβάλλοντες λόγοι (“Winning Arguments”) of 
Thrasymachus.402 However Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι as a specific title does not appear 
before the 6th century AD in a Byzantine source by Hesychius Miletus. 
 
“Democritus of Abdera had bought Diagoras, a son of Telekleides and seeing that he was bright, being 
a slave for 10.000 drachmes and he made him his pupil. He applied himself to the lyric art. He was 
called an atheist, because of the following: after the time when someone of the same art, being accused 
by him of stealing a paean which he himself had made, swore he did not steal this, but performing it a 
short while later, met with success. Thereupon Diagoras, being upset, wrote the so-called 
‘Apopyrgizontes Logoi’, which includes his withdrawal and falling away from his belief concerning the 
divine.”403 
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 Lanzillotta (2010), p. 454-455 & Bremmer (2007), p. 21-22. 
402
 Janko (2001), p.7. 
403
 Hesychius Milesius, On Famous Men, XVII: ∆ιαγόραν τὸν Τηλεκλείδου εὐφυᾶ θεασάµενος 
∆ηµόκριτος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης ὠνήσατο αὐτοῦ δοῦλον ὄντα µυρίων δραχµῶν καὶ µαθητὴν 
ἐποιήσατο. ὁ δὲ τῇ λυρικῇ ἐπέθετο. ἐπεκλήθη δὲ ἄθεος, ὅτι ὁµότεχνός τις αἰτιαθεὶς ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, 
ὡς δὴ παιᾶνα ὑφελόµενος, ὃν αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν, ἐξωµόσατο µὴ κεκλοφέναι αὐτόν, µικρὸν δὲ 
ὕστερον ἐπιδειξάµενος αὐτὸν εὐηµέρησεν. ἐντεῦθεν ὁ ∆ιαγόρας λυπηθεὶς ἔγραψε τοὺς 
Ἀποπυργίζοντας λόγους, ἔκπτωσιν ἔχοντας τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον δόξης. 
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The Suda (i.e. ∆523: ∆ιαγόρας) quotes this paragraph almost in its entirety, apart from 
one sentence that mentions Corinth as the place of death of Diagoras.404Another 
lemma from the Suda (Α3493: Ἀποπυργίζοντας λόγους) offers the following 
information: 
 
“The works which Diagoras the Atheist wrote, containing the recantation and dissolution of his belief 
in the divine.” (transl. D. Whitehead)405 
 
About the exact meaning of Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι much has been speculated. Most 
scholars viewed an etymological connection between ἀποπυργίζω, which is without 
doubt a unique word in the ancient Greek language or a so-called ἅπαξ εἰρηµένον406, 
and the noun πύργος (its original meaning being ‘tower (in a set of walls)’.407 As early 
as Homer, it can also be interpreted in a more military context as ‘bastion’ or 
‘citadel’408 with related verbs as πυργοῦν or πυργοῦσθαι, which can be translated as “to 
fence with towers” or more generally as “to build up”.409 With attention to the time 
frame in which Diagoras lived, ἀποπυργίζω was also being related to ἀποτειχίζω (“to 
block off by a set of walls”), a verb that is used by Herodotus (Histories, VI,32,2), 
Thucydides (The Peloponnesian War, 1, 64, 1) and Aristophanes (Birds, 1576).410    
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 Suda (∆523: ∆ιαγόρας): κατοικήσας δὲ Κόρινθον ὁ ∆ιαγόρας αὐτόθι τὸν βίον 
κατέστρεψεν.(“But Diagoras, settling in Corinth, lived out his life there.”(transl. D. Whitehead)) 
405
 Suda (Α3493: Ἀποπυργίζοντας λόγους): Ἀποπυργίζοντας λόγους, οὓς ἔγραψε ∆ιαγόρας ὁ 
Ἄθεος, ἀναχώρησιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔκπτωσιν ἔχοντας τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον δόξης. 
406
 Jacoby (1959), p.47, n.236: ἀποπυργίζω is unique in Greek literature and its simplex πυργίζω is 
not found anywhere.  
407
 Homer, The Iliad, VII, 219& 337 & Hesiod, Shield of Heracles, 242. 
408
 Homer, The Odyssee, XI, 556. 
409
 Only Hordern (2001), p.34, n.6 suggests ‘for what it is worth’ a deviant etymological explanation 
and translates Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι as ‘Inflammatory Discourses’, referring to the 1st plural Dorian 
aorist (ἀποπυρίζοµες) of ἀποπυρίζω in Epicharmus (F122 Kassel & Austin), which can be translated 
as ‘to roast on charcoal’. Clearly, this theory is flawed, because ἀποπυργίζω and ἀποπυρίζω have no 
etymological connection whatsoever.  
410
 Woodbury (1965), p.204. 
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Drachmann, for instance, translated the phrase as “Destructive Considerations”411, 
while Jacoby suggested the translation “Fortifying Arguments”, in the sense of 
‘defending mankind by (a wall with) towers’ or (based on Aristophanes’s ἀποτειχίζω) 
‘inclosing the gods, hemming them in, blockading them by (a wall with) towers’.412 
Jacoby’s translation is mainly based on a fragment (286) of Euripides’s Bellerophon, 
which mentions τὰ θεῖα πυργοῦσ᾽ αἱ κακαί τε συµφοραί (“…fortifies religion and ill-
fortune”).413 According to Jacoby, this fragment indicates that the atheist book of 
Diagoras could have been well-known in Athens during the early years of the 
Peloponnesian War, because Bellerophon was produced before 426BC.414   
 
Notwithstanding the strongly hypothetical character of this argument and the unclear 
contextuality of the Bellerophon-fragment (286), Jacoby did convincingly point out 
that no 5th century BC writer would have used ἀποπυργίζω and ἀποτειχίζω or any related 
verb in a non-military, allegorical sense (e.g., ‘destroying the towers of the gods’ or 
‘throwing the gods from their towers’).415 
 
Therefore, Jacoby believed that the original title of the atheist book was only changed 
into the spurious title Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι during a later period.416  
 
Derenne had nevertheless argued that the title should be interpreted as ‘Destroying the 
Towers of the Gods’417, a translation Woodbury adopted to a less metaphorical level 
                                                      
411
 Drachmann (1922), p.32. 
412
 Jacoby (1959), p.30. 
413
 On this matter, see also Woodbury (1965), p. 205; Winiarczyk (1980), p. 54, n.91 & Whitmarsh 
(2015), p. 109-113. Whitmarsh (2016), p. 184 proposes to translate the fragment in the sense of  “x and 
terrible disasters fortify religion”, based on the suggestion that the previous line began with ἀλλ᾽ ἡµῖν 
φόβοι. 
414
 Jacoby (1959), p. 44, n.200. 
415
 Jacoby (1959), p. 21. 
416
 Jacoby (1959), p. 30 (wrongly) believes that the original title of the atheist book was Φρυγίοι 
λόγοι. 
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by suggesting the title ‘Wreckers’ or ‘Debunkers’.418 Romer later translated 
Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι as “Words (or Arguments) That Wall Off”419 which Janko 
adopted as ‘Walling-off Arguments’.420 Most recently, Whitmarsh still holds on to the 
supposed etymological link between ἀποπυργίζω and πύργος by translating the title as 
“Arguments That Knock Down Towers”.421 
 
However, searching analogies between Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι and certain nouns and 
verbs in the timeframe of Diagoras might appear unsatisfactory and futile, especially 
when we consider that this specific title only occurs in Byzantine sources. It would 
therefore be more suitable to search for analogies within a Byzantine setting.  
 
Considering this, a hypothesis that was suggested for the first time during a review of 
Marek Winiarczyk’s doctoral thesis seems noteworthy: the verb ἀποπυργίζω could be 
related to πυργίσκος, a noun meaning ‘closet’ or ‘cupboard’ that did not appear before 
the Christian era.422 As a diminutive, it would have been derived from the obscure 
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 Derenne (1930), p.59. 
418
 Woodbury (1965), p.205. 
419
 Romer (1994), p.357. 
420
 Janko (2001), 7. 
421Whitmarsh (2015), p. 113. Whitmarsh believes that the Bellerophon-fragment (“besieging the towers 
of Olympus”) refers to the Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι of Diagoras, which means that the atheist book 
would have been already written in the 420s BC. This, however, must dismiss the account by Al-
Mubaššir that the book was published posthumously.  Such suggestion was already made by Jacoby 
(1959), p. p. 44, n.200, but mainly to justify his opinion that Diagoras was convicted as early as 433/2 
BC. This argument has convincingly been debunked by Woodbury (1965), p. 192-197, based on the 
information by Diodorus Siculus (Historical Library, XIII, 6-7) and Al-Mubaiššr besides the fact that 
Diagoras had no political importance in 433/2 BC, nor was he an associate of Pericles, like Anaxagoras 
and Protagoras, which would have made him a target of the Diopeithes-decree. Whitmarsh (2016), p. 
182-185 further investigates this supposed reverberation of the Apopurgizontes Logoi in the 
Bellerophon-fragment, but his argumentation is rather stretched. Although Euripides (Bacchae) and 
Aristophanes (Clouds) clearly incorporated ‘atheist’ elements (e.g., the theories of Prodicus) in their 
narrative, I am not convinced that the (military) use of πυργοῦν in the Bellerophon-fragment would 
have referred to a militant atheism of Diagoras that rejected theodicy. The attestation of the title 
Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι of the atheist book and the idea that it contained arguments against divine 
justice are both late.  Besides, the noun θεοµάχος does not necessarily imply an atheist meaning as it 
rather refers to a person who ignores the dunamis of a god, like king Pentheus in Euripides’s Bacchae. 
422
 Winiarczyk (1980), p.57 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 82-83. 
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noun πυργίς that surfaces in the writings of the Alexandrian poet Herondas (3rd century 
BC). 
 
If (the Byzantine) ἀποπυργίζω as a separable verb of the unknown simplex πυργίζω can 
be etymologically traced back to πυργίσκος, then Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι could mean 
‘Disclosing Words (or Opinions)’.423 A specific lemma from the Suda (Π 3200: 
Πυργίσκοι) sustains this argument further: 
 
“Cabinets and treasure-chests: household furniture. Also [attested is the verb] ἀποπυργίζω. Diagoras 
wrote the Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι, containing his withdrawal and falling-away of the belief concerning 
the divine; for he had previously been an atheist.” (transl. D.Whitehead)424 
 
In any case, πυργίσκος, as a diminutive of πυργίς can be etymologically traced back to 
πύργος. The original meaning of πυργίς is most likely ‘hiding-place’425, and that of the 
diminutive consequently ‘little hiding-place’, but in a Byzantine context πυργίσκος is 
clearly referred to as ‘closet’. Besides, the juxtaposition of Θησαυροφυλάκια in Suda (Π 
3200: Πυργίσκοι) suggests ‘a closet obtaining valuable objects’. Winiarczyk, however, 
dismissed the theory as fragile and preferred the hypothesis that ἀποπυργίζω could still 
be a direct derivation from (the militant meaning of) πύργος, without any relationship 
to (the Alexandrian) πυργίς or (the Byzantine) πυργίσκος. 426 
                                                      
423
 Ibidem: the German translation by Winiarczyk being “Aufdeckende, enthüllende Worte” 
424
 Suda (Π 3200: Πυργίσκοι): Πυργίσκοι καὶ Θησαυροφυλάκια: σκεύη κατ᾽ οἶκον. καὶ 
Ἀποπυργίζω. ∆ιαγόρας ἔγραψε τοὺς Ἀποπυργίζοντας λόγους, ἀναχώρησιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔκπτωσιν 
ἔχοντας τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον δόξης: ἄθεος γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρότερον. 
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 Winiarczyk (1980), p.57-58. 
426
 Ibidem. See also Winiarczyk (2016), p. 83-84 for a more elaborate argument on this dismissal. 
Winiarczuk refers to the Suda-edition of Ada Adler (IV 274). She pointed out that the first part of Suda 
(Π 3200: Πυργίσκοι) can be derived from a work by by Artemidorus of Ephesus (2nd century AD), 
while the second part, referring to Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι, originates from Hesychius of Miletus (6th 
century AD). Frankly, I do not understand why Winiarczyk considers this to be less plausible than a 
connection between Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι and the hapax legomenon ἀποπυργίζω as a derivation 
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Nonetheless this inconclusiveness, ἀποπυργίζω remains a ἅπαξ εἰρηµένον, only to be 
cited in three lemmata (Α 3493: Ἀποπυργίζοντας λόγους, ∆ 523: ∆ιαγόρας and Π 3200: 
Πυργίσκοι) from the Suda which were clearly derived from the 6th century AD 
Byzantine writer Hesychius Miletus (On Famous Men, XVII), ∆ 523: ∆ιαγόρας being 
almost an exact copy.  
 
The title Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι is therefore probably a Byzantine invention from the 6th 
century AD and does not qualify as an authentic title for the atheist book of Diagoras. 
Likely, Byzantine scholars suggested the title Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι in an attempt to 
connect the atheist book of Diagoras with supposed atheist writings like Καταβάλλοντες 
λόγοι (“Knock-down Arguments”) of Protagoras and Ὑπερβάλλοντες λόγοι (“Winning 
Arguments”) of Thrasymachus.427 
 
So, if Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι can be considered a Byzantine invention from the 6th 
century AD, which can be translated most fitting by ‘Disclosing Opinions’, this title 
presumably referred to the revealing of the secrecy of the Mysteries of Eleusis by 
Diagoras.428 As discussed earlier, the Eleusinian Mysteries were revered for the 
exceptional bond they assured between worshippers and deities, based on a series of 
secret rites and initiation rituals.429 Consequences for revealing the secrecy were 
extremely harsh resulting in dead penalty, which can explain the death sentence 
Diagoras eventually received from the Athenian Assembly in 415 BC.430 The 
                                                                                                                                                        
from the 5th century BC military meaning of πύργος, even though he finds the theory of πυργίσκος 
still an interesting one. 
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 Woodbury (1965), p. 203. 
428
 Winiarczyk (1980), p. 57. 
429
 On the Eleusinian Mysteries, the most recent research has been done by Bremmer (2014). 
430
 Mikalson (2005), p.84-86. 
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Homeric Hymn to Demeter from the Classical period refers to the consequences of 
revealing the secrecy: 
 
“(Demeter) revealed the conduct of her rites and taught her Mysteries to all of them, 
Holy rites that are not to be transgressed, nor pried into, 
nor divulged. For a great awe of the gods stops the voice. 
Blessed is the mortal on earth, who has seen these rites, 
But the uninitiated who has no share in them never 
has the same lot once dead in the dreary darkness.” (transl. H.P. Foley)431 
 
But by interpreting Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι as a revealing of the secrecy of the Eleusinian 
Mysteries we definitely encounter a problem: descriptions of the content of the atheist 
book by Hesychius Miletus and the Suda do not mention any defamation of the 
Mysteries in the writings of Diagoras. Instead, the Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι are considered 
to be a purely ‘withdrawal of belief in the divine’ and the ‘recantation and dissolution 
of his belief in the divine’. This may seem, at first sight, a description of a radical 
atheist pamphlet, but closer examination does deliver some opposite observations.  
 
For example, the Byzantine sources do not apply the phrase ἀναιρεῖν θεοῦς/ θεῖον 
(‘destroying the gods/divinity’) that is commonly used by Philodemus or Diogenes of 
Oenoanda (Fr.16 I-III 14 Smith) to refer to the extreme nature of the atheism of 
Diagoras.  In stead, nouns like ἀναχώρησις (‘withdrawal’) and ἔκπτωσις (‘extrusion’) 
are being used. This can be understood as a reference to the conversion which 
                                                      
431
 Homeric Hymn to Demeter (lines 478-482):  
τά τ᾽ οὔπως ἔστι παρεξίµεν οὔτε πυθέσθαι 
 οὔτ᾽ ἀχέειν:µέγα γάρ τι θεῶν σέβας ἰσχάνει αὐδήν.  
ὄλβιος, ὃς τάδ᾽ ὄπωπεν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων:  
ὃς δ᾽ ἀτελὴς ἱερῶν ὅς τ᾽ ἄµµορος, οὔποθ᾽ ὁµοίων  
αἶσαν ἔχει φθίµενός περ ὑπὸ ζόφῳ ἠερόεντι.  
See also Graf (2000), p. 124. 
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Diagoras was believed to have experienced in the later tradition. Byzantine sources 
assumed that Diagoras had first been a pious poet before losing his belief in the gods, 
an idea that goes back to Hellenistic and Roman sources.432 This explains why they 
speak about his ‘withdrawal of belief in the divine’.  
 
By the sixth century AD, the work of Diagoras must have been already lost and 
Byzantine scholars could only speculate about its content and form a view based on 
what they knew about Diagoras and other supposed atheoi. Byzantine scholarship was 
familiar with the doctrines of Thrasymachus,433 whose treatise Ὑπερβάλλοντες λόγοι 
(“Winning Arguments”)434 could have influenced, in return, the construction of 
Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι as a title of the book by Diagoras. 
 
So, the attestation of Byzantine sources regarding the existence of Diagoras’s atheist 
book does not necessary lead to the conclusion that these sources viewed the book as 
a genuine philosophical atheist pamphlet, but rather as the result of the atheist 
conversion of a former pious poet.  At this period in history, the book must have been 
already lost for some considerable time, leaving Byzantine scholars no other option 
than to grasp from older literary traditions in order to speculate on the content of the 
alleged book. Apparently, they were convinced that the primary idea behind the 
writing of the atheist book by Diagoras was the refutation of any belief in divine 
justice, in response to the lack of divine intervention after the injustice Diagoras had 
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  Σ  Ar. Nub. 830b & Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 50-53. 
433
  Hermias, Commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 239, 21 Couvr. =DK 85 B8: ὅτι θεοὶ οὐχ ὁρῶσι τὰ 
ἀνθρώπινα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ µέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθῶν παρεῖδον τὴν δικαιοσύνην· 
ὁρῶµεν γὰρ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ταύτηι µὴ χρωµένους. (‘The gods do not see the things that are done 
among men; if they did, they would not overlook the greatest human good, justice. For we find that 
men do not follow it.’) (transl. A.B. Drachmann). The disbelief of Thrasymachus in divine justice also 
resonates in the character of ‘Unjust Speech’ in Aristophanes’s Clouds (900) that proclaims that 
(divine) justice is a fabrication and subordinate to the advantages of injustice. See also Barnes (1979), 
vol II, 152 & Silvermintz (2008), p. 96-98 on this matter. 
434
 Plutarch, Table-talk, 1,2,3 (616d).  
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experienced himself, as attested in biographical and historiographical traditions from 
the Hellenistic and Roman period on. 
 
On the historicity of the different titles regarding the atheist writings of Diagoras, it 
would be safe to conclude that none has any historical value: Φρυγίοι λόγοι must be 
placed in a literary genre of euhemerizing accounts that historically does not fit the 
timeframe Diagoras lived in and Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι appears to be a Byzantine 
invention, since ἀποπυργίζω is most likely a Byzantine ἅπαξ εἰρηµένον. We know 
nonetheless that an atheist book existed from testimonies by Epicurus and 
Aristoxenus, which were both preserved by Philodemus. Either the book was untitled 
(χωρὶς ἐπιγραφῆς) or it possessed a more generic (Erzatz) title like Περὶ Θεῶν, in 
accordance with the philosophical genre and the literary tradition of early prose.435 
This last idea can be very plausible, bearing in mind that every discourse on the 
existence of the gods from the 6th century BC until the 2nd century AD was named 
Περὶ Θεῶν.436 This could explain why neither Aristoxenus nor Epicurus did mention a 
title for the atheist book, simply because it would have been too evident or too 
unimportant to be mentioned. Any unusual title like Φρυγίοι λόγοι or Ἀποπυργίζοντες 
λόγοι would have certainly caught their attention. This did not happen, for the simple 
reason that both titles did not emerge until a much later period in time. 
 
  14.2.3.2) the date and preservation of the atheist book 
 
The historical existence of an atheist book by Diagoras can be demonstrated and this 
concerned probably an innominate treatise or one that carried a more common title 
                                                      
435
 See Schmalzriedt (1970), p. 20-23 & p. 83-119 for a similar analysis of the title Περὶ φύσεως. 
436
 For a complete list of discourses with the title Περὶ θεῶν, see Fahr (1969), p. 183. 
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like Περὶ Θεῶν, in contrast to the preserved titles, which are plausibly unauthentic. In 
this section, I will focus on the production and preservation of this atheist book. A 
first observation indicates a discrepancy between the time the atheist book is believed 
to have been written (between 415 - 400 BC) and the earliest reference to the atheist 
book in ancient sources (ca. 310 BC). After this period, no further information on the 
specific content of the atheist book has been preserved. 
 
This silence of a century in ancient sources between the writing of the atheist book 
and its earliest description definitely needs further investigation and we can start 
tackling this problem by analyzing the 11th century AD Arab source Al-Mubaššir.437 
Although a very late source, it is actually the only testimony that mentions the fact 
that the atheist book was published posthumously. This information does have 
historical credibility, since it has been established that Al-Mubaššir made indirectly 
use of the Φιλόσοφος Ἱστορία (The History of Philosophy) of Porphyry of Tyre as main 
Greek source, which in return relied on the chronologies of Eratosthenes and 
Apollodorus.438 The latter author does deliver concrete information on Diagoras’s 
atheism in Σ Ar. Ra. 320, but this does not concern his writings. The exact or even 
approximate date of the publication of the atheist book remains unknown. We can 
only assume that the book was not published shortly after the death of Diagoras, ca. 
400 BC.439 The account by Pseudo-Lysias from 400 BC, for instance, makes no 
notion of the atheist book, but only specifies that Diagoras was ‘impious in speech in 
regard of foreign rites and festivals’.440  
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 Al-Mubaššir, Muhtār al-h ikam wa-mah āsin al-kalim (Winiarczyk 1981 Diagoras T10). 
438
 Woodbury (1965), p.188 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 36-38. 
439
 There is no ancient evidence to support the idea of Romer (1996), p. 395, n. 9 & Jando (2001), p. 7 
that the atheist book of Diagoras was already a public fact in the late 5th century BC. 
440
 Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 17. 
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During the most part of the 4th century BC, the atheist book of Diagoras must have 
remained unissued. Winiarczyk nonetheless believed that its publication must be 
situated in the first half of the 4th century BC, by referring to a general interest in 
atheist opinions in this period.441 This appears to be, however, a fragile argument, 
because this raises the question why not a single author commented on the atheist 
book in the first half of the 4th century BC. If the atheist book was already made 
public in the first half of the 4th century BC, Plato or Xenophon would have probably 
alluded to it, considering the radical nature of its content and especially Plato’s (Laws, 
X, 889e-890a) interest in atheist opinions.442  At least Plato must have been familiar 
with the actions of Diagoras concerning the divulging of the Mysteries by means of 
the bronze stele on the Acropolis, but he was almost certainly unfamiliar with the 
atheist book. If Plato had any sophist associated with radical atheism in mind in book 
X of Laws, it would rather have been Prodicus or Callicles instead of Diagoras.443   
 
In all probability, the atheist book did not surface before the publication of Plato’s 
Laws, which must be situated ca. 340 BC, based on the floruit of the Academic Philip 
of Opus, the editor of Plato’s Laws (according to Diogenes Laertius, III, 37).444 For 
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 Winiarcyk (1980), p. 68. 
442Another clue for Plato’s interest in ‘atheist literature’ is Apology 26d (concerning the teachings of 
Anaxagoras). See also Sedley (2013)², p. 347-348 on this matter. 
443
 For the identification of Prodicus as a radical atheist, see Henrichs (1984), p. 141 & Mayhew 
(2011), p. 183-184.  According to Henrichs (1975), p. 109, n. 63, Prodicus was also an influence on the 
author of the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease. The correlation between δυσσεβής and 
θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν in this treatise (passage I, 8-9) does indeed resurface in Plato’s Laws (X).  Callicles 
might, on the other hand, be a more logical candidate for the profile of a radical atheist in Plato’s Laws 
(X), as the assumption (889e-890a) that the gods are the product of τινες νόµοι and that they are of a 
different nature in different places due to the difference of νόµοι seems to correspond with the 
immoralism of Callicles, because it justifies might over law (890a) and evokes the Calliclean doctrine 
that divine sanction against immoral deeds of mankind appears to be redundant, due to the inexistence 
of the gods. See also Yunis (1988), p. 36. 
444
 Tarán (1975), p. 127-133. 
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these reasons, it would be wrong to assume that the book was published between 415 
and 400 BC, or even as early as 430 BC, as Felix Jacoby believed.445 
 
Moreover, Greek philosophy before the 4th century BC was largely characterized by 
an oral culture. Only a small number of philosophers wrote their teachings down, 
mainly in the form of scripts for public performances.446 The few books (in the form 
of texts for study) that were actually written in the 5th century BC were the products of 
authors who could not spreak in public or wrote on topics that were not suited for 
public recital, resulting in a very limited publication or widespread distribution.447 The 
political turmoil of the early 5th century BC would witness a furter decrease of 
intellectual freedom to publically address the demos, which led to a substantial 
increase in book writing, from an transitional level in the early and mid 4th century BC 
(e.g., Plato’s dialogues, as a combination of oral and written culture448) to a well 
developed literary culture near the end of the 4th century BC.449 
 
Based on this information and the earliest evidence on the existence of the atheist 
book in Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col. 82, 1-18 (19, 519-536), I believe it 
safe to assume that the publication of the original manuscript by Diagoras must be 
situated between 340 and 310 BC.450 Epicurus is, in any case, the earliest intellectual, 
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 Jacoby (1959), p.  44, n. 200 (based on the implausible argument that Euripides’s Bellerophon (286) 
from c. 426 BC refers to the atheist book of Diagoras). 
446
 Wallace (1996), p. 230. 
447
 Ibidem. 
448
 On this matter, see Xavier (2011), p. 93-98. 
449
 Wallace (1996), p. 231. 
450
 The assumption that the original manuscript of Diagoras survived for a period of about one century 
before being discovered raises questions about its preservation. We do not have any evidence that the 
manuscript was carefully preserved or even copied in the course of the 4th century BC, but we do know 
that Aristoxenus of Tarentum discovered three poems of Diagoras in Mantinea ca. 300 BC (See on this 
matter Winiarczyk (2016), p. 23-26). Notwithstanding the debate on the authorship of these poems (the 
lyric poet Diagoras or the sophist Diagoras?), this discovery indicates that manuscripts could survive 
for more than a century before being made public.  
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who comments ca. 310 BC on the book of Diagoras, in the twelfth book of his Περὶ 
φύσεως (On Nature).451 The passage by Philodemus, on the other hand, might even 
suggest a late 4th century BC contemporaneous debate on the topos of radical 
atheism.452  
 
Next to Epicurus, Aristoxenus, a disciple of Aristotle, is an almost simultaneous 
source (preserved by Philodemus’s On Piety, P.Herc. 1428, col XI) to comment on 
the content of the atheist book, presumably at the very end of the 4th century BC.  
 
It is somehow remarkable that no scholar has ever associated the earliest description 
of the atheist book (ca. 310 BC) with the floruit (ca. 300 BC) of Theodorus of Cyrene, 
the atheist often linked with Diagoras of Melos in ancient sources. It would not seem 
that inconceivable that Theodorus somehow got access to the manuscript of Diagoras 
and issued it to the public, causing the consternation Epicurus and Aristoxenus 
ventilated.453 We do indeed know that in the period 313 to 309 BC, Theodorus 
travelled through Greece as a sophist teacher. During these extensive travels, he 
visited city-states like Corinth. This visit, which Diogenes Laertius (II, 102) mentions, 
could be a crucial element in his adoption of radical atheism. Theodorus might have 
discovered the manuscript after 313 BC in Corinth, which the Suda mentions as the 
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 Winiarczyk (1980), p. 71; Obbink (1996), p. 225-227 & Mayhew (2011), p. 175. 
452
 Yunis (1988), p. 61, n.6. 
453
 See Wehrli (1961), p. 126; Winiarczyk (1980), p. 68; Yunis (1988), p. 61, n. 6 & Winiarczyk 
(2016), p. 86. Wehrli believes that an atheist pamphlet by an anonymous sophist could have been 
published under the name ‘Diagoras’, but he does not provide any dating of the publication. 
Winairczyk defends the idea that the publication must be situated in the first half of the 4th century BC, 
based on possible references to atheist writings in Plato’ Laws (X, 886b-886c). Personally, I am not 
convinced of the hypothesis of Winiarczyk, because the passage from Laws refers to ‘ancient writings’ 
(poetry and prose). This does not involve any atheist books, but rather writings on mythology or 
theogony, in the vein of Homer, Hesiod and Pherecydes. See also Mayhew (2008), p. 65-66. Secondly, 
all known sources on the atheist book of Diagoras must be placed in the late second half of the 4th 
century BC. For these reasons, I believe that this anonymous sophist might have been Theodorus who 
published the book in the late 4th century BC. On the identification of Theodorus as a sophist, see 
Kindstrand (1976), p. 68. 
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city-state where Diagoras died. This also corroborates chronologically with the 
testimonies of Epicirus and Aristoxenus on the atheist book of Diagoras, as described 
in Philodemus’s On Piety.454 Such assumption is also in accordance with Al-
Mubaššir’s report on the posthumous nature of the book. 
 
So, Theodorus of Cyrene might have been the (anonymous) sophist who published an 
atheist book or pamphlet that was traditionally ascribed to Diagoras. Consequently, it 
should be more plausible to situate the atheist book in the late second half of the 4th 
century BC with Theodorus of Cyrene as a possible publisher. This could also explain 
why both philosophers always surface in matters of a more extreme type of atheism 
and are almost viewed as indistinguishable in their denial of divine existence.455 Being 
closely linked to the distinctive epithet ho atheos and being one of the few ‘atheists’, 
who were associated with the phrase ἀναιρεῖν θεοῦς/ θεῖον, Theodorus could have acted 
as a philosophical successor to Diagoras456, not only by publishing the original 
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 Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col. 82, 1-18 (19, 519-536) & P.Herc. 1428, cols. XI-XII. 
455
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 1, 63 & 117; Minucius Felix, Octavius, VIII; Sextus 
Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, III, 218-219 & Pseudo-Plutarch’s Epitome in Aetius’s Opinions of 
the Philosophers, I, 7. 
456
 Theodorus would not have been the only philosopher, who adopted an older doctrine on (the origin 
of) religion and developed it further.  The Stoic Persaeus of Citium (306-243 BC), for instance, 
elaborated on the Prodicean theory of deification, according to Philodemus, On Piety, P.Herc. 1428  
cols. II, 28-III, 13: Περσα[ῖος δὲ] δῆλος ἐστιν [ἀναιρῶν] ὄντω[ς κ]α[ὶ ἀφανί]ζων τὸ δαιµόνιον ἢ 
µηθὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γινώσκων, ὅταν ἐν τῶι Περὶ θεῶν µὴ [ἀπ]ίθανα λέγηι φαίνεσθαι τὰ 
τρέφοντα καὶ ὠφελοῦντα θεοὺς νενοµίσθαι καὶ τετειµῆσθ[αι] πρῶτον ὑπὸ [Προ]δίκου 
γεγραµµένα, µ[ε]τὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺ[ς εὑρ]όντας ἢ τροφὰς ἢ [σ]κέπας ἢ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ὡς 
∆ήµητρα καὶ ∆ι[όνυσον] καὶ τοὺ[ς ∆ιοσκούρ]ου[ς (“It is clear that Persaeus is really abolishing and 
removing the divine or recognizing nothing about it, when in his On Gods he says that it does not 
appear to be unconvincing what was written by Prodicus about the nourishing and useful first having 
been considered and honoured as gods, and after these those who discovered food or shelter or the 
other skills as Demeter and Dionysus and the Dioscuroi.”) (transl. R. Mayhew). The passage by 
Philodemus is the only ancient source in which Persaeus is actually being accused of atheism. 
However, the context of the passage appears to be purely polemical: Persaeus was a disciple of the 
Stoic philosopher Zeno of Citium (333-261 BC) and, according to Diogenes Laertius (VII, 36), he 
wrote a treatise called On Impiety (Περὶ ἀσεβείας). Nothing of its content has been preserved, but it is 
not inconceivable that Persaeus attacked the alleged atheism of Epicurus or early Epicureanism in this 
treatise. Moreover, other sources beside Philodemus (Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, I, 15 and 
Municius Felix’ Octavius XXI, 2) do acknowledge that Persaeus adopted the doctrine of deification, 
but they do not associate this with atheism. Cicero rather points towards a Stoic pantheism by Persaeus: 
useful discoveries for civilization have been identified by divine names, because they reflect a divine 
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manuscript, but by utilizing it also as a (main) source for his own atheist treatise. This 
cannot be verified by further evidence, but the theory is not implausible. Given the 
timeframe in which the atheist book of Diagoras surfaced, it is quite conceivable that 
Theodorus was in some way involved in its publication or its circulation. Considering 
the fact that interest in research on the existence of the gods had not weakened in the 
late 4th century BC, Theodorus must have realized the book would certainly cause 
some consternation, which it eventually did.457   
 
Despite the philosophical obsoleteness of radical atheism458, the publication of a 
manuscript on the inexistence of the gods in the late 4th century BC could still cause 
serious public odium, which could have contributed to its rapid disappearance. After 
                                                                                                                                                        
nature. As such, Persaeus tends to follow the theological doctrines of his teacher Zeno: a divine power, 
identified as Logos, pervades all of nature. The adoption of the theory of Prodicus on deification by 
Persaeus could therefore be understood as a more theological approach to this topic. On this matter, see 
also Erskine (2011), p. 179-180. In analogy with Diagoras did Theodorus also show a similar interest in 
attacking and divulging the Mysteries of Eleusis, as can attested by Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of 
Eminent Philosophers, II, 101: Ὁ δ᾽ οὖν Θεόδωρος προσκαθίσας ποτὲ Εὐρυκλείδῃ τῷ ἱεροφάντῃ, 
"λέγε µοι," ἔφη, "Εὐρυκλείδη, τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ ἀσεβοῦντες περὶ τὰ µυστήρια." εἰπόντος δ᾽ 
ἐκείνου, "οἱ τοῖς ἀµυήτοις αὐτὰ ἐκφέροντες," "ἀσεβεῖς ἄρα," ἔφη, "καὶ σύ, τοῖς ἀµυήτοις 
διηγούµενος." καὶ µέντοι παρ᾽ ὀλίγον ἐκινδύνευσεν εἰς Ἄρειον ἀναχθῆναι πάγον, εἰ µὴ 
∆ηµήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς αὐτὸν ἐρρύσατο. Ἀµφικράτης δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν φησι 
κώνειον αὐτὸν πιεῖν καταδικασθέντα. (“However, Theodorus, sitting on one occasion beside 
Euryclides, the hierophant, began, "Tell me, Euryclides, who they are who violate the mysteries?" 
Euryclides replied, "Those who disclose them to the uninitiated." "Then you violate them," said 
Theodorus, "when you explain them to the uninitiated." Yet he would hardly have escaped from being 
brought before the Areopagus if Demetrius of Phaleron had not rescued him. And Amphicrates in his 
book Upon Illustrious Men says he was condemned to drink the hemlock.”) (transl. R.D. Hicks). The 
last sentence is definitely corrupt, showing too much resemblance with the fate of Socrates, but the 
passage does illustrate a similar interest in a transgressive behaviour against the Mysteries of Eleusis by 
Theodorus who clearly applies sophist reasoning in his conversation with the hierophant. 
457
 Winiarczyk (1980), p.68 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 86 does suggest the idea of Luria (1928), p. 221 
that the atheist book might have existed earlier, based on the argument that it could have been an 
anonymous or even pseudonymous work, similar to the satyr play Sisyphus by Critias, which was 
published anonymously, according to Luria, but Winiarczyk personally dismissed this idea. He 
believed an anonymous sophist could have published the atheist book under the name ‘Diagoras’ 
somewhere in the first half of the 4th century BC. But this is most likely too early: Plato’s Laws (X) 
does not mention any atheistic writings, but rather refers to ‘ancient’ writings’, some with meters, 
others without (886b-886c). This is possibly a reference to the theogonies of Hesiod (poetry) or 
Pherecydes of Syros (prose). Therefore, I am inclined to situate the publication of the atheist book after 
the publication of Laws (ca. 340 BC). This anonymous sophist could than actually have actually been 
Theodorus of Cyrene, who was identified in his days as a sophist, according to Diogenes Laertius, On 
the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 102. 
458
 See section 15.3.3 of the dissertation on this matter. 
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300 BC no further allusions on the book have been recorded. Cicero probably had no 
idea of it existence, since he never referred to it in his numerous allusions on the 
exceptional nature of the atheism of Diagoras and Theodorus in On the Nature of the 
Gods. Maybe it is safe to assume that the book was already lost in the first half of the 
3rd century BC, because even Craterus and Melanthius do not refer to its existence 
anymore.  
 
Regarding the lost atheist book of Diagoras, we have no evidence that its 
disappearance was caused accidently or deliberately. Both Jacoby and Winiarczyk 
suggested that it could have been forgotten over time or simply crumbled away in 
libraries during the Hellenistic period due to a lack of interest.459 This argument is not 
very convincing, because it would imply that a book of such character and 
controversy would not have raised any interest or curiosity of readers, who could have 
preserved copies or compiled fragments of its content.  
 
Perhaps existing copies of the book were deliberately destroyed in an early phase of 
its existence, possibly by opposing intellectuals, who could have detested its content. 
Some sources do attest the occurrence of such actions.460 But this strategy could only 
have been successful on the condition that the book was not yet widespread.461 This 
cannot be proven and therefore, the matter remains inconclusive.   
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 Jacoby (1959), p.25 & Winiarczyk (1980), p.65.  
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 Dover (1988), p. 143-144 believes evidence can be found in ancient sources in which the actual 
physical destruction of papyrus rolls (or at least the intent to do so) is mentioned. For example, 
Aristoxenus (fragment 131 Wehrli) reports that Plato wished to make a bonfire of all the writings of 
Democritus he was able to collect. For a commentary of this fragment, see Wehrli (1967), p. 86. 
461
 In Apology (26d) does Plato suggest that the popularity and commonness of ‘atheist’ doctrines is a 
matter of availability of such doctrines in (metrical or prose) writing.  See on this matter also Sedley 
(2013)², p. 347-348. 
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In any case, we do find indications within literary sources that the early Hellenistic 
period (ca. 300 BC) was characterized by a degree of intolerance towards deviant 
religious opinions. In the Life of Stilpo by Diogenes Laertius, for instance, the 
following information regarding the Minor Socratic Stilpo of Megara (360 - 280 BC) 
and the Cynic Bion of Borysthenes (325 – 250 BC) is recorded: 
 
“When Crates asked him (Stilpo) whether the gods take delight in prayers and adorations, he is said to 
have replied, “Don’t put such a question in the street, simpleton, but when we are alone!” It is said that 
Bion, when he was asked the same question whether there are gods, replied: “Will you not scatter the 
crowd from me, O much-enduring elder?” (transl. R.D. Hicks)462 
 
It is probably too farfetched to assume that the atheist book of Diagoras was tracked 
down by local authorities and publically burned, like Cicero (in contione) and 
Diogenes Laertius (ἐν ἀγορᾷ) suggested of the Περὶ Θεῶν of Protagoras.463  But it could 
be plausible that existing copies of the book of Diagoras (and possibly also the Περὶ 
Θεῶν of Theodorus) were deliberately destroyed.464 This might explain why the book 
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 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 117: Κράτητος τοίνυν αὐτὸν 
ἐρωτήσαντος εἰ οἱ θεοὶ χαίρουσι ταῖς προσκυνήσεσι καὶ εὐχαῖς, φασὶν εἰπεῖν, "περὶ τούτων µὴ 
ἐρώτα, ἀνόητε, ἐν ὁδῷ, ἀλλὰ µόνον." τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ Βίωνα ἐρωτηθέντα εἰ θεοί εἰσιν εἰπεῖν: 
οὐκ ἀπ᾽ ἐµοῦ σκεδάσεις ὄχλον, ταλαπείριε πρέσβυ; 
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 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 63 & Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of the Eminent 
Philosophers, IX, 52. The earliest source on the burning of the books of Protagoras is reported by the 
Sceptic philosopher Timon of Phlius (c.320-c.230 BC), a disciple of Pyrrho, in the second book of his 
Silli, as preserved in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 56-57. Timon does not 
mention any public burnings, but only that “they wished to reduce his writings to ashes” (ἔθελον δὲ 
τέφρην συγγράµµατα θεῖναι). It is also unclear what Timon actually means by ‘they’: does it refer to 
Athenian authorities or competing intellectuals? Filonik (2013), p. 38 refutes the idea of book-burnings 
as a ‘state’ practice, organized by authorities and, based on the preserved sources (Aristoxenus and 
Timon of Phlius) this seems to be a plausible assumption, but occasional book-burnings as an 
individual initiative cannot be ruled out.  See also Wallace (1996), p. 226-240 on the matter.  
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 See Dover (1988), p.143-145 & 157 (additional note) on the well documented phenomenon of 
Greek book burnings. Dover opposes Finley (1977), p. 613 who claimes that burning books was a 
Roman punishment and dismisses Greek book burnings as ‘Hellenistic gossip’.  On this matter, Finley 
may have had a passage from Athenaeus (The Deipnosophists, IX, 374a-b) in mind. In this passage, 
Athenaeus informs us about the old poet and Middle Comedy play wright Anaxandrides (floruit 380-
340 BC), who used to give his failed plays to the incense seller to be cut up in pieces, because he 
refused to revise them due to his old age, although this was normally done with failed plays. Although 
it is not explicitly stated that Anaxandrides’ plays were burned, they were at least the subject of 
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only existed for a brief period of time and no specific reports on its content have 
survived after 300 BC.  
 
  14.2.3.3) the content of the atheist book 
 
On the content of the atheist book by Diagoras we can only speculate. Considering his 
atheist actions and his background as a sophist, the atheist book could have covered 
two topics: either the divulging of the Eleusinian Mysteries or a philosophical denial 
of the existence of the gods.  
 
The title Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι with its most logical translation ‘Disclosing Opinions’ 
could indicate a revealing of Mysteries, but, as discussed in a previous section, this 
title is most likely a later (Byzantine) invention with little historical value. Besides, 
his actions regarding the Mysteries of Eleusis were closely entangled with political 
events, i.e. the eradication of the Melian community by the Athenians.465  These 
events could have evoked the writing of the atheist book in which the Mysteries of 
Eleusis could have been disparaged, but not necessarily on the level of revealing the 
secrecy.466 Maybe the content focused more on the Mysteries as a popular religious 
phenomenon that had to be disposed for being a historical invention or fabrication.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
deliberate destruction. See also Revermann (2006), p. 330 on this matter. Besides, Dover is more 
convincing in his argumentation that Cicero analyzes book burnings as a purely Greek phenomenon. 
As a form of punishment burning books was unknown in Rome in the Late Republic, because Seneca 
the Elder (Controversiae, X, 1.5) refers to the burning of the books of the younger Tiberius Labienus as 
nova poena and res nova et invisitata near the end of Augustus’reign. 
465
 Bremmer (2007), p.18. 
466
 Ancient sources on the divulging of the Mysteries by Diagoras, such as Josephus Flavius, Against 
Apion, 2, 38; Tatian, Address to the Greeks, 27 & Libanius, Apology of Socrates, 154, do not attest a 
revealing of the secrecy, but a ridiculing of the ritual.  
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If so, we could assume that the atheist book consisted of a series of philosophical 
arguments on the refutation of the existence of the gods.467  To sustain this case 
further, we must once again return to Philodemus, who paraphrased the twelfth book 
of Περὶ φύσεως (On Nature) by Epicurus in his treatise On Piety.468 Epicurus 
mentioned Diagoras along with Prodicus and Critias in (what could be considered) the 
oldest index atheorum.  
 
What do these three ‘atheists’ have in common? One can argue that each of them 
developed a theory which, essentially, declared the gods to be a human invention 
(Prodicus, Diagoras?) or even a fabrication (Critias, Diagoras?). They all developed, 
what Jonathan Barnes described as an ‘anthropological aetiology of religious 
beliefs’.469  
 
Democritus is believed to be the first philosopher to have developed an 
anthropological aetiology, as Sextus Empiricus specifies: 
 
“And there are some who have supposed that we have arrived at the conception of Gods from those 
events in the world which are marvelous; which opinion seems to have been held by Democritus, who 
says – For when the men of old time beheld the disasters in the heavens, such as thundering and 
lightning, and thunderbolts and collisions between stars, and eclipses of sun and moon, they were 
affrighted, imagining the Gods to be the causes of these things.” (transl. R.G. Bury)470 
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Democritus, as quoted by Sextus Empiricus in this paragraph, argues that the origins 
of religion must be situated during a primitive phase of mankind, when awe and fear 
for celestial phenomena gave rise to belief in the gods.471 Moreover, Democritus 
seems to dismiss the popular idea that the heavenly bodies were of divine origin. Yet, 
no index atheorum included Democritus, although Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods, 
I, 29) and the Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda (Fr. 9 Smith, VI.3-13) accused 
Democritus of ‘concealed’ atheism.  
 
This latent atheism was explainable by the idea that Democritus only recognized the 
existence of the gods through phenomena called εἴδωλα (“images”), which intervened 
in human life. The gods manifest themselves to humans through these images which 
may appear in the form of epiphanies in dreams or visions.472 According to 
Democritus, these εἴδωλα are constituted of atoms, which are not indestructible. 
Concretely, this signifies that the gods could perish over time, contrary to the vision 
of popular Greek religion which deemed the gods to be immortal.473 
 
So, the anthropological aetiology of Democritus did preserve the gods of popular 
belief, but excluded a universe controlled by any cosmic divinity. This opened a 
gateway for ‘atheist’ aetiologies of Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias. By now combining 
the Democritean principle of gods, who are perishable as atomist congregates, with 
the sophist distinction between φῦσις and νόµος, a mind-set for the denial of divine 
intervention in human life or even divine existence itself was actually created.  
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Prodicus, for example, claimed that the gods had an origin in human history as natural 
elements of a beneficial kind, as Cicero reports: 
 
“Or Prodicus of Ceos, who said that the gods were personifications of things beneficial to the life of 
man -pray what religion was left by this theory?” (transl. H. Rackham)474 
 
A fragment from Philodemus’s On Piety even ascribes a more ‘radical’ view-point to 
Prodicus on the existence of the gods:  
 
“(Prodicus) maintains that the gods of popular belief do not exist and that he does not recognize them, 
but that primitive man, [out of admiration, deified] the fruits of the earth and virtually everything that 
contributed to his subsistence.” (‘transl. A. Henrichs) 475 
 
This is a very crucial source regarding the religious views of Prodicus, because it does 
attest a radicalizing epistemology on the origins of the gods. The neutral position of 
Protagoras on the matter is no longer followed. 476 So, Prodicus can actually be 
recognized as the first philosopher to meet the requirements embedded in the 
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expression θεοὺς οὐ νοµίζειν, making him in effect an atheist or even a precursor of 
radical atheism.477 
 
But other sources tend to diminish the atheism of Prodicus, by arguing that Prodicus 
interpreted the origin of the gods through the benefits of agriculture, as the rhetorician 
and philosopher Themistius (floruit second half 4th century AD) attests: 
 
“And if we should also summon Dionysus and the nymphs and Demeter’s daughter and rain-bringing 
Zeus and growth-promoting Poseidon, then we’ll be already be approaching the initiations and we’ll 
mix into our words the wisdom of Prodicus, who connects all sacred rites of humans and mysteries and 
festivals and initiations to the goods of farming, thinking that even the conception of gods came to 
humans from here and so securing all piety” (transl. R. Mayhew)478 
 
Actually, both types of sources have to be put together in order to reconstruct the dual 
theory of Prodicus on the origin of the gods: the first stage in the existence of religion 
consisted of a deification of natural elements like the moon and sun. In a second, more 
sophisticated stage the emphasis of deification is being laid on the benefits of 
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agriculture.479 In this context, the gods Demeter and Dionysus can be regarded as 
metonymies for ‘bread’ and ‘wine’. Bread and wine symbolized divine inventions and 
these were deified, personalized and institutionalized within organized religion as 
such.480 
 
The agricultural stage of the theory on the origin of gods by Prodicus does on the 
other hand, also have a euhemerizing aspect, as can be attested by Minucius Felix.  
 
“Prodicus says that those who in their wandering were beneficial to the interests of humans with newly 
discovered crops were raised up among the gods.  Persaeus philosophizes to the same opinion, and he 
connects the crops that have been discovered and the discoverers of these very crops by the same 
names, as the lines of the comedy go:’ Without Liber and Ceres Venus grows cold” (transl. R. 
Mayhew)481 
 
 This source attests that Prodicus considered the gods in essence to be human 
‘inventors’ of beneficial objects for mankind, such as bread and wine. They were 
admired by their fellow men, to such extent that they were even deified after their 
demise.482 Albert Henrichs succinctly summarized this complex essence of Prodicus’s 
theory on the origin of organized religion by formulating the following, 
 
‘In the beginning, there was nature and there was man. Soon primitive man came to 
realize that in order for him to survive he had to depend on nature. Therefore he stood 
in awe of those things on which he was most dependent, such as sun and moon, rivers 
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and fruits of the earth, and what else he deemed vital for his continued existence. 
When the time had come for mankind to give everything its proper name, they agreed 
to refer to the various benefactions of nature which they admired as “gods”, and began 
to worship them. Gradually, as human wit entered into competition with nature and 
human individuals distinguished themselves as inventors of new means of survival 
and as benefactors of mankind, this nomenclature was extended to include them too, 
so that they were likewise called “gods”, with their personal names like Demeter and 
Dionysos retained for individual identification, and they were worshipped as such.’483 
 
Obviously, Prodicus’s theory had substantial consequences: it claimed that mystery 
cults and the Eleusinian Mysteries in particular had an origin in agriculture. Demeter 
and Dionysus were not originally gods, but extraordinary humans who were honoured 
for agricultural achievements, such as the invention of bread and wine.484 As gods, 
they were euhemeristically reducible to the status of deified mortals, comparable to 
the heroes Heracles and Asclepius.485  
 
Remarkably, this bold theory of Prodicus did not cause much controversy in Athens in 
the late 5th century BC. At most, Aristophanes ridiculed it in Birds (692).486 Euripides 
nonetheless incorporated a more positive approach to the theory in his play Bacchae. 
In this drama, the seer Tiresias tries to convince the theomachos Pentheus, who rejects 
the cult of Dionysus, to accept the existence and dunamis of the god: 
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“For two things, young man, are first among men: the goddess Demeter—she is the earth, but call her 
whatever name you wish; she nourishes mortals with dry food; but he who came afterwards, the 
offspring of Semele, discovered a match to it, the liquid drink of the grape, and introduced it to mortals. 
It releases wretched mortals from grief, whenever they are filled with the stream of the vine, and gives 
them sleep, a means of forgetting their daily troubles, nor is there another cure for hardships. He who is 
a god is poured out in offerings to the gods, so that by his means men may have good things.” (transl. 
T.A. Buckley)487 
 
The specific passage from Bacchae shows a ‘conventional’ reading of philosophical 
atheism.488 The character of Tiresias clearly emphasizes the Prodicean idea of the 
introduction of beneficial endowments to mankind by Demeter and Dionysus, but he 
does not consider them to be mortals in origin.489 He only stresses their importance to 
mankind and religion in particular. Dionysus, as a personification for wine, is most 
useful for the practice of libation, a traditional concept within organized Greek 
religion. 
 
This rather smooth integration of Prodicus’s views within organized religion must be 
understood within the context of physis versus nomos. As Felix Heinimann had 
demonstrated, both concepts were not contradictory in early sophistic doctrine, but 
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operated on a complementary level.490 The character Tiresias tries to reconcile nomos 
with physis: even in the most reductionist interpretation as being merely dry food and 
wine, Demeter and Dionysus are still of great importance to mankind, and for this 
reason, they deserve respect and worship.491  After all, a human past of Demeter and 
Dionysus would not be contradictory to the common belief that both deities once 
roamed the earth and visited Attica in order to grant mankind the gift of grain and 
wine, which the Athenians yearly celebrated by means of the Eleusinian Mysteries 
and the Anthesteria.492  
 
So, we can conclude that Prodicus’s theory met with little controversy in the late 5th 
century BC. It even got embraced by writers like Euripides, who integrated it in 
religious themes in order to reconcile the religious traditions of nomos with the 
scientific and philosophical theories on physis. Euripides, however, was probably an 
exception in applying this theory, considering the fact that we have no other examples 
of a positive approach to Prodicus’s views493, but it is fairly safe to assume that it was 
generally tolerated, because it did not fundamentally conflict with traditional religion 
by presenting the gods as the logical outcome of Greek (agri)cultural development.494 
 
The politician Critias (ca. 460 – 403 BC) also developed an anthropological aetiology 
on the origin of the gods, but, unlike Prodicus, he produced a more negative theory, 
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based on human fabrication.495 This theory can be derived from Sisyphus, a satyr play 
Critias is supposed to have written in the late 5th century BC.496  The identification of 
the authorship of Sisyphus has caused much debate, not only among modern scholars 
but even within ancient sources. Some writers ascribe the play to Critias while others 
attribute the play to Euripides.497 The current authoritative edition on Euripides 
(Kannicht 2004) does attribute the fragment to Critias.498 The Sisyphus-fragment in its 
entirety contains the following information: 
 
“A time there was, when anarchy did rule the lives of men, which then were like the beasts, enslaved to 
force; nor was there then reward for good men, nor for wicked punishment. Next, as I deem, did men 
establish laws for punishment, that Justice might be lord of all mankind, and Insolence enchained; and 
whosoever did sin was penalized. Next, as the laws did hold men back from deeds of open violence, 
but still such deeds were done in secret,-then, as I maintain, some shrewd man first, a man in counsel 
wise, discovered unto men the fear of Gods, thereby to frighten sinners should they sin even secretly in 
deed, or word, or thought. Hence was it that he brought in Deity, telling how God enjoys an endless 
life, hears with his mind and sees, and taketh thought and heeds things, and his nature is divine, so that 
he hearkens to men’s every word and has the power to see men’s every act. Even if you plan in silence 
some ill deed, the Gods will surely mark it; for in them wisdom resides. So, speaking words like these, 
most cunning doctrine did he introduce, the truth concealing under speech untrue. The place he spoke 
of as the God’s abode was that whereby he could affright men most, -the place from which, he knew, 
both terrors came and easements unto men of toilsome life- to wit the vault above, wherein do dwell 
the lightnings, he beheld, and awesome claps of thunder, and the starry face of heaven, fair-spangled by 
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that cunning craftsman Time, whence, too, the meteor’s glowing mass doth speed and liquid rain 
descends upon the earth. Such were the fears wherewith he hedged men round, and so to God he gave a 
fitting home, by this his speech, and in a fitting place, and thus extinguished lawlessness by laws. Thus 
first did some man, as I deem, persuade men to suppose a race of Gods exists.” (transl. R.G. Bury)499 
 
The fragment gained Critias a later reputation of one of the most notorious atheists 
along with Diagoras and Theodorus.500 Critias is generally considered to be a 
controversial figure not only within Greek philosophy, but also within Greek 
(political) history. Mainly notorious as one of the most severe members of the 
‘Thirty’, he is also known as a playwright and a Presocratic intellectual.501 
   
His position as a sophist, however, is not without dispute.502 Although he is 
traditionally classified as a sophist by Hermann Diels in his Fragmente der 
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Vorsokratiker, he is more likely to be considered a versatile opportunist, who 
employed sophist principles for political ambitions and dramaturgical purposes.503  
 
His biography has no further references to atheism or deviant religious behaviour, 
except the fact that the orator Andocides in his defence plea On the Mysteries (47) 
mentions Critias, as a cousin of his father, among the list of those accused of 
parodying the Mysteries and mutilating the Herms in 415 BC. Andocides claims that 
this charge by a certain Diocleides was false and only intented to incriminate his 
entire family. The Athenian Council examined these charges and discovered that 
Diocleides was indeed delivering false information and eventually ordened his death, 
clearing Critias and other family members of all charges of impiety.  
 
Contemporary sources like Plato and Xenophon also do not attest any atheist thoughts 
or actions by Critias. In the case of Plato, a certain amount of respect can even be 
found for Critias (e.g., in his dialogue Critias), but this can be explained by the fact 
that they were related, Critias being Plato’s uncle on his mother’s side. Xenophon, on 
the other hand, displays an utter dislike for Critias in his writings, but he does not 
associate him with philosophical atheism. On the contrary, Xenophon mentions in his 
Memorabilia a hostile attitude of Critias to philosophy, resulting from a resentment 
against his former tutor Socrates:  
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O’Sullivan (2012), p. 180-182 even argues that the Sisyphus-fragment has very little in common with 
(radical) atheism. On the contrary, the sophist (Protagorean) influence in the fragment must rather be 
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Plato’s description) gathered at Callias’ house to greet Protagoras, a member of the hyperintellectual 
inner circle, and well placed to transmit cutting-edge ideas’. But this argument might only explain how 
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for dramaturgical purposes. 
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“Now Critias bore a grudge against Socrates for this; and when he was one of the Thirty and was 
drafting laws with Charicles, he bore it in mind. He inserted a clause which made it illegal “to teach the 
art of words”. It was a calculated insult to Socrates, whom he saw no means of attacking, except by 
imputing to him the practice constantly attributed to philosophers, and so making him unpopular.” 
(transl. E.C. Marchant & O.J.  Todd)504 
 
So, Critias should not be recognized as a sophist as Hermann Diels did, but rather as a 
politician and occasional playwright. Regarding the latter, he can be compared with 
Euripides, who wrote a play similar to Sisyphus, namely Bellerophon.505 This older 
play also contains a categorical ‘atheist’ passage, uttered by the protagonist: 
 
“Does someone say there are indeed gods in heaven? There are not, there are not, if a man is willing 
not to rely foolishly on the antiquated reasoning. Consider for your selves, do not base your opinion on 
words of mine. I say myself that tyranny kills very many men and deprives them of their possessions; 
and that tyrants break their oaths to ransack cities, and in doing this they are more prosperous under 
heaven than men who live quietly in reverence from day to day. I know too of small cities doing 
honour to the gods which are subject to larger, more impious ones, because they are overcome by a 
more numerous army. I think that, if a man were lazy and prayed to the gods and did not go gathering 
his livelihood with his hand, you would <…> fortify religion, and illfortune.” (transl. C. Collard, M.J. 
Cropp & K.H. Lee) 506 
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 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 1.2.31: ἐξ ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐµίσει τὸν Σωκράτην ὁ Κριτίας, ὥστε καὶ ὅτε 
τῶν τριάκοντα ὢν νοµοθέτης µετὰ Χαρικλέους ἐγένετο, ἀπεµνηµόνευσεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
νόµοις ἔγραψε λόγων τέχνην µὴ διδάσκειν, ἐπηρεάζων ἐκείνῳ καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ὅπῃ ἐπιλάβοιτο, 
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situated between 429 and 425 BC. 
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 Euripides, Bellerophon, 286: φησίν τις εἶναι δῆτ᾽ ἐν οὐρανῶι θεοὺς; οὐκ εἰσίν, οὐκ εἴσ᾽, εἴ τις 
ἀνθρώπων θέλει µὴ τῶι παλαιῶι µῶρος ὢν χρῆσθαι λόγωι. σκέψασθε δ᾽αὐτοί, µὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς 
ἐµοῖς λόγοις γνώµην ἔχοντες. φήµ᾽ ἐγὼ τυραννίδα κτείνειν τε πλείστους κτηµάτων τ᾽ 
ἀποστερεῖν ὅρκους τε παραβαίνοντας ἐκπορθεῖν πόλεις· καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες µᾶλλόν εἰσ᾽ 
εὐδαίµονες τῶν εὐσεβούντων ἡσυχῆι καθ᾽ ἡµέραν. πόλεις τε µικρὰς οἶδα τιµώσας θεοὺς, αἳ 
µειζόνων κλύουσι δυσσεβεστέρων λόγχης ἀριθµῶι πλείονος κρατούµεναι. οἶµαι δ᾽ ἂν ὑµᾶς, εἴ 
τις ἀργὸς ὢν θεοῖς εὔχοιτο καὶ µὴ χειρὶ συλλέγοι βίον <….> τὰ θεῖα πυργοῦσ᾽ αἱ κακαί τε 
συµφοραί. 
     371 
It has been convincingly attested that these specific passages are examples of 
‘character speaking’ and not concrete indications that Critias and Euripides endorsed 
philosophical theories on the inexistence of the gods.507 The stage personae Sisyphus 
and Bellerophon are uttering these ‘atheist’ statements intentionally. This can be 
explained in the case of the villain Sisyphus by his reputation as a trickster508, while in 
the case of the hero Bellerophon disbelief is to be interpreted as a form of initial 
desperation and distrust in the justice of the gods.509  
 
Although certain poets510 and doxographers511 suspected Euripides of atheism in the 
sense of (philosophical) speculation on the inexistence of the gods, any form of 
religious doubts about the gods that can be detected within the characters of 
Euripides’s plays actually serves a traditional principle: eventually, these characters 
will experience that the dunamis of the gods always prevails.   
 
Nevertheless this, both passages are remarkable for their explicit ‘atheist’ content. 
These depict a late 5th century Zeitgeist that was familiar with the existence of an 
extreme type of atheism within Athenian society.  Such an open and blatant 
repudiation of Athenian religion could have been present in certain philosophical 
milieus, but the public ventilation of such sentiments was most likely only acceptable 
within the setting of dramatic speech.512 
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 Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae, 450-451. 
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But if Critias must be regarded as a playwright who only incorporated contemporary 
atheistic thought patterns for dramatic purposes, the question remains why Epicurus 
included him in the first index atheorum next to Prodicus and Diagoras. The answer 
could lie in Epicurus’s opinions on the life of Critias. Being associated with tyranny 
and the mutilation of the Herms, Epicurus could have considered him to be too 
disrespectful to the gods and piety in general.513 Within the apologetic context of On 
Piety the impious playwright Critias could easily be juxtaposed with atheist 
philosophers like Prodicus and Diagoras. 
 
We may thus conclude that the content of the atheist book by Diagoras could have 
displayed an anthropological aetiology that openly denied the existence of the Greek 
gods and reduced them to the status of a human invention, based on a possible 
analogy between the ‘atheist’ intellectuals mentioned in the index atheorum by 
Epicurus, which was preserved in Philodemus’s On Piety. If so, Diagoras could have 
elaborated further on the aetiologies of Democritus and Prodicus and developed them 
to a more radical level.514  
 
The correspondence between Diagoras and Critias, in my opinion, must also be 
situated on the level of anthropological aetiologies. However, Critias did not develop 
a genuine philosophical theory on this matter, but only incorporated contemporary 
‘atheist’ elements in the satyr play Sisyphus for dramaturgical purposes, besides the 
borrowing of ‘older’ motives from early Greek literature.515  
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 I do not endorse the argument of Winiarczyk (2016), p. 125 that Diagoras was only included in this 
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 Kahn (1997), p. 261. On the Hesiodic influences in the Sisyphus-fragment, see O’Sullivan (2012), p. 
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  14.2.3.4) Diagoras and the Derveni Papyrus 
 
In 2001 Richard Janko published an interesting, but rather controversial article 
concerning the authorship of the Derveni Papyrus. In The Derveni Papyrus 
(“Diagoras of Melos, Apopyrgizontes Logoi?”): A New Translation, Janko claimed 
that Diagoras of Melos was in fact the anonymous author ‘∆’ of the Derveni Papyrus.  
 
According to Janko, the Derveni Papyrus must actually be interpreted as the lost 
atheist book of Diagoras.  Janko argued that the Derveni Papyrus can be interpreted as 
a rationalization of Orphic cosmogony.516 Given the time frame of the papyrus, the 
author must have had some connection with Ionic naturalism or at least sophist 
reasoning.517 This leads, according to Janko, to only two possible candidates for the 
authorship, namely Diogenes of Apollonia or Diagoras of Melos.518 The latter is a 
more fitting candidate, in Janko’s opinion, because Aristophanes’s Clouds (830) 
associates Diagoras with Ionic naturalism and the 2nd century Christian apologist 
Athenagoras of Athens links Diagoras with criticism regarding Orphic logos:  
 
“With reason did the Athenians adjudge Diagoras guilty of atheism, in that he not only divulged the 
Orphic doctrine, and published the mysteries of Eleusis and of the Cabiri, and chopped up the wooden 
statue of Hercules to boil his turnips, but openly declared that there was no God at all.” (transl. A. 
Roberts & J. Donaldson).519 
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In an appendix (Diagoras and the Derveni author) to his book The Derveni Papyrus:      
Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation (2005) Gábor Betegh refuted the theory of 
Janko by arguing that two distinct features of Diagoras of Melos, being an atheist and 
a divulger of the Mysteries, cannot be applied to the author of the Derveni Papyrus.520 
In columns 25.10 of the text, the author clearly considers his cosmic principle to be 
divine and he does not criticize initiation in column 6 of the text in any way. Based on 
these observations Betegh ruled out Diagoras as a possible author. 
 
Betegh further criticized Janko for relying on Athenagoras as a source. Indeed, this 
Christian author is not providing very reliable evidence, by associating Diagoras with 
the divulging of Orphic logos. Besides, Janko neglects the specific apologetic context 
of the paragraph from Athenagoras’s plea. In order to rebut accusations of atheism 
against Christians, Athenagoras portrays Diagoras as the ultimate atheist, who not 
only divulged the Eleusinian Mysteries, but also the Mysteries of the Cabiri and 
Orphic logos.521  No a single contemporary or early Hellenistic source does attest any 
divulging of these rituals by Diagoras, so the statement is probably a later Hellenistic 
invention of presenting Diagoras as ‘the ultimate profaner of all popular mystery 
cults’, which was later adopted by Athenagoras.522 
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Due to the effective refutation by Betegh, even Janko no longer supports his own 
theory.523  In the authoritative translation and commentary the Derveni Papyrus 
(2006) of Theokritos Kouremenos, George M. Parassoglou and Kyriakos 
Tsantsanoglou, the theory is therefore omitted.524 
 
If Janko was correct, it would have been a remarkable discovery, but the more 
profound analysis of Betegh has now effectively excluded any connection of Diagoras 
with the Derveni Papyrus. The atheist book remains lost and, due to its early 
disappearance (probably as early as the 3rd century BC), it will, in all probability, 
remain permanently lost.  
 
We have now extensively analyzed the different sources and hypotheses regarding the 
atheist writings of Diagoras. Based on our findings, we can draw the following 
conclusions: 
1) The existence of atheist writings (possibly a prose book) is not an invention of 
later literary traditions. Preserved information by Epicurus (and Aristoxenus, 
to a lesser extent) does acknowledge its existence near the end of the 4th 
century BC. 
2) The preserved titles of the atheist book are not authentic. Both are definitely 
the product of a later (Christian and Byzantine) literary tradition. In all 
probability, the book did not have a title or the title was generic in the tradition 
of similar treatises On the Gods (Περὶ θεῶν). 
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3) The book must have been published posthumously, possiby by Theodorus of 
Cyrene, and must be dated in the last quarter of the 4th century, since it is 
never mentioned earlier than ca. 310 BC. It seems to have disappeared in the 
course of the 3rd century BC, maybe as early as the first quarter of the century, 
because we have no later sources in regard to any analysis of the atheist book. 
As will be argued in the next case study, the atheist book of Diagoras might 
have disappeared almost simultaneously with the death of Theodorus of 
Cyrene ca. 275 BC. 
4) The content of the atheist book is debatable, but due to explict comparisons 
with Prodicus and Critias by Epicurus, the book could have contained an 
anthropological aetiology, most likely comparable to the theory of Prodicus, 
but possibly taken to a more radical level. 
5) The book has no connection with the Derveni Papyrus except the time frame 
of publication (late 4th century BC). The Derveni Papyrus had a completely 
different character. As a poem on Orphic cosmogony, it has no association at 
all with atheism.  
 
14.3) Diagoras and the sociopolitical context of late 5th century BC Athens 
 
So far we have examined the nature of the atheist actions and writings of Diagoras of 
Melos, but an important aspect of this atheism still remains uncovered: “Which 
factors did trigger his atheism to such an extreme level?” Was this merely the result of 
personal experience -like some Hellenistic and Byzantine sources attest- or did 
specific social, political or religious conditions actually shape and develop it into the 
extraordinary atheism Diagoras was notorious for throughout Antiquity? 
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Earlier in this dissertation, I have briefly mentioned the idea that Diagoras’s atheism 
might have radicalized due to the outcome of the Melian Conflict in 416 BC. The 
radicalization of this atheism, on the other hand, appears to be a complex process that 
developed over different years and culminated with the events at Melos, as I wish to 
demonstrate in this section of the case study. A problem that this idea of a ‘process of 
growing radicalism’ nevertheless poses is the lack of legal actions against Diagoras’s 
atheism from Athenian authorities in the period 430 and 415 BC525, when we consider 
that atheism and impiety were inextricably connected concepts. Besides, legislation 
(cf. Diopeithes-decree) had already condemned (lesser) charges of asebeia, like the 
cases of Anaxagoras and (possibly) Diogenes of Apollonia seem to attest.526 
In order to examine these complexity properly, I will divide this chapter into four 
different sections.  
 
1) Diagoras and the Great Plague (430 BC): this first section will focus on the 
social and religious impact of the Great Plague in Athens that might have 
induced the early atheism of Diagoras to a more radical level.527 If so, could 
                                                      
525
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527Winiarczyk (2016), p. 74 & 114 makes the suggestion that the effects of the Plague, which 
indiscriminately struck both pious and impious people, may have induced the denial of the gods in the 
period 430-427/6 BC, but this argument is not further developed by Winiarczyk. 
     378 
this in response have caused an early conviction of Diagoras, as Felix Jacoby 
once claimed? I will also challenge in this section the thesis of Alexander 
Rubel concerning the Great Plague in Athens.528 Did this event really provoke 
a climate of religious despair and crisis in Athens as early as 430 BC or should 
the religious consequences of the Plague be considered to have been minimal?  
2) Diagoras and the polarization of Athenian society in the 420s BC: in this 
second section, I will adapt the concept of polarization of Martin Ostwald in 
order to demonstrate that Athenian society in the 420s BC gradually became 
differentiated by a range of social and political contrasts (e.g., democratic 
versus oligarchic) which profoundly affected intellectual life in Athens.529 
Diagoras did not escape the implications of this polarization. Moreover, he 
appeared to have represented an outspoken anti-Athenian profile, which could 
have caused an increased awareness for his atheist actions and the impact 
these might have had on civic society.  
3) Diagoras and the Melian Conflict (417-416 BC): the third section will deal 
with the military campaign of Athens against the island of Melos, the 
homeland of Diagoras. Could the deliberate starvation of his fellow Melians 
have contributed to the radicalization of Diagoras’s atheism? 
4) Diagoras and he religious scandals (415 BC): in this final section, I will 
examine to which degree the religious scandals did influence the social 
perception on atheism in Athens at the end of the 5th century BC and to which 
extent this affected the professional career and personal life of Diagoras 
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Eventhough each section concerns a specific development within Athenian society, a 
certain interaction and interference between all four sections is obviously detectable. 
Once combined, these four inquiries should enable us to determine the precise 
sociopolitical conditions that could have led to the radicalizing nature of Diagoras’s 
atheism and his consequent ousting by Athenian society. 
 
 14.3.1) Diagoras and Great Plague (430 BC) 
 
Based on the contemporaneous accounts by Hermippus and Aristophanes on 
Diagoras, we can suppose that Diagoras professed his atheism during a substantial 
period (i.e. from 430 to 415 BC with an intermezzo at Mantinea between 425-418 
BC) without any form of prosecution by Athenian authorities.530 This was also the 
opinion of Jan Bremmer, who believed that Diagoras lived safely for some years in 
Athens, in spite of his irreligious behaviour.531  
 
Indeed, from the oldest reference to Diagoras in Hermippus’s Fates from 430 BC to 
the 1st edition of Clouds by Aristophanes in 423 BC, we can deduce that Diagoras was 
a trained sophist who was able to exercise his profession in Athens freely. The sophist 
method of reasoning of the character ‘Socrates the Melian’ in this play is already 
closely aligned with the intellectual opinion of οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεύς (“Zeus does not 
exist”).532  Does this indicate a more radicalizing (‘Calliclean’) understanding of the 
antithesis between physis and nomos, perhaps induced by extraordinary social 
conditions, such as the Great Plague of 430 BC that disturbed the upholding of 
traditional nomoi and created a socioreligious vacuum, in which (radical) atheism 
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could florish without impunity? In order to tackle these problems, we need to 
determine the impact of this event on Athenian society.  
 
Due to their leading role in the Delian League, the Athenians were able to develop 
their city-state from the 460s BC onwards into an empire that reached unprecedented 
demographic, military and economic heights.533 Already in the years 460-445 BC 
Athens would undertake military expeditions against Spartan allies by which it 
displayed its naval supremacy.534 In the early days of the Peloponnesian War, this 
superiority at sea would be combined with successful land-operations against 
Peloponnesian city-states and rebelling allies.535 However, these initial military 
successes were soon overshadowed by the outbreak of plague in 430 BC, which led to 
a demographic crisis, as the contemporary historiographer Thucydides (2, 31) reports. 
The plague of 430 BC was not the first occurrence of pestilence in ancient Athens. In 
the Life of Epimenides (I, 110), Diogenes Laertius reports that Athens was struck by 
pestilence during the 46th Olympiad (596-592 BC). Epimenides eventually stopped 
the plague by sacrificing a number of sheep to the local deities. Beside Thucydides, 
different authors in Antiquity, such as Lucretius (On the Nature of Things, VI, 1138-
1247) and Plutarch (Pericles, 38, 1), have described the Plague of 430 BC, but 
Thucydides is the only contemporaneous and authoritative source from which all 
other sources certainly borrowed their information.536 We are also informed that 
Thucydides himself fell victim of this severe disease (νόσος) and witnessed others 
succumb to it.537 The accurate description of the symptoms of the disease and the 
particular use of medical terminology by Thucydides also indicates that the 
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historiographer must have been familiar with at least some treatises (e.g., Epidemics 
and Prognostic) within the Hippocratic Corpus.538  
 
Despite the detailed description, modern scholars have not been able to determine the 
responsible agent for the disease, although many possible causes have been 
suggested.539 In any case, bubonic plague can be ruled out with most certainty, 
because the symptoms in Thucydides have no similarities with those described by 
Procopius (History of the Wars, II, 65.5) in his report on the outbreak of bubonic 
plague in 6th century AD Byzanthium and the fact that 5th century BC Greeks were 
unfamiliar with the black rat.540  
 
For these reasons, it would be more accurate to speak of an ‘epidemic’ or a ‘severe 
disease’ rather than a ‘plague’. Regardless of the nature of the epidemic, its physical 
and mental impact on Athenian life must have been enormous: military capacity was 
reduced to 25 % and Thucydides (2, 54, 5) reports that the Lacedaemonians remained 
almost untouched by the epidemic, while the Athenian leader Pericles would 
eventually succumb to it.541  In addition to the devastating effects on the population, 
especially in times of war, the epidemic would also have repercussions on organized 
Athenian religion, as Thucydides states:  
 
“And the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to oracles and the like, were all futile, and at last 
men desisted from them, overcome by the calamity. In other respects also the plague first introduced 
into the city a greater lawlessness. […] No fear of the gods or law of men restrained; for, on the one 
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hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike, they judged that piety and impiety came to the same 
thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he would live to be called to account and pay the penalty 
of his misdeeds.” (transl. C.F. Smith)542  
 
Thucydides seems to point out that repercussions of the Plague caused apathy for 
religious affairs among Athenians, which further developed into a religious nihilism 
and moral relativism.543 We must however be careful with such conclusions: in 
analogy with the earlier pestilence of 595-592 BC, Athenians most likely sought 
refuge in rituals and oracles, but, due to the unseen nature of the Plague of 430 BC in 
combination with the ongoing war effort, this proved to be ineffective. Thucydides (2, 
52, 3) also points towards a strong sense of desperation.544 The extraordinary 
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τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐχρήσαντο, πάντα ἀνωφελῆ ἦν, τελευτῶντές τε αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
κακοῦ νικώµενοι.[…] θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόµος οὐδεὶς ἀπεῖργε, τὸ µὲν κρίνοντες ἐν 
ὁµοίῳ καὶ σέβειν καὶ µὴ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὁρᾶν ἐν ἴσῳ ἀπολλυµένους, τῶν δὲ ἁµαρτηµάτων 
οὐδεὶς ἐλπίζων µέχρι τοῦ δίκην γενέσθαι βιοὺς ἂν τὴν τιµωρίαν ἀντιδοῦναι, πολὺ δὲ µείζω τὴν 
ἤδη κατεψηφισµένην σφῶν ἐπικρεµασθῆναι, ἣν πρὶν ἐµπεσεῖν εἰκὸς εἶναι τοῦ βίου τι 
ἀπολαῦσαι.  
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 In his monograph Stadt in Angst: Religion und Politik in Athen während des Peloponnesischen 
Krieges, Rubel (2000), p. 120-129 defends the idea that the Great Plague in Athens caused a climate of 
fear, despair and religious fanaticism, in stead of the religious nihilism that Thucydides (4, 47 &53) 
seems to suggest. Rubel sees analogies between the Great Plague and the Black Death in Medieval 
Europe and believes that premodern societies in general would rather surrender to religious fanaticism, 
as epidemics would be explained in terms of divine wrath. Therefore, premodern man would logically 
seek refuge in all forms of rituals and prayer in order to appease any divine anger as the cause of the 
epidemic. According to Rubel (2000), p. 129-135, Thucydides shows reticence in these matters, 
because of his aim to write a political history of the Peloponnesian War in which religion has no role of 
importance. The idea that Thucydides might have been an atheist or a free-thinker, because his history 
writing was characterized by an absence of supernatural interaction in favour of human psychology and 
decision-making, was already suggested by Meuss (1892), p. 225 and supported by Drachmann (1922), 
p. 28-29. For a complete overview on the debate of Thucydides being an atheist or not, see Jordan 
(1986), p. 119, n.1. Lloyd-Jones (1971), p.137-144, based on Strasburger (1954), p. 515, would 
criticize the common idea that Thucydides was influenced by sophist thought that professed Realpolitik 
in which ‘Calliclean’ dominance of physis over nomos prevailed. Thucydides might have viewed the 
world as a display in brutish force in which only the most brutal prevailed, as demonstrated by his 
emphasis on the description of the violent conflicts in Mytilene, Scione and Melos. But these events do 
not reflect an approval of Athenian imperialism by Thucydides. They rather illustrate the tragedy of the 
human condition: politicians like Cleon and Alcibiades eventually succumb to their human passions, 
because they induce hubris and injustice. According to Lloyd-Jones, p. 144, Thucydides was influenced 
by tragedy and might have been influenced to some degree by the sophist Protagoras. Divine agencies 
are not detected in his history writing, not because they do not exist, but due to the fact that they fulfill 
a more internal role: they affect the human mind through an array of passions that lead to a (tragic) 
form of decision-making. Later studies by Marinatos (1981), p. 139, Parker (1983), p. 277 and Jordan 
     383 
conditions caused by the Plague disturbed public life to such extent that human and 
divine laws (nomoi) could not be upheld to their normal standards. By this statement, 
Thucydides likely meant that the deceased were not properly buried, but to the best of 
circumstances (2, 52, 4). Moreover, the explicit references in paragraph 2, 53 to 
lawlessness in the form of ‘an absence of fear of the gods’ and the judgment that 
‘piety and impiety came to the same time’ does not necessarily refer to some kind of 
religious relativism or atheism. It rather refers to an indecent or criminal attitude by 
those not affected by the epidemic. Such persons seized the opportunity to commits 
acts of impiety, such as the throwing of their dead on funeral pyres of other families 
(2, 52, 4) or the obtaining of property of rich victims (2, 53, 1).       
 
Despite these temporary cases of impiety, in the sense of uncivilized behaviour in 
Thucydides’s opinion, there are indications that civic religion and public life in 
Athens recovered relatively fast from this crisis. For example, in the writings of comic 
playwrights like Aristophanes in the early 420s BC, we cannot find a single trace of 
any moral or religious despair.545 This is actually not so surprising, because such 
attitude is more or less in accordance with the common Athenian mentalities in regard 
to piety.546 Piety and communal prosperity were considered to be compatible 
concepts. Piety caused prosperity, as Isocrates (436-338 BC) formulated it: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1986), p. 147 firmly reject the idea of Thucydides being an atheist and defend the idea of religion as a 
Leitmotiv for the political action in Thucydides’s history writing. Marinatos (1981) stresses the 
importance of oracles for Thucyides and Jordan (1986) provides a thorough analysis of all paragraphs 
in Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War, dealing with religious matters.  
545
 Parker (1996), p.200. 
546
 Mikalson (1983), p. 104; Bruit-Zaidman (2001), p. 214-217 & Filonik (2013), p.14. 
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 “No, you ought to believe rather that those are better off now and will receive the advantage in the 
future at the hands of the gods who are the most righteous and the most faithful in their devotions.” 
(transl. G.Norlin)547 
 
On the same topic, the sophist and orator Antiphon (late 5th century BC) would 
compare impious behaviour with religious relativism by stating that, 
 
“Most of the life of man rests upon hope; and by defying the gods and committing transgressions 
against them, he would rob himself even of hope, the greatest of human blessings”. (transl. 
K.J.Maidment)548 
 
So, based on these sources, it appears that any lack of religious concern would have 
been associated with impiety and experienced as being contradictory to the religious 
mindset of most Athenians. Robert Parker, for instance, argued in his monograph 
Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion (1983) that respect for 
the gods and the laws of men were products of the same sociocultural process in 
ancient Greece.549 If any religious disregard was carried out intentionally, as it was the 
case of the religious scandals of 415 BC, it would be considered an evident example 
of asebeia. In the case of the Plague of 430 BC, ritual neglect was not caused by 
deliberate acts of asebeia, but could be related to a social climate of religious fear and 
despair, similar to the case of the Black Death in Medieval Europe.550 But could we 
also assume that the Plague induced religious fanaticism, as Alexander Rubel 
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 Isocrates, Antidosis, 282: χρὴ δὲ καὶ νῦν πλέον ἔχειν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτήσειν νοµίζειν 
παρὰ µὲν τῶν θεῶν τοὺς εὐσεβεστάτους καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν θεραπείαν τὴν ἐκείνων 
ἐπιµελεστάτους ὄντας. 
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 Antiphon, On the Choreutes, 5: ἔστι µὲν γὰρ τὰ πλείω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῦ βίου ἐν ταῖς 
ἐλπίσιν: ἀσεβῶν δὲ καὶ παραβαίνων τὰ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ αὐτῆς ἂν τῆς ἐλπίδος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ 
µέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθόν. 
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 Parker (1983), p. 170 & 192. 
550
 Rubel (2000), p. 122. 
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claimed?  Ancient evidence on asebeia-trials, for instance, seems to indicate that this 
legal procedure was generally inactive in the period 430-420 BC, with the exception 
of the case of Protagoras (ca. 422 BC).551 
 
Contemporary sources also do not attest any religious despair or fanaticism, but rather 
indicate a form of religious fatalism. Thucydides (2, 54, 2-5) reports that Athenians 
recalled a verse from an oracle (“A Dorian war shall come and plague with it”), by 
which was professed that Apollo would lead the Spartans to victory.  The outbreak of 
the Plague, after the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, could have convinced the 
Athenians of the fact that Apollo had sent pestilence upon them in aid of the 
Spartans.552 This could explain why Athenians considered rituals and appeals to 
oracles to be futile at the moment, because the Plague was experienced as a 
fulfillment of the prophecy and an apparent indication that the gods were favouring 
the Peloponnesians. Moreover, another example of widespread belief in the oracle, 
according to Thucydides, was to be found in the fact that the Plague never reached the 
Peloponnesus and thrived primarily among the population of Athens.553 
 
If one can actually speak of a sense of genuine apathy in the aftermath of the Plague, 
it would have been of a more political nature. Citizens lost confidence in their 
political leaders rather than belief in the traditional gods. Famous politicians like 
Pericles were obviously a more accessible scapegoat for the hardship and sufferings 
that Athenians underwent. Thucydides himself demonstrates this clearly: 
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 See Philips (2013), p. 421-462 for the most recent overview of sources on asebeia, in the sense of 
philosophical speculation on the existence of the gods. 
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 Jordan (1986), p. 132. 
553
 Marinatos (1981), p.139, argues that the lack of clarity in Thucyides’ description of oracles should 
not indicate disbelief or scepticism, but rather that people interpret them according to circumstances. 
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“After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians the Athenians underwent a change of feeling, now 
that their land had been ravaged a second time while the plague and the war combined lay heavily upon 
them. They blamed Pericles for having persuaded them to go to war and held him responsible for the 
misfortunes which befallen them, and were eager to come to an agreement with the Lacedaemonians.” 
(transl. C.F. Smith)554 
 
Clearly, Thucydides’s propensity to explain social circumstances and events in terms 
of political decision-making is noticeable in this specific paragraph. Certain political 
actions by Pericles seem to have aggravated the epidemic, namely the crowding of the 
people out of the country within the city walls (2, 52, 1) and the fact that Pericles 
ordered all Athenians to remain within these barriers (2, 55). Due to the concentration 
of people, the epidemic thrived, especially among the newly arrived citizens from the 
country side. But there are also indications that the epidemic was a short-term event, 
which primarily struck those who had already been ill.555 Thucydides (2, 51, 6) also 
mentions the fact that those who recovered were not affected a second time and 
appeared to be immune to the disease. 
 
Based on these observations, I believe it safe to assume that the religious side-effects 
of the Plague of 430 BC or its impact on the atheism of Diagoras must have been 
minimal due to its momentary character. Despite the demoralizing effect of the Plague 
on the population, enlarged by the consequences of the warfare effort, the Athenians 
did not seem to have embraced a genuine religious nihilism in which (radical) atheism 
could have thrived. Rather, they displayed a political indifference, which created a 
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 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 2, 59: µετὰ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἐσβολὴν τῶν 
Πελοποννησίων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἥ τε γῆ αὐτῶν ἐτέτµητο τὸ δεύτερον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἐπέκειτο 
ἅµα καὶ ὁ πόλεµος, ἠλλοίωντο τὰς γνώµας, καὶ τὸν µὲν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον ὡς πείσαντα 
σφᾶς πολεµεῖν καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ταῖς ξυµφοραῖς περιπεπτωκότες,πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιµονίους 
ὥρµηντο ξυγχωρεῖν  
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 Thucydides, On the Peloponnesian War, 2, 49. 
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vacuum for ambitious radical politicians like Cleon and Alcibiades on the long 
term.556 The fact that the atheist Diagoras was able to live safely and undisturbed in 
Athens between 430 and 425 BC does not seem to be related to any general sense of 
religious apathy or sympathy to atheism; it is more likely the result of a transitory 
period in Athenian history, marked by an ineffectiveness to maintain human and 
divine nomoi, due to the precarious situation.557 This social climate also does not 
support the idea that Diagoras would have been condemned for atheism ca. 430 BC.558 
When Aristophanes presumably mentioned Diagoras in the first edition of Clouds in 
423 BC, Athenian society had recovered from the Plague and settled a truce with 
Sparta, which led to a period of détente in the Peloponnesian War. In this climate, 
authorities could have raised more attention to possible acts of asebeia by Diagoras, 
but, due to his stay in Mantinea in from ca. 425 BC on, Diagoras was out of public 
sight and merely a comical reference by Aristophanes.   
 
Then again, we do not have absolute certainty that Diagoras already appeared in the 
first version of Clouds from 423 BC. One could even argue that it would be more 
logical that Diagoras only appeared in the second version from 418 BC, because his 
return to Athens in 418 BC would have made him a much more visible and 
recognizable character for most Athenian theather-goers. But the close connection 
between Prodicus and ‘Socrates the Melian’ in Clouds (360-362) does nonetheless 
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 Ober (1998), p. 69 argues, based on Thucydides (2, 50.1), that under the stress of war and plague, 
‘Athenian civic ideology’ or the ‘myth of  the demos’, namely the idea to act collectively in the 
interests of the polis as a whole broke down and tended towards a selfish attitude, as characterized by 
poleis overpowered by tyrants and plague. 
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 Ober (1998), p. 68 & Soupios (2004), p. 50. 
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 Jacoby (1959), p. 23 suggested that the Diopeithes-decree was also applied on Diagoras for his 
atheist book in 430 BC, but this is most unlikely. Ancient evidence of Epicurus and Aristoxenus does 
not situate the atheist book this very early. It is rather a loose assumption of Jacoby in order to support 
his theory of a series of asebeia-convictions of Diagoras, based on his dating of the Diopeithes-decree 
in 433/2 BC. This theory has already been refuted by Woodbury (1965), p. 192-195. 
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suggest a strong affiliation between disbelief in the gods and naturalism559, since 
Aristophanes probably viewed both philosophers as so-called ‘meteorosophists’. 
Therefore, the appearance of both sophists in the first version of 423 BC appears more 
plausible.560 
 
In any case, we cannot assume that Diagoras had radicalized views on religious 
beliefs and practices as early as 430 BC or even the early 420s BC. Most likely, 
Diagoras was still a professional sophist in the vein of Protagoras, Hippias and 
Antiphon at the time. Martin Ostwald credits Hippias as the first sophist, who made 
the distinction between physis and nomos, probably as early as 433 BC, based on 
Plato’s Protagoras (337c-337d).561 At this time, physis and nomos were undeniably 
compatible concepts562, which were not to be interpreted in a ‘Calliclean’ way (i.e., 
the idea that might prevails over right). In Protagoras’s opinion, the physical 
conditions of reality (physis) evoked the need of society, based on law and religion 
(nomos), otherwise mankind would be condemned to a beast-like state of living, 
which still resonates in the later Sisyphus-fragment.563  
 
If Diagoras was still a Protagorean sophist in the 430s - early 420s BC, his departure 
for Mantinea in 425 BC, in order to write new legislation becomes more logical. 
Diagoras could have been at most labeled an ‘impious person’ (asebès), who may 
have had some nonconformist views on traditional Greek religion, but he certainly 
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 Ostwald (1986), p. 260-261. Burkert (1985), p. 312-313, on the other hand, credits Archelaus 
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was not a denier of the existence of the gods yet. Consequently, the lawgiver 
Nicodorus could not have been bothered by any affiliation of Diagoras with radical 
atheism, even though Drachmann believed otherwise.564  
 
It appears that Prodicus was the first sophist who took the invention of religion, as 
attested in the Protagoras-myth, to a more rational and radical level,565 as argued 
earlier in this case study. The origin of belief in the gods was no longer defended by 
means of sociological arguments, but rather explained by Prodicus on historical 
grounds. According to Prodicus, religion was a mere byproduct of early developments 
within agricultural societies. Natural objects of importance for the wellbeing of 
mankind and human benefactors, who provided technological innovations, received 
the status of deities in an early phase of human history through a process of 
deification. Belief in deities was part of a developing civilization and therefore 
nothing more than a human invention, according Prodicus’s views.566 This 
radicalizing doctrine on religious beliefs could be situated as early as the late 420s BC 
since Aristophanes’s Clouds (360-362) mentions Prodicus in close connection to 
‘Socrates the Melian’.567 
 
So, we could suppose that Diagoras evolved from a Protagorean sophist to a 
‘Prodicean’ or radical sophist in the late 420s BC only. But, even if this was the case, 
the question remains whether the opinions of Prodicus on religion and the origin of 
the gods were the result of continuing research on the history and nature of religion or 
caused by a radicalization of atheism and sophist thought in general in the 420s BC, 
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as Robert Parker argued?568  In my opinion, both factors should be taken into 
consideration. Radicalizing atheism in the 420s BC was certainly the result of ongoing 
research on the analysis of the distinction between physis and nomos, but determining 
social factors that enabled the shaping of a more extreme form of atheism should also 
be taken into consideration. It cannot be denied that this period was characterized by a 
process of growing polarization of the Athenian community on many different levels, 
and sophist thought on civic religion would not be immune to these developments.  
 
 14.3.2) Diagoras and the polarization of the Athenian society in late 5th 
 century BC  
 
Based on the earliest reference to Diagoras “the Quibbler” by Hermippus from 430 
BC, we can assume that Diagoras was at that point in time a Protagorean sophist, 
perhaps known for rhetorical skills, while Aristophanes referred in the early 420s BC 
to Diagoras as a sophist, who did not believe in the existence of Zeus. In spite of his 
more radical appearence in Aristophanes’s Clouds (423-418 BC), Diagoras seems to 
have enjoyed a rather harmless existence in Athens, since it did not lead to any 
concrete form of prosecution.569  
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 Parker (1996), p. 212-213. 
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 Ostwald (1986), p. 276 & Bremmer (1995), p. 75. The claim of Jacoby (1959), p. 22-24 that the 
prosecution of Diagoras must be situated as early as 433/2 BC, based on the Diopeithes-Decree, has 
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later study by Dunbar (1995), p. 582 situates the decree ca. 417 BC, while Romer (1996), p. 397-398 
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not to 416/5’. Based on Scholion (1073c: οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει πρότερον) on Birds, Romer also argues 
that the decree against Diagoras may have been proclaimed at least at one earlier meeting of the 
Assembly, probably 416/5 BC. Janko (2001), p. 9, n. 29 & Winiarczyk (2016), p. 35 rightly observe 
that nothing indicates that this remark can be derived from Craterus. It is most likely added by the 
scholiast. For these reasons, 415/4 BC is still at present the most accepted date for the decree. 
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We know that the prosecution of cases of asebeia in the 420s BC was still based on 
the so-called Diopeithes-Decree of 438/7 BC, which was largely aimed at natural 
philosophers like Anaxagoras and (possibly) Diogenes of Apollonia, who both 
challenged the divine character of the heavenly bodies by presenting naturalist 
explanations and alternatives.  
 
The initial impact of this decree must be considered to have been limited, because 
philosophers like Anaxagoras and Protagoras enjoyed sufficient political protection 
from statesmen like Pericles.570 It also appears that in the course of the 420s BC the 
decree had lost most of its significance. Initially established by the chresmologos 
Diopeithes as a legal procedure to prosecute naturalist explanations for the mantic art, 
the decree is generally believed to have had a political motive, namely a means to 
question the leadership of Pericles by associating him with philosophers, who 
undermined the fundamental characteristics of civic religion.   
 
But sophists like Protagoras, Prodicus and Diagoras were probably not directly 
targeted by the Diopeithes-Decree. At the time of the passing of this decree, the 
atheism of Diagoras had also not yet developed into an active radicalism, as has been 
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 Scholars, like Dover (1988), p. 138-143, raised doubts about the historicity of the early impiety 
trials (e.g., Anaxagoras, Protagoras and Diagoras) and believed it to be an invention of later 
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been faced with negative responses from Athenian society. See also Boedeker (2007), p.57-59 on this 
matter. 
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argued earlier in this case study. If the atheism of Diagoras between 430 and 418 BC 
still reflected a mere theorectical character, comparable to the aetiological views of 
Democritus and Prodicus, there is no reason to assume that Athenians would have 
considered Diagoras culpable of concrete impious acts.  
 
Aristophanes, nevertheless, portrayed both Prodicus (360-362) and Diagoras (830) in 
Clouds as so-called ‘meteorosophists’. In Aristophanes’s opinion, they embodied a 
combination of sophists, who attract young men with their teachings, and natural 
philosophers, who methodically examine the nature of τὰ µετέωρα (the heavenly 
bodies). By doing so, they were eligible to prosecution, based on the Diopeithes-
decree.571 Then again, they would not have been considered particularly harmful or 
threatful to organized Athenian religion and its religious traditions on the condition 
that their visions on religion remained mere theories.572 Besides, Diagoras was not 
present in Athens in this period, because he was rewriting the constitution in 
Mantinea. He certainly was not in Athens when Clouds was performed a first time in 
423 BC, but he had returned when Aristophanes revised Clouds in ca. 418 BC.  
  
A quick observation of the contemporary information on Diagoras of Melos now 
informs us that these sources depict an exclusively negative image of his personality. 
Hermippus portrayed Diagoras as a sophist windbagger, while Aristophanes 
consecutively identified him as a denier of the gods (Clouds, 830), an associate of 
tyrants (Birds, 1073) and a burden on the initiates of the Eleusinian Mysteries (Frogs, 
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320). Pseudo-Lysias subsequently described Diagoras as an impious metic regarding 
the sacred things and celebrations of the Athenians (Against Andocides, 17). This 
negative image is not so surpising, because Diagoras seems to represent all opposites 
of appropriate late 5th century BC Athenian citizenry. In other words, Diagoras can 
function as a clear antithesis to the model Athenian citizen from the period 430-415 
BC. When we compare the main differences in an overview, we can display the 
following characteristics: 
 
ideal Athenian citizen Diagoras of Melos 
1) citizenship full citizenship metic status 
2) appeal towards  older generations younger generations 
3) political orientation (radical) democratic anti-democratic/oligarchic 
4) religious orientation traditional/popular sophist/atheist 
5) geopolitical orientation Athenian anti-Athenian 
6) ethnicity  Ionian Dorian 
 
These contrasts exemplify an ongoing evolution within the Athenian society during 
the tumultuous second half of the 5th century BC, which led to a specific polarization 
between the Athenian populations.573  
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 The dichotomy between the ideal Athenian citizen and Diagoras of Melos is largely based on 
Ostwald (1986), p. 199-290 (Chapter Five: The Polarizations of the 420s). It should be observed, 
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     394 
For a better understanding, however, we must begin our research on this topic in 461 
BC, after the Persian Wars, when Athens assumed leadership in so-called the Delian 
League with the intent of developing a naval supremacy in the Aegean. 574 
 
In his study Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens 
(2008) Josiah Ober divides the history of Athens into twelve separate eras. In this 
classification, we can observe that the apex of Athenian society is situated in era VI 
(461-430BC) which corresponds essentially to the reign of Pericles.575 This period is 
commonly referred to as the Golden Age of Athens or the Periclean Era, which was 
characterized by an intensification of intellectual criticism and scepticism, but also by 
a growing assimilation between religious and political practices.576 Pericles was an 
exceptional strategos: being eloquent and pragmatical at the same time, he could 
effectively manoeuvre most social differences within Athenian society for a number 
of decades without displeasing any particular social class.577 However, some political 
decisions of Pericles and their social backlashes would have serious implications on 
the long term.   
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  14.3.2.1) the origin of Athenian polarization 
 
As mentioned earlier, the predominant role of Athens in the Delian League quickly 
resulted in an economic, demographic and military boom. Notwithstanding the fact 
that its dominance at sea was unrivaled, the Athenian empire on land proved to be 
weak: land operations to conquer Boeotia failed and an open conflict with the 
Peloponnesian city-state of Corinth angered Sparta, causing the Great Peloponnesian 
War in 431 BC.578  
 
Already in the so-called First Peloponnesian War between 460 and 445 BC, Pericles 
undertook evacuations of the population, but differently from the Persian Wars when 
the Athenian population was evacuated to the country side, Pericles decided to 
relocate the large population of Attica at times of peril as much as possible within the 
city. 579 
 
The degree of attendance and participation in the Assembly would now increase, 
while before the relocation people simply lived too far to attend it. A system of 
financial compensation was also provided for poorer citizens who could no longer 
perform their daily professions, because they took part in the political life of 
Athens.580 This evolution can also be attested by a larger production of public 
decisions in this era, due to the fact that the number of meetings of the Assembly had 
significantly increased.581 As a compensatory measure for their material loss, the large 
quantities of evacuees became aware of their political power and demanded more 
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administrative say. An example of this development is the public pressure on Pericles 
when the plague broke out in 430 BC.582 Other side effects of these reforms were the 
rise of new political phenomena, such as radical democracy and demagogues.  
   
  14.3.2.2) (radical) democratic versus oligarchic 
 
As the influx of Athenians citizens from the countryside increased within the city 
walls between 460 and 445 BC, a new breed of populist politicians realized the 
political significance of this new political class of lower citizens and wished to take 
advantage of it. Most of these so-called demagogues did not belong to the (rural) 
aristocracy, but were members of an Athenian bourgeoisie, deriving their wealth from 
commerce and manufacture. Resented by the rural aristocracy, they made no part of 
their influential social, political and religious networks.583   
 
By focusing now on the new political class, these demagogues hoped to achieve 
political power and recognition. A tactique to persuade the commoners was the 
creation of a sense of commitment to the interests of the people. This attitude led to a 
general resentment of the upper class who despisingly referred to the demagogues as 
“men of the market-place” (ἀγοραῖοι), not only as an allusion to their economical 
background, but also as a clear reference to their rhetorical abilities to persuade the 
gullible mass.584 One of the most remarkable demagogues was undoubtably Cleon, 
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who established a reputation of a persecutor of the upper class by the use of jury 
courts, which consisted largely of jurors from the lower class.585  
 
Clearly, Athens in the 420s BC was characterized by a polarization between the 
different political classes, further enhanced by the gradually decline of upper class 
status. In Plato’s dialogues, the growth of democratic power, which began under 
Pericles’s rule, is the focus of criticism. Stressing on the weak and gullible nature of 
the common people, Plato was convinced that shrewed politicians could easily corrupt 
the demos.586 Comic playwrights like Aristophanes did, indeed, portray the ideal 
demagogue in Knights (188-193) as an unrefined crook: 
 
(Sausage-Seller) 
“But I have not had the least education. I can only read, and that very badly.” 
 
(Demosthenes) 
“That is what may stand in your way, almost knowing how to read. A demagogue must be neither an 
educated nor an honest man; he has to be an ignoramus and a rogue.” (transl. E. O’Neill Jr.)587 
 
Out of these demagogues, a new political faction emerged in the 420s BC: the so-
called ‘radical democrats’. These politicians largely depended on support from the 
demos and were therefore advocates of a factual democracy or a democracy in ergon, 
                                                      
585
 Thucydides, On the Peloponnesian War, 3, 36.6, describes Cleon as “the most violent of the 
Athenian citizens and by far the most trusted by the demos.”. On Cleon, see also Ober (1998), p. 96-
104. 
586
 Plato, Gorgias, 515e.  
587 Aristophanes, Knights, 188-193: 
( Ἀλλαντοπώλης) 
ἀλλ᾽ ὦγάθ᾽ οὐδὲ µουσικὴν ἐπίσταµαι  πλὴν γραµµάτων, καὶ ταῦτα µέντοι κακὰ κακῶς.  
(∆ηµοσθένης) 
τουτὶ µόνον σ᾽ ἔβλαψεν, ὅτι καὶ κακὰ κακῶς. ἡ δηµαγωγία γὰρ οὐ πρὸς µουσικοῦ ἔτ᾽ ἐστὶν 
ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοὺς τρόπους, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀµαθῆ καὶ βδελυρόν. 
     398 
contrary to the leadership of Pericles, which was based on democracy in logos. 588  
This new policy soon proved to be disastrous, due to the fact that most of these radical 
democrats like Alcibiades acted mainly out of personal prestige and ambition.589 
Unlike Pericles, who was able to organize democracy in a more authoritarian way, but 
solely for the purpose of a communal Athenian dunamis, these populist leaders, in 
their eagerness to each win the favour of the demos, rivaled with each other and, by 
doing so, created much social disorder at the expense of the communal interests of the 
polis.  
 
Josiah Ober identified this new form of democratic rule as being ‘factional’ or 
‘personal-interest-oriented’.590 It led to megalomaniac projects like the Sicilian 
Expedition, which did not strengthen, but simply destroyed Athenian dunamis.591 
With these considerations in mind, it does not seem surprising that oligarchic forces 
lingered in late 5th century BC Athenian society with the intent of terminating 
democracy. The mutilation of the Herms in 415 BC, for instance, might have been be 
a well organized and deliberate attack on monuments, which symbolized democratic 
powers.592 Thucydides (6, 27, 3) also mentions that the mutilation must be regarded as 
an oligarchic attempt to overthrow democratic rule. 
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In the case of Diagoras, we do not posses any source that explicitly mentions his 
political orientation. There is nevetheless a clue that he was not democratic: in Birds 
(1073) Aristophanes associates Diagoras with ‘dead tyrants’, presumably the 
Peisistratids.593 More concretely, the reward for the killing of Diagoras is connected 
with tyrannicide, which was still publically denounced and rewarded in 415 BC.594 
The Pisitratids could be a reference to Alcibiades. Thucydides (6, 15 & 6, 53) makes 
different allusions on the popular notion that Alcibiades wanted to endorse tyranny, 
besides the fact that many Athenians regarded Alcibiades as a second Peisistratus. 
This, on the other hand, does not fully explain the connection between Diagoras and 
Alcibiades. At first sight, a clear similarity lacks completely: Alcibiades as the 
architect of the Melian conquest does not appear to have had any political 
resemblance with Diagoras of Melos.  
 
We must realize that the Athenians perceived Alcibiades as an ambiguous figure in 
many ways. Although he was the mastermind behind the Melian campaign, there was 
also the issue of the ‘Melian woman’, on which both Andocides and Plutarch report. 
These authors mention the story that Alcibiades purchased one of the enslaved Melian 
women, who gave birth to a son. Plutarch briefly summarizes this event and seems to 
reject the fatherhood of Alcibiades.595 The contemporaneous information by 
Andocides, however, does mention Alcibiades as the biological father, giving the 
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birth an ominous character: the Melian son of Alcibiades may one day turn against the 
city, becoming a deadly enemy of Athens.596 In other words, the potential of a tyrant 
is present in the Melian son. The fates of Diagoras and the Melian son of Alcibiades 
are akin: both are victims of Athenian imperialism, but also (future) enemies of the 
radical democratic regime that ordered the destruction of Melos.  
 
In the speech Defence for Phaeax, which is also known as Against Alcibiades,597  the 
same argumentation (Chapter 23) can be found about this incriminating affair. This 
speech, which focuses on the political and personal exploits of Alcibiades, seems at 
first sight a plea that was written by Andocides, because the author also identifies 
himself as an aristocrat (ἀγαθός) and an opponent of radical democracy.598 However, 
chronology almost certainly excludes Andocides from authorship.599 The plea must 
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have been written after the fall of Melos (416 BC) and before the defamation of the 
Herms and Mysteries in 415 BC.600 The former is explicitly referred to in Chapters 22 
and 23 and the latter is never mentioned as an important incriminating element against 
Alcibiades.  
 
In any case, the Melian background of the son of Alcibiades and his predestination of 
becoming a tyrant does provide a connection between Alcibiades and Diagoras on the 
matter of tyranny. When Birds was written in 415-414 BC, the story of the illegimate 
son must have been familiar to comic playwrights as one of the many animosities 
against Alcibiades.  
 
  14.3.2.3) citizens versus resident aliens 
 
Evidence of the metic status of Diagoras can be derived from Pseudo-Lysias (Against 
Andocides, 17) by the phrasing περὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἱερὰ καὶ ἑορτὰς ἠσέβει (“he was impious 
regarding the sacred things and celebrations of a foreign place”). The paragraph 
further compares the impiety of Diagoras to that of Andocides and assesses the latter 
to be of a more severe nature, because it concerns impiety committed by an Athenian 
citizen.601 This seems to indicate not only that the atheism of Diagoras was taken less 
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seriously, because of his metic status, but it also points towards a connection between 
atheism and political relevance.602 Kenneth Dover already stressed the relative 
tolerance of Athenian towards resident aliens (e.g., Protagoras and Theophrastus) in 
matters of intellectual freedom, because they did not have any political impact on the 
demos.603 As Josiah Ober observes, metics did not represent a social group that was 
associated with attempts to overturn the Athenian political system, in order to 
establish a new form of politeia that provided metics with access to governmental 
participation.604 Most metics resided voluntarily in Athens; they did not expect to 
obtain citizenship and they usually preserved citizenship in their own poleis.605   
 
One could wonder why Greek citizens were willing to leave their native poleis and 
become alien residents with limited political and economical liberties. The answer 
might be simply a matter of opportunities. Trader-metics or philosopher-metics, for 
instance, were able to accumulate a certain amount of fame and wealth. Then again, 
they could not participate in the Assembly and the jury courts or possess any landed 
property. Exemplary herein is the case of Theophrastus: despite his enormous 
popularity in Athens as Head of the Lyceum, he was unable to obtain a garden until 
his personal friend Demetrius Phalereus donated a piece of land to him.606 
 
Notwithstanding the case of Theophrastus, new commercial laws and a system of 
special grants (ἔγκτησις) were introduced in the mid 4th century BC in order to 
guarantee metics more economic liberties.607 In the military domain, metics also 
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proved to be of importance. Aristotle, for instance, reports that Athenian naval forces 
in the 4th century BC depended heavily on metic manpower.608 Some metics even 
reached high ranks in the Athenian military service. On the religious and fiscal level, 
distinctions between metics and citizens were also negligible at times. Some scholars 
have even suggested that the theoretical discrepancy between politai and non-politai 
did not reflect the situation of daily Athenian life.609 Metics and citizens coexisted in 
the demes and visual distinction between both was probably minimal, but it cannot be 
denied that politai always maintained control over the environment in which both 
social groups interacted. This can be attested by epigraphical evidence: metics in 
inscriptions were distinguishable from citizens by the use of the term οἰκῶν or οἰκοῦσα, 
which referred to the deme of residence.610 This system of social identification might 
have provided the Athenian state with some of form of control mechanism over the 
distribution of metics amongst the demes.  
 
Besides, the principle of ἔγκτησις was only granted rarely.611 There are nevertheless 
indications that the acquisition of real estate by metics was tolerated as early as the 
late 5th century BC, but the oligarchic regime of the Thirty ended this practice by 
means of confiscation, and even the liquidation of wealthy metics.612 In return, metics 
would support pro-democratic forces, which ended Athenian oligarchy in 403 BC.613 
Then again, a democratic regime was not necessarily more favourable to metics. 
Pericles, for instance, had already proposed a law in 451 BC, allowing only the 
descendants of Athenian parents on both paternal and maternal sides to be enrolled in 
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a phratry, preventing (the offspring of) resident aliens, mixed marriages and 
foreigners from becoming full members of the Athenian demos.614  
 
The exclusion of metics from fundamental political liberties noticeably contrasted 
with the military employability of metics by Pericles. Thucydides (2, 31, 2) reports 
that no less than 3.000 or more armed metoikoi assisted the Athenian hoplites and 
fought beside the lightarmed troups during the invasion of the Peloponnesus. The 
military value of metics and foreigners (xenoi) is also emphasized on different 
occasions in the Funeral Oration by Pericles (2, 34, 4 & 2, 36, 4).615    
 
So, in the case of alien citizens versus citizens, polarization did not emerge in the 420s 
BC. Actually, from the earliest occurrence of the metic status in the first quarter of the 
5th century BC on,616 polarization between citizens and metics had been a constant 
factor and legal measures under Percilean rule did not stimulate metic integration into 
Athenian society at all. Customary law, legal restrictions and arbitrariness 
characterized the metic position throughout its existence. Although metics could 
contribute substantially to Athenian society in terms of trade, military service and 
philosophical education (e.g., Aristotle), they could never fully integrate or even elude 
the status of being second-rate citizens. Metics were tolerated inasmuch as they were 
useful to the demes in which they resided. Despite indications of occasional ‘equality’ 
with citizens on the religious or fiscal level, clear social distinctions were emphasized 
whenever it was deemed necessary. The paragraph by Pseudo-Lysias (Against 
Andocides, 17) seems to affirm this tendency. 
 
                                                      
614
 Konstan (2001), p. 34 & Ober (2015), p. 100. 
615
 Konstan (2001), p. 35-36. 
616
 Whitehead (1977), p. 140-147. 
     405 
  14.3.2.4) old generations versus young generations 
 
Other forms of polarization were also detectable within the Athenian society of the 
420s BC, such as the contrast between (older) Athenian citizens and Athenian youth. 
The former were fierce supporters of the democratic institutions, while youngsters in 
the 420s BC developed a definite resentment against these institutions. Aristophanes’s 
Knights characterized these young men as ξυνωµότεις (“conspirators”) suspected of 
subverting democracy by trying to reestablish tyranny.617 They rejected traditional 
values of Athenian democracy and distinguished themselves from the older citizens 
by long hairdress and pederasty, a sexual behaviour that conservative Athenians 
associated with sophistic education, as can be read in Aristophanes’s Clouds (332, 
895-896) & Birds (911). 618 
 
A clear example of the discrepancy between older Athenian citizens and Athenian 
youth appears to be the mutilation of the Herms in 415 BC. Thucyides (6, 28.1), for 
instance, reports that mutilations of statues had been carried out before by young men 
in drunken sport, which could easily lead to the association of Athenian youth with 
acts of religious vandalism.  
 
Indeed, the alleged involvement of prominent Athenians like Alcibiades and 
Andocides, who were supposed to be the ringleaders of the scandals, does indicate 
that public reaction in Athens primarily viewed young men to be responsible for the 
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mutilations.619 There is no reason, however, to dismiss the multilation of the Herms as 
a spontaneous form of prank or disrespect of drunken youth.620 Public opinion did not 
regard the mutilation to be a mere prank, but an orchestrated attempt to overthrow 
democracy.621 The large-scale character and the degree of secrecy rather point 
towards a well organized operation.622  
 
A later association of Athenian youth with atheism is made by Plato in Laws (X, 
888b-889e) by means of an (imaginary) atheist young man who provides stereotyped 
‘atheist’ statements, which the Athenian Stranger (possibly Plato himself) 
systematically debunks. Plato also associates atheism with a disease (πάθος) that 
usually attracts and affects young men, presumably because of the malleability of 
young minds.623 A similar opinion can already be detected in the character of the 
‘Socrates the Melian’ in Aristophanes’s Clouds (830) as the head-master of a sophist 
school, who attracts the sons of wealthy Athenians with his atheist teachings.624 
Sophist education was also believed to be responsible for the ousting of traditional 
values, in favour of indignant behaviour (reversed nomoi, as it were), such as non-
Athenian mannerisms in dress and sexual behaviour625 and the idea of children 
beating up their parents.626 
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  14.3.2.5) traditional/popular religion versus sophist/atheist thought 
 
The impact of the sophists on traditional Athenian religion (and life in general) in the 
420s BC had been instigated by the arrival of the philosopher Protagoras in Athens in 
433 BC. He was the first person who identified himself as a σοφιστής, an itinerant 
σοφός who offered his wisdom for educational purposes.627 For these teachings, 
(mainly) on rhetoric and argumentation, Protagoras charged a certain fee, which 
attracted mostly young men from the upper-class.628 From Protagoras on, other 
intellectuals like Gorgias, Hippias and Prodicus also identified themselves as σοφισταί. 
 
In the second half of the 5th century BC, the profile of the sophist would become the 
antithesis to the traditional democratic citizen.629 Protagoras, for instance, would be 
the first intellectual who denied absolute knowledge about the existence of the gods, 
while his pupil Prodicus argued that the gods had an origin in (agri)cultural history.  
 
Such teachings must have been deemed dangerous by conservative Athenians, 
because it stimulated religious criticism and relativism in the minds of Athenian 
youth, whereas the ideal citizen was considered to be disciplined and uncritical.630  In 
Clouds (886), Aristophanes ridiculed sophist reasoning and their supposed religious 
relativism with the debate between the ‘Weaker Arguments’ and the ‘Stronger 
Arguments’, but more striking is the reference to Diagoras of Melos in Clouds (830) 
in the character of the ‘Socrates the Melian’, whom Aristophanes depicted as a 
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straightforward atheist.631  The naturalist and atomist views on the universe (cf: Dinos 
as the ‘Cosmic Vortex’), combined with the sociological and historical theories of 
Protagoras and Prodicus on popular religion, could easy lead to downright atheism 
(cf. οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεύς), which the traditional Athenian citizen might have associated with 
moral relativism.632  
 
In Platonic thought, this moral relativism would even be explained as ‘immoralism’ 
and was believed to be personified by sophists like Callicles (Gorgias 483b-483c & 
489c) and Thrasymachus (The Republic, I, 343b-344c), who both professed 
uncompromising views on the dominance of physis over nomos.633 According to Plato 
(Laws, X, 886d-886e), this extreme type of atheism had its roots in the materialism of 
Anaxagoras in which the divine character of the heavenly bodies is denied, and 
certainly in the natural philosophy of Archelaus, which asserts that mindless physis 
and tychè (“chance”) preside over divine technè (“craft”) and psychè (“soul”).634 The 
sophists had adopted this “scientific atheism”, but pursued it to an ethical level that 
inevitably led to immoralism.635 Such atheism is therefore assessed as an incurable 
mental illness (Laws, X, 908c) that can only be punished by means of a death sentence 
or a physical removal from society.  
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  14.3.2.6)’Athenian’ versus ‘anti-Athenian’ 
 
From the perspective of the Peloponnesian War, the most striking antithesis between 
Diagoras and Athenian society might arguably have been the contrast in geopolitical 
orientation. In order to fully comprehend the importance of this aspect of the ongoing 
process of polarization in the 420s BC, I shall relate it to the interaction between 
(etnological) concepts such as a Pan-Hellenic and Inter-Hellenic identity. 
 
In the closing paragraphs of the eighth book of Histories, Herodotus described how, 
after the Battle at Salamis in 480 BC, Persians envoys were sent to Athens in an 
attempt to sign a treaty. The Athenian spokesman replied to this request that, 
 
“the kinship of all Greeks in blood and speech, and the shrines of gods and the sacrifices that we have 
in common, and the likeness of our way of life, to all of which it would not befit the Athenians to be 
false. Know this now, if you knew it not before, that as long as one Athenian is left alive we will make 
no agreement with Xerxes. (transl. A.D. Godley)”636 
 
It appears that, faced with the dangers of Persian invasion, a strong sense of Greek 
solidarity was evoked, which led to the development of a Pan-Hellenic identity. Such 
cultural process is not unanticipated, however, because Herodotus’s report seems to 
be in accordance with the ethnological concept of primordiality. This represents the 
idea that ethnic identities (of a common race, religion, language, etc.) are constructed 
when being faced with external threats on a large scale.637   
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The same appeal for a ‘Greek’ or ‘Pan-Hellenic’ identity can be observed in the 
speeches of Isocrates in reponse to the political and military rise of Macedonia.638 But 
once this common threat disappeared, the idea of ‘Greekness’ or ‘Greek solidarity’ 
was no longer a unifying factor and led to the construction of ‘Inter-Hellenic’ 
identities, derived from reoccurring differences and conflicting interests. In the case of 
Athens, the need of creating a distinct ‘Athenian’ identity was instigated by the 
establishment of an Athenian empire, comprising more than 300 city-states.639 In 
order to preserve within this multicultural empire a notion of ‘pure’ Athenian 
characteristics (based on the idea of a common lineage, bloodties, etc) this identity 
was created near the end of the 5th century BC, based on the idea of autochtony (i.e., 
the idea that Athenians were the indigenous population of Attica), which excluded all 
‘foreigners’ or ‘immigrants’ from becoming Athenian full citizens. In this context we 
can mention Pericles’s law of 451 BC, which prohibited metics from enrolling in 
phratries.640  
 
The construction of such Athenian identity, on the one hand, reflects the primordial 
view within the ethnological discourse, namely the fear that over time autochtonous 
Athenians would become a mixed race within this new Athenian empire. It can, on the 
other hand, be explained by the instrumental view as well.641  This view states that 
identities are deliberately created by (a class of) leading men for purposes of political 
or military gain.642  
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We can detect this instrumental approach on an Inter-Hellenic identity in the Funeral 
Oration of Pericles, as preserved by Thucydides (2, 35-46): the new Athenian identity 
is characterized by a well-defined Athenian way of life (e.g., refinement and 
naturalness) that distinguishes Athenians from the lifestyle (e.g., harshness) of their 
Spartan enemies. 643  
 
As the war effort continued through the 420s BC and the brutal hostilities increased, it 
even created a more deep hatred between both city-states and their allies. Shortly after 
a truce, the so-called ‘Peace of Nicias’, was arranged in 421 BC, the young aristocrat 
Alcibiades already tried to revitalize the conflict with Sparta out of personal 
ambition.644 By adopting the aggressive war policy of Cleon, in opposition to the 
‘pacifism’ of  Nicias, Alcibiades was able to persuade the Athenian demos of the need 
to undertake large-scale military expeditions, in order to minimize the Spartan threat.  
 
The eventual elimination of the population of the island of Melos by execution, 
starvation and deportation is herein exemplary. The outcome of this military 
expedition was nevertheless predicatable: the pro-Spartan Melians were from the 
beginning on faced with a dire choice between unconditional surrender to Athenian 
terms or annihilation. Other deeprooted anti-Spartan sentiments were already apparent 
in the assessment of Spartan behaviour by the Athenian envoys in Melos (5, 112-116): 
The Melian oligarchs were regarded as delusional, because they wished to rely on 
Lacedaemonian support, which would not come to their aid.  
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Could this ultimate fate of the Melians, who were victimized by Athenian 
imperialism, have determined the geopolitical orientation of Diagoras? Based on the 
surviving ancient sources, however, we cannot assume for certain that Diagoras of 
Melos was Spartan-minded. It would be safe to conclude that he definitely was not 
Athenian-minded. Because of his Melian background, his association with anti-
democratic forces within Athenian society (Birds, 1073) and his escape to the city-
state of Pellene, known for its support for Sparta, it is not plausible to associate him 
with Athenian sentiments.645 
 
Moreover, Diagoras’s mocking of the Eleusinian Mysteries might have even been 
perceived by the Athenians as a (Spartan-minded) act of war. At least, it must have 
given them a comparable sense of psychological discomfort, once we relate the 
actions of Diagoras to the early days of the Peloponnesian War (431 BC), when 
Sparta and its allies invaded Attica and occupied Eleusis and the Thriasian Plain, 
where most of Athens’s grain was cultivated.646  The Spartan king Archidamus even 
settled on the plain for some time, in an attempt to challenge the Athenians, and 
ordered the crops to be destroyed.647 However, the tactical effect was minimal, since 
Pericles had taken measures to prevent Attica’s dependence on domestic grain. But 
the events nonetheless illustrate that Eleusis was a psychological and religious 
Achillesheel for the Athenians.648  The Spartan occupation endangered the proper 
performance of the ritual in a similar way that Diagoras’s actions disturbed the 
initation of the participants. So, it should not be that inconceivable that the mocking 
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of the Eleusinian Mysteries was perceived as a form of (Spartan) psychological 
warfare in the minds of the Athenians, even if this was not the actual objective of 
Diagoras. If Diagoras intended to disturb the proper performance of the Eleusinian 
Mysteries, then this should, in my opinion, not be considered to have been some form 
of individual action with any military objective, but rather a symbolic protest against 
the deliberate starvation of the Melian community.649 
 
The only indication to contradict these ‘Spartan-minded’ arguments could be his stay 
in Mantinea during its ‘Athenian’ phase from 425 until 418 BC, in which period 
Diagoras (re)wrote the Mantinean constitution, which was revered in Antiquity as a 
mixture of aristocratic and democratic principles.650 However, it is possible that the 
lawgiver Nicodorus of Mantinea only addressed Diagoras for his sophist skills, 
comparable to Protagoras, who wrote the constitution of Thurii.651 The alleged long-
term friendship between Nicordorus and Diagoras is not really a suitable explanation, 
because this actually concerned the younger boxing champion Nicodorus befriending 
the lyric poet Diagoras of Melos a few decades earlier.    
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The return to Athens is also no indication of a sudden pro-Athenian attitude or any 
affinity for democracy Diagoras might have developed after writing the Mantinean 
constitution. Rather, it was a logical step after the Battle of Mantinea.652 Besides, 
Athens could still prove to be an ideal city-state for those who ventilated intellectual 
criticism on traditional religion (e.g., Prodicus), on the condition that these views had 
not yet developed beyond a theoretical character.653 The Athenian audience had 
certainly not forgotten Diagoras of Melos, since he could be recognized in the 
character of the ‘Socrates the Melian’, who attracted Athenian youth with his ‘atheist’ 
teachings in the first version of 423 BC or the revised edition of 418 BC of 
Aristophanes’s Clouds. 
 
The capture of his native Melos in 416 BC, however, would be decisive in the 
geopolitical orientation of Diagoras. By openly attacking the most revered Athenian 
ritual, in response to the Melian campaign, he eventually faced prosecution and fled to 
Pellene –a definite anti-Athenian city-state that vehemently refused his extradition. He 
is believed to have died in Corinth ca. 400 BC, which means that he must have spent 
the remaining years of his life in a Peloponnesian environment. Consequently, 
Athenian society would have identified beyond a reasonable doubt Diagoras of Melos 
in his active radical atheism (418-414 BC) as a downright anti-Athenian element.  
 
  14.3.2.7) ‘Ionian’ versus ‘Dorian’ 
 
To some extent, the contrasts between ‘Athenian’ and ‘Spartan’ did not only have 
geopolitical meaning, but could even be connected to a more ethnic context. As a 
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native of the island of Melos, the ethnicity of Diagoras must have been Dorian. It is, 
important, however, to observe that any reference to ‘Dorians’ or ‘Ionians’ as a 
specific race or even ethnic group has no actual historical value.  
 
The historiographer Herodotus (Histories, I, 56,2) reports that Dorians and Ionians 
were considered to be two different Greek ἔθνη. The Dorians were generally regarded 
as invaders out of Doris who, on their way, had driven peoples away as refugees in 
Attica. These peoples eventually settled in Asia Minor and became known as the 
Ionians. Their former status of refugees, along with their later subjection to Persian 
authority, contributed to a rather negative Ionian image. Because of the Persian 
influences they underwent, Ionians were further associated with luxuriousness and 
effeminacy.654  
 
According to Jonatahan Hall’s Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity (1997), one should 
rather apply the term ‘ethnic identity’ to ‘Dorians’ or ‘Ionians’ in stead of ‘ethnicity’. 
These specific ethnic identities had no distinctive racial, religious or linguistic 
characteristics, but rather comprised the connection to a certain territory and the belief 
in a common heritage.655 This heritage is believed to be have been based on the 
descent from mythical ancestors (e.g., in the case of the Dorians, the eponymous 
Dorus was considered to be the common ancestor, while the Ionians were believed to 
be the descendants of the eponymous Ion) and resulted in an array of cultic practices 
and social customs to emphasize this composed identity, like a Dorian type of knife or 
dress.656    
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It appears that, during the Peloponnesian War, contrasts in ethnic identities between 
Athens and Sparta became more prominent.657 At the start of the Peloponnesian War, 
Athens experienced the negative perception of Ionians as a psychological 
disadvantage and began to stress the importance of an Ionian identity or 
‘Ionianism’.658 Along with this Ionianism an active Ionian propaganda of Athens also 
emerged in the late 5th century BC, in Euripides’s Ion, for instance. In this play, the 
famous Athenian leader is praised as the founder of the Ionian etnos.  
 
However, not all Athenian sources of this period depict a positive image of Ionians. In 
Aristophanes, we are reminded of the more common Athenian distinction between 
Ionians: the Athenian ‘autochthonous’ Ionians and the Asiatic Ionians, who were 
regarded as effeminate and indecisive, due to the mild climate of Asia Minor.659 
Because of these generally negative conceptions of a common Ionian identity, 
Ionianism could not profile itself as being superior to Dorian identity. In stead, it tried 
to establish a sense of ‘Ionian pride’.  
 
The importance of the Dorian or Ionian ethnicity in the conflict also surfaces in 
Thucydides’s account of the Peloponnesian War.660 In the Melian Dialogue (5, 104-
108), for instance, the Melians rely on their Dorian syngeneia or ‘kinship’ with the 
Spartans.  
 
“(Melian commissioners): ‘But we believe that they (=the Lacedaemonians) would be more likely to 
face even danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to 
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Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act; and our common blood insures our fidelity”. (transl. C.F. 
Smith) 661 
 
Thucydides illustrates in this paragraph the importance of ethnicity in the 
Peloponnesian conflict. Thucydides (5, 104-108) also reports that during the 
negotiations for military alliance between Athenians and Melians, the Melians 
emphasize their neutrality in the conflict, but also their aspiration to rally for 
Lacedaemonian support. The Athenian envoys conversely utilize ethnic stereotypes: 
reliance on a common ethnic background will secure the Melians only of a false sense 
of safety. The Lacedaemonians are distrustful and any support from their part will be 
done for opportunist reasons only. The Melians, on the other hand, give the 
impression to be immune to these allegations. They appeal to (stereotypical) Pan-
Hellenic concepts such as ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’ in an attempt to prevent annihilation 
and they fully rely on their blood ties with the Lacedaemonians, which prohibits them 
from forming an alliance against their fellow Dorians.662 Such renewed Inter-Hellenic 
contrasts between Ionians and Dorians are frequent in Thucydides’s account of the 
Peloponnesian War.663 In multiple paragraphs, we can find allusions to Ionian or 
Dorian kinship in an attempt to raise allies for the Peloponnesian conflict.664   
 
Mutual contempt and derogatory remarks can also be observed in several speeches. 
For instance, the Syracusian Hermocrates (6, 76-80) refers to the submissive nature of 
the Ionians, which is in clear contrast to the Dorian sense of freedom. His opponent 
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Euphemus (6, 81-87), head of an Athenian envoy, stresses the importance of Ionian 
defence against the Dorians, probably referring to the supposed ‘aggressive’ and 
‘warlike’ mentality of the Dorian Syracusians.  
 
We do not possess any sources in which Diagoras of Melos supported the Dorian 
identity, but we can assume that the Melian rejection of any alliance with Athens and 
the final outcome of the Melian conflict will probably have contributed to an 
increasing ethnic divergence between Ionian and Dorian members of the Athenian 
population. The downfall of the Dorian population of Melos will have boosted Ionian 
pride and self-confidence. The Dorian sense of superiority in matters of bravery and 
combat, which was still generally accepted at the beginning of the Peloponnesian 
War, was suddenly challenged. 
 
If the capture of Melos was also exploited by Athenian propaganda for the use of 
Ionianism, it could definitely have driven the discrepancy between Diagoras and 
Athenian society even further, making Diagoras a perfect antithesis to the ideal 
Athenian citizen of the late 5th century BC. Under these circumstances, the 
radicalization of his ‘theoretical atheism’ into an ‘active atheism’ within this highly 
polarized Athenian society would have become inevitable.  
 
This concludes our analysis of this long-term process of societal polarization of 420s 
BC Athens that influenced the radicalism of the atheism of Diagoras and which led to 
his further alienation from Athens’s civic society. Let us now examine in this respect 
two important incidents of the 410s BC that cannot be disconnected from the context 
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of the Peloponnesian War. These affairs may not only have further determined the 
radicalism of Diagoras’s atheism, but the eventual outcome of it as well. 
 
 14.3.3) Diagoras and the Melian Conflict (417- 416 BC) 
 
According to Josiah Ober, the Peloponnesian War was characterized by a substantial 
increase of brutal war conduct: large-scale mutilations and executions of soldiers and 
civilians were a new method of warfare that both sides adopted.665 The Mytilenean 
Debate was a clear example of this new policy: when the inhabitants of the polis of 
Mytilene on the island of Lesbos revolted against Athens in 428 BC, the Athenian 
Assembly initially ordered the killing of all male Mytileneans and the selling of the 
surviving population into slavery, but this decision was revoked and the issue of 
punishment was open to debate in a second meeting of the Assembly.666 The 
demagogue Cleon demanded in his speech that the harsh measures against the 
Mytileneans would be carried out, while his opponent Diodotus attacked the 
emotional arguments of Cleon, based on the belief that it hindred efficient political 
decision-making.  
 
According to Thucydides (3, 49, 1), Diodotus eventually won the vote, but only by a 
very small margin. Cleon later adviced the same measures against Scione, which had 
also revolted against Athens and prevailed, as Thucydides (4, 122, 3-6) reports. After 
a siege of two years the city-state of Scione was destroyed in 421 BC with all male 
inhabitants killed and the women and children sold into slavery.  
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This exemplary case of brutal warfare would set the tone for the later Melian Conflict. 
After a relatively calm break in the Peloponnesian War between 425 and 417 BC (the 
so-called ‘Peace of Nicias’) the Athenians, led by Alcibiades, decided to organize a 
large military campaign against Sparta and its allies. But first, the Athenians would 
seek, as a preparing measure, more allies.  
 
For that reason, the inhabitants of the island of Melos -who were by tradition Spartan 
allies, because of their common Lacedaemonian ancestry-, were approached to join 
the Athenian empire. An Athenian embassy was sent to the Melians in order to 
persuade them, but this proved unsuccessful due to the Melian ambition to remain 
neutral in the conflict.667 The Athenian response was ambiguous. A first, they ravaged 
Melos, which resulted in a declaration of war by the Melians, but later on the 
Athenians tried to persuade the oligarchs of Melos by sending a new delegation as 
Thucidydes reports: 
 
“Now the Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians, and were unwilling to obey the Athenians like 
the rest of the islanders. At first they remained quiet as neutrals; then when the Athenians tried to force 
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them by ravaging their land, they went to war openly. […] the Athenian commanders […] sent envoys 
to make proposals to the Melians.” (transl. C.F. Smith)668  
 
These negotiations, however, did not resolve the situation of deadlock, as Thucydides 
further reports:  
 
 “So the Athenians envoys returned to the army; and their generals, as the Melians would not yield, 
immediately commenced hostilities, and drew a wall round about the city of Melos, […] The Melians, 
too, took the part of the Athenian wall over against the market-place by a night assault; then having 
slain some of the men and brought in grain and as many other necessaries as they could, they withdrew 
and kept quiet. After that the Athenians maintained a better watch. So the summer ended. […] About 
the same time (i.e. the following winter) the Melians again at another point took a part of the Athenian 
encompassing wall, the garrison, not being numerous. […] The Athenians thereupon slew all the adult 
males whom they had taken and made slaves of the children and women. But the place they then 
peopled with new settlers from Athens, sending thither at a later time five hundred colonists.” (transl. 
C.F. Smith)669 
 
In this last paragraph from Thucydides’s account, we can detect how the Melians fell 
victim to the Athenian strive for hegemony. Their refusal to ally with Athens is 
regarded as a declaration of war-considering the fact that they already had little 
trustworthiness in the eyes of the Athenians, due to their Lacedaemonian and Dorian 
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kinship- and provokes a deliberate starvation policy by Athens. In a desperate attempt 
to break the Athenian blockade, the Melians resort to violence. This allows the 
Athenians to tighten the blockade even further and to seal the fate of the Melians 
eventually: they can choose between starvation or surrender on Athenian terms.  
 
The eventual fate of the Melians in 417- 416 BC appears to have influenced the 
atheism of Diagoras considerably.670 It could have possibly triggered it to a more 
radical level, in the form of an active rejection of Athenian values and, more 
precisely, Athenian rituals with a political significance. In this context, Diagoras’s 
scoffing at the Mysteries of Eleusis, the ultimate symbol of Athens’s cultural and 
religious imperialism, becomes evident. 
 
Although an Athenian ritual of origin671, the Mysteries of Eleusis developed into an 
imperialist tool during the reign of Pericles. Gradually imposed on Athenian allies, it 
became more a Greek than Athenian ritual.672 An example of this religious 
imperialism is the so-called ‘First Fruits’ decree (IG I³ 78), which could be dated 
around 416 BC673, although some scholars have situated the decree as early as the 
430s BC.674  This decree stipulates that not only Athenian demes, but Athenian allies 
as well had to offer their first-fruits to Demeter.675  
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Through this decree, the Eleusinian Mysteries became an ultimate symbol of Athenian 
imperialism. Any revelation of its secrecy would now have much more political 
repercussions than before. This can explain why the Athenian Assembly condemned, 
besides Diagoras, also the inhabitants of Pellene. Their refusal to extradite Diagoras 
was regarded as a form of political insubordination.676   
 
The ridiculing of the Mysteries by Diagoras cannot be disconnected from the events in 
Melos. Most likely, Diagoras’s atheism radicalized during the Melian campaign of 
417-416 BC.677  The news of the deliberate starvation of the islanders of Melos must 
have reached Athens, where Diagoras was residing at that moment. Thucydides (5, 
113) even reports that the Melians made a desperate attempt to import grain within the 
besieged city walls. I believe that the radicalism of Diagoras’s atheism must be 
regarded as a form of symbolic action. By disturbing the celebrations and initiations 
of the Mysteries of Eleusis, which was based on the promise of a close relationship 
between Demeter and Korè, the principal deities associated with grain production, and 
the food necessities of Greek life678, Diagoras could have attempted to deny Athenians 
the mental reassurance that the production of grain crops would be secured, on the 
condition that the rituals were performed properly. 
 
Still, Athenians would not have been unfamiliar with ridicule concerning the 
Mysteries as Aristophanes’s Frogs (324 ff.) demonstrates, but these mockeries only 
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concerned public aspects of the Mysteries (cf. the Iacchus or Pompè) that were well 
known to non-initiates.679 Any revealment or even (unintended) allusion to the 
secretive aspects of the Mysteries would have met with negative reactions from the 
Athenian community, as the impiety case of Aeschylus illustrates.  
 
In the case of Diagoras, the public mockeries do not appear to have resulted in 
immediate retribution. In my opinion, this relatively slow response of the Athenian 
community to the ridiculing of the Mysteries may have had various reasons. Perhaps 
Athenians did not take his actions seriously at first due to his metic status, like 
Pseudo-Lysias (Against Andocides, 17) seems to attest. They also might have believed 
that divine justice (as stated in the so-called Hymn to Demeter) was being carried out 
by the annihilation of his fellow Melians, in response to the atheism of Diagoras. As 
such, matters were actually being reversed in Athenian minds: not the fate of the 
Melians had caused the radicalized atheism of Diagoras, but vice versa. This general 
opinion can be verified by the Scholia on Aristophanes’s Clouds (830d): 
 
“Diagoras of Melos was originally a godfearing person, but after he was robbed of money he turned 
towards atheism for which the Athenians got angry and they destroyed Melos.” 680 
 
Another, more plausible reason for the relatively late response from Athenian 
authorities could be the tradition that initiates of the Mysteries were usually the butt of 
pranks and ridicule. Aristophanes attests that this form of mockery was the privilege 
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of youngsters.681 But this tradition alone does not indicate that the atheist actions of 
the aged Diagoras were perceived as mere mockery.  However, this was probably not 
the only form of public mockery during the Eleusinian Mysteries. We do have 
information on a precise location that was associated with mockery: initiates who 
passed the bridge over the Cephisus river, on the road from Athens to Eleusis, were 
also traditionally the target of ridicule.682 Plutarch reports that the insults were even 
hurled at prominent dignitaries.683 These phenomena might indicate that the 
ventilation of certain hostile sentiments against Athenian social hierarchy was 
tolerated within well-defined limits.684 For these reasons, Athenian authorities may 
not have immediately recognized the actions of Diagoras as atheist behaviour, but 
rather as expressions of traditional mockery, associated with the initiation of 
participants.  
 
In any case, legal actions against the atheism of Diagoras were eventually carried out 
in 415 BC.  As different scholars have argued, manifest cases of impiety could not be 
left with impunity, since it would jeopardize the well-being of the city-state.685 In the 
case of the ridiculing of the Mysteries by Diagoras, this did not only involve a 
religious and moral well-being, but a political as well. Isocrates (On the Team of 
Horses, 6), for instance, reports on the public perception of the parodying of the 
Mysteries of 415 BC and Alcibiades’s involvement herein: 
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“You know how the City becomes most angry in matters related to the Gods, if one would appear to be 
at fault regarding the Mysteries, and of the other matters, if one dared destroy the democracy.” (transl. 
G.E. Mylonas)686 
 
Although we must be aware that Isocrates, similar to Thucydides, relates the 
parodying of the Mysteries to the assumed attempts of Alcibiades to overthrow the 
democratic establishment, the context of the paragraph nevertheless indicates that the 
divulging of the Mysteries was considered to be a crime, comparable to the 
destruction of democracy.687 
 
So, it would be safe to assume that public opinion in Athens experienced Diagoras’s   
ridiculing of the Mysteries as an obvious case of impiety, not only in the form of a 
transgression against Athenian religion, but as an anti-democratic action as well. With 
such accusations in mind, an impiety trial appeared inevitably, but unexpected events 
in early June 415 BC expanded matters to even larger proportions, in such way that 
most Athenians must have been convinced that blatant disrespect for the gods and 
religion in general was not restricted to a small number of eccentric individuals, such 
as Diagoras, but appeared to be a large-scale, deeply rooted phenomenon within 
Athenian society. 
 
 14.3.4) Diagoras and the religious scandals (415 BC) 
 
The radicalized atheism of Diagoras was indeed ill-timed, for the reason that it 
occurred shortly before two religious scandals in Athens in the late spring of 415 BC, 
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which ominously overshadowed the ambitious military expedition to Sicily. The 
scandals immediately triggered a religious frenzy that would determine the religious 
climate of the last quarter of the 5th century BC.688 As mentioned earlier, these 
scandals involved the parodying of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms on 
which Thucydides reports, 
 
“But in the meantime the stone statues of Hermes in the city of Athens –they are the pillars of square 
construction which according to local custom stand in great numbers both in the doorways of private 
houses and in sacred places- nearly all had their faces mutilated on the same night. No one knew the 
perpetrators, but great rewards were publicly offered for their detection; […] The matter was taken very 
seriously; for it seemed to be ominous for the expedition and to have been done withal in furtherance of 
an overthrow of the democracy. […] and Alcibiades, among others, was implicated in the charges. 
[…]They (i.e. Alcibiades’s political rivals) magnified the matter and shouted that both the mockery of 
the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae had been committed with a view to the overthrow of the 
democracy.” (transl. C.F. Smith)689  
 
Thucydides does not identify the perpetrators of the scandals, but a later source does. 
In his biography of Alcibiades, Plutarch reports on the actual perpetrators and 
identifies Andocides as their ‘ring leader’, 
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“At first, as I have said, sundry vague suspicions and calumnies against Alcibiades were advanced by 
aliens and slaves. Afterwards, during his absence, his enemies went to work more vigorously. They 
brought the outrage upon the Hermae and upon the Eleusinian mysteries under one and the same 
design; both, they said, were fruits of a conspiracy to subvert the government, and so all who were 
accused of any complicity whatsoever therein were cast into prison without trial. […] Among those 
thus held in bonds and imprisonment for trial was Andocides the orator […] He was held to be a foe to 
popular government and an oligarch” (transl. B. Perrin)690 
 
The main commotion about the parodying of the Mysteries was not the fact that the 
ritual was being ridiculed or reenacted in a loathing manner, but the fact that they 
were performed outside of their ritual context within private settings.691  By imitating 
the sacred rites in unceremonious circumstances, the performers jeopardized the 
secrecy in the presence of non-initiates.692 In his defence, Andocides pled to be 
innocent, but he also mentions four different occasions in which the Mysteries were 
reenacted in private houses in attendance of many non-initiates, mainly slaves. 693 
Both Thucydides and Plutarch also refer to the scandals as an attempt to undermine 
the leadership of Alcibiades. Thucydides (6, 27-28) suggests that the religious 
scandals were the result of drunken youth, which were taken out of context in order to 
link Alcibiades with these acts of impiety. Plutarch (Alcibiades, 21) plainly suspects 
that these incidents were caused deliberately to damage the reputation of 
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Alcibiades.694 Under the pretext of an oligarchic conspiracy to overthrow the 
democratic government, supporters of Alcibiades were charged of impiety and 
prosecuted.    
 
Clearly, these testimonies demonstrate to which degree the polarization within 
Athenian society reached a peak in 415 BC. The contrast between (radical) 
democratic and anti-democratic power had become apparent. Relying on popular 
support, radical democrats suppressed any ‘oligarchic’ aspiration. By controlling the 
juridical system, they could annihilate any anti-democratic aspirations.695  
 
Indeed, with the rise of radical democracy more determination to prosecute impiety 
seems to have surfaced. This new repressive climate contrasted with the 420s BC and 
the early 410s BC. Except for the banishment of Protagoras in 422 BC, this period 
was characterized by a rather mild form of persecution of impiety that concerned 
deviant religious behaviour. The sophist Prodicus, for instance, was never accused of 
impiety, despite his (radical) research on the origins of belief in divine existence. This 
changed drastically after the pivotal date of 415 BC. Older cases of supposed impiety 
now resurfaced. The impiety case of Andocides is exemplary of this repressive 
mentality. But also noteworthy is the recovery of the supposed impious deeds of 
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Cinesias in the early 4th century BC by the plea Against Cinesias by Lysias.696 This 
plea even explains the reasons behind the postponement of the impiety case of 
Cinesias: the gods, which had struck his impious associates with lethal disease, spared 
Cinesias only to stand trial eventually. This sort of testimonies seems to be confined 
to the late 5th – early 4th century BC, mainly the period in which radical democracy 
thrived.697    
 
It appears that the ongoing polarization of Athenian society contributed to an 
intensified criminalization of impiety in the late 5th century BC. From the midst of the 
5th century BC, the importance of the demos in religious practices had increased at the 
expense of the aristocratic class (genè). The Assembly now allowed the introduction 
of new cults and religious officials could be fined or even condemned to death for not 
performing their duties properly.698  
 
Prior to 415 BC, those accused of impiety, such as Anaxagoras and Protagoras, had 
been sentenced to exile699, but the impact of the religious scandals seemed to have 
stimulated many death sentences of those involved in the affairs.700 How could this 
change in policy on the matter of asebeia now be explained? A possible explanation 
might be the exceptional and large-scale nature of the religious offences, in 
combination with an increasing sense of religious crisis and fear since the 430s BC. 
This demanded an unambiguously repressive reaction from the Athenian authorities. 
Another less evident explanation, however, could be the lack of pragmatic leadership. 
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After the demise of Pericles, there were no strategoi of his caliber, able to reconcile 
the main differences within Athenian society.701 Based on the accounts by Thucydides 
and Plutarch, which inform us of a lingering fear for an overthrow of Athenian 
democracy by oligarchic forces, it is conceivable that the religious scandals were 
exploited by radical democrats in the vein of Cleon, with the aim of discrediting 
Alcibiades.  
 
Although he was a supporter of radical democracy, Alcibiades’s credentials showed 
too much contrast with the ideal Athenian democrat. His education by Socrates702 
(who was also the teacher of Critias) raised suspicion and his aristocratic background 
linked him with anti-democratic and so-called ‘oligarchic’ sentiments.703 These 
oligarchic ambitions were indeed associated with the Athenian upperclass as the list 
of accused in Andocides’s On the Mysteries (13-15 & 35) seems to conform. Mostly 
prominent citizens, including Andocides and his relatives (47), were among the 
accused.704  
 
It appears that radical democracy had overtaken Athenian society and especially the 
Athenian juridical system since the early years of the Peloponnesian War. These 
radical democrats, belonging to the wealthy Athenian bourgeoisie, benefitted from the 
decreasing political and economical power of the impoverished Athenian aristocracy 
and clearly controlled the juridical system by 415 BC.705 This evolution can be 
attested by the author of the Defence for Phaeax (Against Alcibiades), who identifies 
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himself as an opponent of radical democracy by the use of the adjective ἀγαθός and 
informs us (8, 35-37) that he was tried, but acquitted, four times for anti-democratic 
behaviour.706  
 
So, the multiple polarizations in the 420s BC might have attributed to a new policy 
concerning asebeia. With radical democrats now controlling the courts, prosecution of 
impiety in the late 5th century BC could have became much more repressive, and the 
outbreak of the religious scandals may have functioned as an ideal justification for the 
endorsement of this new repressive policy that would eventually victimize Socrates 
for anti-democratic behaviour.707 A paragraph from Andocides’s plea does depict this 
new climate quite effectively. During his imprisonment for involvement in the 
mutilation of the Herms, his imprisoned nephew Charmides approaches Andocides 
with an emotional plea: 
 
“You see the utter hopelessness of our position, Andocides. […]. Your friends and associates outside 
the family have all been subjected to the charges which are now to prove our own undoing: and half of 
them have been put to death, while the other half have admitted their guilt by going into exile…I beg of 
you: if you have heard anything concerning this affair, disclose it.” (transl. K. Maidment)708 
 
Andocides might have exaggerated this dramatic appeal by Charmides for rhetorical 
purposes, but it does demonstrate the dreadful situation of the many accused of 
participation in the religious scandals. In spite of their citizenship, Andocides and his 
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family members faced examination under torture (βάσανος), because the decree of 
Scamandrius, which forbade the torture of citizens, was suspended by the Council 
during the religious crisis.709  But even without the suspension of this decree, any 
accused citizen could fear the worst, since Athenian law enabled the torture of slaves 
in order to extract information that concerned public affairs.710 Moreover, the 
extended plea of Charmides indicates that, in order to escape death, Andocides had no 
other option than to become an informer as a means to save himself and his 
relatives.711 
 
This increasing rigidity towards acts of impiety would not disregard Diagoras of 
Melos. In the light of the religious scandals, the ridiculing of the Mysteries would 
now have serious consequences. Diagoras was eventually sentenced in absentia, but 
his impiety was strangely enough not associated with the scandals. Diagoras was 
never mentioned in any list of accussed. Besides, the radical democrat Cleonymus 
decreed a reward of one thousand drachmae for information that could lead to 
arrests.712 When this proved to be ineffective, the commissioner and radical democrat 
Peisander even augmented it by ten thousand drachmae.713  Certainly, such large 
rewards would have led to concrete information, if any involvement of Diagoras in 
the scandals was provable.714 Nonetheless, the commissioners who were investigating 
both scandals might have regarded Diagoras as a possible inspirator of the religious 
scandals of 415 BC. Diodorus Siculus (Historical Library, XIII, 6), for instance, 
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 Andocides, On the Mysteries, 43. 
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 Andocides, On the Mysteries, 22. See also Mirhady (2000), p. 66-68, who gives a thorough analysis 
of ancient sources dealing with the procedures on the torture of slaves.  
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 Maidment (1962), p. 381. 
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 Andocides, On the Mysteries, 27 
713
 Ibidem. In paragraph 32, Andocides also describes Peisander and Charicles, who were both 
members of the inquiry commission on the scandals, to be “the most fervent of the democrats” 
(εὐνούστατοι εἶναι τῷ δήµῷ). 
714
 Janko (2001), p. 9. 
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seems to suggest that the ridiculing of the Mysteries by Diagoras was not considered 
to be an isolated case of impiety, but an incident that was symptomatic for the 
ongoing religious crisis and closely associated with the religious scandals.715 For 
instance, Diodorus does state that Diagoras was accused of impiety “while these 
events were taking place” (Τούτων δὲ πραττοµένων). Diodorus also mentioned that 
Diagoras “feared the people” (φοβηθεὶς τὸν δῆµον), which could refer to the 
importance of radical democracy and the role of the Assembly in dealing with 
exceptional cases of asebeia.  It would appear that radical democrats, who controlled 
Athenian political and juridical institutions at the moment, linked the impiety of 
Diagoras to the public outrage over the religious scandals and the general fear of 
oligarchy.716 The idea that sophist teachings on disbelief in the gods had instructed 
Athenian youth to display such religious disrespect could have been decisive in their 
judgment.  
 
In analogy with Diagoras, early 20th century scholarship believed that the sophist 
Protagoras could also be linked to the events of 415 BC, based on an account by 
Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods, I, 63) and the general comparison with 
Diagoras.717  Despite the similarities, there is not a single indication to link Protagoras 
with the religious scandals of 415 BC. Accounts on the impiety trial of Protagoras, 
namely Diogenes Laertius (IX, 50-56), Sextus Empiricus (Against the 
Mathematicians, IX, 56), Plutarch (Nicias, 23.3) and Philostratus (Life of the Sophists, 
I, 10), only report that Protagoras’s Peri Theōn resulted in charges of impiety in 
Athens. He was eventually banished, but drowned shortly afterwards, during an 
attempt to sail to Sicily. Based on a comparative analysis of surviving evidence, 
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 Janko (2001), p. 10. 
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 Winiarczyk (1979), p. 199 & Ostwald (1986), p. 327. 
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 Drachmann (1922), p. 39. 
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scholars like Davison have suggested that he could have been expelled from Athens as 
early as 458/7 BC for political reasons and a second time ca. 422 BC for the opening 
lines of his Peri Theōn.718 Moreover, scholars now generally believe that Protagoras 
was already deceased at the time the scandals took place.719  
 
In any case, the linking of Diagoras’s public actions with the scandals must have 
justified the indictment of a ‘subversive’ anti-Athenian individual, guilty of hostile 
actions against the democratic city-state and its civic rites. 
 
Although the profaners of the Herms and the Mysteries were put on trial, we have no 
information that Diagoras was ever the subject of a verdict by a jury court. The 
specific use of κηρυττεῖν in ancient sources nonetheless indicates a resolution by the 
Assembly in contrast to the usual allotted jury courts to condemn charges of impiety. 
At first sight, there does not seem to have been a verdict preceding the resolution. It 
could, however, be feasible that Diagoras was convicted prior, perhaps by means of a 
probolè.720 On the Mysteries by Andocides does mention the fact that some profaners 
were able to flee the country, once being denounced.721 The perfect use of κηρυττεῖν in 
Σ. Ar. Av. 1073 could indeed signify that Diagoras had already left Athens before the 
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 Davison (1953), p. 36-39. 
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 See Lee (2005), p. 182, who situates the life of Protagoras between 492/1 and 422/1 BC, based  on 
Plato’s dialogues Protagoras (319a) and Meno (91d-91e) and his last attested appearance in Athens in 
422/1 BC. 
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 Ostwald (1986), p.276. This is contested by Janko (2001), p.10 who argues that Diagoras could not 
have been included in the proceedings of the profaners, due to his metic status. This prevented him 
from owning real property that could be confiscated. However, it seems very unlikely that Diagoras 
would not have been the subject of some juridical procedure before the resolution by the Assembly. 
The Scholia in Aristophanem do indicate that the resolution was voted once Pellene as hiding place had 
been discovered. It could be possible that Diagoras was priorly convicted by means of probolè, i.e. a 
prejudicial hearing by the Assembly for offences in connection with festivals like the Eleusinian 
Mysteries (see on this matter McDowell (1978), p. 194 & Philips (2013), p. 415-421). Since the 
inhabitants of Pellene refused to extradite him (because they shared his opinions about the ‘First 
Fruits’-decree?), the case developed a more political importance. Besides, the comparison between 
Diagoras and Andocides by Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 17 would not uphold if there were no 
analogies in regard to juridical procedures.  
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 Andocides, On the Mysteries, 34. 
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Assembly voted the proclamation.722  The same source does also suggest that the 
proclamation was made, after Athenian authorities had ascertained Pellene as 
Diagoras’s place of refuge.   
 
Diagoras probably left Athens as soon as the scandals took place or even earlier, 
already suspecting an impending prosecution. Once the perpetrators of the scandals 
were arrested and put on trial, Diagoras must have been already out of reach of the 
Athenian authorities. The offensive and exceptional nature of his impiety demanded 
nevertheless a comparable form of punishment, but due to his metic status, he could 
not be sentenced by a dikasterion, which could confiscate property and sentence 
citizens to death. Therefore, a death sentence by means of a psephismata by the 
Assembly must have been a logical step from a juridical point of view.  
 
Once Pellene as his hiding place had been detected and the inhabitants refused his 
extradition, the matter even developed a more political character.723 The Athenian 
Assembly ordered the placement of a bronze stele with the engraved resolution on the 
Acropolis. This gave the decision of the Assembly an outspokenly public character.  
Every inhabitant of Attica now became familiar with the impiety of Diagoras of 
Melos and was stimulated to apprehend and extradite the outlawed atheist.   
 
In this concluding part of the case study of Diagoras of Melos, we have now analyzed 
the social factors which could have triggered the development of Diagoras’s atheism 
towards radicalism. The impact of major events like the outbreak of the Great Plague 
at Athens can be assessed as having minimal effect. Although Thucydides suggested 
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that it may have caused a temporal spurt of religious nihilism, we cannot conclude 
that this situation induced philosophical atheism in any sense. We also find no 
indication in the preserved sources that the atheism of Diagoras radicalized as early as 
430 BC or the early 420s BC. Based on our earlier results, radicalization probably did 
not occur before 418 BC. 
 
We can assume that throughout the period 430-414 BC Diagoras of Melos was 
perceived disapprovingly in sources such as Hermippus, Aristophanes and Pseudo-
Lysias, in all probability, because of an ongoing process of polarization on many 
levels within late 5th century BC Athenian society. In this prospect, Diagoras clearly 
represented an anti-Athenian profile. This polarization, which was the product of 
complex sociopolitical decisions, enables us to understand the social evaluation of 
radical views on Athenian beliefs and practices, as embodied by Diagoras of Melos in 
late 5th century BC Athens, more efficiently. 
 
The active atheism, which we have situated in the period 418 and 414 BC, between 
the revision of Clouds and the first performance of Birds, can be attributed to a set of 
events, but mostly to the outcome of the Melian conflict, which implicated the literal 
distruction of the Melian community.  The religious scandals of 415 BC, on the other 
hand, must have permanently ceased the philosophical activity of Diagoras in Athens.  
Diagoras would never be able to return to Athens and he must have died in a 
Peloponnesian environment, presumably Corinth ca. 400 BC. Along with him, radical 
atheism did perish, only to be briefly revived by Theodorus of Cyrene, about a 
century later.  
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The question whether Theodorus can truly be considered to have been the successor 
of Diagoras’s radical atheism will be the main topic of investigation in the next case 
study. 
 
Chapter 15: Theodorus of Cyrene (ca. 345 – ca. 275 BC) 
 
With the expulsion of Diagoras from Athens in 415 BC, positive atheism disappeared 
in late 5th century BC Athens, but this could have only been a temporary situation. 
The extreme type of atheism might have resurfaced in the late 4th century BC in the 
actions and writings of Theodorus of Cyrene.  
 
Although both philosophers lived and acted in a totally different historical context, 
some important similarities can be detected. For instance, in eighteen ancient sources, 
Theodorus of Cyrene is mentioned in close connection with Diagoras of Melos and he 
was also indentified by the epithet ho atheos.724 Secondly, Theodorus wrote a treatise 
On the Gods (Περὶ θεῶν) which content could have been similar to the atheist book of 
Diagoras. Thirdly, Theodorus also showed a comparable interest in the divulging of 
the Mysteries of Eleusis. And finally, Hellenistic philosophical tradition attributes 
many anecdotes to Theodorus, in which ‘atheist’ wittiness, comparable to that of 
Diagoras, is recorded.   
 
Notwithstanding these similarities, most scholars have rejected any radical nature of 
Theodorus’s atheism and have evaluated it as a mere denial of popular religion or 
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Volksreligion.725 In this case study, however, I shall argue that Theodorus was not 
only the successor of the radical atheism of Diagoras, but also the last representative 
of a radical atheism that was eventually surpassed in Hellenistic Times by less 
extreme forms of critical reflection on Greek religion. 
 
15.1) systematic analysis of the ancient sources on Theodorus of Cyrene 
 
The historical sources on Theodorus of Cyrene are to a certain extent problematic. 
Similar to Diagoras of Melos, no actual writings of Theodorus have been preserved, 
but this appears to be a general tendency within Hellenistic philosophy.726 But, 
contrary to Diagoras, no contemporary sources have survived.727 The oldest surviving 
source on Theodorus of Cyrene is the index atheorum in Cicero’s On the Nature of the 
Gods (I, 1-2 & 63), which itself is believed to have been based on the lost index 
atheorum by Clitomachus from ca. 100 BC. Cicero’s discourse is also the oldest 
surviving source to connect Diagoras of Melos with Theodorus of Cyrene as ultimate 
‘deniers of the gods’ (I, 1-2: nullos (deos) esse putaverunt).  Different sources after 
Cicero have maintained this linking728, using Cicero as a key source.729 These are, for 
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728
 All these indices atheorum could have been derived from Clitomachus’s index atheorum which 
itself could be based on the first index atheorum by Epicurus (mentioned in the 12th book of his 
discourse On Nature) and a supposed index atheorum by Philochorus, an early 3rd century BC 
historiographer, who wrote a history of Athens from its earliest times until his death in 261 BC. C.W. 
Müller in his article Protagoras über die Götter (1967), p.151-159 argues that Philochorus did 
extensively comment on the asebeia-trials and individual cases of atheism in Athens. According to this 
scholar, Philochorus could have been the main source for indices atheorum by Valerius Maximus, Nine 
Books of Memorable Deeds and Sayings, I, 1: Protagoras, Socrates and Phidias; Flavius Josephus, 
Against Apion, 2, 263: Socrates, Anaxagoras, Diagoras and Protagoras; Plutarch, Nicias, 23,4: 
Protagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates; Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, 611 A-B: Socrates, Diagoras, 
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example, Pseudo-Plutarch’s Epitome in Aetius (The Opinions of the Philosophers, I, 
17 (ca. 170 AD), Sextus Empiricus’s Against the Mathematicians, IX, 50-53 (ca. 200 
AD), Minucius Felix’ Octavius, 8 (ca. 200 AD), Lactantius’s Treatise on the Wrath of 
God, IX, 7 & X, 47 (ca. 300 AD), Theodoretus’s A Cure of Greek Maladies or 
Knowledge of the Gospel Truth from the Greek Philosophy, II, 112 & III, 4 (ca. 425 
AD) 730  and Pseudo-Galenus’s History of Philosophy, 35 (ca. 550 AD).  
 
Diogenes Laertius, however, is the most elaborate and informative source on 
Theodorus. This Hellenistic biographer comprises approximately 30 % of all 
surviving sources. Diogenes is also the only source giving concrete information on the 
life and teachings of Theodorus, whereas the majority of sources only refer to 
Theodorus as the archetypal atheist, next to Diagoras of Melos.  Other important 
sources are Philo of Alexandria (Every Good Man is Free, 127), which mentions the 
(forced) exile of Theodorus, and Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians, IX, 
55), which is the only source, besides Diogenes Laertius, to comment on the Περὶ θεῶν 
of Theodorus. By briefly alluding to the content of this Peri Theōn Diogenes Laertius 
(II, 97) suggests that he has actually read the book, but this cannot be the case. Cicero, 
the oldest surviving source on Theodorus, never mentions an atheist book by 
                                                                                                                                                        
Theodorus; Libanius, Apology of Socrates, 154: Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Diagoras, Socrates; John 
Chrysostom, Homilies on First Corinthians, IV, 5: Protagoras, Diagoras, Theodorus, Socrates. 
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 Winiarczyk (1976), p. 45: Winiarczyk argues that only Minucius Felix and Lactantius derived their 
information from Cicero. In the case of Aetius (Pseudo-Plutarch), Theodoretus and Pseudo-Galenus, 
Winiarczyk follows the argument of Diels (1879), p.58 that an anynymous Epicurean writer could have 
been the key source. Winiarczyk also believes that Sextus Empiricus used Clitomachus (and not 
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 Theodoretus, Cure of the Greek Maladies: Knowledge of the Gospel Truth from the Greek 
Philosophy, III, 4 and John Crysostom, Homilies on First Corinthians IV,5 mistakenly describe 
Diagoras as ‘ὁ Μιλήσιος’ instead of ‘ὁ Μήλιος’. 
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Theodorus (or Diagoras) and we have no certainty that Clitomachus, Cicero’s main 
source, was familiar with its existence either. Theodorus’s Peri Theōn, in analogy 
with Diagoras’s atheist book, was almost certainly lost by the middle of the 3rd 
century BC. Diogenes Laertius probably relied for any reference to the book on his 
oldest source, Antigonus of Carystus (ca. 290- 239 BC), who could have derived his 
information from Philochorus (floruit after 300 BC).  
 
The Christian sources on Theodorus are inseparable from those on Diagoras, due to 
the close linking of both philosophers to an ultimate denial of the existence of the 
gods. These Christian apologists either indicate the subversive nature of radical 
atheism (cf. Minucius Felix & Lactantius) or they focus on the euhemerizing strength 
of radical atheism in regard to the debunking of pagan religion (cf. Clement of 
Alexandria & Arnobius). An exceptional Christian source on Theodorus the Atheist is 
Epiphanius (ca. 520 – ca. 590 AD). Epiphanius (On Faith, IX, 28) does not link 
Theodorus with Diagoras as a denier of the gods, most likely because all of his 
information seems to be derived from Diogenes Laertius’s Life of Aristippus (II, 98-
99), which he compiles in a more negative perspective (e.g., Diogenes Laertius 
mentions the fact that Theodorus allowed theft on occasion, while Epiphanius 
suggests that Theodorus considered theft to be common). 
 
The Byzantine sources on Theodorus consist mainly of Hesychius Milesius, who 
relies completely on Diogenes Laertius, and the Suda. Regarding the last, caution is 
definitely needed. The lemma on Theodorus (Θ150) mentions him being a disciple of 
Zeno of Citium. Clearly, this is a mix-up with another ‘Theodorus’, most likely one of 
three Stoic philosophers by the name ‘Theodorus’ who are mentioned by Diogenes 
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Laertius (II, 103). The rest of the lemma focuses on the anecdote with Hipparchia and 
is largely derived from Diogenes Laertius (VI, 96-98). 
 
Diogenes Laertius mentions 20 different persons (II, 103) to have borne the name 
‘Theodorus’, of which only two were specifically called ‘Theodorus of Cyrene’: the 
late 4th century BC Theodorus ‘the Atheist’ and the early 4th century BC Theodorus 
‘the Mathematician’ which Plato mentions in his dialogues Theaetetus and The 
Sophist. Diogenes Laertius also mentions three Stoic philosophers by the name 
‘Theodorus’. One of these could be the actual author of the discourse Against 
Epicurus, which Diogenes (X, 5) seems to identify with Theodorus the Atheist. It is 
nonetheless more plausible to attribute this discourse to a Stoic by the name of 
Theodorus, because of its polemical title, which alludes to the ongoing debate 
between Stoics and Epicureans on theological matters during the Hellenistic period.  
 
15.2) historical reconstruction of the life and atheism of Theodorus of Cyrene 
 
 15.2.1) the life of Theodorus 
 
The actual life of Theodorus the Atheist has been reconstructed by the Polish scholar 
Marek Winiarczyk in his article Theodorus ὁ Ἄθεος .731 Based on the information the 
ancient sources provide, we can retrieve the following biographical information: 
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 Winiarczyk (1981)², p. 70-71. 
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1) Theodorus was born before 340 BC in Cyrene.  We must place the date of his 
birth before 340 BC, because sources report that his teacher was Aristippus the 
Younger whose floruit must be situated ca. 325 BC. 
2) Due to an anti-Egyptian uprising in his native Cyrene in 313 BC, Theodorus 
fled to Athens, possibly for his involvement in the aristocratic, pro-Egyptian 
party in Cyrene. 
3) From 313 BC on, he travelled through Greece and visited Corinth. 
4) He was accussed of impiety in Athens in ca. 309 BC. A personal intervention 
by Demetrius of Phaleron prevented his trial before the Areopagus. 
5) By 309 BC, he was staying in Alexandria and became a supporter of Ptolemy 
I. From there, he went on a diplomatic mission to Thrace, offering his services 
to Lysimachus (many anecdotes during this particular stay have survived in 
sources) 
6) He returned to Alexandria ca. 300 BC where he founded his own (successful) 
philosophical school. Megas, the successor of Ptolemy I,  also became his 
benefactor 
7) Theodorus died in Cyrene. The date of death is unknown, but must be situated 
ca. 275 BC. 
 
Although the biographical reconstruction by Winarczyk is certainly plausible, it must 
however be observed that he relies almost entirely on The Life of Aristippus (II, 65-
104) by Diogenes Laertius and dismisses important information from (older) sources, 
such as Philo of Alexandria, regarding the impiety trial of Theodorus. Another 
objection is the rather early date of the impiety trial. I shall argue in a further section 
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of the case study that the actual date must be placed in 308 BC and this for different 
historical and chronological reasons. 
 
 15.2.2) The atheism of Theodorus of Cyrene 
 
Next to Diagoras of Melos, Theodorus of Cyrene is commonly described by ancient 
sources, such as Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods, I, 1) and Sextus Empiricus 
(Against the Mathematicians, IX, 50-53 & Outlines of Pyrrhonism, III, 218-219), as a 
representative of a most uncompromising form of atheism. However, many scholars 
considered this atheism to be a mere denial of popular religion, comparable to the 
atheism of Stilpo, (360-280 BC), a Minor Socratic of the Dialectical (or ‘Megarian’) 
School.732 This theory of Theodorus as a denier of Volksgötter was first suggested in 
Eduard Zeller’s Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung 
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Stilpo as a Minor Socratic of the Dialectical (or Megaric) school, see Dorandi (1999), p. 47, 52 & 
Dorandi (1999)², p. 61. On the alleged atheism of Stilpo, see Diogenes Laertius (II, 116), who reports 
that Stilpo once argued that the statue of Athena by Phidias did not represent a god. Once summoned 
by the Areopagus, Stilpo defended himself by stating that his argumentation was correct: Athena is a 
goddess and not a god, because only male divinities are gods. Diogenes further reports that Stilpo was 
not condemned to death for his atheism, but ordered to leave Athens.  Drachmann (1922), p.74 argues 
that Stilpo’s impiety can be assessed as a ‘bad joke’ and considers him to be a sceptic or agnostic, but 
Drachmann immediately admits that the information on his religious standpoint is too scanty to 
determine the nature of his philosophical atheism. O’Sullivan (1997), p. 147 has a similar remark, but 
reinterprets the paragraph of Diogenes Laertius: Stilpo’s argument was based on the assertion that the 
Athena of Phidias was not a god, because Zeus made Athena. This seems to imply a monotheistic 
tendency of Stilpo. This is also the opinion of Drozdek (2007), p. 150, who regards Stilpo as a 
disbeliever in traditional Greek polytheism. 
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(1862-1868) and was based on a passage from Plutarch’s Moralia in which even the 
most notorious atheists as Diagoras and Theodorus are characterized as still 
preserving a notion of divinity:733 
 
“One might perhaps chance upon barbaric and savage tribes that have no conception of god, but not a 
single man has there been who having a conception of god did not conceive him to be indestructible 
and everlasting. At any rate, those who have been called atheists, Theodorus and Diagoras and Hippo 
and their like, did not venture to say of divinity that it is subject to deconstruction but did not believe 
that there is anything indestructible, preserving the preconception of god while not admitting the 
existence of what is indestructible.” (transl. H. Cherniss & E. N. O’Neil)734  
 
This passage of Plutarch is actually not an adequate source to interpret the nature of 
Theodorus’s atheism. The context of the paragraph is polemical: Plutarch criticizes 
early Stoics such as Cleanthes (ca.330 - ca.230 BC) and Chrysippus (ca.280 - ca.207 
BC), who believed that the Greek gods, with the exception of Zeus, came into 
existence and would eventually be absorbed into the concept of a cosmic fire.735 
According to Plutarch, this idea was against all common conceptions on the 
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φυλάττοντες. Another ancient source mentioned by Gomperz (1925), vol II, p. 250. in support of the 
theory of Theodorus as a denier of popular religion is Clement of Alexandria, Protreptiucs, 2, 24, 2-4, 
but Decharme (1904), p. 173-174 already rejected Clement as a source for evaluating the nature of 
Theodorus’s atheism, due to the Christian polemical context of the paragraphs. Gomperz (1925), vol. 
II, p. 196 also refers to Plutarch (On Tranquillity of Mind 5 (467b)) in order to question the radicalism 
of Theodorus’s atheism. This passage, in which Theodorus ridiculed popular belief and superstition, is 
mainly anecdotal, however, and does not in any way indicate that Theodorus ridiculed popular religion 
only. A similar anecdotal account of Theodorus as a ridiculer of Greek religious beliefs (by ironically 
attributing himself the epithet theos by means of sophistic argumentation) can be found in Diogenes 
Laertius (II, 100). 
735
 Algra (2004), p. 180-183. 
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indestructibility of the gods. The inclusion of notorious atheists seems to emphasize 
Plutarch’s argument: atheist ideas (e.g., aetiological theories) on divinity have more 
sense than the theological views of Cleanthes and Chrysippus, even though atheists, 
such as Hippo, were commonly discredited for the paltriness of their thoughts 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1, 984 a3).736  
 
The idea of Zeller, however, was supported by Winiarczyk (1981)², still the most 
elaborate study on Theodorus of Cyrene to date. According to Winiarczyk, the clue 
for evaluating Theodorus’s atheism as a mere denial of popular religion can be found 
in Diogenes Laertius (II, 97), who reports that Epicurus borrowed many elements 
from the atheist book by Theodorus. Due to the fact that Epicurus did not write any 
radical atheistic treatise, Winiarczyk concluded that Theodorus’s Peri Theōn must 
rather be evaluated as a denial of popular religion in the tradition of Xenophanes of 
Colophon.737 Because of the alleged influence of Theodorus on Epicurus and 
Epicurus’s belief in the existence of the gods in the so-called intermundia, Theodorus 
could have preserved the philosophical existence of the gods and thus merely rejected 
                                                      
736
 The idea that atheists like Diagoras still preserved the preconception of divinity seems to contradict 
with another passage by Plutarch, namely On Superstition, 13 (171c), which relates Diagoras to θεοὺς 
µὴ νοµίζειν. Therefore, I tend to believe that Plutarch (1075a-c) connects the atheism of Diagoras and 
his likes to the atomism of Democritus, but only in purpose of the polemical context of the passage. A 
tradition that the atheism of Diagoras originates from the atomism of Democritus already resonates in 
Aristophanes’s Clouds (828-830) and survives in Byzantine sources such as Hesychius Miletus 
(Biographical Dictionary of Learned Men, 17) and  Suda (∆ 523: ∆ιαγόρας), which identify Diagoras 
as a slave and pupil of Democritus (on this matter, see also Ostwald (1986), p.276, n.290). Plutarch’s 
idea of atheists still preserving room for a notion of divinity appears to resemble the Democritean idea 
of ‘long-living gods’ (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 19). Democritus did 
acknowledge the existence of gods, but envisioned them to be mere eidola or images of atomic 
consistency, which were perishable. The Stoic Balbus in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods (I, 29) and 
the Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda (Fr. 9 VI 3-13 Smith), for instance, accuse Democritus of 
concealed atheism, because he envisioned the gods as mere images that only appear in the form of 
dreams. According to Barnes (1979), vol. II, p. 156-159, Democritus could have been an atheist, 
because he implicitly acknowledged the inexistence of the gods, by evaluating them to be mere images 
or visions in dreams. Vlastos (1945), p.115, n.24, on the other hand, argues that the Democritean 
concept of eidola should be interpreted as an aetiological explanation for popular belief in the gods. 
737
 Winiarczyk (1981)², p. 84-85. 
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their popular presentation.738 In fact, the assertion that Epicurus copied Theodorus in 
Diogenes Laertius serves to prove that Epicurus was an atheist, and can therefore not 
be used to draw conclusions about the possible borrowing of metaphysical 
concepts.739  
 
Moreover, Epicurus was most likely aware of the radicalism of Theodorus. A.A. 
Long, for instance, has suggested that the exile of Theodorus may have served as a 
warning for Epicurus not to write a similar account on the gods.740 In fact, Epicurus 
moved to Athens only years after Theodorus was put on trial741, so he certainly must 
have been familiar with the incident and probably knew of the reputation of 
Theodorus, while analyzing his atheist book ca. 300 BC.  
 
Indeed, the expression θεοὺς ἀναιρεῖν used by Diogenes Laertius (II, 97) in order to 
describe the nature of Theodorus’s atheism does indicate radicalism. Sextus 
Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians, IX, 55) also acknowledges Theodorus as a 
radical atheist, by stating that “he demolished the theological beliefs of the Greeks by 
a variety of arguments in his treatise On the Gods ”.742 Epiphanius (On Faith, IX, 28) 
reports correspondingly that “Theodorus was accused of being an atheist because he 
                                                      
738
 However, the Epicurean concept of the intermundia or metakosmia, in which the gods dwell only 
appeared in later sources like Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 18 & On Divination, II, 40. So, the 
intermundia may not be a genuine doctrine by Epicurus, but rather a later development. Hence, the 
argument by Zeller (1922), vol.II, p. 376-377 that asserts that Epicurus still preserved the existence of 
the gods, despite the influence of Theodorus’s atheist book on Epicurus, cannot be based on the 
concept of intermundia nor should it lead to the conclusion that Theodorus did acknowledge the 
existence of a philosophical God or god(s) in favour of the gods of popular belief. 
739
 Mansfeld (1999), p.453. 
740
 Long (1999), p. 637. 
741
 Mansfeld (1999), p. 453. 
742
 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 55: ὁ µὲν διὰ τοῦ περὶ θεῶν συντάγµατος τὰ 
παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι θεολογούµενα ποικίλως ἀνασκευάσας, 
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said of the gods that they were nonsense. He was convinced that divinity does not 
exist”. 743 
 
Based on this information, we may deduce that Epicurus experienced Theodorus as a 
radical atheist, but he might have considered this intellectual mind-set to be too 
extreme, negative and socially dangerous.744 It seems therefore best to take the 
unanimous ancient evidence seriously and to understand Theodorus as a radical 
atheist, who denied the existence of the gods. It is unclear when he first formulated 
that idea. There seems to be no indication that Theodorus began developing atheist 
arguments prior to his travels through Greece, which must be situated from 313 BC 
on.  
 
Before this date, the orthodox Cyrenaic principles of Aristippus the Elder regarding 
personal freedom and autarky must have taken a central position in his philosophical 
thinking. Along with Anniceris (floruit 300 BC) and Hegesias (floruit 290 BC), 
Theodorus can be considered the main representative of Cyrenaic philosophy. By 
using the sophist method of reasoning (Diogenes Laertius, II, 99 & IV, 52) and the 
                                                      
743
 Epiphanius, On Faith, IX, 28: Θεόδωρος ὁ ἄθεος ἐπικληθεὶς ἔφη λῆρον εἶναι τοὺς περὶ τοῦ 
θεοῦ λόγους. ᾤετο γὰρ µὴ εἶναι θεῖον, 
744
 This could have led to the accusations of Epicurus of being a ‘crypto-atheist’ (Mansfeld (1999), p. 
464), who only preserved the gods for social reasons, as mentioned by Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually 
Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, 21 (1102b-c): ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις, οὐδὲν 
δεόµενος, διὰ τὸν φόβον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φθέγγεται φωνὰς ἐναντίας οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ: καὶ θύων 
µὲν ὡς µαγείρῳ παρέστηκε τῷ ἱερεῖ σφάττοντι, θύσας δ᾽ ἄπεισι λέγων τὸ Μενάνδρειον ἔθυον 
οὐ προσέχουσιν οὐδέν µοι θεοῖς:οὕτω γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται δεῖν σχηµατίζεσθαι καὶ µὴ 
φθονεῖν µηδ᾽ ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς (“For out of fear of public opinion he goes through a 
mummery of prayers and obeisances that he has no use for and pronounces words that run counter to 
his philosophy; when he sacrifices, the priest at his side who immolates the victim is to him a butcher; 
and when it is over he goes away with Menander’s words on his lips: “I sacrificed to gods who heed me 
not.” For this is the comedy that Epicurus thinks we should play, and not spoil the pleasure of the 
multitude or make ourselves for what others delight in doing.”) (transl. B. Einarson & P.H. De Lacy). 
Another view is expressed by Obbink (1989), p. 218-220, who relates accusations of impiety against 
Epicureans for reasons of hedonism and not Epicurean theology. Obbink based his argumentation 
largely on Carneades (Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, 4 (1089c)), 
who attacked Epicureans for reasons of pleasure, not theology.   
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Aristippean distinction of nomos and physis (Diogenes Laertius, II, 93) this 
individualist and self-sufficient philosophy asserted that social principles such as 
friendship, patriotism and religion were to be neglected. A wise man, Theodorus 
argued, realizes that these principles are only regarded as honourable by convention 
and custom, not by nature.745 Regarding religion, Theodorus stressed the fact that 
sacrilege is permitted, because the prejudice against it only exist in order to control 
the foolish mass.  
 
From 313 BC on, Theodorus began to travel through Greece. Diogenes Laertius 
informs us that Theodorus profiled himself as a sophist, who took an interest in 
divulging the Mysteries of Eleusis by interrogating the hierophant Euryclides. In the 
following paragraph, Diogenes reports: 
 
“However, Theodorus, sitting on one occasion beside Euryclides, the hierophant, began, "Tell me, 
Euryclides, who they are who violate the mysteries?" Euryclides replied, "Those who disclose them to 
the uninitiated." "Then you violate them," said Theodorus, "when you explain them to the 
uninitiated.".” (transl. R.D. Hicks)746 
 
This is an important source, not only for demonstrating the controversy Theodorus 
evoked regarding the Mysteries of Eleusis by use of sophist argumentation, but also 
because Diogenes Laertius (II, 101) closely relates this incident to a pending 
conviction of Theodorus before the Areopagus. The passage does not specify the 
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 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 99. 
746Diogenes Laertius, On The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 101: Ὁ δ᾽ οὖν Θεόδωρος 
προσκαθίσας ποτὲ Εὐρυκλείδῃ τῷ ἱεροφάντῃ, "λέγε µοι," ἔφη, "Εὐρυκλείδη, τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ 
ἀσεβοῦντες περὶ τὰ µυστήρια." εἰπόντος δ᾽ ἐκείνου, "οἱ τοῖς ἀµυήτοις αὐτὰ ἐκφέροντες," 
"ἀσεβεῖς ἄρα," ἔφη, "καὶ σύ, τοῖς ἀµυήτοις διηγούµενος.". 
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exact accusation. Nonetheless, it seems probable that it involved transgressive actions 
against the Mysteries of Eleusis.747 
 
Concerning this event, we can assume that Theodorus seems to have held a different 
opinion from the Aristippean view of prudence (Diogenes Laertius, II, 93): the wise 
man will be deterred from wrongdoing by the prejudices and penalties, imposed by 
public opinion. In contrast to the prudential view on justice of Aristippus the Elder, 
which would have certainly advised caution when openly debating the nature of the 
Eleusinian Mysteries, Theodorus seems to have developed a more uncompromising 
opinion concerning conventional morality. For instance, he deemed the prejudices of 
public opinion to be worthless.748 In this context, the idea that theft, adultery and 
sacrilege are allowed on occasion appears comprehensible, because these are not 
discreditable by nature (Diogenes Laertius, II, 97). The wise man would indulge these 
passions openly without the least regard to circumstances.  
 
The hypothesis of Winiarczyk that Theodorus would have only promoted a denial of 
popular religion therefore becomes difficult to sustain. There are no indications that 
Theodorus did advocate a reform of Greek belief in the way Xenophanes or Heraclitus 
envisioned it. The Theodorian wise man has no need for a sophisticated religion or 
even a natural theology in the vein of Democritus. In his strive to obtain complete 
freedom and self-sufficiency, he cannot be disturbed by the notion of gods.749 The 
correspondence between Theodorus’s radicalizing view on Cyrenaic thought and his 
                                                      
747
 In addition to the charge of atheism (Epiphanius, On Faith, IX, 28), the asebeia-trial of Theodorus 
could also have been based on the accusation of “corrupting youth” (Plutarch, Phocion, 38,2). 
748
 Long (1999), p. 637. 
749
 Drachmann (1922), p. 75 & Kindstrand (1976), p. 69. 
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adoption of radical atheism therefore seems to function as a sort of cross-fertilization, 
which was nonetheless destined to face public odium eventually. 
 
 15.2.3) the Peri Theōn of Theodorus of Cyrene 
 
As to the writings of Theodorus of Cyrene, we only posses limited information. From 
Sextus Empiricus, we know that Theodorus (eventually) published his own Περὶ Θεῶν 
which, similar to that of Diagoras, also represented an annihilation of belief in the 
gods. 
 
“Theodorus “the Atheist”, too, is of the same mind as these men, and (according to some) Protagoras of 
Abdera; the former, seeing that he demolished the theological beliefs of the Greeks by a variety of 
arguments in his treatise Concerning Gods.” (transl. R.G. Bury) 750    
 
Additional information on the Peri Theōn of Theodorus is provided by Diogenes 
Laertius: 
 
“Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of 
his entitled Of the Gods which is not contemptible. From that book, they say, Epicurus borrowed most 
of what he wrote on the subject.” (transl. R.D. Hicks)751 
 
Diogenes Laertius gives the impression that he actually read the atheist book of 
Theodorus. As a biographer situated in the early 3rd century AD, this cannot be the 
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 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 55: Συµφέρεται δὲ τουτοῖς τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ 
Θεόδωρος ὁ ἄθεος καὶ κατὰ τινας Πρωταγόρας ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης, ὁ µὲν διὰ τοῦ περὶ θεῶν 
συντάγµατος τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι θεολογούµενα ποικίλως ἀνασκευάσας, 
751
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 97: ἦν δ᾽ὁ Θεόδωρος παντάπασιν 
ἀναιρῶν τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας· καὶ αὐτοῦ περιετύχοµεν βιβλίῳ ἐπιγεγραµµένῳ Περὶ θεῶν, οὐκ 
εὐκαταφρονήτῳ· ἐξ οὗ φασιν Ἐπίκουρον λαβόντα τὰ πλεῖστα εἰπεῖν. 
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case.752 He is likely relying on one of his oldest sources on this matter, possibly 
Antigonus of Carystus (ca. 290 – 239 BC).753 The segment of importance, however, is 
the notion that Epicurus utilized the Περὶ Θεῶν of Theodorus as a source for his own 
writings on the existence of the gods. This would imply that the theological views of 
Theodorus and Epicurus were comparable. But this assumption does not correspond 
with the doxographical account by Philodemus in which Epicurus criticizes the 
writings of Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias as being too extreme.  This account by 
Philodemus is the oldest source that mentions the atheist book of Diagoras and it 
refers to the period of ca. 310, at a moment when Theodorus’s own Περὶ Θεῶν was 
supposedly published.754 Theodorus, however, is not being mentioned by Philodemus, 
unless the wording κἄ[λλοις in the fragment refers to philosophers like Theodorus.755  
 
The fact that Epicurus does not mention his slightly older contemporary by name may 
appear to be peculiar at first sight, bearing in mind that Epicurus intensively analyzed 
Theodorus’s Περὶ Θεῶν. Epicurus must also have been aware of Theodorus’s 
                                                      
752
 The atheist book of Theodorus was probably lost early.  If the περὶ θεῶν of Theodorus was similar 
in content to the atheist book by Diagoras, it could have been lost already in the first half of the 3rd 
century BC. In any case, there is no evidence that Cicero and Philo were still familiar with the περὶ 
θεῶν of Theodorus or atheist books in general, although Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 63 does 
mention the public burning of the περὶ θεῶν of Protagoras.  The existence and alleged reputation of 
the περὶ θεῶν by Theodorus only resurfaces in later sources like Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes 
Laertius, which presumably relied on information from early sources like Antigonus of Carystes or 
Philochorus, who may have actually read the atheist book or knew details of its content. This might 
have been the main argument for Clitomachus to include Theodorus in his index atheorum. See on this 
matter the diagram of atheist catalogues by Winiarczyk (1976), p. 45. Winiarczyk dimisses Cicero as a 
direct source for Sextus, but believes that both relied on Clitomachus, but only Sextus directly and 
Cicero indirectly through Philo.  
753
 Hicks (1966), vol. I, p. xxiii. 
754
 Winiarczyk (1981), p. ix dates the publication of Theodorus’s Peri Theōn in 309 BC at the time he 
believed Theodorus was being accused of impiety. 
755
 Obbink (1996), p. 355-356: κἄ[λλοις might refer to Protagoras, who is mentioned in connection 
with Diagoras by Diogenes of Oenoanda (Fr. 16 I-III 14 Smith), but, based on Philodemus (On Piety, 
1428, col. 14, 32-15,8), Protagoras rather qualifies the atheist category of ‘those who say it is unknown 
whether there are any gods or what they are like’, while the category of ‘ those who say openly that 
there are no gods or clearly do way with them’ is more adequate to identify the atheism of Theodorus. 
Obbink does also not exclude the option that the end of line 526 might not have contained the words 
κἄ[λλοις, but possibly the name of a fourth atheist. Considering the association of Theodorus’s atheism 
with the category of φανεροὺς ὄντας ὡς ἀνήιρουν (see also Diogenes Laertius, II, 97), he might be a 
fitting candidate, according to Obbink. See also Mayhew (2011), p. 179 on this matter. 
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reputation of advocating an extreme type of atheism, because he resided in Athens 
only a few years after the impiety trial of Theodorus.756 Then again, it would be more 
logical for Epicurus to refer to Diagoras in stead of Theodorus, because the other 
‘atheists’, Prodicus and Critias, were contemporaries of Diagoras.  
 
This could lead to the assumption that the (implicit) linking of both radical atheists 
originated as early as Epicurus. It could even mean that both atheist books by 
Diagoras and Theodorus were very similar in content, when the testimony of 
Diogenes Laertius (II, 97) on Theodorus’s Peri Theōn (ἦν δ᾽ὁ Θεόδωρος παντάπασιν 
ἀναιρῶν τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας: “Theodorus was a man who completely destroyed the 
belief in the gods”) is compared with Philodemus’s account (On Piety, P.Herc. 1077, 
col. 82, 3-5 (19, 521-523) on the atheist book by Diagoras (τὸ [θεῖον ἐ]κ τῶν ὄντων 
[ἀναι]ροῦσιν: “they (i.e. Diagoras, Prodicus and Critias) eliminate the divine from 
existing things)”.757  
 
Theodorus is nevertheless not being mentioned by name by Epicurus, but this might 
have only been a matter of caution, bearing in mind that the impiety trial of 
Theodorus was still a recent affair by the time Epicurus commented on the atheist 
book of Diagoras. But, if both atheist books were very similar in content, Epicurus 
might have implicitly criticized Theodorus in the twelfth book of Περὶ φύσεως (On 
Nature).758 If so, Epicurus probably assessed Theodorus’s vision on the existence of 
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 Mansfeld (1999), p. 453 
757
 A similar account on the Peri Theōn of Theodorus with the use of the verb ἀνασκευάζω can be 
found in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 55: συντάγµατος τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι 
θεολογούµενα ποικίλως ἀνασκευάσας (“he demolished the theological beliefs of the Greeks with 
an array of arguments”) (transl. R.G. Bury). 
758
 See Bignone (1936), vol. II, p. 415, who asserts that Epicurus actually refers to the atheist book of 
Theodorus (and not Diagoras) in the fragment by Philodemus. Given the recent date of the impiety trial 
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the gods as being too extreme and even obsolete.759 Radical atheism was already 
experienced as being anachronistic in the days of Epicurus and reduced to an 
insignificant issue in the theological polemics of early Hellenistic philosophy, as will 
be discussed further in the case study of Theodorus. 
 
Besides this information from Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius on the Peri 
Theōn of Theodorus, Winiarczyk refers to an additional source (Diogenes Laertius, II, 
65) in his sourcebook on Diagoras and Theodorus, in which another work by 
Theodorus is cited, namely Περὶ αἱρέσεων (On Sects).760 In this treatise Theodorus is 
believed to have attacked the Cyrenaic Aristippus and the principles of pleasure and 
pain, in analogy with Plato’s Phaedo, but there is no certainty whatsoever that this 
work should be ascribed to Theodorus ‘the Atheist’ of Cyrene. Diogenes Laertius 
does not provide a list of works by Theodorus and it is also not known that he ever 
attacked the Cyrenaic principles of Aristippus. At most, Theodorus developed the 
Cyrenaic principles to a more extreme level.761 On Sects might therefore be a treatise 
of one of twenty other intellectuals, who have all borne the name ‘Theodorus’, 
according to Diogenes Laertius (II, 103). For instance, one of three Stoic 
philosophers, who were identifiable by the name ‘Theodorus’s, might have been the 
author of the Περὶ αἱρέσεων.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Theodorus (c. 308 BC), Epicurus might have considered it more prudent to refer to an older 
representative of radical atheism when discussing these matters. 
759
 Bremmer (2007), p.12: Bremmer distinguishes atheism in the Classical Period from atheism in the 
Hellenistic Period, which is being characterized by a moderate or ‘soft’ atheism that specifically wants 
to save the existence of the gods. 
760
 Winiarczyk (1981), p. 39. 
761
 Long (1999), p. 638. 
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The publication of the Περὶ θεῶν by Theodorus is dated by Winiarczyk at ca. 309 BC 
as being the actual cause of his impiety trial.762 The renewed interest by Theodorus in 
the manuscript of Diagoras could be explained by his own philosophicial point of 
view: according to the main Cyrenaic principles a wise man cannot be deisidaimon or 
‘god-fearing’. Fear of the gods is based on empty opinions.763  This will only lead to 
the obstruction of pleasure as the supreme good and must therefore be restricted.764 
The concept of irrational fear of the gods might also have been an important element 
for intellectuals like Epicurus for borrowing many elements from Theodorus’s Περὶ 
θεῶν, according to Diogenes Laertius (II, 97).  
 
Epicurus was a slightly younger contemporary of Theodorus and arrived in Athens 
only a few years after Theodorus’s exile.765 Considering the specific report by Sextus 
Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians, IX, 55) on the Περὶ θεῶν of Theodorus (ὁ µὲν 
διὰ τοῦ περὶ θεῶν συντάγµατος τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι θεολογούµενα ποικίλως ἀνασκευάσας: 
“he demolished the theological beliefs of the Greeks by a variety of arguments in his 
treatise Concerning Gods”) and the influence it had on Epicurus (Diogenes Laertius, 
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 Winiarczyk (1981), p. ix, but this can be disputed by Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers, II, 101, which considers the transgression of the Eleusinian Mysteries to be the cause of 
the impiety trial of Theodorus. 
763The idea that religion or belief in gods was a meaningless concept for Theodorus can also be 
supported by Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 100: ∆οκεῖ δὲ θεὸς 
κληθῆναι, Στίλπωνος αὐτὸν ἐρωτήσαντος οὕτως, "ἆρά γε, Θεόδωρε, ὃ φῂς εἶναι, τοῦτο καὶ 
εἶ;" ἐπινεύσαντος δέ, "φῂς δ᾽ εἶναι θεόν;" τοῦ δ᾽ ὁµολογήσαντος, "θεὸς εἶ ἄρα," ἔφη. 
δεξαµένου δ᾽ ἀσµένως, γελάσας φησίν, "ἀλλ᾽, ὦ µόχθηρε, τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καὶ κολοιὸς ἂν 
ὁµολογήσειας εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα µυρία. (“He appears to have been called θεός (‘god’) in consequence 
of the following argument addressed to him by Stilpo."Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself 
to be?" To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, "And do you say you are god?" To this he agreed. 
"Then it follows that you are god." Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, "But, you 
rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.") (transl. 
R.D. Hicks). According to Whitmarsh (2015), p. 122-123, the original version of this anecdote must 
have been Stilpo asking Theodorus if he was ἄθεος in a self-aware, self-declared sense, otherwise the 
story does not make any sense. I disagree, because the last sentence of this paragraph clearly refers to 
the ironical purpose of the epithet θεὸς for a self-declared atheist as Theodorus. Adopting such a nick-
name had no more meaning to Theodorus than identifying himself with a common bird.  
764
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 91 & Drachmann (1922), p.75. 
765
 Mansfeld (1999), p. 453. 
     456 
II, 97) it does not appear probable that the book merely criticized the gods of popular 
religion.766  
 
But even if Epicirus did borrow elements of Theodorus’s Περὶ θεῶν, like Diogenes 
Laertius describes, he probably wished to formulate arguments in favour of the 
existence of the gods, but these arguments clearly displayed a dual character. The 
blessedness of the gods acts as a moral guideline for mortals, but the same blessedness 
prevents the gods from partaking in the system of reciprocity and being involved in 
the course of nature and the lives of mortals.767  
 
Consequently, Epicurean theology had much more resemblance with atheism than 
organized Greek religion or even Plato’s renewed philosophical theism. The gods 
exist, but they are completely inactive in the universe and, as a result, divination needs 
to be rejected.768 The divine character of the heavenly bodies is also rejected by 
Epicurus in the Letter to Herodotus (Diogenes Laertius, X, 97), because these celestial 
objects can be explained by natural causes.  
 
Still, Epicurus most likely considered the atheism of Diagoras and Theodorus to be 
too extreme, as can be detected in the apologetic accounts by Philodemus and 
Diogenes of Oenoanda.  
 
We can also detect in the Letter to Menoeceus (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 123) the 
Epicurean belief that ‘impiety’ did not involve the denial of the gods of popular belief, 
but rather the concept of traditional theism, similar to Plato’s, Laws, X, 885b. Not the 
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man who denied the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirmed of the 
gods what the multitude believes was truly impious in Epicurus’s opinion. Epicurean 
theology in this passage seems to emphasize that having no popular idea of the gods is 
a lesser evil than having a wrong conception, because the former leaves the gods 
undisturbed in their blessedness, while false popular beliefs subject the gods to all 
sorts of impious actions like deceit, theft and adultery and submit worshippers to fear 
and harm.769   
 
So, if Epicurus borrowed some elements from Theodorus’s Peri Theōn, he most likely 
limited this borrowing to arguments that rejected popular belief and did not expand it 
to any denial of the philosophical existence of the gods. Notwithstanding Epicurus’s 
attempt to distance himself from any notion of radical atheism, the supposed 
concealed character of radical atheism within Epicurean theology was a recurring 
criticism in Hellenistic philosophical debate, as Cicero reports: 
 
“It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as the good friend of us all, Posidonius, argued in the fifth book 
of his On the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he 
said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular odium.” (transl. H. 
Rackham)770 
 
Despite its influences on Epicurus, we should not assume that the Peri Theōn merely 
reflected a rejection of Volksreligion, comparable to the theological views of 
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Xenophanes of Colophon, as Winiarczyk argued.771 There is no indication whatsoever 
in the preserved sources to support this theory. Furthermore, this would demand the 
ignorance of any analogy with the atheist book of Diagoras. I believe it more plausible 
to identify the Peri Theōn of Theodorus as an anthropological aetiology of religion, 
comparable with Democritus and Prodicus, regarding the historical origin of the gods 
of traditional religion, and the Sisyphus-fragment, on the matter of religion as a human 
invention and fabrication. We should once again turn to Epicurean sources for this 
matter. In Philodemus’s account (On Piety, P. Herc.1077, col. 82,1-18 (19, 519-536)) 
Prodicus, Diagoras, Critias and “other atheists” (κἄ[λλοις), possibly Theodorus, are 
reproached for being “raving lunatics, who eliminate the divine from existing 
things”.772 Epicurus compares Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias in this fragment with 
(the Cynic founder) Antisthenes (ca. 445 – ca. 365 BC), because “they respell the 
names of the gods” (in order to explain the origin of belief in them).773 Apparently, 
Epicurus refers in this fragment to the aetiological theories on the origin of the gods 
(e.g., Prodicus’s theory on the correlation between the origin of religion and 
agricultural innovations). Antisthenes attested a similar theory by stating that by 
convention (κατὰ νόµον) many gods exist, but by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) only one.774  If 
Antisthenes viewed the many gods in Greek religion indeed as inventions of cultic 
history and reduced them to one natural principle, he also demolished the gods “from 
existing things” (ἐκ τῶν ὄντων) and denied their role in the origin of religion and the 
order of things.775  
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But the verb παραγραµµατίζειν (‘to respell the name of the gods’) might also refer to 
Stesimbrotos of Thasos (ca. 470 – ca. 420 BC), a sophist whom Walter Burkert 
believed to be the author of the Derveni Papyrus.776 A fragment of his writings states 
that the name Dionysus actually means ‘Dionyxus’ (‘Zeus-stabber’), because “he 
stabbed the thigh-bone of Zeus with the horns he was born with”.777  However, it 
seems more likely that παραγραµµίζ[ουσι refers to the use of metonymy, in order to 
explain the etymology of the name of the gods. The principle of metonymy 
(Hephaestus=fire, Demeter= grain, Dionysus=wine) was known to Prodicus and the 
metonymy of Dionysus being wine surfaces in Eurpides’s Bacchae (274-285). So, the 
use of metonymy by Prodicus and also Diagoras, Critias and ‘other atheists’ (like 
Theodorus) might have been interpreted by Epicurus as a ‘rewriting of divine names’, 
which Epicurus explicitly rejected in the Letter to Herodotus, because it reduces the 
majesty of beings associated with bliss and immortality.778  
 
Another theory that might explain the ‘respelling of the names of the gods’ involves 
the substitution of the gods by natural phenomena and by means of anagram, which 
could have been already suggested by Theagenes of Reghium (floruit ca. 525 BC). 
According to Porphyry (The Homeric Questions, I, 240), Theagenes considered the 
gods to be allegorical explanations for natural phenomena. For instance, Poseidon 
represented the element ‘water’, while Hephaestus stood for ‘fire’ and Hera for ‘air’. 
The latter could be explained by changing the letters ΗΡΑ (Hera) to ΑΗΡ (air).779 The 
same form of reasoning could be applied to the concept of Dinos, the cosmic vortex, 
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which replaced Zeus or Dios, as professed by the character of ‘Socrates the Melian’, 
an amalgam of Socrates the Athenian and Diagoras of Melos, in Aristophanes’s 
Clouds (830).780 
 
In resuming these different theories, the whole concept of the Mysteries of Eleusis 
could have been assessed in the atheist books by Diagoras and Theodorus as a 
historical invention, based on the Prodicean principle of metonymy (Demeter=grain), 
or even a fabrication, in analogy with the Sisyphus-fragment. This would explain the 
specific title Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι (‘Disclosing Arguments’) Byzantine scholars 
provided the atheist book of Diagoras with. If so, Theodorus, out of a renewed interest 
in the divulging of the Mysteries and radical atheist opinions, could have elaborated 
further on this topic in his own atheist book at the end of the 4th century BC.  
 
On the other hand, Theodorus must have underestimated the controversial nature of 
ridiculing the Mysteries, even a century after the death of Diagoras of Melos. As 
Diogenes Laertius (II, 101) reports, it was this transgressive approach against the 
Mysteries that eventually brought Theodorus before the Areopagus on charges of 
asebeia. 
 
15.3) Theodorus and the sociopolitical context of late 4th century BC Athens 
 
In this last section of the case study of Theodorus, we will investigate the interaction 
between the atheism of Theodorus and the sociopolitical context of late 4th century 
BC Athens.  
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A first subsection deals with an in depth analysis of the impiety case of Theodorus 
that will also include the proposal of a new (fixation of) date of Theodorus’s impiety 
trial. Secondly, the subsection ‘diplomatic career of Theodorus’ will deal with the 
professional activities of Theodorus after the impiety trial. Finally, I shall discuss the 
‘Theodorian school’, its influence and followers, but also the (philosophical) 
circumstances behind its early demise. This last subsection will enable us to fully 
assess the final impact of radical atheism in Antiquity. 
 
 15.3.1) the impiety trial of Theodorus of Cyrene 
 
The publication of the atheist book of Diagoras, as mentioned by Epicurus and 
Aristoxenus ca. 310-300 BC781, does coincide with accusations of asebeia Theodorus 
underwent ca. 309 BC, according to Winiarczyk.782  
 
We are informed by Athenaeus (The Deipnosophists, XIII, 611b) and Diogenes 
Laertius (II, 101) that Theodorus was accused of asebeia in Athens.  Because both 
sources report that Theodorus was forced to drink hemlock, we might deduce that he 
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was condemned to death, even if we know that Theodorus was not executed in 
Athens.  
 
The fact that Theodorus was banished from Athens can only be retrieved from a 
testimony of Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 BC – ca. 50 AD)783, while Diogenes Laertius 
is the sole source mentioning the rescue of Theodorus of Cyrene by Demetrius of 
Phaleron, the pro-Macedonian governor of Athens. Winiarczyk has argued that 
Demetrius probably advised Theodorus to leave Athens by going into voluntary exile, 
but, more recently, O’Sullivan has suggested that Demetrius could have proposed 
exile as a method of punishment, which might have prevented an actual execution of 
Theodorus on the charge of asebeia.784  
 
Comparative analysis of the surviving sources seems to favour the argument of 
O’Sullivan. Firstly, Winiarczyk relies almost entirely on the testimony of Diogenes 
Laertius, which suggest no actual trial, while the older account of Philo does not 
mention a voluntary exile785, but rather an enforced flight (δρασµόν), which could 
indicate that Theodorus was initially judged, but escaped a death sentence through 
negotiations by Demetrius of Phaleron. The latter may have convinced the judges that 
Theodorus would never revisit Athens to commit acts of impiety such as atheism and 
the corrupting of youth.  This hypothesis seems to correspond with the comparison 
                                                      
783
 Philo of Alexandria, Every Good Man is Free, 127: Θεόδωρον λόγος ἔχει τὸν ἐπικληθέντα ἄθεον 
ἐκπεσόντα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν καὶ πρὸς Λυσίµαχον ἐλθόντα, ἐπειδή τις τῶν ἐν τέλει τὸν δρασµόν 
ὠνείδισεν, ἅµα καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐπιλέγων, ὅτι ἐπὶ ἀθεότητι καὶ διαφθορᾷ τῶν νέων καταγνωσθεὶς 
ἐξέπεσεν, (“A story is told of Theodorus surnamed the atheist, that when he had been banished from 
Athens and had joined Lysimachus, his flight was brought up against him by a person of authority, who 
recited the circumstances which caused it and declared that he had been ejected after being condemned 
as an atheist and corrupter of youth”) (transl. F.H. Colson). 
784
 Winiarczyk (1981), p. 68 & O’Sullivan (1997), p. 144. 
785
 According to Athenian law, those accused of asebeia had the right to go into voluntary exile in order 
to escape prosecution (Plato, Crito, 52c), but this right only seems to have been applicable to citizens. 
See also Nails (2009), p. 326 on this matter. 
     463 
both Philo (Every Good Man is Free 127) and Diogenes Laertius (II, 102) draw 
between Theodorus and some mythological figures: Theodorus was “ejected” 
(ἐξέπεσεν) because the Athenians were not able to cope with his ‘massive’ atheism, 
similar to Heracles, who was thrown overboard by the Argonauts, because of his 
overloading weight and Dionysus, who was born prematurely, because his mother 
Semele could no longer bear his weight.  
 
Considering the corrupting of youth by Theodorus, Plutarch (Phocion, 38,2) mentions 
the fact that Phocus, the son of Phocion, attended lectures of Theodorus ‘the Atheist’ 
at the Lyceum. In one of these lectures, Theodorus justified the ransoming of a 
mistress, a principle which Phocion’s son would eventually carry out when his 
mistress was being kept hostage in a brothel. If such (sophistic) teachings were 
interpreted as ‘corrupting youth’, it becomes evident that Athenian authorities 
prosecuted Theodorus on the charge of impiety and demanded his physical removal 
from Athens. At that moment, Demetrius probably suggested a forced exile in stead of 
an execution.  
 
The rescue of Theodorus by Demetrius may have had political motifs, as a 
compensation for favouring the pro-Macedonian government. We do know that 
Theodorus was involved in the aristocratic party in Cyrene, so he might have 
supported anti-democratic tendencies in Athens. Another ‘political’ argument for the 
rescue of Theodorus by Demetrius could be his association with Phocion (through his 
son Phocus), who was a political associate of Demetrius before his execution in early 
318 BC.786 But, once again, a lack of sources prevents certainty. Even if Theodorus 
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could have relied on political protection, animosities within Athenian society against 
matters of atheism and impiety did not appear to have vanished near the end of the 
fourth century BC. Diogenes Laertius reports that both Stilpo and Bion of 
Borysthenes reflected on the public odium and the intellectual discretion that should 
be displayed when discussing the (in)existence of the gods openly.787  
 
Although Fahr dates the trial of Stilpo after that of Theodorus, the former was in all 
probability prosecuted earlier.788 This can be deduced from a passage by Diogenes 
Laertius (II, 117) in which Theodorus contemplates on the asebeia-trial of Stilpo after 
his exile was ordered by the Areopagites. This indicates that Theodorus was still 
residing in Athens when Stilpo was prosecuted.   
 
The actual date of Theodorus’s trial is difficult to pinpoint, but must definitely be 
situated during the rule of Demetrius Phalereus (317-307 BC).789 Both Kindstrand and 
O’Sullivan argue that the trial belongs to the second half of the Phalerean regime 
(between 312-307 BC), while Winiarczyk relies on Jerome (Winiarczyk 1981 
Theodorus T1A) to situate the trial at 309 BC.790  
 
Kindstrand, then again, seems quite confident to pinpoint the date of the impiety trial 
at 307 BC based on the argument that Theodorus could have been banished from 
Athens once the protection of Demetrius Phalereus disappeared due to his own exile 
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in 307 BC.791 The argument by Kindstrand is not very solid, in my opinion. Given the 
impudent nature of Theodorus’s atheism, as described by Diogenes Laertius (II, 116), 
the Areopagites would have almost certainly insisted on a more severe sentence, once 
the protection of Demetrius Phalereus was absent. Based on the information of 
Stilpo’s return to Megara after his asebeia-trial and the need of intervention by 
Demetrius Phalereus, I believe it safer to situate the date of the impiety trial at ca. 308 
BC.  
 
 15.3.2) the diplomatic career of Theodorus of Cyrene 
 
The rescue of Theodorus from the Areopagites is believed to have been the result of a 
personal intervention by Demetrius Phalereus. We have no concrete indication that 
this individual action was based on a genuine interest in philosophy or atheism. 
Diogenes Laertius (V, 75) nonetheless identified the talented Demetrius as a disciple 
of Theophrastus and Cicero exemplified him as an excellent Peripatetic philosopher-
ruler.792 Demetrius did indeed write different books on philosophical subjects, beside 
treatises on literature, politics, art, history and rhetoric, which were all characterized 
by a distinctive philosophical style (according to Diogenes Laertius V,80-81, who 
provides a complete list of titles), but the rescue of Theodorus might also have been 
undertaken for a combination of political and intellectual purposes.  
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For this matter, it could more useful to turn to the Macedonian king Cassander, on 
whose orders the intervention could have been carried out. The same Cassander 
employed the writer Euhemerus of Messene between 300 and 280 BC. According to 
Diodorus of Sicily (Historical Library, VI, 1), Euhemerus composed a novel called 
Ἱερὰ Ἀναγραφή (Sacred History).793 In this novel Euhemerus described an imaginary 
voyage on the Indian Ocean, which led him to the island of Panchaea where he 
discovered the sanctuary of Zeus Triphylius. On a golden stele in the sanctuary, the 
deeds of Zeus, Cronus and Uranus were recorded. Euhemerus learnt from the 
information that these gods were originally great kings who brought prosperity among 
their subjects by establishing law and order and by introducing different kinds of 
cultivational skills.794 Because of their exceptional beneficial government, these kings 
were considered to have had a supernatural disposition, which allowed their worship 
with immortal honours after their demise. As such, they could eventually become 
gods.795 
 
The utopian novel of Euhemerus clearly had a political goal. It furnished not only a 
historical explanation for the existence of certain gods, but it also provided Hellenistic 
rulers, who claimed to act as benefactors of their subjects, with a validation to receive 
worship in the form of ruler-cults through a process of deification after their 
demise.796  
 
                                                      
793
 I would not expand the connection between Theodorus and Cassander to such extent like Ley 
(1966), p. 299 does by assuming that Euhemerus could have been the teacher of Theodorus in regard to 
radical atheism. There is no indication whatsoever in the existing sources and Theodorus’s radical 
atheism was already an established fact ca. 300 BC. 
794
 Rose & Hornblower (1993), p. 567. 
795
 Ibidem. 
796
 On the cult of Hellenistic rulers, see especially Habicht (1970), Quaegebeur (1989), Van Nuffelen 
(1999), Chaniotis (2003) & Van Nuffelen (2004). 
     467 
Euheremism was not an original concept, however. The older anthropological 
aetiologies by Democritus, Prodicus and presumably Diagoras (on which Theodorus 
might have further elaborated) were based on the same principles: some gods were in 
essence deified natural objects and phenomena and other gods were originally 
exceptional men who received a deified status after death.797 If the atheist book, 
published by Theodorus ca. 310 BC did indeed display an anthropological aetiology, 
king Cassander might have been interested in Theodorus’s services for justifying his 
own deification process. Therefore, the rescue of Theodorus by Demetrius of Phaleron 
could have been instigated by Cassander himself.   
 
Theodorus did not eventually offer his services to Cassander, but became instead 
employed by Ptolemy I. We have no sources that inform us about any euhemerizing 
services Theodorus could have performed for Ptolemy I. The only sign in this 
direction might be the Peripatetic Straton of Lampsacus (ca. 340 – ca. 268 BC), who 
was employed by Ptolemy I as early as 322/1 BC.798 Although he was never 
associated with the term atheos in Classical Antiquity, Straton was known as the 
‘Natural Philosopher’ who explained all divinity in terms of natural causes and 
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processes, as Cicero specified.799 On this matter, Straton was clearly influenced by 
Democritus, the earliest advocate of a natural theology and the first author of an 
anthropological aetiology. But the employment of Straton by Ptolemy I probably did 
not involve any euhemerizing services and could have been related to educational 
purposes only, since Straton was entrusted with the education of Ptolemy II 
Philadelphus, the son of Ptolemy I Soter.800 
 
The reason why Theodorus eventually went to Alexandria may have been purely 
political. We do know the young Theodorus had favoured the pro-Egyptian party in 
his native Cyrene, so Ptolemy I, as his new employer, could have been a logical step 
after his exile from Athens. In Alexandria, Theodorus was later joined by his former 
rescuer Demetrius of Phaleron who himself was exiled from Athens in 307 BC and 
moved to Alexandria ca. 297-295 BC.801   
 
Under Ptolemy I, Theodorus became a diplomatic ambassador, who visited the court 
of Lysimachus, the king of Thrace. Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius have preserved 
some anecdotes concerning the visit to Lysimachus. These anecdotes display 
Theodorus as a witty and self-assured philosopher, mixing atheist, Cyrenaic and 
Cynic principles with sophist reasoning on different matters like the social position of 
women (the incident with the stripping of the cloak of Hipparchia, as reported by 
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Diogenes Laertius (VI, 97-98), due respect for monarchs (Diogenes Laertius, II, 102) 
and the fear of death.  
 
Regarding this last topic, Plutarch mentions the rather macabre story of Theodorus 
witnessing a caged subject of Lysimachus, called Telesphorus, whose eyes were 
gouged out and whose ears, nose and tongue were lopped off. 802 In an attempt to 
intimidate Theodorus, Lysimachus warned the philosopher not to wrong him (as he 
had wronged the Athenians) if he wished to avoid a similar fate like Telesphorus. But 
Theodorus replied with the famous words: 
 
“What cares Theodorus whether he rots above the ground or under it?” (transl. P.H. De Lacy & B. 
Einarson)803 
 
However, the anecdotal sources on Theodorus during his diplomatic career appear to 
have little historical value and can, to some extent, be compared with the anecdoctic 
sources on Diagoras. As Diogenes Laertius (II, 103) mentions, these anecdotes in 
which Theodorus displays a typical audacity can also be ascribed to the Cyrenaic 
Aristippus or the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope.  
 
The anecdotes can nonetheless illustrate the philosophical influence Theodorus could 
have had on Epicurus and early Epicureans on the matter of anxiety: false conceptions 
(e.g., of the gods) lead to an unreasonable fear (e.g., of death). Also, the sarcasm 
Theodorus displayed in the anecdoctes shows his influence on later Cynics like Bion 
of Borysthenes, whom Diogenes Laertius (IV, 52) mentions as a pupil of Theodorus.  
                                                      
802
 Plutarch, On Exile, 16 (606b). 
803
 Plutarch, On Exile, 16 (606b): ‘τί δὲ Θεοδώρῳ µέλει, ἔφη, πότερον ὑπὲρ γῆς ἢ ὑπὸ γῆς 
σήπεται;  
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 15.3.3) the Theodorian school and the demise of radical atheism in Antiquity 
 
According to the doxographer Hippobotus (Diogenes Laertius, I, 19), Theodorus 
would eventually establish (ca. 300 BC) his own philosophical school: the 
‘Theodoreans’, a Cyrenaic school separate from the two other Cyrenaic schools by 
Hegesias and Anniceris, which all developed out of the old Cyrenaic school by 
Aristippus the Elder and Aristippus the Younger.804 Based on information on the life 
of Bion by Diogenes Laertius (IV, 52 & 54), the Theodorians appeared to have 
incorporated radical atheism within their Cyrenaic doctrines: 
 
“Next he (Bion) went over to Theodorean views, after he had heard the lectures of Theodorus the 
Atheist, who used every kind of sophistical argument […]. In his familiar talk he would often 
vehemently assail belief in the gods, a taste which he had derived from Theodorus.” (transl. R.D. 
Hicks)805 
 
The lectures by Theodorus clearly influenced Bion in such a way that his attitude 
towards the gods and religion fitted the requirements for ‘radical atheism’, as 
Diogenes Laertius further reports:  
 
                                                      
804
 Diogenes Laertius (II, 97-98) informs us that, before founding his own philosophical school, 
Theodorus was initially a disciple of Anniceris, who must have been about the same age as Theodorus. 
Although both shared common ideas on the rejection of conventional morality and friendship, 
Anniceris rather considered friendship in itself not as desirable, but only useful when benefitting one’s 
own pleasure and happiness (Diogenes Laertius, II, 96-97). Theodorus, on the other hand, evaluated 
friendship based on the (Cynic) distinction between the wise and the foolish.  
805
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IV, 52-54: ἔπειτα ἐπὶ τὰ Θεοδώρεια 
µετῆλθε διακούσας Θεοδώρου τοῦ ἀθέου κατὰ πᾶν εἶδος λόγου σοφιστεύοντος· […] πολλὰ δὲ 
καὶ ἀθεώτερον προεφέρετο τοῖς ὁµιλοῦσι, τοῦτο Θεοδώρειον ἀπολαύσας. 
     471 
“We hear that Bion, to whom the Scythian806 land of Borysthenes gave birth, denied that the gods really 
exist [… ]. He (Bion) denied the existence of the gods, and would not even look at a temple and often 
mocked at mortals for sacrificing to deities.” (transl. R.D. Hicks) 807   
 
Supported by this information of Diogenes Laertius, it seems unlikely that Bion and 
Theodorus were merely deniers of popular religion.808  But even if the Theodorians 
had one famous philosopher in their midst, their atheist school did not experience a 
lengthy existence. A possible explanation is the fact that radical atheism was already 
anachronistic at the time Theodorus founded his philosophical school. A first 
indication of this obsoleteness could be the philosophical rejection of (radical) 
atheism in Plato’s Laws, X (889e-890a). Radical atheism would be closely associated 
with the negative profile of the travelling sophist teacher and immoralist. Such 
intellectuals had no loyalty to the community in which they operated and, for that 
reason, they escaped the restraints of nomos. This is the case for Diagoras and 
Theodorus: both were alien to the Athenian demos and its cults, which they ridiculed. 
                                                      
806
 The attraction of Bion to radical atheism, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, seems not so surprising 
when looking at his Scythian background.  Several ancient sources like Plutarch (On Superstition, 13 
(171c)) or Origen (Against Celsus, I, 1-27) do portray the Scythians as an ‘uncivilized’ or ‘primitive’ 
people with no concept of gods or religious traditions at all. Some scholars, on the other hand, such as 
Dudley (1937), p. 64-65, Kindstrand (1976), p. 240 & Goulet-Cazé (1996), p.77-78, have pointed out 
the rather hostile attitude of Diogenes Laertius against Bion on matters of atheism. According to these 
scholars, Diogenes Laertius (IV, 52-54) exaggerates the influence the atheism of Theodorus might have 
had on Bion. Instead, the paragraphs are more in accordance with the typical Cynic thoughts on 
traditional Greek religion, prayer and piety in general. Both Kindstrand (1976), p. 69 & Goulet-Caze 
(1996), on the other hand, acknowledge a more radical (negative) attitude towards religion and 
morality, apart from a more radical implementation of the Cynic principles of freedom and self-
sufficiency by Theodorus in comparison to Bion.   
807
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IV, 55-56: Βίωνα, τὸν Βορυσθένης 
ἔφυσε γῆ Σκύθισσα, λέγειν ἀκούοµεν θεοὺς ὡς οὐδέν εἰσιν ὄντως.[…] ὁ µὴ θεοὺς εἶναι λέγων, 
ὁ νηὸν οὐδὲ βλέψας, ὁ πολλὰ χλευάσας βροτούς, ὅσοι θεοῖς ἔθυον 
808
 The idea of Theodorus as a denier of popular religion, according to Winiarczyk (1981)², p.85.n.93, 
is also supported by a paragraph of Diogenes Laertius (II, 117) in which Stilpo and Bion showed a high 
degree of prudence regarding the public character of their atheism. Winiarczyk believes this to be an 
indication that both philosophers did not proclaim an extreme atheism, but rather employed a critical 
opinion of any anthropomorphic presentation of the gods. The paragraph, however, only seems to 
indicate that both philosophers were aware of the repressive attitude of authorities and the negative 
response of the masses to an open and explicit atheism. The idea of a mere disbelief in traditional 
Greek polytheism could, on the other hand, be plausible in the case of Stilpo, according to Drozdek 
(2007), p. 150, but certainly not in the case of Bion. 
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In the case of Theodorus, we can also allude to his notion of the wise man, whom 
distances himself from patriotism, because he associates any allegiance to a certain 
country with the foolish multitude.  
 
Moreover, in Book X (908c) of Laws, Plato asserts that piety is the key antidote to the 
disease called ‘atheism’. Piety ensures an obedient civic community, but piety is not a 
static concept; it demands constant pious action.809 This can only be achieved when 
three beliefs are self-evident, namely (a) the gods exist, (b) the gods do care for 
human affairs and (c) the gods cannot be bribed by false prayers and sacrifices.  
 
According to Laws, X, 885b, “no one who believes, as the laws prescribe, in the 
existence of the gods has ever yet done an impious deed voluntarily, or uttered a 
lawless word: he that acts so is in one or other of these three conditions of mind”. 
Therefore, Plato argues that in his (utopian) theocracy, the integration of nomos, 
mythos and logos will evoke a state-controlled philosophical religion that evolves 
around piety being contraposed to atheism, which is considered to be a crime against 
the state.810  
 
Piety, as a guaranty for an obedient citizenry, prevails on the expense of intellectual 
investigations concerning divine matters.811  Research on the gods, as previously 
conducted by sophists and naturalists like Anaxagoras, was no longer authorized after 
                                                      
809
 According to McPherran (2011), p. 116-120, Plato envisions a Socratic understanding of the concept 
of ‘piety’: a virtue that enables humans to service the gods by assisting them in their primary task to 
produce the most beautiful product, i.e. goodness (Euthyphro, 12e-14a). This concept of piety is a 
Socratic adaptation of five characteristics of (traditional) Greek piety as stated by Euthyphro 
(Euthyphro, 5d-15c): (1) piety is opposed against whom ever does injustice, (2) piety is what is loved 
by the gods, (3) all the gods love piety, (4) piety represents a venerable service to the gods and (5) piety 
entails knowledge of sacrificing and praying.  
810
 Bruit-Zaidman (2001), p. 167-168. 
811
 Burkert (1985), p.333-337 & Yunis (1988), p. 34 -36.  
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Plato’s renewed theism. Radical atheism and belief in an anthropological aetiology as 
possible explanations for the inexistence of the gods were now being viewed as 
conflicting with the idea of a cosmic and self-moving Soul, whose intervention could 
be proven by the perfect movement of the heavenly bodies. While the sophistic 
method of thought and action in the 5th century BC had led to the idea that man can 
free himself from the gods, the notion of ὁµοίωσις θεῷ (“to compare oneself with 
divinity”) became the norm within 4th century BC Greek theology and philosophy.812  
 
Atheism, therefore, not only embodied a sacrilegious and lawless antithesis to Plato’s 
theism, it also reflected a 5th century BC intellectual novelty that became surpassed by 
the upcoming Hellenistic theologies, which viewed the gods as role models for moral 
emulation. To put it more bluntly: the (Hellenistic) wise man mimiced the gods, in 
contrast to the (Theodorian) wise man, who distanced himself from the gods.  
 
Based on the dominant influence Plato’s opinions would exercise on Hellenistic 
theology and philosophy in general, we can assume that (radical) atheism became an 
unfavourable intellectual position after Plato.813 This assumption appears to be 
supported by the fact that after Theodorus’s trial ca. 308 BC, no later cases of asebeia, 
based on unorthodox opinions concerning the gods, are reported. All philosophical 
schools would now distance themselves from any suspicions of atheism by stressing 
the importance of piety and traditional worship. This was mostly a concern for 
Epicureans, who faced multiple accusations of atheism, because they were believed to 
violate the second belief of Plato (Laws, X, 885b: the gods do pay attention to human 
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 Obbink (1989), p. 199 & Obbink (1996), p. 9. 
813
 Lloyd-Jones (1971), p. 137 & Herrmann (2007), p. 386. 
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affairs) by rejecting divination and denying the divine character of the heavenly 
bodies, because the latter can be explained by natural causes.814  
 
Regardless of their personal opinions, most intellectuals after Plato no longer openly 
questioned the legitimacy of organized religion, but rather promoted them for reasons 
of social cohesion.815 For instance, Philodemus (On Piety, P.Herc. 1098, 18-27) 
stresses the fact that Epicurus shared in all the festivals and was initiated in the 
(Lesser) Mysteries, in honour of Dionysus. Only Cynicism, which shunned civic 
religion and convention in general, would refrain from the need to display piety. This 
could explain the confusion in later historiographical and biographical traditions 
between radical atheists and early Cynics such as Diogenes of Sinope.816 
 
The obsoleteness of radical atheism within philosophy at the dawn of the Hellenistic 
period was, nevertheless, not the only factor that contributed to the early demise of the 
Theodorian school. Cyrenaic philosophy also became outdated ca. 250 BC in favour 
of early Epicureanism, which acknowledged a more sophisticated understanding of 
the concept of hedonism.817  Consequently, the Theodorians hardly survived their 
                                                      
814
 On the rejection of divination by Epicurus, see Cicero, On Divination, I, 3. On the denial of the 
divine character of the heavenly bodies by Epicurus, see Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers, X, 81.  
815
 Burkert (1985), p. 337. 
816
 On the confusion between Diogenes of Sinope and Theodorus of Cyrene, see Diogenes Laertius, II, 
103, on the confusion between Diogenes of Sinope and Diagoras of Melos, see Diogenes Laertius VI, 
59. 
817Epicurus distanced himself from Aristippus (the Elder and the Younger) and the Cyrenaics, for 
whom pleasure represented the immediate fulfillment of every bodily desire, by a more differentiated 
evaluation of pleasure. Diogenes Laertius (X, 129) reports that Epicurus assessed pleasure by 
incorporating Aristotle’s view (Nicomachean Ethics, 1154 b28) of pleasures ‘at rest’ (ἐν ἠρηµίᾳ) and 
pleasures ‘in motion’ (ἐν κίνησει). Freedom of disturbance (ἀταραξία) and absence of pain (ἀπονία) 
are regarded as passive pleasures ‘at rest’, while delight (χαρὰ) and exultation (ἐυφροσύνη) are 
evaluated as active pleasures ‘in motion’. Similar to Aristotle, the pleasures at rest are viewed as truer 
forms of pleasure by Epicurus, because the simple hedonism of the Cyrenaics is rejected as being 
paradoxical: every enjoyment will always demand more and actual fulfillment of pleasure can never be 
achieved. Therefore, Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus, 127-129) argues that reason should be the primary 
instigator of pleasure, resulting in the distinction between natural and necessary desires (e.g., nutrition, 
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founder, who presumably died ca. 275 BC. The end of the Theodorian school ca. 250 
BC seems to coincide approximately with the year in which Bion of Borysthenes is 
believed to have died.  This date appears to be a terminus ante quem for further traces 
of radical atheism in Classical Antiquity, not only due to the fact that Theodorian 
philosophy was now outdated, but also because of the early loss of the atheist books 
of Diagoras and Theodorus, which prevented the reverberation of radical atheism in a 
later era in Antiquity.818 Although early Epicureanism incorporated certain 
Theodorian elements in its theology, it deliberately chose a less radical approach and 
professed a more ‘soft’ atheism, as Jan Bremmer formulated it.819  
 
In concluding this case study, we can assert that, along with Diagoras of Melos, 
Theodorus of Cyrene is indubitably the most archetypal atheist in Antiquity, as he is 
mentioned in eighteen separate ancient sources in close connection with Diagoras of 
Melos. Although their atheist actions must be situated in a different sociohistorical 
context, striking resemblances between both philosophers can be detected.  
 
Firstly, Theodorus is almost the only 4th century BC philosopher still associated with 
the phrase θεοὺς ἀναιρεῖν820 and he could have been one of the ‘radical atheists’, along 
                                                                                                                                                        
sleep), natural and unnecessary desires (e.g., sexual desires) and unnatural and unnecessary desires 
(e.g., wealth and political ambition). For the correlation between Epicurus and Aristotle on pleasure, 
see Jones (1992), p.49-50 & 221, n.108 (for bibliographical references) & Johansen (1998), p. 436-438. 
On the obsoleteness of Cyrenaicism in favour of Epicureanism, see Long (1999), p. 639. 
818
 Winiarczyk (1980), p. 68 & Winiarczyk (1981)², p. 85. 
819
 Bremmer (2007), p. 12. 
820
 Besides Theodorus, the phrase θεοὺς ἀναιρεῖν might also be applicable to Philippus the Megarian, 
a late 4th century BC associate of Stilpo, on the condition that he is the ‘Philippus’ Philodemus refers to 
in P. Herc. 1428, col. XII, 10. In the 3rd century BC, the phrase is only used by Philodemus (P.Herc. 
1428 cols. II, 28 - III,13) to refer to the ‘atheism’ of the Stoic Persaeus of Citium, (306-243 BC) whom 
Philodemus might have considered to be the successor of the radical atheist Prodicus. 
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with Prodicus, Critias and Diagoras, Epicurus implicitly refers to in an index 
atheorum in the twelfth book of his On Nature by the use of the wording κἄ[λλοις.821  
 
Secondly, Theodorus seems to have shared with Diagoras a keen interest in the 
divulging of the Mysteries of Eleusis. This could have been the cause of his impiety 
trial and consecutive exile ca. 308 BC, although we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the atheist book of Theodorus was the actual reason behind the charges of asebeia.  
 
This brings us to a third analogy between Diagoras and Theodorus: on the subject of 
the atheist books of both philosophers, there are also striking similarities. The first 
time the so-called Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι or ‘Disclosing Arguments’ of Diagoras surface 
in antique sources must be situated ca. 310-300 BC with corresponds with the 
‘posthumous’ character of the atheist book according to Al-Mubaššir, but it also 
coincides with the supposed publication of Theodorus’s Περὶ θεῶν. Possibly, 
Theodorus could have been the sophist, who published the atheist book of Diagoras 
after discovering the original manuscript during his visit in Corinth, the place of death 
of Diagoras.822 Theodorus might have elaborated further on the original manuscript of 
Diagoras in his own Περὶ θεῶν, out of a renewed interest in the divulging of the 
Mysteries of Eleusis.  
 
                                                      
821
 Obbink (1996), p. 355. 
822
 Wehrli (1961), p. 126 suggests that a sophist could have used the name of Diagoras to publish an 
atheistic work. Winiarczyk (2016), p. 86 agrees on this matter and situates its publication in the first 
half of the 4th century BC, but he does not support this idea by any means. Based on the testimony of 
Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col. 82, 1-18 (19, 519-536) & P. Herc. 1428, cols. XI-XII, we do 
have evidence to situate this publication before 310 BC. The publication of  Plato’s Laws after 340 BC 
might also serve as a terminus post quem, because Plato did not seem to have any knowledge of ‘atheist 
writings’, except for the doctrines of the natural philosopher Anaxagoras in Apology, 26c. 
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In all probability, both atheist books were similar in content and, based on the existing 
sources, they were the only treatises from Antiquity in which a philosophical denial of 
the existence of the gods could have been defended. I would not go as far as 
suggesting that the Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι of Diagoras and the Περὶ θεῶν of Theodorus 
are basically the same atheist book, but it is somehow striking that the publication of 
both atheist books must be situated in the same period (ca. 310-300 BC) and both 
disappeared more or less simultaneously (ca. 275- 250 BC). 
 
Only on the matter of what might have triggered their radical atheism, both 
philosophers seem to diverge: the radical atheism of Diagoras was largely activated 
by a congregate of sociopolitical factors that must be situated in a very short period, 
from 416-415 BC during the siege of Melos.823 Theodorus, on the other hand, showed 
an early interest in this extreme type of atheism, because it appeared not so different 
from his original Cyrenaic thinking. He definitely embraced it over different decades 
(roughly from 313 BC up to the time of his death in 275 BC) as his philosophical 
school was largely founded on the principles of an uncompromising atheism and an 
aversion to civic religion, which could explain the appeal it had on later Cynics, such 
as Bion of Borysthenes.  
 
 
 
                                                      
823
 We have no clue when Diagoras exactly wrote his atheist book.  R. Janko (2001), p. 7 places the 
date of composition between 423 and 418 BC, which corresponds with the first and revised edition of 
Clouds. Janko however provides no further argument for the dating of the atheist book. Furthermore, 
there is no indication in Clouds that the atheist book made Diagoras a notorious figure in Athens, but 
rather the public character of his divulging and ridiculing of the Eleusinian Mysteries, which appeared 
to be the cause of his conviction in 415 BC in the light of the religious scandals. Most likely, the book 
was not yet written in 415 BC.  Given the fact that Diagoras died ca. 400 BC and regarding the 
‘posthumous’ publication of the book; we can only assume that the book was written somewhere 
between 415 and 400 BC. 
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Chapter 16: conclusions 
 
Thoughout these case studies, we have attempted to locate the presence of positive 
atheism in the actions and writings of renowned atheoi in Classical Antiquity. As 
Jacoby (1959) had already stated, Diagoras of Melos is indeed the clearest exponent 
of what can be described a ‘complete’ or ‘uncompromising’ atheism. Although 
scholars like Woodbury (1965) and Winiarczyk (1979 & 1980)824 had serious doubts 
about the existence of an extreme type of atheism in Antiquity,  more recent studies 
by Obbink (1996) and Bremmer (1995 & 2007) tend to reaffirm the vision of Jacoby.  
 
This is also my opinion: the radical atheism of Diagoras must be regarded as a 
byproduct of a radicalizing sophist movement in which religion was assessed as the 
ultimate product of nomos or human convention (cf. Prodicus). On the other hand, 
extraordinary societal conditions, such as the siege of Melos, also intensified the 
radicalization of Diagoras’s atheism substantially. These combined factors created a 
unique, but very brief period (416-415 BC) in which this extreme type of atheism 
could materialize itself in an open and public way.  
 
The religious scandals in 415 BC, however, function as a definite turning point. After 
415 BC, the open character of Diagoras’s radical atheism was no longer possible, due 
to an increasing influence of radical democratic powers within Athenian society 
which identified themselves as traditionalist in terms of religious customs and 
practices. This is clearly discernible in the ‘ominous’ impact the religious scandals 
had on the public opinion in Athens. It jeopardized any successful outcome of the 
                                                      
824
 The latest research on Diagoras by Winiarczyk (2016), p. 111-115 once more dismisses the idea of 
Diagoras of Melos being a radical atheist. 
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Sicilian Expedition, making the perpetrators in this perspective guilty of uncivic and 
anti-Athenian behaviour.825 In all likelihood, Diagoras was not convicted of any 
involvement in the scandals, but he was definitely associated with it.826 Therefore, an 
open attack on Athenian rituals was no longer tolerated after 415 BC.  
 
Although Diagoras was not personally involved in the religious scandals, he clearly 
fitted an anti-Athenian profile which demanded his removal from public life. With the 
disappearance of Diagoras, radical atheism also disappeared in Athens for more than a 
century.  
 
By the time radical atheism resurfaced in the person of Theodorus of Cyrene ca. 310 
BC, the social conditions in Athens had changed drastically. Being no longer a 
politically independent city-state, it was now subjected to Macedonian rule. Athens 
had now been reduced to a cultural and philosophical centre. In this new Athens, 
radical atheism could still cause some controversy, but its impact was no longer 
comparable to the days of Diagoras. Then again, Theodorus, who picked up the 
gauntlet Diagoras had left, risked a similar death sentence or death warrant, since any 
divulging of the Eleusinian Mysteries was still a highly controversial matter. 
However, it would prove to have less consequence for Theodorus personally, since he 
received political protection from the pro-Macedonian regime. Such form of political 
action would have been unthinkable in the days of Diagoras.  
 
Clearly, radical atheism in the late 5th century BC was largely determined by different 
sociopolitical circumstances than its revival a century later. Radical atheism in the 
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 Ober (1998), p. 118. 
826
 Psuedo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 17.  
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days of Theodorus was largely reduced to a philosophical debate of minor importance. 
Theodorus had initially embraced this type of atheism, because it appeared to be 
compatible with the radical nature of his original Cyrenaic thinking. However, the 
Zeitgeist was no longer favourable to radical atheism, as the emerging Hellenistic 
philosophical schools would at most adopt a more moderate or “soft” atheism in their 
epistemological and theological discourses. Consequently, the radical atheism of 
Theodorus had an anachronistic character: it was a preserved relic of the 5th century 
BC and no longer of any intellectual importance, hence the quick disasppearence of 
the Theodorian school after Theodorus’s death in ca. 275 BC. But the final curtain on 
the most extreme variant of ‘atheism in Antiquity’ definitely fell once its last 
associate, Bion of Borythenes, died ca. 250 BC.  
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PART 4: deviant religious behaviour in the context of  
ancient Greek philosophy 
 
Based on the results of the previous case studies, we have concluded that positive 
atheism in Antiquity was essentially limited to the actions and writings of Diagoras of 
Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene.  
 
This low rate of positive atheists in Antiquity seems to indicate that the denial of 
divine existence was an exceptional intellectual standpoint. Some scholars related this 
rareness to the effect the death sentence of Socrates could have caused on a self-
professed atheism and critical intellectualism in general.1 Jan Bremmer still followed 
this opinion in his article Atheism in Antiquity (2007), stating that ‘[T]he death of 
Socrates constituted the end of an era. Most philosophers had got the message and 
remained careful in expounding their views’.2 Bremmer immediately added, 
nevertheless, that Theodorus ‘the Atheist’ of Cyrene formed the occasional exception 
on this attitude.  
 
These opinions apparently approach (radical) atheism as a strictly social phenomenon 
and argue that its demise was determined by public refutation and discrimination. 
Although social conditions in terms of charges of impiety and impiety trials have had 
an important impact on radical atheism, I shall analyze radical atheism in this part 
from a purely philosophical angle by arguing that (a) radical atheism was a logical 
evolution of early Greek philosophy and (b) radical atheism was only a temporal 
manifestation within the concept of ‘atheism in Antiquity’, because Plato’s views on 
                                                      
1
 McCabe (1933), p. 31; Babut (1974), p. 7; Wallace (1996), p. 231 & Bruit-Zaidman (2001), p. 164-
166. 
2
 Bremmer (2007), p.19. 
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radical atheism, followed by diverse philosophical debates and polemics during the 
Hellenistic period principally shaped its final outcome.  
 
Radical atheism did not represent a final development in the history of critical 
reflection on ancient Greek religion. Being a peripheral phenomenon throughout its 
existence, it rather characterized a temporal and transitional phase that was quickly 
surpassed by other, less uncompromising forms of religious criticism. In arguing so, I 
will challenge the general perception in recent studies, which tend to view the 
development of philosophical atheism in Antiquity as a linear process: originating in 
the Archaic period, further developing in the Classical period, and culminating in the 
Hellenistic period, only to be finally terminated by the prevalence of (Judeo-
Christian) monotheism over (Graeco-Roman) polytheism.3  
 
I believe that the caesura for a self-aware and self-declared (positive) philosophical 
atheism in Antiquity must be situated much earlier, with the publication of Plato’s 
Laws (c. 340 BC), which rejected atheism by means of an improved (philosophical) 
theism.  
 
After Plato, Greek intellectuals (with the exception of Theodorus of Cyrene) would 
not profile themselves as self-declared (positive) atheists anymore. In order to 
demonstrate this theory more concretely, philosophical atheism will be embedded in 
the history of Greek philosophy, from the earliest (‘Archaic’) examples of so-called 
                                                      
3
 See Sedley (2013), p. 150, who situates the end of philosophical atheism at the start of the Roman 
Empire (31 BC), with Carneades as its last representative and, most recently, Whitmarsh (2015), p.11 
& 238, who views the arrival of Christianity and its lack of a pluralist and flexible attitude towards 
atheism as the determining factor for the ending of philosophical atheism in Antiquity. 
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‘philosophical religion’4 in response to traditional Greek religion to the rise of a 
radical atheism in the Classical period and finally, the various Hellenistic 
philosophical schools, which all have dealt with the phenomenon of atheism. Radical 
atheism in the Classcial period was mainly associated with the sophist movement and 
primarily confronted traditional Greek religion by means of radical conclusions on 
religion and the existence of the gods. The question whether it could make a similar 
stance against the growing importance of philosophical religion during the Hellenistic 
period will also be included in the investigation. 
 
Chapter 17: the Archaic period: the birth of ‘philosophical religion’ 
 
Based on our research so far, positive atheism in Classical Antiquity could be 
described, from an etic point of view, as an antitheistic philosophical position, mainly 
associated with sophist thought and recognizable by an open and active rejection of 
organized Greek religion in all its aspects (theology and cult practices) next to a 
complete lack of alternative conceptions on divine existence. 
 
Negative atheism, on the other hand, was mainly associated with the agnosticism of 
Protagoras and reverberated afterwards in the Academic Scepticism of Carneades.5 
With the exception of Cynic agnosticism, it did not endorse an absence of belief in the 
gods, in contrast to negative atheism in the modern sense, but rather accepted the 
existence of the gods on sociological and philosophical grounds and in anticipation of 
irrefutable counter-argumentation. 
 
                                                      
4
 Burkert (1985), p. 305-337. 
5
 Sedley (2013), p. 147-150. 
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From an emic point of view, both forms of philosophical atheism were regarded as an 
Athenian-based irreligious phenomenon that (at least during the Classical period) was 
closely related to asebeia and eligible to prosecution between the 430s BC (the 
passing of the Diopeithes-decree) and 307 BC (the end of the reign of Demetrius 
Phalereus). 
 
This descripition of negative and positive atheism in Greek and Roman Antiquity 
obviously reflects a lengthy development of critical reflection on traditional Greek 
religion. Actually, the origins of both negative and positive atheism in Antiquity 
cannot be disconnected from the materialization of deviant religious behaviour in 
ancient Greek societies. The historical complexity of this matter comprises different 
layers of inquiry, but can basically be reduced to a twofold question: “What triggered 
the emergence of deviant religious behaviour, in the form of critical reflection on 
organized religion, in ancient Greece?” and “Why was this phenomenon limited to 
certain regions of ancient Greece?”.  
 
In the following section, I shall argue that the actual ‘birth’ of this phenomenon 
originated already in the Archaic period and can be associated with the combination 
of specific social and material conditions, namely the social recognition of political 
and intellectual liberties and the spread of written Greek culture, which is closely 
related to the rise of Greek literacy.6 This combination of factors was almost 
exclusively confined to the city-states of Miletus and Athens. 
 
 
                                                      
6
 Bremmer (1982), p. 43 & Noegel (2007), p. 28.  
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17.1) material and societal conditions for deviant religious behaviour 
 
With the emergence of the Greek alphabet in the 8th century BC the impetus wat set to 
codify much of Greek oral culture.7 An important preoccupation of this early Greek 
literary output focused on the production of divine genealogies like Homer’s The Iliad 
and Hesiod’s Theogony.8 This should not be so surprising, as the chaotic and 
diversified nature of Greek orally transmitted mythology demanded unification and 
standardization at a certain point in time.  
 
An additional argument to explain the primary focus on theogonies in early Greek 
writing can be found in the cultural tendency to believe that everything humans had 
not intentionally constructed themselves had to be of divine manufacture.9 However, 
the canonization and classification of an orally transmitted theogony and mythology 
did have severe consequences. First of all, it concerns a process of intentional 
selection by the dominant classes of society, whose interests’ canonization must 
reflect.10 Second, once orally transmitted theogonies and mythologies are written 
down, their content cannot be fundamentally altered or adapted to changing social 
circumstances.11 It becomes, metaphorically speaking, ‘frozen in time’, although this 
assumption should be moderated by another important consequence of canonization. 
This concerns the degree of individualism that is now being incorporated into 
                                                      
7
 See also Kahn (2003), p. 140-141 on this matter. 
8
 Herodotus, Histories, II, 53,2: Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅµηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω µευ 
πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι καὶ οὐ πλέοσι: οὗτοι δὲ εἰσὶ οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι καὶ τοῖσι 
θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυµίας δόντες καὶ τιµάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σηµήναντες. 
(“for I suppose Hesiod and Homer flourished not more than four hundred years earlier than I; and these 
are the ones who taught the Greeks the descent of the gods, and gave the gods their names, and 
determined their spheres and functions, and described their outward forms.”) (transl. A.D. Godley). See 
also Noegel (2007), p.24-25 for Near Eastern parallels with Homer’s The Iliad and The Odyssey and 
Hesiod’s Theogony. 
9
 Dover (1988), p. 153-154. 
10
 Goody (1998), p.4. 
11
 Goody (1998), p.5. 
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canonized versions of traditional myths. Some mythographers, especially the 
Alexandrian poets in late Antiquity, definitely reshaped oral transmitted myths to a 
more individualistic treatment, but this critique could also be related to the tragedians 
or even the early Greek poets.12  
 
The Presocratic thinker Xenophanes of Colophon (ca 570 – ca. 475 BC), one of the 
earliest authors of critical reflection on religion, already accused Homer and Hesiod of 
having corrupted the true nature of the gods by falsely attributing human 
characteristics to them.13 This criticism on Greek anthropomorphism is actually not so 
surprising, but a logical outcome of canonization. Once a text is fixed in writing, it 
can become the subject of intellectual inquiry based on a scrutinized analysis. By 
doing so, many inconsistencies (in traditional religion, for example) could be 
detected.  
 
In the article Literacy and the Origins and Limitations of Greek Atheism (1982), Jan 
Bremmer defended the idea that deviant religious behaviour in the form of critical 
religious reflection has its actual roots in the Archaic Age as a logical outcome of a 
process of increasing literacy.14 First, it broadened the intellectual horizon by shifting 
the focus from a passive audience of ‘listeners’ to an active audience of ‘readers’. 
Second, by writing a specific set of arguments down, it could now be analyzed and 
criticized in detail, in order to be further developed or improved by other authors. 
However, it must be observed that the emergence of intellectual criticism (on religion) 
appeared to be a pure Greek phenomenon with no parallel in other nearby literate 
                                                      
12
 Bremmer (1982), p. 46-47. See also Sommerstein (2002), p. 16 on Euripides’s Medea. Diodorus 
Siculus, Historical Library, IV, 54-56 is the authoritative source on the differences between the 
traditional myth of Medea and Euripides’s version of the story.  
13
 Xenophanes (DK 21 B11). 
14
 Bremmer (1982), p. 43. 
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regions such as the Near East. This could be explained by the complicated character 
of writing in the Near East, which prevented a widespread literacy and restricted 
writing mainly to a minority of scribal elites.15  
 
But literacy cannot be the only responsible factor for the rise of Greek religious 
criticism and skepticism, in contrast to the Near East.16 Literacy in the Greek world 
appears to have been closely connected with the existence of an interactive political 
system. Whereas the large-scale societies in the Near East were characterized by fixed 
political systems, based around autocratic (‘divine’) leadership with the assistance of 
a central bureaucracy and subsidiary regional administrations, different small-scale 
communities in the Greek world knew a much more dynamic (i.e. ‘constitutional’) 
political system that relied on public participation.17 Citizens in such communities did 
partake in decision-making by means of voting and attending assemblies, councils and 
dicasteries. This resulted in a high degree of political consciousness and experience of 
citizens and the self-evident character of certain political rights and liberties, such as 
free speech (ἰσηγορία).18 
 
In Greek city-states (such as Athens, Miletus) where philosophy, science and religious 
criticism would eventually flourish, we witness early political reforms (e.g., 
democracy) that demanded a participatory citizenry, which in return stimulated and 
increased literacy.19 Indeed, the city-state of Miletus seemed to have played a pivotal 
role, not only in the development of early Ionian naturalist philosophy, but also 
                                                      
15
 Bremmer (1982), p. 48-49. 
16
 Lloyd (1979), p. 266. 
17
 Lloyd (1979), p. 241-242. 
18
 On this matter, see Momigliano (1973), p. 252-263 & Momigliano (1973)², p. 264-267. 
19
 Vernant (1974), p. 95. In the case of Miletus, this may concern the sociopolitical phenomenon of 
στάσις (Herodotus, Histories, II, 29).  
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regarding critical reflection on organized religion. The first identifiable individual, 
who questioned the validity of traditional Greek beliefs, and more specifically Greek 
mythology, is believed to be the mytho-historiographer Hecataeus of Miletus (floruit 
ca. 500 BC). 20 Mythology would be the first religious component to experience this 
intellectual criticism and relativism, due to the fact that Greek mythology usually 
explained natural events as caused by individual actions and personal interventions of 
deities. In Homer’s Odyssey, for example, Odysseus’s attempts to sail back to Ithaca 
are frequently prevented by the sea-god Poseidon, who personally troubles the waters 
or rouses the winds.21  
 
Hecataeus described Greek mythology (‘the tales of the Hellenes’) in the opening 
lines of his Genealogies (preserved in Demetrius of Phaleron’s treatise On Elocution, 
12) as being ‘absurd.22  Most likely, Hecataeus attacked the supernatural elements of 
Greek mythology that his predecessors had incorporated within their historiographical 
accounts and which seemed incompatible with his own rationalizing approach to 
historiography, as the fragment continues: ‘I write this as it appears to be true to me’.   
 
17.2) early Naturalist thought 
 
Prior to Hecataeus, Milesian cosmologists from the early 6th century BC already 
began to analyze events in the world in terms of natural forces and necessity and no 
longer ascribed them to be the product of divine whims. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics 
(1, 983 b20), distinguished this type of intellectuals from the theologoi (‘speculators 
                                                      
20
 According to Meijer (1981), p. 228-229, Hecataeus of Miletus can be regarded as the first exponent 
of ‘Greek atheism’ while Lloyd-Jones (1971), p. 130 identifies him as the earliest representative of 
‘Greek relativism’, an important factor in the growth of ancient Greek atheism. 
21
 Thrower (2000), p. 9-10. 
22
 Hecataeus of Miletus (FGrHist 1 F1). 
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on the divine’), who relied upon supernatural and mythological arguments to describe 
natural phenomena, and labeled them physiologoi (‘natural philosophers’).23  
 
According to Aristotle, the first natural philosophers were Ionians, of whom Thales of 
Miletus (floruit 585 BC) would be the first representative. As the oldest Ionian natural 
philosopher, Thales would identify water as the single material principle (archè) in 
contrast to the traditional ‘theologoi’, who would ascribe this to be a union between 
Oceanus and Tethys. Anaximander of Miletus (ca. 610 – ca. 546 BC) identified the 
primary substance as ‘unlimited without definition’ (τὸ ἄπειρον), while parts undergo 
change but the whole is unchangeable’.24 Anaximenes of Miletus (floruit ca. 546-526 
BC) ‘took for his first principle air or that which is unlimited’.25 He would succeed 
Thales in studies of cosmology and cosmogony.26  
 
Anaximander rejected Thales’s idea of the primary substance being water, because it 
cannot be the first cause of other elements like fire. Instead, he postulated that the 
infinite and immeasurable apeiron was the first principle, which he considered to be 
immortal and divine.27 Anaximenes, on the other hand, would clarify the first 
principle being air, based on the process of rarefaction and condensation: air can turn 
into water, penetrates soil and fuels fire. Similar to Anaximander, Anaxamines 
regarded air as the first principle to be divine, but the assumption by the Epicurean 
Velleius (in Cicero’s treatise On the Nature of the Gods) that Anaximenes considered 
                                                      
23
 Frede & Laks (2002), p. viii. 
24
 According to Gerson (1990), p.15, this fragment (DK 12 A9) indicates that Anaximander was the 
first to reason that the archè must be separate or different from all other things of which it is the archè.  
25
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 1 & 2. 
26
 Long (1999)², p. xvii-xxviii  & Long (1999)³, xxix-xxx. 
27
 Anaximander (DK 12 A 15), See also Burkert (1985), p. 307-308: Anaximander would be the first 
intellectual to identify the apeiron with the neuter theion (“the divine”) and thus substituted mythical 
divine personalities by the apeiron as the highest principle. 
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air to be ‘God’ with a beginning in time is most likely wrong, and must be situated 
within the context of Velleius’s adjusting of Milesian cosmology to Epicurean 
theology.28  Clearly, Velleius misapprehended the cosmology of Anaximander and 
Aniximenes: the first principle is not identical to the gods, who, according to 
Velleius’s interpretation of Anaximander29, would come into existence and perish 
over time. The archè is, as Burkert formulates it, ‘the divine beginning which 
embraces everything and guides everything, from which everything proceeds, 
including gods and things divine’.30 
 
In traditional studies on early Greek philosophy, such as John Burnet’s Early Greek 
Philosophy (1892), the Ionian philosophers are nevertheless regarded as the first 
exponents of ‘atheism in Antiquity’, in the sense of disbelief in the existence of the 
gods.31 This hypothesis, however, has been contested since the publication of Werner 
Jaeger’s monograph Die Theologie der frühen griechischen Denker (1953), due to the 
fact that Ionian naturalists still utilized terminology like ‘god’ or ‘divine’, in order to 
explain nature.32 This is certainly the case for Thales, who would have attested that 
‘the world is animate and full of divinities’33  
 
The natural philosophers, who began to describe the physical world, were still 
operating within a theistic framework. So, it was culturally speaking evident to regard 
the basic principles of the cosmos as divine, even for Diogenes of Apollonia, who 
flourished ca.150 years after Thales and Anaximander, and still identified the primary 
                                                      
28
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 26. 
29
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 25. 
30
 Burkert (1985), p. 308. 
31
 Burnet (1920), p. 50. 
32
 Jaeger (1953), p. 28-49. 
33
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, I, 27. 
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stuff air to be endowed with divine intelligence.34  Anaxagoras (ca. 510- ca. 428 BC), 
who later declared the sun to be a mass of red-hot metal35, would be the first 
philosopher to be accused of asebeia by Cleon (most probably based on the 
Diopeithes-decree of the 430s BC), but Anaxagoras cannot be labeled an ‘atheist’. 
Because Anaxagoras envisioned a cosmic intelligence, called Nous (‘Mind’) that had 
set order in the orginal chaotic structure of the universe, his natural philosophy should 
not be associated with atheism.36 The same remark can be addressed to Diogenes of 
Apollonia, who also defended the divine nature of (what he considered to be the 
primary element) ‘air’ and identified it with ‘Zeus’.37 
 
Still, the old hypothesis of Burnet is not without its merits. Although the Ionian 
naturalists cannot be considered the earliest Greek atheists, because they did not 
substitute Greek religion or the gods by a mechanistic or naturalist world, they do 
have their importance in the history of ‘atheism in Antiquity’, due to the fact that they 
instigated a less mythological and more natural and impersonal approach to Greek 
religion. No longer was the idea prevailing that personal and impetuous actions of 
individual deities dominated reality, but rather the idea that the whole of nature was 
being instigated and ordered by a supreme intelligence or ‘Mind’ (Nous). This idea 
would lay the foundations for later Eleatic and Socratic theories on matters of 
metaphysics and theology.  
 
To put it more bluntly, after the Ionic naturalists very few Greek intellectuals would 
have still endorsed belief in the Olympian gods, as dictated by traditional 
                                                      
34
 Broadie (1999), p.205-206. 
35
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 8. 
36
 Plutarch, Pericles, 4,4. 
37
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 29. 
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mythology.38 The tone was set now amongst intellectuals to reinterpret the nature of 
the traditional gods in such way that religious orthodoxy and orthopraxy could be 
reconciled with a more philosophical understanding of divine existence. 
 
Heraclitus, for instance, rejected phallic cults, while Empedocles rejected the 
anthromorphic presentation of the gods.39 Epicurus, however, endorsed the idea of 
anthropomorphism, but denied the divine character of the heavenly bodies, divination 
and reciprocity between gods and mortals altogether, because it would conflict with 
the idea of divine undisturbedness and blessedness.40 Theophrastus, then again, 
rejected animal sacrifice as a natural expression of piety, which Porphyry extended 
with the principle of abstinence from meat consumption. 41 
 
But notwithstanding the rejection of different aspects of popular religion, the denial of 
divine existence was seldom defended.42 Moreover, those philosophers who were 
often associated with the phemenon of ‘not believing in the gods’, such as Democritus 
and Epicurus, because of their mechanistic views on fysics and cosmology, still 
defended participation in traditional religious practices, most likely for reasons of 
(social) convention.43 
 
                                                      
38
 Roberts (2005), p. 88. 
39
 Heraclitus (DK 22 B15) & Empedocles (DK 31 B133 & B134). 
40
 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I, 48; Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 123; Plutarch, Against 
Colotes, 17 (1117a-b); Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 25). 
41
 Theophrastus, On Piety, frs.1-18 & Porphyry, On Abstinence from Animal Food, I-IV.   
42
 Parker (2012), p. 193. 
43
 Epicurus was believed to have been initiated in the Mysteries of Eleusis (Philodemus, On Piety, P. 
Herc. 1098 col. 28, 808-810) and, according to Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers, IX, 43, Democritus did his utmost best not to die during the Thesmophoria, otherwise, 
his sister would not be able to attend it. A famous saying by Democritus, ‘a life without festivals is like 
a road without inns’ (DK 68 B 230), also seems to emphasize his belief in the importance of rituals for 
social reasons. 
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So, from the emergence of Ionian naturalism on, we could acknowledge that, on an 
intellectual level, the notion of popular religion became gradually surpassed, not by 
atheism, as Burnett assumed, but by the concept of a ‘philosophical religion’44 or the 
‘God of the Philosopher’ in which the traditional views on the gods and piety were 
fundamentally reformed.45 In this sense, the birth of Greek ‘deviant religious 
behaviour’ can be ascribed to the emergence of Ionian mytho-historiography and 
naturalist philosophy as the first intellectual movement to uphold a nonconformist 
view regarding the traditional conceptions of the Greek gods.  
 
17.3) Xenophanes 
 
Commonly, the naturalist philosopher and poet Xenophanes of Colophon (ca. 570 - 
ca. 478 BC), is regarded as the first Greek ‘nonconformist’ intellectual with regard to 
popular Greek religion.  In various elegiac and iambic poems, Xenophanes critically 
reflected on Greek religion and more particularly the anthropomorphic nature of the 
Homeric and Hesiodic gods.46 Well-known are his arguments regarding the latter,  
 
“Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods 
all sorts of things which are matters of reproach and censure among men: 
theft, adultery, and mutual deceit.” (transl. J.H. Lesher)47 
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 Burkert (1985), p. 305-337. 
45
 Herrmann (2007), p. 385-397. 
46
 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX, 18. 
47
 Xenophanes of Colophon (DK 21B 11):  
πάντα θεοῖσ᾽ἀνέθηκαν Ὃµηρός θ᾽ Ἡσίοδός τε, 
ὅσσα παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, 
κλέπτειν µοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.      
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In stead of the traditional Homeric pantheon, Xenophanes suggested the idea of a 
supreme divine being (‘God’), although traces of a ‘Greatest God’ can already be 
detected as early as Homer (The Iliad, VIII, 51-52 & The Odyssee, XX, 75) and 
Hesiod (Works & Days, 267: ‘the eye of Zeus, seeing all and understanding all’), but 
more in the sense of an all-governing and all-controlling divine authority.  
 
Influenced by the writings of Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, Xenophanes 
could have been the first intellectual to openly identify the Milesian idea of a single 
physical archè with ‘God’, which he probably identified for the first time with Nous 
(‘Mind’).48 In Xenophanes’s cosmology, anthropomorphism is fully replaced by this 
single divine intellect, which guides the universe in a way Anaximander already 
envisioned.  
 
Modern tradition has frequently labeled Xenophanes as an early monotheist within 
Western philosophy, but some of his fragments mention the existence of multiple 
gods. For instance, Xenophanes argued that ‘God is one, greatest among gods and 
men’, in no way similar to mortals in body or in mind’.49 Therefore, it seems 
historically more plausible to regard Xenophanes as an advocate of a more well-
balanced and sophisticated polytheism in which the supreme God presided over the 
other gods.50   
                                                      
48
 Broadie (1999), p. 212, Burkert (1985), p.308: The idea of a ‘Supreme God’ did not originate from 
Xenophanes, but he was likely the first to associate the ‘Supreme God’ with Nous or ‘Mind’, which 
solved the problem: ‘How can an impersonal divine principle act as a guide of everything? Plutarch 
(Pericles, 4,4), on the other hand, believed Anaxagoras to be the first intellectual to identify the 
creative principle in the universe with ‘Mind’ (νοῦς) and not ‘Change’ (τῦχη) or ‘Neccesity’ 
(ἀνάγκη).  
49
 Xenophanes of Colophon (21 DK B23). 
50
 Drozdek (2007), p. 21. Gerson (1990), p.18-19, on the other hand, criticizes the idea of Xenophanes 
being a (popular) polytheist and argues that he must be rather viewed as a philosophical monotheist, 
because the fragment DK 21 B23 does not suggest, in his opinion, a multiplicity of active personal 
beings more powerful than men. 
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As such, Xenophanes would be the first Greek philosopher to conceptualize the idea 
of ‘God’ as a cosmic ‘Mind’, which would be adopted by later Ionic naturalists, 
Eleatic philosophers, and further elaborated by the Socratics and the Stoics.  
 
17.4) Heraclitus  
 
The religious opinions of Xenophanes, in return, quickly underwent criticism from a 
contemporary natural philosopher, named Heraclitus of Ephesus (floruit ca. 500 
BC).51 In a preserved fragment, Heraclitus states that, 
 
‘Much learning does not teach the mind; otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and 
again Xenophanes and Hecataeus.’ (transl. E. Hussey).52 
 
When this fragment is analyzed in the light of other preserved fragments, we can 
assume that Heraclitus contests both Xenophanes and Hecataeus concerning the idea 
that the nature of the gods can be understood.53 Xenophanes considered the gods to 
have been compromised by Homer and Hesiod, because of the emphasis they laid on a 
deceitful nature of the gods, while Hecataeus questioned traditional Greek mythology, 
plausibly for similar reasons as Xenophanes.  
 
However, Heraclitus seemed convinced that both Xenophanes and Hecataeus wrongly 
rejected the idea of the nature of the gods being ‘evil’ in favour of ‘good’, because 
                                                      
51
 The tradition to consider Heraclitus to be a natural philosopher originates from Aristotle, 1, 984a5-8, 
but this is debatable, because Heraclitus also took interest in logic and ontology, similar to Parmenides 
of Elea. This connection between Ionian naturalism and Eleatic philosophy was also apparent to 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1, 986b21-22, who recognized Parmenides as a pupil of Xenophanes. See also 
Gerson (1990), p. 20-21 on this matter. 
52
 Heraclitus (DK 22 B40): πολυµαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ 
Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον. 
53
 According to Heraclitus (DK 22 B32, 93 & B123), the nature of the gods cannot be known. 
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this dismisses the importance of ‘Cosmic Struggle’ or ‘Strife’, an idea the natural 
philosopher Empedocles (floruit ca. 450 BC) would further develop by adding the 
concept of Eros (‘Love’) to counter ‘Strife’ in a dualist universe.  
 
Similar to Xenophanes, Heraclitus also believed in a divine ‘Mind’ as archè, but 
envisoned it to be an ever-living process of fire. Like fire, this Nous, which Heraclitus 
identified as Logos, could transform itself in all sorts of shapes and thus comprising a 
unity of opposites (e.g., day and night, war and peace, satiety and hunger).54 
According to Heraclitus, this Logos causes a cyclic, ongoing process of birth and 
destruction of a unity of opposites, which later philosophers identified as ‘flux’.55  
 
Although the opposites form a unity, they are nevertheless, due to their oppositional 
nature, in continuing conflict (‘Strife’) with each other in the cosmic process of 
coming into existence and ceasing to be. While Logos acts as the divine archè that 
controls the cosmic process, distinction between the traditional Greek gods and 
humans in Hercalitean cosmology is merely a matter of shape that is caused by chance 
during the natural process of creation.56 Both gods and humans share the element of 
psychè (‘soul’), which is either ’mortal’ (being subject to dying) or ‘immortal’ 
(returning to life).57 Death as a permanent state does not exist, according to 
Heraclitus, because this would mean that death escapes the continuing process of 
                                                      
54
 In different fragments (DK 22 B 30, 31, 67 & 90), Heraclitus explains how the eternal fire can cause 
a unity of opposites, namely by subdividing the ever-living process of fire into the opposed occurences 
of “kindling” and “quenching”, which can both be subdivided into two subprocesses (“warm” and 
“dry” besides  “cold” and “wet”).  This comprises the four cosmic opposites which in pairs of opposites 
compose the four world masses (earth: cold and dry, sea: cold and wet, air: hot and wet and celestial 
fire: hot and dry). See also Hussey (1999), p. 98-100. 
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 Plato, Cratylus, 402a4-11 & Theaetetus 152d2-e9 & Aristotle, Topics I.II 104b21-22 & On Heaven, 
III.1.298b29-33. 
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 Trépanier (2010), p. 285-286. 
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 Heraclitus (DK 22 B62).  
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creation. Therefore, gods and humans go through the same cyclic process and only 
chance determines whether the ‘soul’ becomes ‘god’ or ‘man’.  
 
But Heraclitus nevertheless believed in a distinction between ‘lesser gods’ and an 
overseeing, all-governing ‘cosmic deity’. The former are considered “the mortal 
immortals, the wakeful gardians of the living and the dead”58, while the later 
embodies “the one wise, separate from all other things”.59 The ‘lesser gods’ are 
subjected to the process of creation, and this idea later resurfaced in the theological 
teachings of the Stoics Cleanthes and Chrysippus. According to them, all gods, except 
for Zeus, were subjected to an eternal process of regeneration in a cosmic fire.60  
 
17.5) Parmenides 
 
The opinions of Heraclitus would, in return, be attacked by the metaphysical and 
ontological arguments of the Eleatic philosopher Parmenides (floruit ca. 450 BC), 
who defended the idea of an unchangeable, immovable archè. Like Anaximander, 
Parmenides believed that an archè should be fundamentally different from everything 
it is an archè of. This can explain why the physical world with its appearences of 
plurality and change can be caused by a metaphysical (i.e. divine) archè that is 
actually reality itself (‘being’).  
 
In Parmenidean thought, two ‘ways’ of inquiry’ (‘the Way of Truth’ and ‘the Way of 
Appearance’) are displayed in a poem (DK 44 B1) by a tutoring goddess. The first 
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 Heraclitus (DK 22 B63). 
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 Heraclitus (DK 22 B108). 
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 The theological views of Cleanthes and Chrysippus resulted in accusations of atheism. The main 
source on this matter is Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against the Stoics, 31 (1075a-c). 
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way leads to the truth, according to Parmenides, and represents ‘[it] is and [it] is not 
possible for [it] not to be’ (or ‘being’), while the second way, which leads to disaster 
in Parmenides’s opinion, represents ‘[it] is not and it is necessary for [it] not to be’ (or 
‘not-being’).61 The second way is not acceptable, because ‘not-being’ is 
incomprehensible and unidentifiable.62 Coming into existence, like Heraclitus 
envisioned, is also impossible, because it assumes change from what ‘[it] is not’ to 
what ‘[it] is’ and thus assuming a ‘not-being’. Therefore, all forms of motion or 
incompleteness concerning ‘being’ must be ruled out; otherwise ‘being’ is subjected 
to change and differentiation from a ‘not-being’. 63 
 
Greek philosophy after Parmenides is often translated as a series of responses to his 
arguments.64  For instance, Aristotle’s ‘immovable first mover’ seems to have many 
similarities with Parmenides’s immovable archè, while Plato would integrate the 
naturalist idea of a divine Nous (‘Mind’) and the unchangeable Being of Eleatic 
thought to define a dominant principle (‘World-soul’) presiding over physis (‘nature’) 
and nomos (‘convention’) in order to counter the sophist arguments against the 
existence of the gods.65  
 
But Parmenides could also be regarded ‘the father of materialism’.66 Although 
Parmenides envisioned Being in an abstract and metaphysical world (the ‘Way of 
Truth’) in which reason and divinity coincide,67 Being is also reflected through the 
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63
 Graham (1999), p. 165 & Drozdek (2007), p. 48-49. 
64
 See Barnes (1979), vol II, p.11-15; Gerson (1990), p.21 & Curd (1991), p.241. 
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(deceitful) ‘Way of Appearance’, which represents the physical world of the senses.68 
Unchangeability nonetheless characterizes Being in both ‘Ways’. Atomists later 
adopted this tenet and postulated that atoms compound bodies –regardless of the fact 
whether the Democritean principle of necessity (ἀνάγκη) or the Epicurean idea of 
inclination (παρέγκλισις) acts as the driving force behind this process– , which disperse 
at the moment of corporal death, but continue hereafter the perpetual process of 
forming new aggregates.69 
 
In any case, by offering two distinct ’ways’ to perceive reality, Parmenides seems to 
have resolved the conundrum of Anaximander: how can a (divine) archè be 
fundamentally different from everything it is the archè of? So, with the poem of 
Parmenides, we witness a first emanation of philosophical religion at the dusk of the 
Archaic period. Although Parmenides never characterizes his ‘being’ as divine, we 
can presume such, due to the fact that ‘the Way of Truth’ is presented to him by a 
teaching goddess.70  For this reason, there is no indication to consider Parmenides an 
exception in early Greek philosophy in regard to belief in a divine archè, but, at the 
same time, we cannot deny that Parmenides also offered later Greek thinkers the 
possibility to perceive reality in a strictly materialist manner (e.g., Democritus’s 
etheè), in which natural laws suppressed divine existence in terms of causality. 
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17.6) conclusions 
 
We can, in concluding this chapter on deviant religious behaviour in the Archaic 
period, assess that ‘atheism’ in the sense of disbelief in god(s) was unknown in early 
Greek philosophy. All philosophers, without exception, preserved the idea of divine 
existence as the dominant active force behind the physical world and later natural 
philosophers like Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia would 
maintain this viewpoint.71 When analyzing the phenomenon from the perspective of 
‘deviant religious behaviour’, on the other hand, we cannot deny the fact that this 
intellectual mind set, reflecting an innovative, nonconformist approach to traditional 
Greek belief, has its actual roots in the Archaic period in the rationalizing approach to 
mytho-historiography by Hecataeus of Miletus and the poetic attacks on Homeric and 
Hesiodic anthropomorphism from Xenophanes of Colophon on.  
 
The mythical personalities of the traditional Greek gods are gradually surpassed by 
the concept of a single, impersonal and bodyless ‘God’, who coincides with the first 
material principle. Regardless of the fact how this primary substance was actually 
defined by various philosophers, the principle of archè was always identified as 
having a divine nature.72  
 
In addition to the divine underlying principle, the reintegrated function of the gods of 
traditional Greek belief is often difficult to determine in early Greek philosophy. 
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Xenophanes speaks of multiple gods, which indicates that polytheism is not being 
discarded, but the gods of tradition in Xenophanes’s natural theology are bereft of 
much supremacy that deals with an anthropomorphic nature. Not only their 
mythological personalities are rejected, but also the practice of divination, by which 
seers can acquire specific knowledge about the future by interpreting omens, because 
Xenophanes rejects the idea that the gods can speak directly to humans due to a lack 
of corporeal form.73  The distinction between ‘gods ‘and ‘humans’ in Heraclitus’s 
natural theology, on the other hand, seems to be merely a matter of shape that is 
caused randomly by the cyclic progress of birth and destruction. In Parmenides’s 
metaphysical theology, the function of the traditional gods is even more indistinct: 
although the two ways of inquiry are presented by a goddess, we have no indication 
that this goddess actually represents one of the traditional ‘Twelve Gods’. We could 
be dealing with a ‘Parmenidean’ goddess, solely constructed for solemnizing 
reasons.74 The goddess does not actually provide any divine relevation, but rather 
offers two different methodologies: the first methodology (‘Way of Truth’) being in 
accordance with any logical assessment, while the second (‘Way of Appearances’) 
only entails logical contradictions.75  
 
So, early Greek philosophy seems to have limited the importance of the gods of 
traditional Greek belief as active agents in the physical world severely, in favour of 
what would eventually become the concept of the ‘God of the Philosopher’ on which 
Plato and Aristotle would further elaborate. The development of certain philosophical 
ideas in the Classical period, however, would even make the idea of a ‘Greatest God’ 
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redundant and thus paving the way for atheism in the strict sense, as will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 18: the Classical period: the rise and disappearance of 
‘radical’ atheism 
 
In the early Classical period, a new generation of natural philosophers (the so-called 
“Neo-Ionians”) emerged, who still regarded the primary substance to be of divine 
nature. For instance, Anaxagoras (ca. 510 – ca. 428 BC) also envisioned a Cosmic 
Mind or Nous, while Diogenes of Apollonia (floruit ca. 425 BC) postulated ‘Zeus’ to 
be identical with the element air, which is endowed with intelligence and 
consciousness. Hippo of Rhegium (floruit ca. 450 BC), similar to Thales, claimed 
water to be the divine principle that act as a creative agent of all things.76 
 
But in contrast to early Greek natural philosophy, these Neo-Ionians were now being 
confronted with accusations of being asebès, and the introduction of legislation to 
condemn such socially unacceptable behaviour.77  Later literary traditions even 
associated them with atheism78, although they still deemed a divine underlying cause 
behind the primary substance to be self-evident. Like early natural philosophy, Neo-
Ionian philosophy also endeavoured a more profound sense of piety that was not 
dictated by tradition, but by a deeper insight in the essence of being.79 Plato (Laws, 
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XII, 967c), on the other hand, criticized the slander of atheism natural philosophers 
such as Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia experienced from comic poets while 
Aristophanes’s character of the atheist ‘Socrates the Melian’ in Clouds (830) appears 
to be a mixture of Neo-Ionian naturalism and atomism with sophist elements.80  
 
As demonstrated earlier within this dissertation, Athenian society in the second half of 
the 5th century BC did not distinguish Neo-Ionian philosophers from the early sophist 
movement and its categorical opinions and ‘radical’ attitude to traditional Greek 
religion.81 Besides, early natural philosophers like Xenophanes of Colophon and 
Heraclitus of Ephesus already utilized radical criticisms on organized religion, but 
they were never associated with any disbelief in the gods. The criticisms of 
Xenophanes and Empedocles, for example, were largely aimed at the 
anthropomorphic nature of the gods as depicted by Homeric tradition, while 
Heraclitus criticized the rituals of phallic cults.82 Although their reflections could be 
interpreted as ‘atheist’ at first sight, Xenophanes, Heraclitus and Empedocles were 
never called atheoi in Antiquity. This could be explained by the fact that these early 
natural philosophers were primarily recognized as poets83, due to the fact that most of 
them recorded their ideas in verse for artistic reasons.84 Their critical remarks on 
traditional Greek religion were not considered to be less acceptable than, for instance, 
the poetic reflections on divine justice by Theognis or Pindar’s assessment of Homer 
(“his lies and winged artfulness”) in Nemean 7, 23.85 This, however, is not the case 
with the portrayal of Neo-Ionian philosophy in comic plays. In Aristophanes’s Clouds 
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(830), the naturalism of Diogenes of Apollonia is combined with the radical atheism 
of Diagoras of Melos in the character of ‘Socrates the Melian’. 
 
With the re-emergence of the Ionian prose treatise and the rise of sophist prose 
writings like Protagoras’s Ἀλήθεια (‘Truth’) or Καταβάλλοντες λóγοι (‘Knockdown 
Arguments’) in the second half of the 5th century BC86, combined with a more 
methodical and less allegorical approach on the critical assessment of traditional 
Greek religion, philosophical speculation on divine existence during the Classical 
period became increasingly associated with socially unacceptable behaviour that 
threatened civic religion. These philosophical speculations, in return, would further 
radicalize to a certain degree that divinity was no longer considered to be an 
underlying principle of reality, as the following philosophical traditions substantiate. 
 
18.1) Atomist thought 
  
In the Early Classical period, atomism appeared to be the first philosophical 
movement, in which divinity, as an active force in the physicial world, played no role 
of importance anymore. This introduced a new way of theological thinking, which 
could be identified as ‘atheism’ in the sense of a denial of divine existence.87  
 
The origins of atomism are generally attributed to Leucippus of Miletus or Abdera 
(floruit ca. 440 BC), but already in Antiquity the life of Leucippus was cloaked in 
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obscurity, to such extent that Epicurus even doubted his existence.88 Aristotle 
nevertheless attests the historicity of Leucippus on different occasions, but he is not 
always consistent in his recognition of Leucippus as the originator of atomism.89 Later 
sources tend to recognize Democritus (ca. 460 – ca. 380 BC) as the principal author of 
the atomist theory.90  
 
The most elaborate source on atomism is nonetheless Aristotle (On Generation and 
Corruption, I.7-8 324a35-325a31). He describes it as a reconciliation of the sensitory 
perception of plurality, motion and change with the Eleatic denial of coming to be or 
ceasing to exist. More concretely, atomist theory postulates the existence of 
unchangeable primary elements, but contrary to the observable stuffs or elements of 
Ionian naturalism, these elements are unobservable due to their compactness and 
indivisible (literally ‘uncuttable’ or atomon) nature.  
 
These basic corpuscles or ‘atoms’ operate in a perpetual state of interaction with each 
other, by which they form aggregates. For instance, to form a world order, the atoms 
cluster together in a circular swirl or vortex.91 This process is characterized by a 
mechanistic, purposeless but deterministic necessity, because each stage of atomic 
interaction is caused by a preceding interaction. The atomic interaction does also 
entail the existence of an empty space that (a) separates the atoms from each other and 
(b) allows motion of the singular atoms or their aggregates. This empty space or 
‘void’ should not be regarded as a literal ‘nothingness’, which would be in conflict 
with the Parmenidian denial of ‘non-being’.  
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Moreover, Parmenides (DK 28 B22-25) already suggested that the existence of a 
multitude of things in ‘being’ is only plausible when void is present to separate things, 
while the Eleatic Melissus (floruit late 5th century BC) argued that void is necessary in 
order to allow objects to move.92 Although atomist theory subsisted in accordance 
with Eleatic thought, it would be unlikely to assume that the atomic process and void 
were considered to be divine concepts by atomists.93   
 
For the first time in Greek philosophical thought, the idea of a naturalized cosmology 
had arrived. This development would have important theological implications.  
Atomism would induce new contrasting ideas to the (Parmenidian) notion of ‘God’ as 
a divine, non-physical phenomenon that acts as the archè of the physical world, 
namely that (a) no form of divinity exists or (b) divinity must be viewed as a 
nonfundamental phenomenon in the physical world. The first ideas would be 
supported by sophists and (radical) atheists, while the second idea could correspond 
with the personal view of Democritus. Concerning Democritus’s own religious 
thoughts, older studies on this matter explained his view on the Greek gods as purely 
naturalistic and aetiological in order to explain certain natural phenomena.94 Later 
studies, however, do acknowledge a sophisticated theological belief within 
Democritean thought.95 
 
Gods as physical phenomena existed in Democritus’s opinion, because gods can 
materialize themselves in the shape of ‘images’ (εἴδωλα) in dreams or visions, similar 
to the later Epicurean view on the preconception of gods as images in the human 
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mind. In Democritean thought, the gods of traditional Greek religion as eidola must 
be also composed of atoms, because atoms and void are the only archai of everything 
in the universe that comes into being and perishes over time. Anything else is only 
thought to exist.96 Therefore, it is believed that Democritus viewed the gods as living, 
anthropomorphic eidola of enormous size, possessing a high degree of morality, 
intellect and interest in human affairs.97 At first sight, the theological views of 
Democritus regarding the gods do not seem to be compatible with the mechanistic 
nature of the atomist theory, but this is nevertheless regulated by the idea of spherical 
atoms. This type of atoms is characterized by a finer nature, which Democritus 
associated with divinity and the soul.98 Due to the finer consistency of spherical 
atoms, the gods and the soul are invisible to the naked eye and are only observable 
through the mind by means of eidola.  
 
In Democritean theology the gods are thus the result of a more complicated atomic 
conglomeration, which provides them with a lengthy and qualitative existence, but 
like humans, they are still perishable physical beings whose (spherical) atomic 
compounds scatter on the moment of corporeal death.99  
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Notwithstanding the lack of divine imperishability, veneration of the gods was 
strongly supported by Democritus, based on the conviction that human life should be 
based on cheerfulness and well-being (euthumia).  
 
This can only be achieved when physis and nomos are compatible concepts.100 
Democritean epistemology, theology and ethics should therefore be analyzed in a 
close connection, in order to determine the religious doctrines of Democritus. 
Although a divine archè is not recognized in atomist theory and teleology is not 
accepted101, Democritus seems to have acknowledged divinity as an all-pervading 
form of intellect or ‘Mind’ in Nature (cf. Diogenes of Apollonia’s Zeus)102 that 
operates as a creative force behind atomic composition, similar to the idea of a 
heavenly fire by Heraclitus.103 The Greek gods as aggregates of spherical atoms are 
personal actualizations of this Mind to a perfect degree and mankind must attempt to 
approximate the qualities of these ‘immortal’ (i.e. in the sense of long-living) and 
highly moral gods as closely as possible. In order to do so, man must become a god 
himself (cf. Empedocles), i.e. by imitating their divine qualities.  
 
But how does this relate to the accusastions of atheism against Democritus in ancient 
sources?104 One can identify Democritus as an atheist, based on the aetiological 
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elements within his theology: the origin of the gods of traditional belief arose from an 
irrational fear of natural phenomena. For this reason, I believe it safe to assume that 
Democritus did not believe in the gods of traditional Greek religion. Nevertheless this 
observation, piety, as displayed in traditional worship, appears to be a pivotal element 
in the religious thought of Democritus. Surely, Democritus would not have supported 
the moral relativism of Callicles and Thrasymachus, because such inclination would 
not secure peace of mind or guarantee any prospect on a pleasant life.  
 
Moreover, the eidola, which appear in dreams and visions, can either be beneficial or 
harmful, depending on the moral attitude of those who evoke them.105 The beneficial 
eidola (ἀγαθοποιά) can be induced through the use of prayer.106 Spiteful acts or 
injustice, on the other hand, can provoke the harmful eidola (κακοποιά) leading to 
unfavourable acts towards those who committed injustice.107 Therefore, divine justice 
in Democritean thought is manifesting itself in a rather traditionalist fashion, i.e. in 
the form of misfortune during human life (e.g., the multiple perils at sea religious 
offenders like Protagoras or Diagoras would have suffered according to some literary 
traditions).108  
 
According to Christopher C.W. Taylor, this inconsistency in Democritean thought, 
namely a naturalistic viewpoint versus a conventional one, can be explained by a 
fundamental difference between the physical theory of Democritus and his views on 
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ethics and politics. The former is atheist, because it postulates that nature is dissimilar 
to any human representation or convention, while the latter is based on the idea that 
moral conventions are inherent to human nature.109  
 
Democritean ethics and politics are actually similar to Protagorean thought: individual 
freedom is restricted due to the hostile environment of physis, in which humans dwell. 
They must rely upon communal protection and this will imply the observance of laws 
(in a sort of ‘Hobbesian’ social contract, as it were) in order to secure a harmonious 
society.110 Without nomos, mankind would succumb to its own aggressive and selfish 
nature and civilization would simply be inconceivable. Therefore, the highest good in 
human life is the pursuit of happiness, which Democritus identifies as “well-being” or 
“harmony”.111  A pleasant life is most of all an untroubled life and this can only be 
assured by respecting the law and adjusting one’s self-interest to conventional 
morality.  
 
Another basic assumption in Democritean ethics is the belief that the gods only 
bestow goodness upon men. The evil that men endure is the mere result of their own 
“blindness of mind and lack of judgment”.112 This thought pattern of supreme good 
would be further sophisticated in Plato’s dialogues (The Republic & Protagoras) and 
systematized in Aristotle’s Ethics.113  
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18.2) Sophist thought 
 
A different intellectual movement within Greek philosophy, which emerged almost 
simultaneously with atomism and also critically questioned traditional views on 
divinity, was the Sophist movement. Like Xenophanes and Heraclitus, the Sophists 
did formulate radical criticisms, but these did not necessarily include alternative 
concepts on divinity. In the research of Protagoras of Abdera (floruit ca. 440 BC), a 
fellow citizen of Democritus, the possible inexistence of the gods became overtly a 
matter of debate for the first time. In the opening lines of his lost Peri Theōn, which 
have been preserved by Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods, I, 63) and Diogenes 
Laertius (IX, 52), Protagoras stated that,  
 
“As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either that they exist or that they do not exist. For many 
are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human 
life." (transl. R.D. Hicks)114 
 
As the passage indicates, Protagoras argued that the possible inexistence of the gods is 
not an expression of disbelief, but rather a matter of lack of knowledge. The briefness 
of human life prevents any satisfying answer. Consequently, ignorance is the only 
certainty about the existence of the gods. This would implicate that Protagoras was 
rather an agnostic than an atheist.115  
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However, Protagoras would have rather assessed the existence of the gods as a matter 
of relative truth and belief.116 When we analyze Plato as a source on the sophist 
Protagoras, we cannot discern any similarities with other sophists (or so-called 
‘immoralists’) like Callicles or Thrasymachus on the matter of atheism.  
 
Similar to Plato (Laws, X, 886a), Protagoras seems to have acknowledged the 
existence of the gods based on an argumentatio ad populum (Protagoras, 320c). 
Protagoras’s view on the gods is characterized by the idea that mankind always had 
some basic form of theistic belief. The gods themselves are no observable facts, but 
rather products of the human mind. In other words, the gods only exist by human 
convention and law (nomos) and are thus seperated from any empirical reality (or 
Democritus’s etheè).  
 
Still, the sophist Protagoras is not portrayed as an (immoral) atheist by Plato, because 
his views on the gods are not that much removed from traditional Greek religion: 
nomos as a precondition for any social and civic life is regarded as a gift by the gods 
(cf. Demosthenes, Against Aristogiton I, 20) and is supervised by Dikè, the 
personification of Zeus’s justice.  So, Protagoras in Plato’s dialogues is convinced that 
any concept of the gods (e.g., divine justice) in the human mind is actually implanted 
by Zeus himself.117  
 
It remains nevertheless unclear to which extent Plato’s depiction of Protagoras reflects 
the actual views of the sophist on the Greek gods. According to the so-called 
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‘Protagoras-myth’ in Plato’s dialogue Protagoras (320c-322e), Protagoras believed 
nomos to be founded in physis, because the method of nature evokes the creation of 
social constructs. Man cannot survive on individual instinct or intelligence alone in a 
hostile environment. He must create alliances with his fellow men in order to 
maximize his changes of survival. This inevitably implies the loss of individual 
freedom, since rules in the form of legislation are needed to guarantee any success of 
social coexistence. Justice (δίκη) and conscience (αἰδώς) are products of a social life 
and these are alien to the natural way of life, which Callicles or Thrasymachus 
defended.   
 
These Protagorean views did correspond with other sophist research on the origin of 
the gods (cf. Prodicus of Ceos). This critical reflection on traditional religion would 
reach a height in the last quarter of the 5th century BC and is particularly noticeable in 
plays like Aristophanes’s Clouds and the satyr play Sisyphus of which the authorship 
is attributed to either Critias or Euripides.  
 
In the latter play, religion is depicted as a forgery, only invented by shrewd men as a 
means to control the masses. A similar idea can also be found in Euripides’s 
Bellerophon and The Wise Melanippe. In this last play, the following passage (665d) 
can be read:  
 
(Melanippe) “Zeus, whoever Zeus is, for I know not but by report,” (transl. C. Collard, M.J. Cropp & 
K.H. Lee)118 
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Euripides portrays in The Wise Melanippe a female protagonist, who distinguishes 
herself by her intellect and rhetorical abilities.119 According to Plutarch (Amatorius, 
756c), The Wise Melanippe caused quite some consternation. However, Plutarch does 
not specify whether the unconventional portraying of the female character Melanippe 
or any suggestions of ‘atheism’ in the play formed the basis of this controversy.  
Considering the fact that casting doubts on the gods appears to be a recurring element 
in Euripidean drama120, we could assume the latter. But this short passage does not 
necessarily indicate any atheism of the character Melanippe, nor should it be 
interpreted in such way that Euripides promoted atheism in his plays.121 The doubts 
which Euripides’s human characters cast on the gods, rather reflects a recognizable 
late 5th century BC Zeitgeist, which was characterized by sociopolitical turmoil and 
religious crisis.122  But the use of ‘atheist’ statements by Euripides also serves 
dramaturgical purposes, since this always evolves towards a traditional outcome: the 
(female) characters that initiallty doubted Zeus for reasons of despair and 
confusion123, will eventually experience his justice and benevolence in order to have 
their traditional belief in the gods restored.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
ὕπο. ((Melanippe) “Zeus, for we own he has received that name from truth alone, and not from 
common fame”.) (transl. W.H. Goodwin). 
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the impending destruction of the city of Troy. 
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The ‘atheist’ passages in Euripides’s plays nevertheless illustrate that late 5th century 
BC audiences could recognize the incorporation of philosophical doctrines on the 
existence of the gods or at least they could recognize this as a form of religious 
criticism when being exposed to it.124 This is also the opinion of David Sedley in his 
recent article on atheism in Antiquity: the fact that the opening lines of Protagoras’s 
Peri Theōn raised the question of the existence of the gods must reflect to a certain 
extent a sociocultural context, in which a negative answer to this question could have 
been imaginable.125 According to Sedley, Protagoras’s Peri Theōn might even 
indicate that positive atheism was an established fact in late 5th century BC Athens.126   
 
But Protagoras is not a probable representative of positive atheism for different 
reasons. Firstly, Protagoras is generally depicted as a highly respected intellectual and 
a defender of conventional morality in Plato’s dialogues, who poses the question ‘Do 
the gods (not) exist? from an epistemological point of view, rather than an 
onthological one.127 Secondly, the debate on the existence versus the inexistence of 
the gods in the Peri Theōn was more likely of a rhetorical nature, based on the 
principle of antithetical argument, as the alternative title Knockdown Arguments 
seems to suggest.128 Thirdly, the opening lines of Protagoras’s Peri Theōn do not 
necessarly reflect any scepticism or agnosticism, but might suggest that divine 
existence is simply beyond human comprehension and should therefore not be a topic 
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of any investigation. 129 As Protagoras himself argues, the briefness of human life 
does not allow to investigate the matter thoroughly enough, so we must refrain from 
any speculation. 
 
A more plausible example of sophistic reasoning that could have stimulated positive 
atheism is the assessment of divine justice as being a mere artificial human 
construct.130 The second type of asebeis, according to Plato (Laws, X, 885b), namely 
those who do not believe in divine involvement in human affairs or the deists 
represent such mind-set. The sophist Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (ca. 459 – ca 400 
BC), for instance, seems to embody this ‘deist’ opinion: 
 
“The gods do not see the things that are done among men; if they did, they would not overlook the 
greatest human good, justice. For we find that men do not follow it.” (transl. A.B. Drachmann)131 
 
The debate on (divine) justice also surfaces in the character of Callicles, a young 
sophist and pupil of Gorgias, in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias (483a-483e) from ca. 380 
BC.  It is commonly accepted among modern scholars that Callicles represents an 
actual historical figure from the late 5th century BC, albeit he appears to be unknown 
outside Plato’s dialogues.132 According to Eric R. Dodds, Callicles might represent 
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the sophist whom Plato could have become if Socrates had never crossed his path.133 
Callicles is portrayed in Plato’s dialogue as a sort of Realpolitiker, who opposes any 
conventional justice in favour of a natural immoralism.  
 
In Callicles’s opinion, a majority of weak have been able to restrain a minority of 
strong by means of social constructs (nomoi), such as legislation (and, logically, 
organized religion as well), although such behaviour is not present in nature (physis), 
where an abundance of preys is being submitted to predators.134 Callicles thus 
advocates a natural state in which a strong minority, undisturbed by any sense of 
justice, prevails over the weak masses. Socrates, on the other hand, rejects Callicles’s 
ideas as being chaotic and stipulates that the cosmos is orderly structured, which 
enables the concept of justice to be self-evident.135  
 
Based on the scarcity of preserved sources, we cannot conclude with certainty that 
Thrasymachus and Callicles actually professed philosophical atheism, in the sense of 
deism and antitheism, but it should be clear that contemporaries could have 
interpreted such types of atheism as the natural outcome of their radical conclusions 
on the conventional character of justice, legislation, morality and religion.  
 
18.3) Plato 
 
As mentioned more than once throughout this dissertation, the influence of Plato on 
the subject of philosophical atheism in Antiquity cannot be underestimated. Already 
from the first appearance of the noun ἀθεότης, which can be found in the dialogue 
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Statesman (309a), Plato relates it to violence and injustice as typical characteristics of 
a man lacking virtue and self-restraint.  For this reason, the phenomenon of atheotès 
must be answered by a death sentence, exile or the deprivation of the most basic civic 
rights. In the Seventh Letter (336b), Plato compares ἀθεότης with ἀνοµία (lawlessness) 
and considers both to have its roots in ἀµαθία (ignorance), which he regards as the 
greatest of all evils. Based on the information given in these sources, it is nonetheless 
unclear if Plato regards ἀθεότης as a social or a philosophical phenomenon.  
 
This latter could, however, be the case as Statesman, Seventh Letter and Laws are late 
dialogues. Plato seems to have constructed the noun especially to relate to a certain 
mind-set, associated with naturalist and sophist philosophers. In the tenth book of his 
last dialogue Laws, which focuses on the phenomenon of atheism and the ongoing 
debate on the existence of the gods, Plato describes atheism as the outcome of 
naturalist and sophist philosophy that has reduced the divine character of the heavenly 
bodies to impersonal matter and, in doing so, it has stimulated ‘atheist’ argumentation 
that convinces (especially young) people that the gods do not exist: 
 
“It is rather the novel views of our modern scientists that we must hold responsible as the cause of 
mischief. For the result of arguments of such people is this, -that when you and I try to prove the 
existence of the gods by pointing to these very objects- sun, moon, stars, and earth- as instances of 
deity and divinity, people who have been converted by these scientists will assert that these things are 
simply earth and stone, incapable of paying any heed to human affairs, and that these beliefs of ours are 
speciously tricked out with arguments to make them plausible.” (transl. R.G. Bury)136 
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 Plato, Laws, X, 886d: τὰ µὲν οὖν δὴ τῶν ἀρχαίων πέρι µεθείσθω καὶ χαιρέτω, καὶ ὅπῃ θεοῖσιν 
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In Plato’s opinion, the human soul is immortal, which enables mankind to transcend 
the physical world and to reach a divine state (Theaetetus, 176b).137 But by strictly 
relying on mechanistic doctrines, Plato argues, the immortality of the soul is being 
denied and the heavenly bodies are stripped of their divine character. This should, on 
the other hand, not lead to the assumption that, for example, Anaxagoras was an 
immoralist, since Plato (Laws, XII, 967c) explicitly rejects the slander of atheism by 
contemporary poets against naturalist philosophers, whom they compared with “dogs 
howling at the moon”.  
 
Moreover, Plato still displays a minimum of respect in Laws for naturalist 
philosophers, even if they were accused of impiety. In passage XII, 967b, Plato argues 
that ‘atheist’ thinkers like Anaxagoras simply drew the wrong conclusions, based on 
the hypothesis that the soul is posterior to body and not vice versa. In sharp contrast to 
Plato’s considerations for naturalist philosophers, however, is his fierce stance against 
atheism from a sophist signature.   Plato clearly regards disbelief in the gods as a 
sophist plague to which especially young people are susceptible: 
 
“The first statement, my dear sir, which these people make about the gods is that they exist by art and 
not by nature,—by certain legal conventions which differ from place to place, according as each tribe 
agreed when forming their laws. They assert, moreover, that there is one class of things beautiful by 
nature, and another class beautiful by convention; while as to things just, they do not exist at all by 
nature, but men are constantly in dispute about them and continually altering them, and whatever 
alteration they make at any time is at that time authoritative, though it owes its existence to art and the 
laws, and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views which young people imbibe from 
men of science, both prose-writers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by 
                                                                                                                                                        
ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεπεισµένοι ἂν λέγοιεν ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτὰ καὶ οὐδὲν 
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force; whence it comes that the young people are afflicted with a plague of impiety, as though the gods 
were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and, because of this, factions also arise, when 
these teachers attract them towards the life that is right “according to nature,” which consists in being 
master over the rest in reality, instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention.” (transl. 
R.G. Bury)138 
 
Plato seems to associate this type of ‘atheism’ with ‘nihilism’ in the sense of an 
absence of ‘goodness’. Sophist education corrupts youth by reducing the gods and 
laws to products of human convention. If forces like nature and convention dominate 
reality instead of the mental energy of a divine mind or Nous, goodness and justice 
cannot be accomplished, in Plato’s opinion.139  
 
In order to counter the sophist arguments on the gods, Plato attempts to formulate 
evidence of divine existence, which manifests itself in the heavenly bodies and the 
ordering of the seasons140, but Plato also mentions the argument of tradition and the 
idea that even barbarians believe in the existence of gods.141 However, Plato does 
realize that traditional religion is not the most appropriate remedy for atheism. As a 
matter of fact, Plato argues that fraudulent aspects of traditional religion lead to 
atheism. This reasoning becomes evident in his classification of 3 types of what he 
considers to be ‘impious persons’:  
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“he that acts so (i.e impiously) is in one or other of these three conditions of mind: either he does not 
believe in what I have said; or, secondly, he believes that the gods exist, but have no care for men; or, 
thirdly, he believes that they are easy to win over when bribed by offerings and prayers.” (transl. R.G. 
Bury)142 
 
The first type consists of a small group of (radical) atheists, namely those who do not 
believe in the existence of the gods, while the second type comprises the deists. 
According to Plato (X, 889e), this second type of disbelief has come into existence 
due to the fact that poets wrongly attributed the term ‘happy’ to the gods (cf. The 
Republic, II, 363, 366d-e & III, 392). This suggests a lack of concern of the gods for 
human affairs. The third type is actually not atheism, but a corruptive form of 
traditional theism, which should also be considered impious in Plato’s opinion. This 
type of impiety characterizes an aspect of traditional religion of which Plato is very 
critical, namely the dominant Homeric and Hesiodic views on the gods of the 
tradition, which Plato assesses as being counterproductive in terms of the education of 
children.143  
 
On this matter, Plato seems to have been influenced by Xenophanes of Colophon.144 
Especially in The Republic did Plato criticize aspects of popular religion, such as 
mythology, which Homer and Hesiod had shaped around the theme of ‘gods plotting 
against one another’.145 This can be at most an inspiration for poets, but it has no 
actual significance to religion. This early refutation of popular religion has led to the 
opinion that the younger Plato in The Republic displayed a much more critical opinion 
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of religion than the older Plato. Especially Drachmann argued that Laws, in which 
Plato warns youth not to yield to the disease of atheism, could indicate a developed 
conservatism in Plato’s later years by promoting again the gods of traditional belief.146 
This, however, has already been refuted early on. Tate demonstrated that The 
Republic and Laws are not incongruent as both focus on a critical attitude towards 
poetry.147 It is regarded as an ‘unnatural form of art’ in both The Republic and 
Laws.148  
 
Besides, it seems unlikely that (even the younger) Plato considered the purely 
anthropomorphic Olympians to be the actual gods of tradition, because the theogonies 
of Homer and Hesiod had characterized these gods by immoral standards such as 
arbitrariness and wickedness.149 In Plato’s opinion, the gods can perform no other 
conduct than goodness.150 But, at the same time, the importance of traditional worship 
(Laws, X, 803e) as embedded within civic religion is also being emphasized. For 
these reasons, Plato undertakes an attempt to harmonize the gods of tradition with an 
abstract and more heavenly kind of gods, whom direct the orderly motions of the 
heavenly bodies.151 Because the regularity of these motions cannot be ascribed to 
change or human manipulation, divine intelligence must be the underlying principle.  
Then again, the question remains if these gods should replace the gods of tradition. 
The latter are frequently mentioned by name throughout Plato’s literary output.152 
Could we be dealing with two distinguishable kinds of gods: celestial and traditional 
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gods? Being gods, both could be characterized by an indissoluble interaction between 
‘winged souls that fly up to heaven’ (in contrast to humans) and bodies.153 However, 
there is no indication that Plato envisioned two different kinds of eternal gods. Rather, 
the difference could be situated on the level of visibility of the divine bodies.154 The 
gods are free to present themselves to mortals in the form of their own preference: 
visible in the form of the sun, moon, earth and stars or in a more ‘anthropomorphic’ 
appearance, according to traditional worship. Their only commitment (to the 
Demiurge?) is the compliance to the metaphysical principle of ‘goodness’.  The 
eternal gods thus represent moral perfection and this can be observed in the regularity 
of the heavenly bodies. They do care about human affairs and cannot be bribed by 
prayers or sacrifices, in contrast to the gods of a more popular understanding of 
traditional belief.155  
 
Regardless of his critical attitude of traditional theism, the fiercest reaction of Plato is 
aimed at radical atheists in particular (from passage X, 885e on).156 Plato aims to 
create in Laws a counterweight to the popularity of atheism in his days by disclosing it 
as a mere form of sophist trickery. This ambition is closely connected with the 
reevaluation of religion as a communal matter, in stead of an increasingly private 
one.157 In the light of this objective, the choice of atheos as an indicator for atheist 
behaviour is a logical step: due to the negative connotations already attached to the 
term, Plato must have realized its stigmatic potential on a social level when 
identifying certain philosophical arguments with atheos. Indeed, atheism is described 
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as being harmful to society, especially since Plato experiences it as a widespread 
phenomenon.158  
 
The main plea in Laws (X) consists, however, of providing a well-defined 
(philosophical) answer to atheism.  In Plato’s opinion, atheists are devoid of common 
sense and must be persuaded of the fact that their thinking is fundamentally wrong. 
This can be achieved by reforming and reeducating atheists. If this proves to be 
unsuccessful, proper legislation for persecuting atheism (cf.: asebeia-trials) should be 
implemented.  
 
More concretely, the character of the Athenian Stranger (who could easily be regarded 
to be Plato himself, although modern research seems to doubt this159) makes use of an 
imaginary opponent: an atheist young man provides atheist statements, which the 
Athenian systematically debunks.  
 
The main ‘atheist argument’ is unfolded in Laws, X, 888b-889e and is composed of 
different forms of (stereotyped) ‘atheist’ reasoning160,  
 
1) all of reality has evolved out of a stationary form of chaos 
2) reality can be reduced to materialistic conditions (e.g., chance, motion) 
3) all these conditions are characterized by soullessness and meaninglessness 
4) most conditions are characterized by randomness 
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5) some conditions, on the other hand, (e.g., mass, speed) are constant and 
unchangeable and arise out of necessity  
6) four elements have emerged out of these conditions and comprise an amalgam 
of composites that come into existence or perish. This system can be called 
‘nature’  
7) nature has created mankind as a mere composite by chance 
8) mankind created laws, art and other forms of convention, from which concepts 
like religion and justice developed. Therefore, the gods are an artificial 
product of art, law or any other form of human convention. Their existence 
can ultimately be traced back to nature, but only as a human construct without 
any natural warrant.161  
 
In order to debunk these arguments, the Athenian Stranger basically starts with the 
fundamental questions: “What has triggered this reality to develop as such?” and 
“How did reality arise out of chaos, when atheists claim that this chaos was stationary 
(cf. X, 895a)?” In other words, how could ‘motion’ have triggered reality if it was not 
prior to reality? According to Plato, ‘motion’ is not subordinate to matter or change, 
but a primal characteristic of ‘soul’ which is constructed by a divine intellect (Nous) 
in the form of a Demiurge.162 This divine entity of the highest principle has no soul of 
its own, but is pure intellect that brings order in the souls in which it is present.163 
 
On this matter, Plato actually adopted the Anaxagorean concept of a governing Nous 
or ‘Cosmic Mind’, which he regards as the motivating principle behind creation and 
the primordial cause of reality, but Plato also criticizes Anaxagoras for not providing 
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Nous with any teleological meaning and regarding it to be subsequent to primary 
matter (XII, 967b).164  
 
A second form of criticism of Anaxagoras is the fact that Plato still associates the 
success of atheism among youth with teachings that the sun and moon are mere earth 
and stones.165 This is clearly an Anaxagorean doctrine, beside the idea that motion is 
caused by change or matter. Tate, however, believed that the Anaxagorean references 
within the main ‘atheist’ argument does not actually refer to 5th century BC Ionic 
naturalists, but rather to early 4th century BC sophist thinking that had integrated 
Anaxagorean doctrines.166  This could be plausible, because it would explain why 
Aristophanes associated the character of Socrates Melios in Clouds (830) with Ionic 
naturalism (cf.: the Cosmic Dinos as a reference to the idea of Zeus-Aether of 
Diogenes of Apollonia167), while Melios was clearly a reference to the (atheist) 
sophist Diagoras of Melos. It would indicate that atheist philosophers had absorbed 
Ionic principles within their thinking, as the main atheist argument in Laws (X, 888b-
889e) illustrates.  
 
Another possibility, which Tate already suggested168, is mentioned by Catherine 
Zuckert.169  In the teaching of the Athenian Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras, we also 
witness a mixture of different philosophical traditions. According to Diogenes 
Laertius (II, 16), Archelaus propagated a physical philosophy, possibly paving the 
way for a (premodern) mechanistic materialism to explain reality, but at the same time 
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he evaluated the problem of what can be called ‘just’ and ‘bias’, based on the sophist 
distinction between nature and convention. Therefore, Plato could have regarded 
Archelaus as a crossover-figure between naturalism and sophist thought, as well as a 
key-figure among the contemporary atheists and their materialistic opinions in Laws, 
X, 888b-889e.  
 
By means of ten different characteristics of motion170, the Athenian Stranger now 
rejects the arguments of the contemporary atheists by regarding the primacy of ‘soul’, 
as a principle of ‘motion’, over ‘matter’ (and thus ‘nature’ in general). According to 
the Athenian Stranger, this leads to the irrefutable fact that ‘soul’ (and not a certain 
‘primary substance’ like some Presocratics assumed) is the causality behind all things. 
Such conclusion, however, could lead to the idea that ‘soul’ is also the cause of evil. 
But Plato appears to recognize a dual existence of ‘soul’ within Laws: ‘good souls’ 
(X, 896e) are responsible for ‘order’, while ‘evil souls’ only cause ‘disorder’ (X, 
897b-897d). This underlying principle between orderly and disorderly motion appears 
to be influenced by the Heraclitean idea of a cosmic battle between the opposites 
‘good’ and ‘bad’171. Heraclitus (and I quote Charles H. Kahn on this matter) ‘is above 
all (philosophers) concerned to define the place allotted to man within this ordered 
universe’.172 The refutation of atheism by Plato, however, is not only carried out in a 
philosophical manner. According to Plato, the rejection of atheism must also be based 
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on sociological principles. This becomes evident when Plato compares the atheism of 
contemporary youth with gluttony (literally ‘maddened by gluttony for pleasure’).173 
 
Christopher Bobonich argued that Plato’ Laws basically reflects a system of 
educational outlines, which are based on the control of irrational emotions and desires 
often associated with youth.174 However, Bobonich does not explain how these 
irrational emotions and desires can be countered (i.e. by an emphasis on ‘virtue’) or 
even detected. Therefore, I tend to follow Thomas Pangle on this matter. Pangle in his 
article The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato’s Laws (1976) stressed the 
importance of the concept of thumos throughout Plato’s Laws to distinguish ‘decent 
citizenship’ from ‘indecent citizenship’. The primary meaning of θυµός is ‘anger’ or 
more generally ‘spiritedness’, but Plato specifically applied the noun in the context of 
‘religious eagerness’.175 For example, in The Republic (IV, 439d-440a), Plato 
considers thumos to be a vital part of the soul, taking an intermediary position 
between reason and desire. Therefore, it can be associated with virtues like courage, 
competitiveness and honour.  
 
Basically, the concept of thumos could indicate that Plato considered impiety and 
atheism not mere expressions of antisocial behaviour, but criminal acts. These cause 
moral indignation in the eyes of decent citizens, whose thumos they trigger. 
Therefore, thumos is the factor that discriminates ‘good citizenship’ from its bad 
equivalent as it guarantees virtues such as piety, obedience to legislation and 
patriotism. Pangle even constructs the profile of the ideal civic religion as being 
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‘thumotic’.176 Moreover, thumos is not restricted to mankind, as the gods also appear 
to be thumothic, which would explain their commitment to human affairs.177 The 
thumotic nature of the gods, which is characterized by reward of just men and 
punishment of unjust men is therefore reflected within civil legislation that deals with 
matters of piety and impiety.  As such, the sociological approach to explain atheism is 
similar to the philosophical approach: it can quintessentially be reduced to an eternal, 
ongoing (Heraclitean) battle between good (‘order’) and evil (‘disorder’).   
 
However, Plato does not identify atheist behaviour simply by a lack of thumos, since 
he discriminates ‘atheists of just nature’ from ‘atheists of unjust nature’. This becomes 
evident in the Plato’s division of ‘impiety’ into six different classes (X, 908a-910d). 
This classification is based on the three types of ‘impious persons’, which Plato 
mentioned in X, 885b.178 These are each further extended with two subcategories 
(‘persons with a good nature’ versus ‘persons with an evil nature’). Each category of 
impiety corresponds with a well-defined punishment.  
 
What Plato precisely envisioned by means of these six classes is rather difficult to 
reconstruct, since he never fully conceptualized these classes of impiety. Based on the 
information of book X, 908a-910d, I believe that the following overview plausibly 
displays the complete evaluation of the six classes of ‘impiety’: 
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type of impiety subcategory 
 
representatives method of 
punishment 
a) atheists of 
unjust nature 
tyrants, diviners, 
strategoi, (sophist) 
philosophers 
death penalty/ 
(imprisonment) 
1) denying the 
existence of the 
gods (atheists) 
b) atheists of 
just nature 
(natural) philosophers imprisonment/ 
reformatory for a 
period of 5 years/  
a) deists of 
unjust nature 
“those who 
(methodically) identify 
the gods as neglectful” 
(philosophers) 
death penalty/ 
(imprisonment) 
2) denying the 
interest of the gods 
in human affairs 
(deists) 
b) deists of 
just nature 
“those who (foolishly) 
identify the gods as 
neglectful” (youngsters) 
imprisonment/ 
reformatory for a 
period of 5 years/  
a) traditional 
theists  of 
unjust nature 
(dishonest) private 
worshippers 
death penalty/ 
(imprisonment) 
3) bribing the gods 
with offerings and 
prayers 
(traditional theists) b) traditional 
theists of just 
nature 
(naïve) private 
worshippers 
fine 
 
I will now provide this overview with an in-depth analysis. Let us first begin with the 
proposals of punishment. Plato (X, 908e) appears to be categorical on this matter: 
only the impious with a just nature (“those devoid of evil”) can be faced with a 
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reformatory, while the impious with an unjust nature should be sentenced to death. 
After execution, they must be left unburied beyond the borders of the city. According 
to Zuckert, this should be interpreted, next to a method of dishonouring, as a way to 
physically remove any memory of (unjust) asebeis.179  
 
Regarding the penalty of imprisonment, the comparison is being made with the three 
prisons of the Athenian State: the general one near the market which could detain the 
minor cases of impious persons of just nature, the sophronisterion (‘Sound-Mind 
Center’) near the Nocturnal Council and a third in the middle of the country, “in the 
wildest and loneliest spot possible” (X, 908a).180 To this last type of prison, the 
impious of unjust nature of all three types should be sent when they are not executed. 
This might seem to be contradictory to the idea that the impious of unjust nature 
should only be put to death, but this type of punishment actually corresponds to the 
idea of ‘being socially dead’. Such persons have to be physically removed as far as 
possible from Athenian society where they cannot be visited by any free man and are 
completely dependent on nourishment by slaves as long as they stay alive. Moreover, 
the children of such incarcerated persons are considered to be orphans.181 The 
preference of an imprisonment in this third type of prison over a death penalty might 
function as a more effective means to socially discourage impiety of an unjust nature: 
a slow and agonizing death should be perceived as being far worse than a quick 
execution.182 
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The impious of just nature of all three types, on the other hand, are placed for safe 
custody in the general person or must be incarcerated in the ‘Sound-Mind Center’ or 
‘moderation-tank’, located near the Nocturnal Council. This type of prison is only 
reserved for those impious persons of just nature who demand a more efficient and 
methodical form of re-education. They are restricted to interaction with members of 
the Council for a period of five years, who will persuade them to acknowledge a 
correct interpretation of the gods.183 If they no longer advocate their atheist behaviour 
after five years, they can reenter society. If they still display inappropriate behaviour 
towards the gods and they are again convicted of the same crime, they must be put to 
death (X, 908e-909a). 
 
We can now move on to the actual six classes. According to Harvey Yunis, the 1st 
type of atheists (“those who do not believe in the existence of the gods”) and its 
division into two subtypes of unjust and just atheists corresponds to “immoral 
atheists” (e.g., Callicles) and “scientific atheists” (e.g., Anaxagoras).184 Further 
analysis of the overview indicates that Plato only considers the first class (1a) to 
consist of radical atheists, although Plato (X, 886d-886e) argues that radical atheism 
has its roots in scientific atheism. Among radical atheists, the atheist tyrant is 
observed as the most dangerous type. It is, however, not apparent if Plato refers on 
this matter to Critias as the archetypal atheist tyrant. Considering the fact that he was 
related to Critias and based on the respect by which he approaches this family line 
within the dialogue Critias, it could be doubtful that Plato specifically had Critias in 
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mind. Possibly, Alcibiades may be a more suitable example of this type of impiety in 
Plato’s opinion.  
 
Alongside the atheist tyrant, Diagoras of Melos, a sophist who had been condemned 
to death (by default) by the Assembly in 415 BC, could also be an example of an 
unjust (radical) atheist. Although Plato never mentions Diagoras in any writing, it 
would appear unlikely that he was not familiar with the actions of this sophist, given 
the impact of Diagoras on late 5th century BC Athenian religion and society (cf. the 
bronze stele with his conviction, publicly displayed on the Acropolis, according to 
Melanthius (FGrHist 342 F3).   
 
Protagoras, then again, does not appear to be an example of the first class of impiety, 
as Plato mentions the well-respected reputation this sophist enjoyed during and after 
his lifetime.185 This first class of ‘atheists with an unjust nature’ furthermore entails 
diviners, a category of ‘atheists’, which Plato regards as hypocritical, because they 
disguise themselves as being religious. On this matter, Plato seems to agree with the 
author of the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease, I, 8. These diviners falsely 
pretend to possess supernatural skills and superior knowledge over nature. By 
behaving so, they ignore the gods for being ‘Stronger Ones’ (cf. Burkert) or they act 
as usurpers of the gods, which basically results in their denial.186  
 
The second class (1b), comprising ‘atheists with a just nature’, refers to natural 
philosophers such as Anaxagoras. These philosophers are labeled ‘disbelievers in the 
existence of the gods’, because they deny the divine character of the heavenly bodies 
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(X, 886d & 967a). Instead, they seem to believe in impersonal forces (X, 886d-e & 
967a), which can be identified as ‘divine’ and which substitute the gods of nomos.187 
But Anaxagoras cannot be labeled a radical atheist, since he envisoned a cosmic Nous 
or ‘Mind’ as divine archè in the tradition of Xenophanes, However, Plato (X, 886d-
886e) seems to regard his scientific research on the heavenly bodies to be responsible 
for the development of radical atheism.188 Nevertheless his association with atheotès 
in Plato’s opinion, Anaxagoras and similar naturalists (e.g., Diogenes of Apollonia) 
are probably considered ‘atheists with a just nature’, as Plato (XII, 967c) states that 
they were inappropriately confronted with vilifications of atheism by poets.189 
 
In identifying the second type of impiety, the main argument of ‘a belief in neglectful 
gods’ is based on the prosperity of the wicked (X, 899d-900b). The asebeis of the 
second type are deists, who do acknowledge the existence of the gods (X, 899d), but 
do not believe that they are concerned with human affairs. Plato (X, 900c-903a) 
refutes this kind of atheists by arguing that the gods care for small matters (i.e. human 
affairs) as much as for large matters (i.e. universe). Although Plato remains vague in 
describing both subcatergories of the second class, the first subcategory (2a) seems to 
comprise certain philosophers or σοφοί, who attest the existence of the gods, but also 
believe that these gods are subordinate to mechanistic structures, which results in their 
incapability and indifference to human affairs. Such views on divinity might not even 
demand any worship.  
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Plato does not identify any of them explicitly, but contemporary intellectuals such as 
the deists Thrasymachus (The Republic) and Aristodemus (from Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia, 1.4.2-18) could be plausible representatives. The main reason why Plato 
regards asebeis of this subcategory as being ‘unjust’ might be the fact that their views 
perceive the gods as being selfish and indifferent, which conflicts with the idea of 
‘goodness’ as the quintessential feature of the gods.  
 
The second subcategory (2b) appears to be of a less scientific nature190, comprising 
most likely youngsters (νέοι)191, who are susceptible to the idea that the gods do not 
punish wickedness. Plato (X, 888c) states that such a thought is generally not 
persisted throughout life and is eradicated by life experience and old age.192 
 
Whereas classes 1 to 2 are considered to be mainly of a philosophical nature, the third 
type is of a more general or ‘civilian’ nature. This can be corroborated by the fact that 
Plato only describes the first two types to be “sharing in the disease of atheism” (τὸ 
µὲν µὴ νοµίζειν θεοὺς ἀµφοῖν ἂν ἐνυπάρχοι κοινὸν πάθος).193 Nevertheless this 
observation, the fifth class of impiety is also liable to the death penalty. This can be 
explained by the fact that Plato (X, 909d & 910b-d) regards private worship as 
impious and unjust. As he reports, worshipping the gods in the concealed space of a 
private house does not attribute to the well-being of society.  According to Plato, 
private worship decreases equality and social cohesion between citizens and 
undermines propriety towards the gods.194 Plato also argues in this passage that the 
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danger of a deceitful attitude towards the gods in ways of personal prayer and 
sacrifice increases once social control is minimal. More concretely, the fifth class (3a) 
represents those traditional theists who are driven by dishonest purposes (e.g., profit) 
in their ambition to raise private shrines.195 The sixth class (3b), finally, entails those 
who profess traditional theism on private shrines in an honest, but childish way.196 
They should be pointed out that the gods cannot be bribed by offerings and prayers. 
According to Plato, this represents the mildest class of impiety and it should be 
corrected by officials (“the Guardians of the Laws”), who must demand the 
substitution of private shrines for public ones.197 If this is not being obeyed, then a 
fine is probably the most appropriate way to reprimand such behaviour.198 
 
This concludes our analysis of Plato’s six classes of impiety. With this information in 
mind, we can assume that Plato’s influence on the debate of deviant religious 
behaviour cannot be underestimated from a social and intellectual point of view. 
Although Laws is generally interpreted as an example of a ‘utopian theocracy’199 or an 
idealistic view on Athenian polis religion200, Plato’s opinions on the phenomenon of 
deviant religious behaviour are not restricted to the communal sphere. Atheism, deism 
and traditional theism are not merely perceived as transgressions against civic 
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religion, ancestral customs or the gods of the state that must be intercepted by means 
of repressive legislation. Plato truly endeavoured an intellectual refutation of this 
irreligious behaviour as well. In fact, both views merge and cannot be disconnected. 
For the first time, a systematic analysis and critical assessment of philosophical 
atheism in Antiquity had been undertaken. Based on lengthy argumentation in 
(mainly) Timaeus and Laws in order to support the connection and interaction 
between (divine) intellect and (divine) soul, Plato demonstrates that belief in the 
existence of the gods and their active presence in the world is not only a matter of 
respect for ancestral customs, but also of reason and common sense. Those who do 
not believe in the existence of the gods or regard them as indifferent to human affairs 
are erroneous, not only from a social view-point, but from an intellectual as well. 
There is, according to Plato, simply no logical argumentation to support atheism, 
because nature and divinity are undividable concepts in such a way that any scientific 
understanding of nature entails an understanding of divinity as the causal explanation 
behind nature.  
 
For these reasons, Laws appears to be a continuation of Plato’s cosmology and 
theology as depicted in Timaeus, in which an elaboration of the principle of the 
‘Supreme God’ (Nous) from naturalist philosophies (cf. Xenophanes, Heraclitus and 
Anaxagoras) and the Eleatic denial of coming into existence or ceasing to be (cf. 
Parmenides) can be detected.201 The extensive argumentations on soul (psychè) 
presiding intellect (nous) in Laws,202 combined with the teleological views of 
Timaeus, delivers a total representation of Plato’s philosophical theology and its 
compatibility with the gods of traditional Greek religion.   
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The first prerequisite in this fundamental interaction between philosophical theology 
and traditional religion exists of the postulation that the eternal gods are good and 
only capable of goodness.203  A second requirement forms the acknowledgment of a 
distinct structure (and not a hierarchy204) of divine existence. The Demiurge (or 
‘Craftsman’) represents the active principle of divine intellect (nous) that enables the 
creation of ‘order in disorder’. The Demiurge should not be considered a ‘Supreme 
God’, in the way Xenophanes envisioned it, or even a divine entity. He does not have 
a soul or a body of his own, which is a quintessential feature for any living creature.205 
The Demiurge rather represents, what Gerd Van Riel describes as ‘that which makes a 
god into a god’ or ‘that which, as the essential character of divinity, is present in every 
single god’.206 This, however, does not mean that the Demiurge as a divine intellect 
can exist separately from ‘soul’. On this matter, Plato is adamant throughout his 
literary output: intellect cannot exist without soul.207  Therefore, the Demiurge must 
be interpreted as ‘Intellect’ that brings order in the souls in which it is also present.208 
In doing so, it creates (eternal, unchangeable) ‘Forms’ (paradeigmata) of order which 
may not be perceivable by senses, but only by mind (nous). In order to function, 
‘mind’ must always rely on ‘soul’ (psychè), which moves by itself. So, before 
producing the eternal gods, the Demiurge first assembles a soul of the most 
encompassing order, namely the World-soul (psychè kosmou), which can be identified 
with Zeus, the father of the gods and all mortal beings.209 This soul of the highest 
order is the first to partake in the virtue of divine or ‘demiurgic’ intellect, but the latter 
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is also detectable in the heavenly bodies (characterized by an orderly, self-moving 
regularity) (Laws, X, 896c-899b) and the traditional gods ‘prescribed by law’ (Laws, 
X, 903b, 905e, 906d). 
 
As such, Plato’s Laws succeeds in harmonizing the elaborate theology of Timaeus 
with traditional religion. The task of mankind, according to Plato’s theology, is to 
approximate the supreme soul of ‘God’,210 by reducing reliance on human senses and 
physical distractions (i.e. pleasure) as much as possible.211 In order to do so, men 
should rely on the concept of thumos or the religious strive for goodness. As the gods 
are “good” and “all-knowing” (The Republic, II, 379a & Laws, X, 903b), they cannot 
by bribed by false payers or deceitful sacrifices. This once again demonstrates the 
incompatibility of religion and impiety: the impious cannot partake in any religious 
activity, due to their unjust nature. They do not posses thumos that enables them to 
display good and sincere behaviour towards the gods.212 With these elements in mind, 
Plato’s classification of impiety becomes evident: the distinction between asebeis of 
‘just nature’ and asebeis of ‘unjust nature’ is a matter of thumos: unjust asebeis lack 
any notion of thumos, while the amount of thumos within just asebeis is insufficient. 
This can explain Plato’s proposal of reeducating only the just atheists, as they still 
have potential of successfully reentering civic society.   
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Although Plato described in Laws (X) an unrealistic and utopian view of 4th century 
BC Athens213, his philosophical and theological views on atheism appear to have had 
a lasting effect on Greek philosophy during the Hellenistic period.214  Since atheism 
was now conceptualized as an opposite to morality and goodness, philosophers after 
Plato no longer seemed to have promoted any action or behaviour associated with 
atheism. On the contrary, the now stigmatized atheism would function as an ideal 
means to attack any philosophical or theological opponent in the Hellenistic period.215 
 
18.4) Aristotle 
 
As mentioned above, the greatest contribution of Plato to the field of theology would 
be his reinterpretation of the concept of Greek theism.216 Aristotle further elaborated 
on this Platonic theology, but proposed a shift in the perception of the supreme God. 
In contrast to Plato, who defended the idea of a World-soul or ‘self-moving first 
mover’ in order to explain motion as a primordial characteristic for the creation of 
reality, Aristotle rejected this idea and introduced instead the concept of the 
‘immovable first mover’. In his book Metaphysics (1071 b3), Aristotle enfolds the 
idea of a supernatural ‘Reason’ (Nous), which is unchangeable and impersonal. The 
Aristotelian God does not act as a Demiurge that created order in a chaotic universe, 
because such notion would indicate a state of change. The God of Aristotle coincides 
with the notion of pure thought and reality and therefore acts as a precondition for any 
knowledge and existence.217  
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In other words, God has not created the world, he is identical to the world or the world 
exists because God exists and vice versa. The Aristotelian God is nevertheless a very 
abstract and formal concept and, according to some scholars, no more than a 
metaphysical postulation within the empirical philosophy of Aristotle, only created for 
the purpose of identifying an ultimate cause of motion and change.218  
 
Therefore, this impersonal ‘God of the Philosopher’ is only appealing to intellectuals 
and has no meaning within any popular notion of belief and its idea of reciprocity. 
Aristotle solves this problem in his Nicomachean Ethics (1179a 20-25) by substituting 
the supreme God as an object of reverence by means of the gods of traditional belief: 
 
“And it seems likely that the man who pursues intellectual activity, and who cultivates his intellect and 
keeps that in the best condition, is also the man most beloved of the gods. For if, as is generally 
believed, the gods exercise some superintendence over human affairs, then it will be reasonable to 
suppose that they take pleasure in that part of man which is best and most akin to themselves, namely 
the intellect”. (transl. H Rackham)219 
 
As the passage illustrates, the traditional gods within Aristotle’s ethics do resemble 
the supreme Aristotelian God as they are also indistinguishable from the notion of 
reason and pure intellect.220 However, they are not strictly impersonal as they 
experience pleasure and supervise human affairs as well. Notwithstanding this, 
Aristotle did no longer support a purely anthropomorphic conception of the gods and 
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the heavenly bodies. The fact that such a traditional notion of divinity was not in 
accordance with his theological views can be observed in Metaphysics (12, 1074b): 
 
“A tradition has been handed down by the ancient thinkers of very early times, and bequeathed to 
posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the Divine 
pervades the whole of nature.The rest of their tradition has been added later in a mythological form to 
influence the vulgar and as a constitutional and utilitarian expedient; they say that these gods are 
human in shape or are like certain other animals, and make other statements consequent upon and 
similar to those which we have mentioned.” (transl. H.Tredennick).221 
 
This passage illustrate the influence Aristotle would have on later Stoic ‘pantheistic’ 
theology by stating that ‘Divinity pervades the whole of nature’. The Stoics would 
also adopt Aristotle’s view on the origin of religion: the ancients did have a notion (or 
‘preconception’) of the true nature of divine existence, but were only able to translate 
it into a primitive design (i.e. gods in human or animal shape).222 In any case, 
Aristotle demonstrated that a philosophical notion of the Greek gods does not have to 
be incompatible with traditional worship or associated with atheism at all. 
 
But this stament might not have concerned Straton of Lampsacus, head of the 
Peripatetic school between ca. 286 and ca. 268 BC. Like Aristoteles, Straton also 
viewed ‘God’ to be identical with ‘reality’ or ‘nature’, to be more precise. According 
to Straton, divine power is manifested in nature, which contains in itself the causes of 
birth, growth and decay, but this divine power is entirely devoid of sensation and of 
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any form.223 This view on physics and cosmology gained Straton the epithet ‘the 
Natural Philosopher’, because he mainly attacked the pantheistic nature of Stoic 
theology.224  Stratons’ ‘God’ is thus a further abstraction of the Aristotelian God, but 
without any teleological or providential meaning: Straton’s ‘God’ symbolizes nothing 
more than the regenerative character of nature. Unfortunately, we do not have any 
evidence regarding Straton’s view on the traditional gods, but he probably tackled this 
issue in his (lost) treatise On the Gods.225 
 
Based on this information from Aristotle and Straton, it cannot be denied that the 
congruence between the personalized gods of popular Greek religion and the 
philosophical envisioned gods became increasingly artificial at the dusk of the 
Classical period. It would be the intellectual challenge of the Hellenistic period to 
harmonize these philosophical gods with the popular notion of the gods as dictated by 
traditional worship.  
 
18.5) conclusions 
 
We can conclude our analysis that philosophical atheism, in the sense of denying the 
existence of the gods, did exist in the Classical period, and more precisely in the late 
5th century and early 4th century BC Athens. This philosophical atheism appears to be 
the product of two developments within Greek philosophy, which almost emerged 
simultaneously, namely atomism and the sophist movement. In the character of the 
‘Socrates the Melian’, the head of a sophist school in Aristophanes’s Clouds, we 
detect the archetype of the atheist, combining elements of atomist theory (the 
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replacement of Zeus by Dinos, the cosmic swirl) and sophist reasoning (the presence 
of ‘Wrong Logic’ and ‘Right Logic’).  
 
In the atomist theory of Leucippus and Democritus, we witness the earliest expression 
of a mechanistic cosmology, in which divinity plays a non-fundamental role. There is 
no indication of a divine archè and the gods are susceptible to perishability regardless 
of the fact that they are the result of complex and sophisticated atomic compounds. In 
Democritean theology, traditional belief in personalized gods is still preserved, but 
mainly explained in aetiological terms. Fear for natural forces is what compelled 
primitive man to believe that these were being caused by gods (DK 68 A75).  
 
Albeit the atheistic tendencies in atomist theory, we cannot identify Democritus as an 
atheist. The gods, even as atomic congregates, were believed to be living images or 
eidola of gigantic size, gifted with intelligence, morality and interest in human affairs. 
Religion even played a fundamental role in Democritean ethical and political theory: 
physis and nomos were viewed as compatible concepts as demonstrated by the 
metaphor of the prosperous city-state (DK 68 B252).    
 
Totally different was the general opinion within the sophist movement. The existence 
of Greek gods could now be explained on aetiological, sociological, or historical 
grounds, based on a dichotomy between the natural word (physis) and the social 
dimension (nomos).  Prodicus believed that the Greek gods were the result of a 
historical process of deification of agricultural innovations or innovators, while 
Callicles and Thrasymachus, the so-called “immoralists” in Plato’s opinion, 
considered all aspects of nomos (justice, religion) to be social constructs, only created 
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to detain those who are naturally determined to dominate their fellow men.  Of course, 
we are largely restricted to Plato as a source concerning the religious opinions of 
Callicles and Thrasymachus and it appears that Plato deliberately connects their 
atheism with immoralism, in order to isolate them from other sophists like Protagoras, 
although the latter made similar statements concerning nomoi as the product of human 
convention.  In contrast to the immoralists, however, Protagoras viewed nomos as the 
indispensable outcome of physis. The natural conditions of reality necessitates the 
existence of nomoi, otherwise men would be condemned to a beast-like existence 
without any awareness of (divine) justice. 
 
Once again, we cannot underrate the significance of Plato in the further course of 
‘atheism in Antiquity’, and especially in the demise of radical atheism. Not only did 
Plato fulfill a pivotal role in the conceptualization of philosophical atheism (Apology 
& Laws), he also elaborated Greek theism to a highly sophisticated level (Timaeus & 
Phaedrus). The early concept of a ‘Mind’ (Nous) was no longer that of an initial force 
subsequent to creation, in the way Anaxagoras envisoned it, but an active and 
teologically functioning immanence. 
 
In this renewed Greek theism, a close interaction between theology and piety could 
not be denied. In order to make Plato’s theism operational, traditional Greek piety had 
to be transformed as well. Every impious action by tyrants, strategoi, philosophers 
who denied the existence or importance of the gods, diviners, religious opportunists 
and private worshippers led to the corrupting of the moral integrity of the gods and the 
solemnity of piety. This kind of behaviour was now considered to be a criminal 
offence against the religion of the (Platonic) state and had to be annihilated. (Radical) 
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atheism, deism or traditional theism, whether on a theoretical or a practical level, 
would no longer be a tolerated mind-set in Plato’s city-state, after its transformation 
into a theocracy. It should be observed, however, that Plato’s proposals for the 
execution, incarceration or reeducation of atheists were never realized.226 The 
permanent disappearance of asebeia-trials near the end of the 4th century BC is also an 
indicator that Plato’s proposals were never implementated on the social level. 
 
On the philosophical level, however, Plato’s approach to atheism would have a lasting 
effect on Greek intellectual thought. Whereas criticisms on Greek religion within 
Presocratic thought mainly involved a diminishing of traditional characteristics of the 
popular gods (extreme anthropomorphism, arbitrariness), the philosophical gods, as 
conceptualized by Socratic thought, appeared to be the embodiment of moral 
perfection, which had to be emulated in first instance by any self-respecting 
philosopher.227  
 
But the transition from popular religion to philosophical religion does not end there. 
According to Aristotelian theology, the philosophical gods are also surpassed by a 
Supreme God, who is indistinguishable from reality. Denying the immanence of this 
‘Philosopher’s God’ therefore results in the denial of reality, which must have been 
perceived as an absurd notion by most post-Aristotelian philosophical schools. The 
combination of these factors determined the attitude of the impending Hellenistic 
philosophical schools towards atheism. Not the existence of the gods was any longer a 
matter of debate, but any popular notion that had previously blurred a true and 
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genuine representation of the Greek gods. This change in theological direction would 
pave the way for more moderate forms of atheism. 
 
Chapter 19: the Hellenistic period: the rise of ‘soft’ atheism 
 
Mostly negative aspects of the traditional gods had formed the basis of much critical 
reflection on Greek religion from the Archaic period on, and this aspect of traditional 
religion had been gradually countered by the rise of philosophical theology, which 
culminated in the literary output of Plato. Due to this evolution, the explicit denial of 
the gods came under a growing philosophical scrutiny at the end of the Classical 
period (cf. Plato’s, Laws, X). By the time of the early Hellenistic period, it had 
become an isolated intellectual position, like the exceptional case of Theodorus of 
Cyrene illustrates. In the further course of the Hellenistic period, the nature of atheism 
would change drastically, as will be demonstrated in this chapter. 
 
But we can also witness an evolution in the use of ‘atheist’ terminology after the 
Classical period. For instance, the noun ἀθεότης (‘godlesness’ or ‘ungodliness’) was 
coined by Plato and it appeared only with this specific meaning in his writings.228 In 
the treatise On Superstition by Plutarch in the early 2nd century AD the noun would 
nonetheless resurface, but with a new meaning.229 Compared to Plato, ἀθεότης in 
Plutarch’s treatise does not only entail disbelief in the gods, but also refers to the 
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denial of divine providence.230 As Plutarch relates ἀθεότης to an outwitting of any fear 
of the gods, ἀθεότης seems to refer primarily to the alleged atheism (or deism) of the 
Epicureans. This assumption indicates, as Jan Bremmer formulates it, that ‘the 
invention of atheism would open a new road to intellectual freedom, but also enabled 
people to label opponents in a new way’.231 Based on the second part of this quote, we 
can deduce that the the conceptualization of atheism by Plato paved the way for a 
more assertive theism that now excluded atheism as a socially and intellectually 
unacceptable mindset. The application of the noun ἀθεότης in the sense of ‘disbelief’ 
or ‘denial of divine providence’ by Plutarch and its alleged association with 
Epicureanism seems to acknowledge this new direction in assessing atheism. 
 
The concept of atheism in the Hellenistic period would be characterized by a highly 
polemical nature and this was being materialized in (mainly Stoic) accusations of 
atheism against Epicureans.232 These allegations would in return lead to refutations of 
charges of atheism by Epicurean intellectuals in the form of apologetic writings. We 
can mention in this regard The Epicurean Inscription by Diogenes of Oenoanda (2nd 
century AD) and the treatise On Piety by Philodemus of Gadara (ca.110-35 BC).  
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The latter treatise not only contains the oldest ‘atheist catalogue’ by Epicurus233, but 
also a description of atheism into three types of ‘atheists’234: 
 
(1) Those who say that the gods cannot show any feeling and that they are clearly without senses. 
(τοὺς οὐδ᾽ ἐπικεινηθῆναι δυναµένους ἢ το[ὺ]ς ἐναργῶς ἀναισθήτους) 
(2) Those who say that it is unknown whether there are any gods. 
(τοὺς ἄγνωστον εἴ τινές εἰσι θε[οὶ] λέγοντας ἢ ποῖοί τινές εἰσιν) 
(3) Those who say openly that the gods do not exist and of whom it is clear that they eliminate them. 
(τοὺς δι[α]ρρήδην ὅτι οὐκ εἰ[σ]ὶν ἀποφαινοµένους ἢ φανεροὺς ὄντας ὡς ἀνήιρουν).235 
 
This classification of atheism is somehow problematic, because Philodemus is not 
always consistent in his categorizing of atheists into these three groups.236 For 
instance, the first group most likely refers to followers of Stoic theology, who tend to 
reduce the anthropomorphism of the gods to the level of inanimate objects, such as the 
heavenly bodies.237 Whereas the second group comprises the agnostics in the vein of 
Protagoras238, the third group clearly refers to the denial of the existence of the gods, 
by use of the verb ἀναιρεῖν, which can be applied to those philosophers whom 
Epicurus identified as radical atheists (Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias)239, but it also 
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refers to the Stoic philosopher Persaeus of Citium (306-243 BC) 240 and a certain 
‘Philippus’241,  who could have been Philippus the Megarian, a late 4th century-early 
3rd century BC disciple of Stilpo242 or an unknown (Stoic) intellectual by the name 
‘Philippus’, who might have been an associate of Cleanthes.243 Philodemus associated 
both philosophers with views that ‘destroyed’ the anthropomorphic nature of the gods. 
Apparently, the third category of atheists reflects the highly polemicizing nature of the 
Hellenistic debate on atheism: any non-Epicurean philosopher who critized the 
corporeal presentation of the gods, could be accused by Philodemus of (completely) 
destroying the gods.244 This is clearly the case for Prodicus, whose radical atheism is 
closely related to his reductionist views on the anthropomorphic nature of the gods. 
Prodicus basically reduced the gods to objects of agricultural and beneficial use, 
which is acknowledged in another fragment of On Piety.245  
 
Another example of this reducing of all varieties of ‘atheism’ to radical atheism can 
be found in Diogenes of Oenoanda (Fr 16 I-III 14 Smith), who regards Protagoras as a 
type (3) atheist, although he undoubtedly belongs to type (2).246 But, as Dirk Obbink 
rightly observed, doxographical and biographical accounts from the Roman period 
tend to compress all types of atheism into the third type of atheists.247 This is, for 
example, displayed in the common perception of Diogenes of Sinope as a radical 
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atheist in the vein of Diagoras of Melos or the strong affiliation of the Cynic Bion of 
Borysthenes with the radical atheism of the School of Theodorians.248 
 
An alternative interpretation of the classification of atheists by Philodemus, in my 
opinion, is the idea of a hierarchical categorization. By stating that the atheism of the 
Stoics is ‘even worse’ than the radical atheism of Diagoras249, Philodemus might 
actually regard radical atheism as the least harmful form of atheism. The reasoning 
behind this assumption might be the opinion that having no conception of the gods is 
still preferable over false conceptions or false beliefs in the gods.250 The former leaves 
the gods undisturbed in their blessedness, while the latter only induce distorted 
(pre)conceptions of the gods. 251 
 
Clearly, Philodemus’s distinction of atheism into three different groups did not offer a 
definite classification of the phenomenon, but rather indicated that atheism in 
Antiquity never reflected ‘a well-defined or ideologically fixed position’.252 Besides, 
it demonstrated that the polemical nature of debates on the existence and nature of the 
gods from the Hellenistic period on would easily result in accusations of ‘atheism’ 
against rivaling philosophical schools. 
 
Despite this tendency, most philosophical schools wished to adopt a more ‘soft’ form 
of atheism that only denied the popular presentation of the gods. An explicit rejection 
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or denial of divine existence no longer seemed justifiable on philosophical grounds. 
Even Euhemerus, who further elaborated on the anthropological aetiology of Prodicus 
by reducing Uranus, Chronus and Zeus to the status of deified kings, still aimed to 
preserve the gods into an intellectually suitable form.253  
 
Perhaps this tendency towards a more moderate atheism from the Hellenistic period 
on becomes understandable by examining the theological views of the Pyrrhonian 
Sceptic Sextus Empiricus (floruit ca. 200 AD), who associated atheism with 
philosophical dogmatism. According to Sextus, atheism as perceived by those listed in 
his index atheorum (Against the Mathematicians, IX, 51-60) must be considered to be 
dogmatic as it neglects any preconception of God(s), which mankind seems to possess 
naturally.254 Moreover, Sextus argues that the absence of divine existence is absurd, 
due to the fact that concepts such as piety and justice would otherwise be non-
existing. 
 
“If Gods do not exist, piety is not existent. For piety is “the science of service of things non-existent, 
nor, consequently, will any science thereof exist; and just as there cannot be any science of service to 
Hippocentaurs, they being non-existent, so there will not be any science of service to the Gods if they 
are non-existent.[…] Furthermore, if justice too has been introduced because of the connexion of men 
with one another and with the Gods, if Gods exist not, neither will justice subsist; which is absurd.” 
(transl. R.G. Bury)255 
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Another passage on the logical existence of the gods by Sextus Empiricus (Against the 
Mathematicians, IX, 88-91) reflects the opinion of the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes 
(ca. 330- ca. 230 BC). Cleanthes argued that experience teaches us that life embodies 
a natural hierarchy: some living beings are superior to others, consequently their must 
be a life form that is best. Man dominates other life forms, but he is prone to injury, 
sickness and death. So, logically, there must be a higher life form (i.e gods).256 
 
These paragraphs from Sextus Empiricus’s Against the Mathematicians could be 
regarded as representative of the Hellenistic period.  The existence of the gods was 
now being experienced as an undeniable fact or reality.257 Therefore, their denial no 
longer appeared to be wishful. This new attitude towards the existence of the gods did 
not only shape the nature of critical reflection on organized religion in the Hellenistic 
period, but in the so-called ‘Post-Hellenistic period’ (1st century BC- 2nd century AD) 
as well.258 The emphasis was now being laid on the removal of popular and corruptive 
elements within traditional religion.  
 
Such approach can be detected in The Swindlers Unmasked, a virulent attack on 
oracles and so-called oracle-mongers. The treatise is ascribed to Oenomaeus, a Cynic, 
who flourished ca. 120 AD. In the passages that have been preserved in Eusebius’s 
Preparation for the Gospel (V, 21-25), Oenomaus does not aim to destroy religious 
practices such as the worship of deities or the use of divination, although he targets 
the Delphic Apollo with a multitude of insults. Rather does Oenomaus direct his 
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attacks at ‘human imposters’ like the Delphic priests, whom he considers frauds and 
swindlers. He accuses them of deceiving the masses by “concealing their own 
ignorance simply by the obscurity of their ambiguous language”.259  
 
To some extent, The Swindlers Unmasked by Oenomaeus can be compared to 
Lucian’s work Alexander the False Prophet in which not religion itself is being the 
topic of criticism, but rather the religious exploits of fraudulent persons at the expense 
of uncritical and gullible masses. In this specific work, Lucian ridicules the mystic 
Alexander of Abonoteichus (ca. 100-170 AD), whom he believes to be an oracle-
monger. Alexander fooled worshippers in Pontus by the use of a glove puppet and by 
pretending it to be an incarnation of Glycon, the snake god. When he was criticized 
for performing a hoax, Alexander recognized these critics as Christians and ‘atheists’. 
The latter term referred to Epicureans most likely as Lucian mentions that ‘the 
followers of Epicurus, when in the cities, began to detect gradually all the trickery’.260   
 
Another method in the Hellenistic period to remove popular elements within 
traditional religion is situated on the level of the rationalization of mythology. On this 
matter, the early 3rd century BC writer Palaephatus, an associate of Aristotle, can be 
mentioned. In his work called On Unbelievable Tales, Palaephatus debunked popular 
mythology in order to examine its historical truth.261 This, however, does not imply 
that Palaephatus should be considered to have been an atheist as he remarkably 
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 Lucian, Alexander the False Prophet, 25: καὶ µάλιστα ὅσοι Ἐπικούρου ἑταῖροι ἦσαν καὶ ἐν ταῖς 
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avoided any mentioning of the gods in his analysis of myths. Instead, the focus is laid 
on the historicity and rationalization of myths, relating to heroes and heroines.262  
 
But detecting the historical or rational background of myths was not the only method 
to deplore popular elements within mythology. From a Stoic point of view, mythology 
was believed to contain primitive forms of philosophical theology and this could be 
extracted by means of etymology or allegory. This method was used by the Stoic 
philosopher Lucius Annius Cornutus (floruit c. 60 AD) in his educational treatise 
Overview of the Traditions Concerning Greek Theology. Influenced by the works of 
Cleanthes and Chrysippus263, Cornutus aimed to discover philosophical truths in 
Greek mythology and theogony. According to the Stoics, ancient societies had a 
primitive understanding of theology and materialized their knowledge by means of 
mythology in which they related the elements (στοιχεῖα) to a divine origin.264 
Traditional poets, however, had added many false truths to such extent that ancient 
theology was largely lost.265  
 
The tendency to scrutinize popular religion by means of criticism, rationalization, 
etymology and allegory, instead of denying the gods on philosophical, historical and 
sociological grounds, appears to be a general characteristic of Hellenistic philosophy. 
Not the gods themselves are being questioned, but rather a too popular interpretation 
of religion, which could easily lead to superstition.266 As such, critical religious 
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reflection in Hellenistic Times must rather be interpreted as a detaching of popular 
expressions which had distorted the philosophical and theological truths of ancient 
Greek religion in the course of time.  A consequence of this evolution is the fact that 
genuine disbelief in the existence of the gods no longer occurred in Hellenistic Times. 
How can this shift in critical religious reflection now be explained? Certainly, it 
cannot be ascribed to any self-restraint or self-censorship of authors or philosophers in 
regard to atheist thoughts. Although some scholars, such as Jan Bremmer, point 
towards the execution of Socrates as a clear warning not to express any longer explicit 
theories on the non-existence of the gods267, the information from doxographers on 
                                                                                                                                                        
he will go to an expounder of sacred law who will simply tell him to have the bag stitched up, but the 
superstitious man will ignore such practical advice and will try to expiate everything he considers 
ominous by means of sacrifice. The idea of an increase in superstition in the Hellenistic Period refutes 
the old argument by Drachmann (1922), p. 89-94 that decline of belief in the popular gods in favour of 
more abstract deities such as Tyche (‘Fate’ or ‘Fortune’) was an established social phenomenon in most 
of the Hellenistic World. Drachmann also linked this argument with the fact that writers, as early as 
Thucydides, already made use of Tyche instead of the traditional gods when dealing with matters 
outside the human sphere of influence. A similar approach can be detected in the writings of Polybius, 
who made extensive use of Tyche at the expense of the traditional gods. This argument is now 
outdated, not only because Euripides already incorporated the idea of Tyche presiding over the other 
immortal gods in different plays (Ionians, 1512-1514, Hecuba, 488-491 & Cyclops, 606), but also due 
to the fact that modern scholars (See Mikalson 1998, p. 1-10) generally detect, besides continuity in 
cult practices, also a renewed interest in religious practices and traditions in Hellenistic Times. 
Moreover, the cult of Tyche in the Hellenistic period was not representative for a decline in belief or 
worship, but rather epitomized a direction towards superstition where Tyche became identified with 
‘blind chance’. The goddess Tyche appears to have been a popular theistic deity with specific temples 
and rites, which is not compatible with the idea of a widespread disbelief or atheism regarding popular 
belief. Therefore, the theory of Drachmann is definitely obsolete, but the case of Tyche does exemplify 
the need in complex Hellenistic societies for the personification and anthropomorphic deification of 
more abstract concepts, which were not fully covered by the gods of the traditional Greek Pantheon, 
such as the irregularity of Fate. 
267
 Bremmer (2007), p.19. In contrast to Dover (1988), p. 153-158 who argued that Athenian citizens 
were strikingly tolerant of intellectuals for different reasons.  For example, sophist teaching could 
improve the defensibility of the uneducated. Strepsiades in Aristophanes’s Clouds does not want to 
absorb science and philosophy by the means of a sophist teaching, but rather wishes to outwit his 
numerous debt collectors. Another reason can be found in the custom of hospitality. Many philosophers 
in Athens were of foreign origin and depended on the patronage of wealthy families. Although they 
could influence Athenian society and politics by educating youth, they could not participate in any 
policy as they did not primarily belong to the Athenian demos. This could explain why the atheism of 
Diagoras of Melos was considered less harmful than the involvement of Andocides in the religious 
scandals, the latter being an Athenian citizen and the former of mere metic status. On this matter, see 
also Konstan (2011), p. 87 who argues that foreign intellectuals (Protagoras, Prodicus, etc.) were 
familiar, but of little concern to the Athenian audiences of Old Comedy and as such never important 
enough to feature as protagonists during an entire play, which could indicate a certain degree of 
indifference towards their (sophist) teachings. 
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the impiety trials of alleged atheoi in early Hellenistic Times is sporadic and 
anecdotal, and in some cases even spurious.268   
 
The answer could rather lie in the implementation of theology within each 
philosophical system from Aristotle on. At the dawn of the Hellenistic period, 
theology became a vital part of most philosophical schools. This innovation, however, 
originated from Plato, who described in his dialogues Theaetetus (151d) & The 
Republic (II, 379a-381c) that any description of the gods should be based on three 
recurring elements: (1) the gods are good, (2) the gods are not the cause of evil, but 
only of goodness and (3) the gods remain unchanged.269  This Platonic model of god-
description or “speaking about the gods” (θεολογία)270 is actually a rationalization of 
the gods of popular religion. It remodeled them to the idea of ‘goodness’ and 
‘unchangeablity’, which would form the basis of Aristotle’s own theology and later 
Hellenistic theologies.271  
 
In the now following sections of this chapter, I will analyze the different philosophical 
schools in the Hellenistic period and how these dealt with (allegations of) atheism. In 
doing so, we will detect that the phenomenon of atheism became a highly polemical 
matter in Hellenistic Times. Many accusations of atheism against philosophical 
opponents would not necessarily concern actual atheism in the sense of denying the 
existence of the gods, but rather involved conflicting theological perceptions of divine 
existence. 
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19.1) Epicureanism 
 
From the Hellenistic period on, most philosophical schools would formulate elaborate 
arguments in favour of divine existence, and more specifically those schools 
frequently associated with atheism, such as Epicureanism.272 Albeit many apologetic 
attempts, the Epicureans would never be able to remove the stigma of atheism 
altogether.273 For example, the so-called indices atheorum appeared to have been an 
Epicurean invention since the oldest known catalogue of atheists can be ascribed to 
Epicurus’s work On Nature (book XII), of which a brief summary has survived 
through Philodemus’s On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col.82, 1-18 (19, 519-536). In this 
index atheorum, Epicurus condemned those who are considered antitheists such as 
Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias, comparing them to ‘mad dwellers’.  
 
Another indication of Epicureanism disassociating itself with atheism is the evidence 
from Epicurean theology, not only in later apologetic writings such as Philodemus’s 
On Piety, but also in the Letter to Menoeceus by Epicurus. In this letter, Epicurus 
acknowledged the existence of the gods, but at the same time he condemned popular 
religion for being impious.274  
 
This statement by Epicurus is somehow peculiar, because sources like Philodemus, 
On Piety, P. Herc.1098, col.28, 808-810 & P. Herc.1077, col.49, 1397-1398 allude to 
the fact that Epicurus was initiated in the Mysteries and also acknowledged all forms 
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 Apuleius (Apology, 27) associates accusations of atheism against Epicureans and naturalist 
philosophers with the general ignorance of the uneducated.   
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 Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, X, 123: ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν 
πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς. (“Not the man who denies the gods 
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of traditional worship.275 However, both statements should not be incongruous, 
because the Letter to Menoeceus aims to formulate a genuine Epicurean theology and 
epistemology. By describing the gods as blessed, unchangeable and imperishable 
beings, Epicurus distinguished an ‘Aristotelian’ conception of the gods from false 
beliefs (e.g., popular misconceptions of the gods, based on literary readings of 
traditional poets). Still, Epicurus did not support the Platonic and Aristotelian idea 
that divine intellect was being reflected in the motions of the heavenly bodies.276  
 
In Epicurean theology, any concern for reprisal by the gods is also completely 
lacking, as this conflicts with the Epicurean ideal of tranquility (ἀταραξία).277 
Therefore, Epicureanism basically undermined one of the main tenets of popular 
Greek religion: the idea of reciprocity between gods and mortals, which was even 
reflected within Greek religious language.278 For instance, sacrifices to the gods were 
perceived as ‘pleasing offerings’ (κεχαρισµένα), which in return would evoke divine 
favour, and a man was only considered to be εὐδαίµων (‘happy’ or ‘fortunate’), if he 
could rely on εὐδαιµονία or ‘the support of a favourable deity’.   
 
But, according to Epicurean theology, a true conception of the gods was not believed 
to be contradictory with traditional worship, because the latter was considered a 
necessary product of cultural history (i.e a deep psychological need of mankind to 
recognize and relate to the quintessence of divine nature). This idea basically 
corresponds with Epicurus’s idea of ‘preconception’ or prolepsis.279 In The Life of 
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 Epicurus explains the signification of prolepsis in the Letter to Herodotus (Diogenes Laertius, On 
the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, X, 37-38: Πρῶτον µὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγµένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὦ 
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Epicurus (Book X, 31), Diogenes Laertius explains that, according to Epicurus, 
standards of truth are formed by sensations (αἰσθήσεις), feelings (πάθη) and 
preconceptions (προλήψεις). Prolepsis or preconception can be interpreted as a mental 
picture or sketch of a universal nature, which enables us to fully understand objects. It 
is the result of what Diogenes (X, 33) called ‘a universal idea stored in the mind 
through recollections of an external object often presented’.280 As such, 
preconceptions can exist of basic sensory experiences such as ‘blue’ or ‘round’ or can 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ εἰληφέναι, ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόµενα ἢ ζητούµενα ἢ ἀπορούµενα ἔχωµεν εἰς ταῦτα 
ἀνάγοντες ἐπικρίνειν, καὶ µὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡµῖν <ἴῃ> εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ κενοὺς 
φθόγγους ἔχωµεν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόηµα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ 
µηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἕξοµεν τὸ ζητούµενον ἢ ἀπορούµενον καὶ δοξαζόµενον 
ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἀνάξοµεν. (“First, Herodotus, it is necessary to have grasped what is subordinate to our 
utterances so that we may have the means to judge what is believed or sought or perplexing by 
referring to this, and so that everything will not <be> unjudged by us as we demonstrate to infinity or 
we have empty utterances. For it is necessary that the first concept in accordance wit each utterance be 
seen and require demonstration, if we are to have a [standard of] reference for what is sought or 
perplexing and believed.”) (transl. E. Asmis). 
280
 Later Epicurean sources are more precise on how the ‘first mental picture’ of the preconception 
‘god’ is actually formed. The Epicurean Velleius (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 43) argues that 
nature has imprinted the preconception of gods in the mind of humans. Sextus Empiricus, Against the 
Mathematicians, IX, 43-47 reports that belief in the gods, according to the Epicureans, arose from 
human-shaped images in dreams which underwent a process of transition (µετάβασις), namely an 
enlarging of these human-shaped images combined with the conception of the ‘happy man’ in order to 
explain the Epicurean notion of divine happiness and  blessedness. On this matter, Sextus accuses the 
Epicureans of contradiction and circularity, because the understanding of the conception ‘happiness’ 
(εὐδαιµονία) supposes divine manifestation (δαιµόνια). So, ‘god’ cannot be perceived based on the 
idea of happiness as happiness cannot be perceived without an idea of deity. Nevertheless this 
criticism, Lucretius (On the nature of Things, VI, 68-79) seems to argue that the images of the gods 
cannot be received without a tranquil and peaceful mind-set, otherwise fear will inevitably lead to a 
false belief in vengeful gods. These images of the gods enter the human mind as atomic streams of 
human-shaped images (εἴδωλα) through dreams or visions; an idea which also appeared in the 
teachings of Democritus (DK 68 A 74-79). Based on these observations, some modern scholars (see 
A.A. Long & D.N. Sedley (1987), p.139-149) argued that gods within Epicurean theology are mere 
non-biological ‘thought-constructs’: i.e mental pictures or impressions without solid bodies who 
evolved from transition by the intensification and enlarging of impressions of robust, long-living and 
happy men to an ‘eternal’ and ‘indestructible’ level. The need to construct such mental beings is innate 
as gods function as the ultimate moral paradigms. According to Long and Sedley, Epicurus perceived 
gods in such a way that each person can create his own gods as paradigms or role models for his own 
ethical goal in life. The ‘eternal’ and ‘indestructible’ nature of gods must be interpreted as a moral 
model that can be exemplary to future generations of mankind. This idea could, on the one hand, 
explain why awareness of gods can differ from person to person as it cannot be proven that people 
experience the (streams of) images of the gods in dreams all alike. On the other hand does the idea of 
‘thought-constructs’ appear to be based on a selective interpretation of Epicurean sources from 
different traditions (e.g., the Letter to Menoeceus which seems to suggest that gods are ‘constructed’ 
while Lucretius mentions that the images of the gods are easily disrupted when not experienced by a 
peaceful mind-set) and remains therefore very controversial (on this matter see Mansfield (1993) and 
Swiebe (2003)). The main counterargument is based on the (frequent) Epicurean statement that the 
gods are actual living (zōia) and corporeal beings (see Obbink (1996), p.11 & Mansfeld (1999), p.474) 
and, as such, not mere mental constructs, which do not exist outside the human mind. For a recent 
analysis of the idea of preconception or prolepsis, see Essler (2011), p. 148-187. 
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be of a more complex nature like preconceptions of ‘justice’ or ‘god’.281 This latter is 
probably the preconception the most complex to conceive and Epicurus deals with it 
in the Letter to Menoeceus (123-124). Firstly, Epicurus argued that belief in deities is 
embedded within the common sense of humanity and corresponds with the 
preconception of ‘god’ as an immortal, indestructible and blessed being.  
 
Secondly, Epicurus believed that the general preconception of the gods, as 
experienced by the masses, is false, because the idea of gods, intervening in human 
life on a basis of reciprocity, does contradict with the concept of blessedness: 
 
“For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; 
hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good 
from the hand of the gods, seeing that they are always favourable to their own good qualities and take 
pleasure in men like unto themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind.” (transl. R.D. 
Hicks).282 
 
Still, Epicurus advocated the usefulness of religion by which gods can be fully 
worshipped according to tradition. Reducing the gods to purely natural elements or 
forces of chance, in the way the natural philosophers advocated, is also to be rejected, 
because this reduces men to mere subjects of the unpredictability and arbitrariness of 
nature.283  
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Honouring the gods, as role models in order to reach a certain degree of divine 
blessedness and undisturbedness, still provides hope for mankind.  This existential 
hope must ultimately cause the disappearance of any fear of death or mortality. 
Basically speaking, Epicureans should develop into ‘gods among mankind’284.  In this 
context, the Epicurean theory of ritual as a means of social cohesion can also be 
mentioned. 285   
 
Nevertheless these observations, philosophical opponents (such as Posidonius) 
persisted that Epicureans were actually ‘crypto-atheists', only participating in rituals 
in order to avoid public odium.286 This opinion was also supported by the fact that 
Epicurus rejected divine providence, the divine character of the heavenly bodies and 
divination.287  
 
Another plausible explanation for accusations of atheism could be found in the 
distinctive Epicurean attitude to venerate its founder Epicurus to an even divine 
status.288 As such, one could interpret that allegations of atheism against Epicurus 
involved the notion of theomachia: resisting the dunamis of the gods over mankind 
with the specific intent to become a god oneself, although the Letter to Menoeceus 
clearly contradicts such allegations.289  
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19.2) Stoicism 
 
Stoic theology was believed to be a mixture of pantheism and a henotheistic approach 
to monotheism and polytheism.290 Perhaps the essential characteristics of Stoic 
theology are summarized most concisely by Diogenes Laertius (VII, 147) in his 
biography of Zeno of Citium (333-261 BC), the founder of Stoicsm: 
 
“The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting 
nothing evil [into him], taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of 
human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in 
general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names 
according to its various powers.” (transl. R.D. Hicks).291 
 
In this brief description of Stoic theology, we can see clear references to Plato (on 
teleology, the demiurgic nature of ‘God’ and his inability to perform evil)292 and 
Aristotle (on the pantheistic characteristic of an all-pervading ‘God’ in the 
universe).293 However, there are also differences with Socratic thought. For instance, 
in Stoic theology the Demiurge coincides with (the Stoic) God, whereas Plato 
considered the Demiurge and the World-soul to be two distinctive forms of divine 
existence.294 Different from Plato is also the relatively unimportance of traditional 
polytheism in Stoic theology. Theologically speaking, the Stoics were monotheists, 
but they nevertheless preserved polytheism by regarding the Olympian gods as mortal 
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and perishable beings, whom -in contrast to Zeus- were destroyed in a cosmic 
conflagration and thus subjected to a cycle of rebirth or palingenesis.295  
 
The Stoics were also reluctant in regard to the traditional presentation of the gods of 
popular Greek worship, but accepted their existence based on the principle of 
universal agreement.296 As an alternative, the Olympian Gods within Stoic theology 
were reinterpreted as allegorical manifestations of a single ‘Reason’ (Logos) or ‘God’, 
which was identified as Zeus. The universe (i.e. stars, heavenly bodies and earth) also 
reflects the perfect nature of this cosmic Reason and therefore, Stoic theology can be 
interpreted as pantheistic.297  
 
Epicureans, such as Philodemus (ca. 110 – ca. 35 BC) eventually accused Stoics of 
atheism. In his treatise, On Piety, Philodemus suspected Stoics to be radical atheists, 
because they reduced the anthropomorphic gods to cosmological objects.298 
Philodemus also labeled the Stoic Persaeus of Citium (306-243 BC) a radical atheist, 
because he adopted the theories of Prodicus, whom Philodemus also identified as a 
radical atheist.299 But in all probability Persaeus should not be viewed a radical 
atheist, because he only reinterpreted the theories of Prodicus in a more positive 
sense.300 While the theories of Prodicus stressed that belief in the gods by ancient men 
was the result of the personification of things beneficial to mankind and the 
deification of agricultural innovators, Persaeus explained these theories in a Stoic 
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sense: recognizing beneficial things and innovators as ‘gods’ is a form of proof that 
even primitive mankind had a preconception (prolepsis) of ‘God’ and acknowledged 
him as an active and providential force in the world.301  The latter, however, was also 
problematic in the eyes of the Epicureans. The Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda (2nd 
century AD) attacked the dogmatic belief in teleology and providence of the Stoics in 
the opening lines of fragment 52 of The Epicurean Inscription. The first lines are 
damaged, but we can clearily read from line I, 14 on: ‘so, if divination [is eliminated], 
what other evidence for fate is there?’.302  
 
But attacks on Stoicism were not exclusively of Epicurean signature. The Academic 
Sceptic Carneades (215-129 BC) specifically attacked the pantheistic characteristics 
of Stoic theology, but also the Stoic concepts of ‘God’ as a creator endowing men 
with reason and ‘absolute knowledge’, based on the Stoic idea that true knowledge 
can be obtained by a grasping of the soul by cognitive sense impressions.303 The main 
criticisms of Carneades against Stoicism are preserved in Cicero’s On the Nature of 
the Gods (III, 43) and are based on the technique of soritès (‘heap’). The term ‘heap’ 
as, A.A. Long formulates it, refers to ‘the difficulties of indicating precise 
differentiating characteristics’.304  What must be understood by this description of 
soritès is the fact that Carneades regarded the Stoic idea of polytheism to be invalid, 
because it cannot provide a fundamental distinction between divine and non-divine 
entities. One can consider every mythological figure (nymphs, satyrs, etc.) to be a 
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‘god’, based on the argument that it is being -even remotely- worshipped or temples 
are dedicated to it. But this will result in a ‘heap’ of deities and this can only be 
avoided if definite standards are formulated, which eliminate any possibility of a 
‘heap’ of deities.305  
 
The Platonist Plutarch (ca. 45- ca. 120 AD), who was also very critical of 
Epicureanism306, attacked the Stoics in two separate treatises (On Common 
Conceptions Against the Stoics & On the Self-Contradictions of the Stoics) in which 
he mainly targeted the ‘atheist’ teachings of Cleanthes (ca. 330- ca. 230 BC) and his 
pupil Chrysippus (ca. 280 - ca. 207 BC).307 Both Stoics believed that all gods, except 
for Zeus, were constantly being absorbed and renewed by the process of conflagration 
(ἐκπύρωσις), which implied the denial of their imperishability. 308   
 
In his treastise On Isis and Osiris, Plutarch would also profile himself as being very 
critical of Stoicism. Stoic pantheism, according to Plutarch, dissipated the gods into 
senseless and inanimate objects, which, in return, led to atheism.309  
 
The fact that Plutarch methodically criticized Epicureanism and Stoicism, in 
particular, might have been primarily a matter of philosophical rivalry. Although 
Stoicism, like Epicureanism, did contain some forms of truth in Plutarch’s opinion, it 
was nevertheless in too direct competition with the Platonist school in order to 
become the most dominant philosophical school in the Roman Empire of the early 2nd 
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century AD.310 As a Platonist, Plutarch would only recognize the teachings of Plato as 
being in complete accordance with philosophical truth.311  
 
19.3) Scepticism 
 
Except for one particular source (i.e. Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, III, 44) 
which denies the suggestion that Carneades endorsed atheism, we have no indication 
that (Academic or Pyrrhonian) Scepticism was ever confronted with allegations of 
atheism. But we may assume that this was nevertheless the case, based on the concept 
of indices atheorum. We have so far analyzed these ‘atheist lists’ as distinctive means 
to dissociate oneself from affiliations with atheism by identifying the ‘actual’ atheists 
in rivaling philosophical schools (e.g., Epicureans versus Stoics). Moreover, the two 
most important and extensive indices atheorum from Antiquity were compiled by 
Sceptic scholars, namely Cicero and Sextus Empiricus. These indices atheorum, in 
return, are believed to have been based on the lost κατάλογος ἀθέων (which might have 
been a part of the supposed treatise Περὶ ἀθεότητος, although this remains highly 
uncertain312) of the Academic Sceptic Clitomachus (187-110 BC).313   
 
Clitomachus was believed to be a pupil of Carneades (215-129 BC), the main 
representative of Academic Scepticism. Carneades also attributed to the polemical 
debate on the existence of gods within Hellenistic philosophy, and mainly attacked 
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Stoic ideas, as discussed in the previous section.314  According to Cicero, Carneades 
did not wish to encourage atheism or destroy Greek polytheism and religion in 
general, but rather demonstrated the ‘dogmatist’ attitude of certain Hellenistic 
philosophical schools, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism.315 But, then again, the 
teachings of Carneades (as argued earlier in the dissertation) do meet the requirements 
of what can be described as ‘negative atheism in Antiquity’.316  
 
The anti-dogmatist attitude of Academic Scepticism nevertheless becomes evident 
throughout Cicero’s treatise: the Epicurean and Stoic spokesmen, Velleius and 
Balbus, are each convinced of the validity of their arguments on the existence of the 
gods, while Cotta (similar to Cicero) forms an Academic Sceptic counterweight based 
on typical sceptical principles such as epochè (‘suspension of judgment’) and the 
absence of epistomè (‘definite knowledge’). The existence of the gods is 
acknowledged on terms of tradition and ancestral customs.317 The Academic Sceptic, 
however, will refrain from any speculation on the nature of divine existence.318 
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When Pyrrhonian Scepticism eventually surpassed Academic Scepticism in the 1st 
century BC, with its renewed emphasis on ataraxia (‘peace of mind’) next to epochè, 
the teachings of Carneades were no longer fashionable among Sceptics. This resulted 
in a less anti-dogmatist attitude.319 
 
We can conclude this section on Academic Scepticism with the assumption that its 
determined attitude to refrain from any speculation on divine existence, in contrast 
with its tendency to acknowledge the existence of the gods, its display of piety and 
acceptance of traditional worship, resulted in a particular (ancient) form of negative 
atheism.  
 
But negative atheism in a modern sense, namely the complete absence of any theistic 
belief, would only be discernible in the next philosophical school. 
 
19.4) Cynicism 
 
One Hellenistic philosophical school which has not been mentioned yet and cannot be 
overlooked in a study of philosophical atheism in Antiquity is Cynicism. Generally 
discussed in a rather peripheral manner in most research on Hellenistic philosophy320, 
a quick assumption could lead to the conclusion that Cynicism is of only marginal 
importance within the history of philosophical atheism. Being basically a practical 
mind-set without a distinct epistemology or theology, Cynicism definitely was the 
eccentric among Hellenistic philosophy. It mainly emphasized the importance of 
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ethics and more specifically the Socratic concept of virtue, combined with practical 
wisdom (phronèsis) and freedom. This was practiced by an ascetic lifestyle that 
rejected social convention (nomos) and returned to the simplicity of nature (physis).321  
 
A precursor of Cynicism is believed to be Antisthenes (ca. 445 – ca. 365 BC), a 
disciple of Gorgias and a follower of Socrates322, but the deist Aristodemus (“The 
Dwarf”), who envisoned the godhead (τό δαιµόνιον) to be too magnificent to pay any 
attention to human affairs, could also be considered a forerunner of Cynicism.323  
Because he believed that the gods had no need for veneration, Aristodemus did not 
sacrifice to the gods or make use of divination and laughed at those who did. Socrates, 
on the other hand, persuaded him of the need to acknowledge the gods, based on the 
argument of intelligent design that indicates that the gods are concerned with man’s 
well-being.324 But the fact that Aristodemus made fun of conventional religion is 
definitely a feature that later Cynics would share.325 
 
The main representative of Cynicism was, nonetheless, Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 412 – 
ca.321 BC), a contemporary of Plato, who, according to Diogenes Laertius (VI, 20-
80), practiced the Cynic ideals to an almost extreme level. Considering the fact that 
Cynics, such as Diogenes, are believed to have shunned social conventions and 
traditions in such a way that it openly provoked the civic community (e.g., by 
performing bodily functions in public) and due to the complete lack of any Cynic 
theology, philosophical (negative) atheism could have been an essential characteristic 
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of Cynicism. However, some ancient sources did endorse the idea that Diogenes 
believed in the existence of the gods, but this belief was not expressed by any 
conventional form of worship.326 But these ancient views do not deliver any proof that 
Cynicism acknowledged alternative theories on divine existence. Rather, Cynicism 
must be viewed as a pure form of agnosticism and irreligion. The Cynic ideal reflects 
a state of self-sufficiency and a total detachment of all aspects of civic life, and in 
particular civic religion. The Cynic aversion to religion was relatively consistent 
throughout Antiquity and was characterized by a rejection of anthropomorphism, 
divination, sacrifices, oracles, the Mysteries, amulets and belief in punishment after 
life.327 Such a reductionist attitude towards traditional Greek religion could lead to the 
notion that Cynicism almost identified itself with positive atheism in the sense of 
disbelief in the gods, but this is definitely not the case. Similar to Plato’s assessment 
of traditional theism in Laws (X, 885b), the Cynic experienced traditional Greek 
religion as a form of impiety, because worshippers assume that Gods can always be 
flattered by a variety of cultic practices.  
 
This is, for instance, the opinion of the Cynic Menippus of Gadara (ca. 300 – ca. 250 
BC), whose writings have only survived through different dialogues by Lucian. In 
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these dialogues (i.e. On Sacrifices, Zeus Refutatus, Zeus Tragicus and 
Icaromenippus), Lucian portrays Menippus as being extremely critical of traditional 
cultic practices, although we can never be sure how accurate Lucian portrays the 
historical Menippus. Nevertheless, Lucian’s Menippus is still in accordance with the 
Cynicism of Diogenes. Obviously, the Greek gods do not fulfill any practical role of 
importance in Cynicism and this does not facilitate any accurate idea of the godhead, 
according to Cynic doctrine.  
 
Maybe the answer can be found in a statement of its founder Antisthenes that 
‘according to tradition there are many gods, but according to nature there is only 
one’.328 Clearly, Antisthenes must not be considered to have been a monotheist as 
Lactantius (Divine Institutions, I, 5.18) assumed, since he actually referred to the 
distinction between the gods of physis (nature) and nomos (culture). The latter in the 
form of anthropomorphic beings, who are worshipped according to traditional 
religion, are being rejected by the Cynics. Instead the gods are absorbed within the 
singular concept of nature. Nature is the only supremacy the Cynic must acknowledge 
in order to obtain a status of self-sufficiency and detachment.  All aspects of civic life 
can be abandoned, but nature is nevertheless inescapable.329 
 
So, the ‘gods’ of the Cynics could be impersonal, non-anthropomorphic 
manifestations of natural forces, but there is no evidence in ancient sources that nature 
actually coincided with divine existence in Cynic thought. Moreover, belief in the 
gods was most likely of no concern to the Cynic, because it was not experienced as 
beneficial for the ideal of self-sufficiency. The Cynic simply did not care about these 
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matters and refrained from further speculation on divine existence. Hence, the 
theological viewpoint of Cynicism can be assessed as agnostic.330 Traditional religion 
is being rejected, because it rather reflects civic society than any sincere belief in 
divine existence. Performing sacrifices to anthropomorphically conceived beings only 
serves to tie gods to human interests. The Cynics (cf. Lucian’s Menippus of Gadara) 
experienced such notion of divinity as particularly impious. For these reasons, I 
propose to relate Cynicism to negative atheism in a modern sense: a complete absence 
of religious beliefs and practices is preferred over any traditional or alternative 
interpretation of the gods. The gods might exist, but the Cynic has no preoccupation 
whatsoever with these matters.  
 
Notwithstanding the negative atheism of the Cynics in relation to the gods, the 
connection between Cynicism and positive atheism was quickly drawn. Diogenes 
Laertius, for instance, mentions some anecdotes on the life of Diogenes of Sinope, 
which some of his sources relate to notorious atheists such as Diagoras of Melos (on 
the Samothrace offerings: VI, 59 ) and Theodorus of Cyrence (on the insulting of 
Lysias, the druggist: VI, 41). The striking wittiness that Diogenes displays in these 
paragraphs does indeed remind us of comparable ironical remarks by Diagoras and 
Theodorus.331   
 
Another argument for linking radical atheism with Cynicism is the fact that the Cynic 
Bion of Borysthenes (ca. 325- ca. 250 BC) is believed to have been a disciple of 
Theodorus ‘the Atheist’ of Cyrene for some time.332 Diogenes Laertius (IV, 54-57) 
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reports that Bion did forsake his disbelief in the gods near the end of his life, when 
being struck by illness.  Deeply fearing death, Bion would even convert to an almost 
superstitious form of popular Greek belief, as can be read in the following passage: 
 
“We hear that Bion, to whom the Scythian land of Borysthenes gave birth, denied that the gods really 
exist. Had he persisted in holding this opinion, it would have been right to say, "He thinks as he 
pleases: wrongly, to be sure, but still he does think so." But in fact, when he fell ill of a lingering 
disease and feared death, he who denied the existence of the gods, and would not even look at a temple, 
who often mocked at mortals for sacrificing to deities, not only over hearth and high altars and table, 
with sweet savour and fat and incense did he gladden the nostrils of the gods; nor was he content to say 
"I have sinned, forgive the past," […] Fool for wishing that the divine favour might be purchased at a 
certain price, as if the gods existed just when Bion chose to recognize them! It was then with vain 
wisdom that, when the driveller was all ashes, he stretched out his hand and said "Hail, Pluto, 
hail!".”(transl. R.D. Hicks).333 
 
Diogenes’s account of the final days of Bion’s life seems to display some form of 
poetic justice: the radical atheist with the Scythian background, who did not belief in 
the gods and consequently did not sacrifice to them, finally realizes his wrongdoings 
against the gods and becomes remorseful once being confronted with a deteriorating 
health.334   
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It is also striking how Diogenes Laertius portrays Bion as a hypocritical and cowardly 
figure who, only in the sight of death, regrets his previous atheism. Moreover, 
Diogenes Laertius particularly mocks the inconsistency of Bion’s religious attitude 
during his life rather than his former radical atheist opinions. By arguing that Bion 
should have persisted in his atheism until the very end, regardless of the fact it is 
dismissed as being erroneous, Diogenes believes that Bion would have upheld more 
credibility as a philosopher.335   
 
Some scholars, however, have argued that Diogenes Laertius is being too harsh and 
hostile to Bion in regard to his supposed atheism. For instance, both Dudley and 
Kindstrand criticized Diogenes Laertius for not understanding the irreligious nature of 
Bion’s Cynicism properly and identifying it too much with the atheism of 
Theodorus.336 Indeed, Diogenes might haven been be too fixated on the atheism of 
Bion, but this could have been a deliberate action. By concentrating more on a 
portrayal of Bion ‘the Atheist’ instead of Bion ‘the Cynic’, Diogenes could have more 
effectively depicted Bion as falling victim to the opposite deviation of Greek piety, 
namely δεισιδαιµονία (‘superstition’).337  
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In any case, the passage by Diogenes Laertius illustrates in an ironical way how 
radical atheism finally came to an end with the death of Bion. Given the fact that the 
Theodorian school perished shortly after the death of Theodorus (ca. 275 BC), the 
final blow to radical atheism in the Greek world would be the death of Bion (ca. 250 
BC). Having forsaken atheism on his deathbed, the passage exemplifies how 
traditional Greek religion had eventually prevailed over (radical) atheism.   
 
19.5) conclusions 
 
In resuming the historical importance of the Hellenistic philosophical schools on the 
topic of atheism, we could conclude that Jan Bremmer’s idea of a Hellenistic ‘soft 
atheism’ can be supported once we contrapose it to the idea of a ‘hard atheism’ in the 
Classical period that aimed to ‘destroy the gods’ (theous anairein). With the exception 
of the short-lived Theodorian school, positive atheism no longer occurred during the 
Hellenistic period. Negative atheism in the sense of agnosticism, on the other hand, is 
detectable in the Cynic absence of belief and the Sceptic suspension of judgment 
regarding the nature of the gods. The former corresponds to a negative atheism in the 
modern sense, while the latter appears to embody a negative atheism that was 
distinctive of Antiquity: the precise nature of the gods cannot be known, but they 
should be worshipped for multiple reasons, nonetheless. 
 
Like the majority of Hellenistic philosophical schools, Scepticism did acknowledge 
the existence of the gods, whether by means of a well-defined theology or by 
alternative concepts on traditional Greek religion and worship. Plato’s renewed theism 
with its emphasis on piety and a purely philosophical interpretation of divine 
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existence (identifiable as being ‘good’ and not bribable by the exploits of popular 
religion) had already set the tone for the many philosophical debates and polemics on 
the nature of the gods that surfaced during the Hellenistic period.338 Based on this 
Platonic interpretation of theism, a too popular presentation of the gods was no longer 
justifiable, because it did not stimulate piety, but only encouraged unacceptable forms 
of superstition or priestly frausts.  This might explain the Hellenistic tendency to 
rationalize or reinterpret traditional mythology (e.g., by means of allegory) in order to 
uncover its intrinsic truths. Atheism in the sense of a negative evaluation of the 
existence of the gods and, more particularly, disbelief in the (Socratic) gods became 
the other disfavourable position in this religious spectre. Philosophically disowned by 
Plato as a form of ‘mental weakness’ in his final dialogue Laws, atheism would turn 
out to be a stigmatic label the vast majority of philosophical schools did not wish to 
be associated with.  
 
The concept of atheism also proved to be an effective tool for the discrimination of 
philosophical opponents. Once linked to allegations of atheism, the stigma turned out 
to be permanent, as the case of Epicureanism clearly demonstrates.  
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the level of considering ‘pleasure’ or ‘happiness’ as the ultimate manifestation of ‘goodness’, hence the 
Epicurean idea of ‘blessed nature’ as a quintessential feature of the gods.  See on this matter also Jones 
(1992), p.49-50 & Long (1999), p. 639. 
 
     578 
Finally, radical atheism would receive its final blow during the Hellenistic period as 
attempts by Theodorus of Cyrene and Bion of Borysthenes to revive it would 
ultimately fail. A radical atheism, based on the aetiological theories of Prodicus and 
Democritus, and possibly Diagoras of Melos, had become obsolete. Mainly targeting 
traditional Greek religion and its irrational understanding of natural phenomena, 
radical atheism was too much embedded in the sophist tradition and, as such, not able 
to adapt to the renewed philosophical climate of the Hellenistic period. It did also not 
provide any convincing arguments to counter Plato’s philosophical theism, which was 
further conceptualized in the theologies of the Hellenistic philosophical schools.  
 
This downwards evolution of (radical) atheism is actually reported by the Christian 
writer Lactantius in his Treatise on the Wrath of God: 
 
“[t]here lived a certain Diagoras of Melos, who altogether denied the existence of God, and on account 
of this sentiment was called atheist also Theodorus of Cyrene: both of whom, because they were unable 
to discover anything new, all things having already been said and found out, preferred even, in 
opposition to the truth, to deny that in which all preceding philosophers had agreed without any 
ambiguity. (transl. A. Roberts & J. Donaldson)”.339 
 
Efforts by Theodorus and Bion to revive radical atheism, may have stirred at most 
some public consternation (e.g., the divulging of the Mysteries by Theodorus), which 
resulted in charges of asebeia, but this legal procedure had turned out to be ineffective 
or even unpopular in the Hellenistic period.340  
                                                      
339
 Lactantius, Treatise on the Wrath of God, IX: extitit Melius quidam Diagoras, qui nullum esse 
omnino Deum diceret, ob eamque sententiam nominatus est ἄθεος. Item Cyrenaeus Theodorus: ambo 
quia nihil noui poterant reperire, omnibus iam dictis et inuentis, maluerunt uel contra ueritatem id 
negare, in quo priores uniuersi sine ambiguitate consenserant.   
340
 Diogenes Laertius (V, 37) reports how Agnonides, who ventured to charge Theophrastus, head of 
the Lyceum, with impiety nearly escaped punishment himself. Diogenes does not mention whether the 
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Both atheists also represented a rather isolated and unsupported position in the 
intellectual debate and they did not enjoy any popularity that can be compared to 
Theophrastus, for example.  The impact of their teachings upon Athenian religion or 
civic society in general could therefore only have been minimal. In the case of 
Theodorus, allegations of asebeia seem to be closely related to his scoffing of the 
Eleusinian Mysteries, rather than the publication of his atheist Peri Theōn. Certainly, 
Theodorus had little to fear from charges of asebeia, as (pro-) Macedonian authorities 
like Demetrius of Phaleron did ensure political protection, probably based on a 
genuine interest in philosophical matters.341 Macedonian rulers, such as Cassander, 
Lysimachus or Ptolemy I, also seem to have supported philosophers like Theodorus to 
some extent, but here the favouring must probably be situated in the use of their 
diplomatic services or their usefulness in the creation and justification of euhemerized 
Hellenistic ruler-cults rather than the approval of any (radical) atheist statement 
against Athenian religion. In the case of Bion, his affiliation with radical atheism may 
even have been a short-termed phenomenon, given his versatile philosophical interests 
and the absence of concrete charges of asebeia against Bion in ancient sources. As 
Drachmann already formulated it more tersely, denying the existence of the gods went 
out of fashion very early in ancient Greece.342 This may also explain why Bion 
abandoned radical atheism at a certain point and became a disciple of Theophrastus 
the Peripatetic, according to Diogenes Laertius, IV, 52.343  
                                                                                                                                                        
prosecutor had to drop charges due to public pressure or Macedonian rule, but the paragraph does 
illustrate the popularity Theophrastus enjoyed in Athens, given the fact that about 2000 pupils used to 
attend his lectures.  
341
 On the political protection of Theodorus of Cyrene by Demetrius of Phaleron, see Diogenes Laertius 
(II, 101). For philosophical reasons involved in the rescue of Theodorus of Cyrene by Demetrius 
Phaleraus, see O’Sullivan (1997), p. 145, n. 46 with references to ancient sources, which suggest that 
Demetrius showed some favours for the Cynic Crates of Thebes. 
342
 Drachmann (1922), p. 110. 
343
 For a complete overwiew of the different philosophical standpoints of Bion, see Kindstrand (1976), 
p. 56-78. 
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PART 5: deviant religious behaviour in a Roman  
(religious and philosophical) context 
 
In this final part of the dissertation, I aim to investigate to which degree the 
phenomenon of deviant religious behaviour is transferable to a Roman context. 
Basically, we can reduce this inquiry to the fundamental question: “Can we detect a 
genuine ‘(ancient) Roman atheism’ that developed in analogy with Greek atheism or 
should we rather speak of a Roman variant of ancient Greek atheism?”. I shall now 
argue in this concluding part that ‘(ancient) Roman atheism’ can be regarded as a 
redundant term. At most, we can detect a temporal interest in Greek philosophical 
doctrines on the (in)existence of the gods. Secondly, I believe that the Greek adjective 
atheos was not only adopted by the Roman world on the philosophical level, but on 
the social level as well. Similar to the Greek context, atheos in a Roman context was 
also experienced as a dysfunctional mind-set that induced retribution from religious 
communities.  
 
Concretely speaking, I will reconstruct deviant religious behaviour in a Roman 
context by means of the most prominent Roman sources on the topic, namely Marcus 
Terentius Varro Reatinus (116-27 BC), Titus Lucretius Carus (99-55 BC), Marcus 
Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC) and Gaius Plinius Secundus Maior (23-79 AD).  Varro 
forms a starting point on deviant religious behaviour in a Roman context. Similar to 
Hecataeus of Miletus, Varro aimed to isolate (naive) mythological elements within 
Roman religious traditions by distinguishing different levels of Roman theology. 
Lucretius, Cicero and Pliny the Elder, on the other hand, deliver significant 
information on the Roman debate on the (in)existence of the gods in the late Republic 
and early Principate. Finally, Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (62-113 AD) and 
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different early Christian (apologetic) writers will provide evidence on the social and 
religious implications of the label atheos (or its lesser known Latin variant atheus). 
 
Chapter 20: deviant religious behaviour in a Roman (philosophical) context 
 
Transferring the debate on the (in)existence of the gods and the phenomenon of 
deviant religious behaviour from a Greek to a Roman context could prove to be a 
difficult task, not only because of the striking contrasts between both religious 
traditions, but also due to the relative lateness of Roman sources on the history and 
nature of Roman religion.1  The oldest sources on Roman religion are of Greek origin. 
Polybius (ca. 200 – ca. 120 BC), for example, mentions what he believed to be 
fundamental differences between Greek and Roman religion, 
 
“The respect in which the Roman constitution is most markedly superior is in their behaviour towards 
the gods. It is, I think, the very thing that brings reproach amongst other peoples that binds the Roman 
state together: I mean their superstitiousness. For nothing could exceed the extent to which this aspect 
both of their private lives and of their public occasions is dramatized and elaborated. Many would find 
this astonishing.” (transl. M. Beard, J. North & S. Price).2 
 
An important observation by Polybius, a higher Roman sense of religiosity –which 
Polybius experiences as superstition-, is the fact that Roman religion pervaded public 
                                                      
1
 North (2000), p. 6-7. 
2
 Polybius, History, VI, 56, 6: Μεγίστην δέ µοι δοκεῖ διαφορὰν ἔχειν τὸ Ῥωµαίων πολίτευµα πρὸς 
βέλτιον ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει. καί µοι δοκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδιζόµενον, 
τοῦτο συνέχειν τὰ Ῥωµαίων πράγµατα, λέγω δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιµονίαν: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ 
ἐκτετραγῴδηται καὶ παρεισῆκται τοῦτο τὸ µέρος παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς εἴς τε τοὺς κατ᾽ ἰδίαν βίους καὶ 
τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως ὥστε µὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολήν. ὃ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι 
θαυµάσιον.  
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and personal life to a much larger extent than Greek religion did.3 Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus (ca. 60 BC – ca. 7 AD), acknowledged this idea of Polybius by seeking 
a historical explanation for the strong sense of religiosity in Roman tradition. He 
reports that: 
 
“Romulus rejected all the traditional (Greek) myths concerning the gods that contain blasphemies or 
calumnies against them, looking upon them as wicked, useless and indecent, and unworthy, not only of 
the gods, but even of good men; and he accustomed people both to think and to speak the best of the 
gods and to attribute to them no product unworthy of their blessed nature.[…] So careful are the 
Romans to guard against religious practices that are not part of their own traditions; and they abominate 
all empty pomp that falls below proper standards of decency.” (transl. M. Beard, J. North & S. Price) .4 
 
In these paragraphs, Dionysius seems to aim his criticisms primarily at Greek 
mythology: divine myths within the Homeric and Hesiodic traditions are too much 
focused on negative aspects of anthropomorphism. This contrasts in Dionysius’s 
opinion with the common reluctance of ancient and contemporary Romans to adopt 
(Greek) religious ideas which associate the gods with improper images and stories.5 
 
                                                      
3
 The extended passage by Polybius contains an analysis of superstition and popular belief in general as 
important elements of the Roman religious constitution. According to Polybius, these allow control 
over the masses, wheras such measures would be unnecessary in a state of reasonable people.  
Drachmann (1922), p. 91 considers the passage by Polybius to be direct evidence of a deep-rooted 
atheism in the 2nd century BC, but I firmly disagree. The passage rather indicates that Polybius viewed 
popular religion as an indispensible condition for any social fabric. See also Cicero, On the Nature of 
the Gods, I, 2 for a similar argument. 
4
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, History of Rome, II, 18 (3) & 19 (5): τοὺς δὲ παραδεδοµένους περὶ 
αὐτῶν µύθους, ἐν οἷς βλασφηµίαι τινὲς ἔνεισι κατ᾽ αὐτῶν ἢ κακηγορίαι, πονηροὺς καὶ 
ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ ἀσχήµονας ὑπολαβὼν εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ὅτι θεῶν ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν 
ἀξίους, ἅπαντας ἐξέβαλε καὶ παρεσκεύασε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ κράτιστα περὶ θεῶν λέγειν τε 
καὶ φρονεῖν µηδὲν αὐτοῖς προσάπτοντας ἀνάξιον ἐπιτήδευµα τῆς µακαρίας φύσεως. 
5
 Price (1999), p. 153. 
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A similar hostile stance against (Greek) religious influences and the concept of 
anthropormophism in particular, is reported by Plutarch (ca. 46 - ca. 120 AD) in his 
biography of the second Roman king, Numa Pompilius: 
 
“Furthermore, his ordinances concerning images are altogether in harmony with the doctrines of 
Pythagoras. For that philosopher maintained that the first principle of being was beyond sense or 
feeling, was invisible and uncreated, and discernible only by the mind. And in like manner Numa 
forbade the Romans to revere an image of God which had the form of man or beast. Nor was there 
among them in this earlier time any painted or graven likeness of Deity, but while for the first hundred 
and seventy years they were continually building temples and establishing sacred shrines, they made no 
statues in bodily form for them, convinced that it was impious to liken higher things to lower, and that 
it was impossible to apprehend Deity except by the intellect. Their sacrifices, too, were altogether 
appropriate to the Pythagorean worship; for most of them involved no bloodshed, but were made with 
flour, drink-offerings, and the least costly gifts.” (transl. B. Perrin).6 
 
It is somehow remarkable that Plutarch relates this ancient Roman resentment for 
Greek anthropormorphism to Greek philosophy, and especially early Greek 
philosophical theology (e.g., Xenophanes, Empedocles, Pythagoras) with its stronge 
aversion against a physical presentation of the Greek gods. A similar attitude can 
already be detected in Varro’s Divine Antiquities, as will be discussed in a following 
section. According to Varro, ancient Roman religion was already from an early stage 
on consistent with a sophisticated philosophical understanding of divine existence. 
Only later foreign (e.g., Etruscan) cultural influences ‘polluted’ the original nature of 
                                                      
6
 Plutarch, Numa, 8, 7-8: ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀφιδρυµάτων νοµοθετήµατα παντάπασιν 
ἀδελφὰ τῶν Πυθαγόρου δογµάτων, οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνος αἰσθητὸν ἢ παθητόν, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ 
ἄκτιστον καὶ νοητὸν ὑπελάµβανεν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον, οὗτός τε διεκώλυσεν ἀνθρωποειδῆ καὶ 
ζῳόµορφον εἰκόνα θεοῦ Ῥωµαίους νοµίζειν. οὐδ᾽ ἦν παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς οὔτε γραπτὸν οὔτε πλαστὸν 
εἶδος θεοῦ πρότερον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἑκατὸν ἑβδοµήκοντα τοῖς πρώτοις ἔτεσι ναοὺς µὲν οἰκοδοµού 
µεν οι καὶ καλιάδας ἱερὰς ἱστῶντες, ἄγαλµα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔµµορφον ποιούµενοι διετέλουν, ὡς 
οὔτε ὅσιον ἀφοµοιοῦν τὰ βελτίονα τοῖς χείροσιν οὔτε ἐφάπτεσθαι θεοῦ δυνατὸν ἄλλως ἢ 
νοήσει, κοµιδῆ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν θυσιῶν ἔχεται τῆς Πυθαγορικῆς ἁγιστείας: ἀναίµακτοι γάρ ἦσαν 
αἵ γε πολλαί, δι᾽ ἀλφίτου καὶ σπονδῆς καὶ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων πεποιηµέναι.  
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ancient Roman religion by introducing deviant religious constructs (e.g. 
anthropomorphism and animal sacrifice) that were inconsistent with philosophical 
truths. It is noteworthy to mention in this respect that Plutarch indeed situates this 
absence of iconography within the Roman religious experience of the first two 
hunderd years of Roman history (until c.575 BC, according to Varro, fr. 13 & 18 
preserved in Augustine’s The City of God, 4.31), i.e. before the introduction of Greek 
anthropomorphism, most likely during the Etruscan rule over Rome (6th century BC).7   
 
But another key element in traditional Roman religion (which is not mentioned by the 
Greek authors above) is the importance of role models.8 Exemplary in this respect is 
the significance of Roman virtus and pietas, as embodied by Aeneas in Virgil’s 
Aeneid and contraposed to the impiety and tyranny of Mezentius, an Etruscan king.9 
Mezentius is identified in Virgil’s Aeneid (VII, 648 & VIII, 7) as contemptor divium 
(“a despiser of the gods”) and symbolizes the sacrilegious past of the Etruscan people, 
as described by Greek historiographers.10 
 
Due to the idealization of concepts like virtus and pietas, atheism as the result of 
individual reflection and personal choice would appear an unfavourable viewpoint 
within ancient Roman society. Such assumption could also be enhanced by the 
general Roman aversion for inappropriate religious practices and unseemly 
                                                      
7
 North (2000), p. 13-14, n.7 & Van Nuffelen (2011), p. 30-34. 
8
 See, for further information, Bell (2008), p. 1-39. 
9
 On this matter, see Pralon-Julia (2002), p. 93-107. 
10
 Herodotus, Histories, I, 167. The paragraph mainly refers to the supposed sacrilegious habit of the 
Etruscans to prevent the burial of defeated enemies, who were killed in battle. This denial of funerary 
rites is the same form of impiety that is embodied in the character of Mezentius by Virgil. 
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anthropomorphic perceptions of the Roman gods, which prevented early criticisms of 
the likes of Xenophanes and Empedocles.11  
 
The fact that foreign religious practices were regarded as threatening to Roman 
religious customs and traditions is generally attested by the repulsion of the cult of 
Bacchus by the Roman senate in 186 BC. However, the fear of foreign (mainly 
Greek) influences on Roman religion was also felt on the philosophical level. In this 
case, Pliny the Elder (Natural History, XIII, 27) reports on the discovery of the body 
of king Numa Pompilius in 181 BC.12 Along with the body, preserved books 
containing the teachings of Pythagoras were also found in the coffin. According to 
Pliny, the senate soon passed a decree that the books had to be burnt, due to the fact 
that they were considered to be a danger to Roman religion.  
 
This story by Pliny the Elder, whom modern scholars generally interpret as being very 
negative about Greek influences on Roman culture13, does illustrate how threatening 
Greek philosophy was perceived. One of the most revered personalities within the 
Roman religious tradition simply could not be associated with any particular Greek 
way of thinking.  
 
20.1) Varro 
 
This fear of Greek philosophy would continue during the mid-first century BC, as the 
earliest scientific depiction of Roman religion in Latin, namely Varro’s (largely lost) 
                                                      
11
 Price (1996), p.153. 
12
 The same story is also mentioned by Livy, History of Rome, XL, 29. 
13
 Riddle (1995), p. 669. 
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Divine Antiquities (ca. 47 BC), seems to have propagated.14 This monumental survey 
comprised 16 books and structured Roman religion ideally around the agricultural 
year, based on well defined categories of gods, festivals, rites and priests.15  
 
According to early 20th century scholars, Varro’s Divine Antiquities aimed at the 
preservation of Roman religious traditions and intentionally reacted against the 
decline of public Roman religion, the influence of Greek culture and philosophy and 
the rise of scepticism among the Roman elite during the Civil Wars of the Late 
Republic. 16 Modern scholars have now largely rejected this so-called ‘decline model’, 
by stressing the importance of a dynamic process of change and continuation of public 
Roman religion during the Empire.17  
 
Moreover, the common view that Varro must be regarded as a reactionary 
traditionalist of Roman religion against foreign, mainly Greek influences, has been 
recently challenged.18 According to this view, the extent of Greek philosophy (mainly 
Stoicism) embedded in the Divine Antiquities should not be underestimated. This 
becomes apparent in Varro’s classification of the Roman religious tradition into 3 
types of theology: natural theology (theologia naturalis), civic theology (theologia 
civilis) and mythical theology (theologia mythica). This classification corresponds 
with the Stoic views (mainly Posidonius) that mankind was ruled in a primitive stage 
                                                      
14
 For an overview of the structure of Varro’s Divine Antiquities, see Rüpke (2009), p. 59-60. 
15
 Price (2012), p.1268. 
16
 Wissowa (1912), p.70-71; Drachmann (1922), p. 100 & 119; Latte (1960), p. 264-293 & Taylor 
(1961), p. 76-97. 
17
 North (2000), p.30-34. 
18
 Rüpke (2009), p. 56-59; Van Nuffelen (2010), p. 162-188 & Van Nuffelen (2011), p. 29-37.  
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by philosopher-kings, who encoded ancient wisdom in the form of myth and poetry, 
and which later on reverberated in cultic practices, such as mystery cults.19   
 
Varro also argued that mythical theology had no actual historical value within Roman 
religion and only served the desire of poets to entertain audiences with nice stories.20 
Only theologia naturalis and theologia civilis were considered to be the historical 
fabrics of Roman religion that embodied philosophical truth. But Varro concluded 
that theologia naturalis had been obscured by the many disagreeing opinions among 
philosophers. Besides, Varro assessed this type of theology to be too demanding of 
the intellect of most people.21 Civic theology, then again, had easily led to forms of 
superstition, due to the introduction of iconography (despite the rejection of the 
Roman ancients)22 and the fact that (uneducated) worshippers easily mistook such cult 
images for being representative of the true nature of the gods.23  
 
20.2) Lucretius 
 
Despite its critiques on the philosophical blurriness of Roman religious traditions, 
Varro’s Divine Antiquities did not encourage any disbelief in the traditional gods. 
This, however, is not the case in the poem On the Nature of Things by Lucretius (99-
55 BC), in which noticeable atheism is intertwined with obvious elements of 
Epicurean theology. In passage II, 1090-1094 the following can be read: 
 
                                                      
19
 Van Nuffelen (2010), p. 163 & Van Nuffelen (2011), p. 35. 
20
 Varro, Divine Antiquities, fr. 7. 
21
 Van Nuffelen (2011), p. 35 (based on Varro, Divine Antiquities, fr. 11).  
22
 Plutarch, Numa, 8,7-8. 
23
 Van Nuffelen (2010), p. 183-188 & Van Nuffelen (2011), p. 35. 
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“If you hold fast to these convictions, nature is seen to be free at once and rid of proud masters, herself 
doing it all by herself of her own accord, without the help of the gods. For I appeal to the holy hearts of 
the gods, which in tranquil peace pass untroubled days and a life serene” (transl. W.H.D. Rouse).24 
 
Although the passage “nature is seen to be free at once and rid of proud masters” can 
be interpreted as atheism at first sight, it would contrast with the fact that Lucretius 
acknowledged the existence of the gods as can be further read in the passage.  
 
A possible explanation could be the idea that Lucretius did not support the common 
idea within Roman religion of reciprocity between gods and humans. In Lucretius’s 
view, gods are part of nature and not superior (cf. domini superbi) to nature. 
Attributing limitless powers to the gods over nature is absurd in Lucretius’s opinion, 
because nature itself is presiding over the gods.  Based on these observations, scholars 
like Kirk Summers, detect a more ‘revolutionary’ Epicureanism within Lucretius’s 
writing in comparison to doxographical writers such as Philodemus.25 Especially 
passage V, 1198-1203 seems to form the core of Lucretius’s vision on religion by 
stressing the redundant character of worship: 
 
“It is no piety to show oneself often with covered head, turning towards a stone and approaching every 
altar, none to fall prostrate upon the ground and to spread open the palms before shrines of the gods, 
none to sprinkle altars with the blood of beasts in showers and to link vow to vow; but rather to be able 
to survey all things with tranquil mind.” (transl. W.H.D. Rouse). 26 
                                                      
24
 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, II, 1090-1094:  
Quae bene cognita si teneas, natura videtur 
libera continuo, dominis privata superbis, 
ipsa sua per se sponte omnia dis agere expers. 
nam pro sancta deum tranquilla pectora pace, 
quae placidum degunt aevom vitamque serenam 
25
 Summers (1995), p.33 
26
 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V, 1198-1203: 
nec pietas ullast velatum saepe videri 
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Nevertheless the fact that Lucretius commonly displayed an orthodox approach to 
Epicurean theology, he clearly rejected worship in favour of philosophical religiosity 
and quietism.27 So, we might assume that Lucretius interpreted Epicurean theology in 
a more radical way: piety towards the gods is displayed by mimicking their 
blessedness and peaceful state of mind, not by the evocation of their favour through 
ritual bloodshed that is based on superstition and fear of the gods, albeit Epirucus 
himself propagated participation in traditional worship.28 
 
In a different passage (V, 1136-1160) Lucretius reports on the ‘invention’ of law and 
religion as a means to avert the violence that men inflicted upon each other. This 
might be a direct reference to the Sisyphus-fragment, which was also known to Cicero 
(On the Nature of the Gods, I, 42). Another atheist element in On the Nature of Things 
(V, 1105-1113) is the influence of euhemerism, which could have been familiar to 
Lucretius through the Latin translation of Euhemerus’s writings by the influential poet 
Ennius (239-169 BC).29 According to Lucretius, great men or kings founded society 
and, consequently, statutes and customary rites.  
 
Further on (V, 1160-1203), Lucretius mentions that the spread of belief in divine 
existence among men is not so surprising, because the gods can physically appear to 
mankind in dreams. On this matter, Lucretius was probably influenced by the eidola 
                                                                                                                                                        
vertier ad lapidem atque omnis accedere ad aras, 
nec procumbere humi prostratum et pandere palmas 
ante dem delubra, nec aras sanguine multo 
spargere quadrupendum, nec votis nectere vota, 
sed mage placata posse omnia mente tueri. 
27
 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V, 1201-1203. On the philosophical religiosity of Lucretius, see 
Masson (1923), p. 149-152; Fauth (1973), p.205-225 & Summers (1995), p.32-57. 
28
 Summers (1995), p. 34 & Obbink (1996), p. 9. 
29
 Winiarczyk (2003), p. 119-135 & Rüpke (2009), p. 58. 
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of Democritus.30  However, it is also consistent with the Epucurean idea of prolepsis: 
a preconception of the gods (by means of a ‘mental picture’) is innate to mankind and 
enables us to discern ‘true religion’ from false beliefs.31  
 
20.3) Cicero 
 
Another important source on the topic of philosophical atheism in the Late Republic is 
undoubtedly Cicero’s treatise On the Nature of the Gods. This literary work consists 
of a polemical debate, led by pontifex Gaius Aurelius Cotta, on the existence of the 
gods. The Epicurean Gaius Velleius and the Stoic Quintus Lucilius Balbus each 
expound the arguments of their philosophical school on the matter, while the 
Academic Sceptic Cotta most likely reflects Cicero’s own philosophical conviction.32 
But also important in this treatise is the oldest (surviving) occurrence of the adjective 
atheos in a philosophical sense.33  Presumably, Cicero relied on information from the 
Academic Sceptic Clitomachus on this matter.34  Another possible source for Cicero 
                                                      
30
 Democritus (DK 55 A 74-79). 
31
 Essler (2011), p. 346. 
32
 The treatise was written in the year 45 BC, after the death of his daughter Tullia (On the Nature of 
the Gods, I, 9), but the imaginary setting of the treatise must be situated ca. 77-76 BC. See Rackham 
(1967), p. xv for further information. 
33
 A slightly younger (but purely historiographical) attestation of Diagoras ho atheos can be found in 
Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, XIII, 6-7. 
34
 In Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 23 & 63, the occurrence of atheos refers twice to the epithet 
of Diagoras of Melos. Winiarczyk (1976), p.36 argued that Cicero as a Academic Sceptic had 
incorporated this element from Clitomachus’s index while he also believed that Clitomachus himself 
relied on the lost book of Eudemus, based on a reference by Diogenes of Oenoanda (fragment 11 
Chilton= Fr. 16 I-III 14 Smith). The argument by Winiarczyk is disputable, however, since he relies on 
the edition of Chilton (1971) for the reference to Eudemus of Rhodos (as the earliest source to mention 
Diagoras ‘the atheist’), while the edition of Smith (1993) restores the fragment without any reference to 
Eudemus. Jacoby (1959), p.15 had already suggested that Theophrastus or Eudemus, as disciples of 
Aristotle and contemporary sources to Epicurus and Aristoxenus, could have read the atheist book of 
Diagoras, while Barnes (1979), vol. II, p.306 (n.11) rejects the idea of Eudemus as an early source for 
Diagoras ho atheos due to the fact that not a single letter of Eudemus’ name appears on the fragmentary 
stone.  
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could have been Posidonius, whom Cicero mentions as the main philosopher behind 
Stoic accusations of atheism against Epicureans. 35  
 
In the introduction to the treatise (I, 5), Cicero states that the exact nature of the gods 
is most likely the most debated topic among mankind. From the uneducated to the 
most learned men, a multitude of opinions and views on the matter exist. In Cicero’s 
opinion, it is thus evident that the subject should not be excluded from discussion for 
any (dogmatic) reason. But, at the same time, Cicero (I, 2) warns that a too 
philosophical understanding of (popular) religion may lead to a philosophical atheism 
that denies the gods (antitheism) or their importance to mankind (deism). According 
to Cicero (I, 4), the social fabric of human society completely depends on the 
acknowledgment and worship of the gods. Philosophical atheism, on the other hand, is 
associated with the destruction of piety, which Cicero considers the foundation of 
civilization. Atheism is therefore explicitly rejected on different occasions throughout 
the treatise.36 Then again, mythology is also dismissed (in analogy with Varro?) as a 
pure form of superstition, which corrupts the true nature of religion.37  
 
Despite the appeal for ‘true religion’, Cicero himself would not prove to be immune to 
the emotional comforts of popular religion. In a euhemerizing attempt to deify his 
deceased daughter Tullia, Cicero even tried to erect a temple in her honour.38 The 
advice of his friend Titus Pomponius Atticus eventually persuaded Cicero to shelve 
                                                      
35
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 123. 
36
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 62-63, 117-118 & III, 44. 
37
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, II, 70-72. 
38
 Cicero, Letters to Atticus, XII, 18-36. 
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the idea.39 So, it appears that even the most educated among Roman elite could be 
lured by the deficiencies of theologia civilis for comforting reasons. 
 
After Cicero, Roman sources on philosophical atheism (with the exception of Pliny 
the Elder) are remarkably scarce and only dealing with the topic indirectly.40 This 
could lead to the assumption that philosophical atheism and the debate on the 
existence of the gods was a rather marginal phenomenon within Roman society that 
mainly encountered intellectual interest during the late Republic. 
 
20.4) Pliny the Elder 
 
During the early Empire (1st century AD), the debate on atheism and the nature of the 
gods no longer appeared to be of much interest within Roman literature. Based on the 
Speech of Maecenas to Augustus, as preserved by Cassius Dio (LII, 36), we might 
even conclude that any philosophical speculation about divine matters was considered 
to be undesirable at the dawn of the Principate, 
 
“Those who attempt to distort our religion with strange rites you should abhor and punish, not merely 
for the sake of the gods (since if a man despises these he will not pay honour to any other being), but 
because such men, by bringing in new divinities in place of the old, persuade many to adopt foreign 
practices, from which spring up conspiracies, factions, and cabals, which are far from profitable to a 
monarchy. Do not, therefore, permit anybody to be an atheist or a sorcerer. […] The same thing is done 
                                                      
39
 Cicero, Letters to Atticus, XII, 23, 25, 35 & 36. 
40
 See Horace, Epistles, 1,1; 1,2 & 1,12 (for a Roman Eclectic view on different philosophical beliefs); 
Seneca the Elder, Fragments, 31-39 (for a refutation of traditional mythology, in the vein of Varro); 
Epictetus, Discourses, II, 20 (for a Stoic (‘Posidonean’) accusation of atheism against the Epicureans) 
& Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VI, 44 (for a personal view on the providential nature of the (Stoic) 
gods). 
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also by many who pretend to be philosophers; hence I advise you to be on your guard against them, 
too.” (transl. E. Cary).41 
 
As Henk Versnel observed, this speech might reflect to a larger extent the opinions of 
Cassius Dio rather than those of Maecenas and, as such, it could be more applicable to 
the situation of atheoi and philosophers under Severan rule and not necessarily 
representable for Augustan atheoi and philosophers.42  However, we do not possess 
any information on supposed ‘atheist’ philosophers during the Severan reign, so we 
should refrain from further speculation on the matter. 
 
In any case, this speech cannot be put forward as an intellectual restriction under 
Flavian rule, because Pliny the Elder tackles the issue of divine existence in the 
theological section of his scientific encyclopedia. In the fifth chapter (14-27) of the 
second book of his Natural History, Pliny seems to express, at first sight, an 
outspoken atheism by stating that (popular) notions of the gods attest of absurdity and 
human weakness.  
 
“For this reason I deem it a mark of human weakness to seek to discover the shape and form of God. 
Whoever God is –provided there is a God- and in whatever region he is, he consists wholly of sense, 
sight and hearing, wholly of soul, wholly of mind, wholly of himself. To believe in gods without 
                                                      
41
 Cassius Dio, Roman History, LII, 36: τοὺς δὲ δὴ ξενίζοντάς  τι περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ µίσει καὶ κόλαζε, 
µὴ µόνον τῶν θεῶν ἕνεκα, ὧν ὁ καταφρονήσας οὐδ᾽ ἄλλου ἄν τινος προτιµήσειεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι 
καὶ καινά τινα δαιµόνια οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀντεσφέροντες πολλοὺς ἀναπείθουσιν ἀλλοτριονοµεῖν, κἀκ 
τούτου καὶ συνωµοσίαι καὶ συστάσεις ἑταιρεῖαί τε γίγνονται, ἅπερ ἥκιστα µοναρχίᾳ συµφέρει. 
µήτ᾽ οὖν ἀθέῳ τινὶ µήτε γόητι συγχωρήσῃς εἶναι. […] πίστευε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοὺς 
φιλοσοφεῖν λέγοντας ὁµοίους αὐτοῖς εἶναι: µυρία γὰρ κακὰ καὶ δήµους καὶ ἰδιώτας τὸ 
πρόσχηµά τινες τοῦτο προβαλλόµενοι δρῶσι. 
42
 Versnel (1990), p. 130 (based on a dissertation by A.V. van Stekelenburg, De redevoeringen bij 
Cassius Dio (Leiden, 1971)). 
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number, and gods corresponding to men’s vices as well as to their virtues, […], reaches an even greater 
height of folly.” (transl. H. Rackham).43 
 
This passage should not be interpreted as atheism. On the contrary, Pliny rejects the 
concept of personalized gods only in favour of a single God, which he completely 
identifies with nature. As such, Pliny embraced Stoic pantheism, although older 
studies on the Natural History also suggest support for other philosophical schools 
like Epicureanism and Academic Scepticism by Pliny.44   
 
It would be more accurate, however, to speak of admiration regarding the oratory 
skills of (the Academic Sceptic) Cicero (VII, 116-117) and some intellectual 
similarities between Lucretius and Pliny.45 Similar to Lucretius, Pliny (XI, 273) 
resented superstition and traditional beliefs, because they only induce irrational fear, 
like fear for natural phenomena. The divinity (divina Natura) Pliny envisioned 
manifests itself in nature and not in traditional religion, which he dismisses (II, 14) as 
human folly (imbecillitas humana).  
 
Instead, Pliny proposed a crucial partnership between natura and humanitas. Humans 
must profile themselves as being vital parts of nature. Similar to Cicero’s statement of 
“man being born to contemplate and imitate the universe”, it is not traditional 
worship, but the potential of the human intellect that enables us to grasp divinity as 
manifested in nature.46 Herein, Pliny differs from Lucretius. Lucretius (On the Nature 
                                                      
43
 Pliny the Elder, Natural History, II, 14-15: Quapropter effigiem dei formamque quaerere 
inbecillitatis humanae reor. quisquis est deus, si modo est alius, et quacumque in parte, totus est sensus, 
totus visus, totus auditus, totus animae, totus animi, totus sui. Innumeros quidem credere atque etiam ex 
vitiis hominum, non virtutibus tantum, […], ad socordiam accedit.  
44
 Enfield (1819), vol II, p.131; Steiner (1955), p.137-143. 
45
 Beagon (1992), p. 73 & 114. 
46
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, II, 37. 
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of Things, I, 77 & V, 90) believed that mankind is only able to understand and manage 
nature by means of science, while Pliny is more reluctant to engage in such matters. 
Human intellect has its limitations and shortcomings, and should therefore only grasp 
divina Natura, in order to remove fear.47  
 
Another important theological difference between Lucretius and Pliny the Elder 
concerns the matter of multiplicity of gods. Lucretius’s vision on the theological 
views of Epicurus is presumably in accordance with Philodemus (On Piety, cols. 362-
363): not only the Panhellenic gods exist, but also the gods of all non-Greek peoples, 
providing that these gods have been discerned from false beliefs (Letter to 
Menoeceus, 123-124) and that they are aggregated, based on the concept of prolepsis 
(preconception).48  
 
Pliny the Elder, however, rejects the traditional multiplicity of gods and sustains 
instead the idea of a single all-pervading godhead, divina Natura, which is 
comparable to the Stoic concept of Logos or (‘Reason’). The Olympian gods are 
reduced to human fantasies (II, 14-18) or traditional explanations (II, 19-20) to 
describe the extraordinary.49 Notwithstanding his suspension of traditional beliefs, 
Pliny the Elder did not endorse atheism, due to the fact that he provided worshippers 
with an answer to the uncertanties of human life. For instance, Pliny observed 
common features between Natura and Fortuna (Tychè). Natura is, on the one hand, a 
providential divinity (natura providia), but she can be quite whimsical (natura 
ludens), on the other hand, which explains the differences in capacities and 
                                                      
47
 Beagon (1992), p. 73. 
48
 Obbink (2002), p. 209-214. For a recent analysis of the idea of prolepsis, see Essler (2011), p. 148-
187. 
49
 Beagon (1992), p. 92. 
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achievements between men.50 Fortuna is nevertheless an intermediary deity (II, 22-
23) to whom both disbelievers in the traditional gods and superstitious people could 
relate to due to her abstract and diverse nature. The manner in which Pliny also 
depicted Fortune suggests that he regarded the deity as a theistic perceived substitute 
for the traditional gods, with its own worship and shrines. Moreover, Pliny considered 
Fortune similar to other (abstract) Roman deities such as Hope, Honour and Clemency 
(cf.: spem, honorem, clementiam). These deities represented either human virtues or 
vices, like the worship of the deity ‘Bad Fortune’ in a temple on the Esquilline (cf.: 
ara et malae fortunae esquiliis) seems to acknowledge.  
 
Chapter 21: deviant religious behaviour in a Roman (religious) context 
 
The statements by Lucretius, Cicero and Pliny the Elder convinced some classical 
scholars of the idea that a profound sense of scepticism and atheism regarding 
traditional beliefs was quite common among Roman nobility from the late Republic 
on.51 According to Drachmann, this scepticism was also noticeable by the fact that the 
office of flamen Dialis was vacant for a period of over seventy-five years, more 
precisely between 87 and 11 BC (Tacitus, Annals, III, 58) until Augustus reinstituted 
it, along with the reinstallment of other rites and priesthoods, and the restoration of 
eighty dilapidated temples (Res Gestae, 20).52  
 
                                                      
50
 On the references to natura provida and natura ludens in the Natural History, see Beagon (1992), p. 
36-42 & 79-91. 
51
 Wissowa (1912), p.70-71; Drachmann (1922), p.100 & 119 & Latte (1960), p. 264-293.  
52
 The vacancy of the office of flamen Dialis does not seem to be related to phenomena such as 
scepticism or atheism. On the contrary: Velleius Paterculus, Roman History, II, 20 informs that the 
vacancy actually involved a curse on the office, since the last flamen Dialis, Lucius Cornelius Merula, 
committed suicide in the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in 87 BC, in order to provoke divine vengeance 
upon his political enemy, Lucius Cornelius Cinna. 
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There is, indeed, some form of religious scepticism noticeable among members of 
Roman upper-class, along with a certain degree of religious neglect, in the sense of 
festivals held at inappropriate dates or prodigies not being properly recorded53, but 
these events do not correspond with an intentional destruction of traditional religious 
values on a large scale, since principal religious institutions (e.g., priestly colleges) 
remained undisrupted during the Late Republic.  
 
Rather, these forms of religious neglect can be ascribed to the social turmoil of the 
Civil Wars, which had disturbed many aspects of daily Roman life. The same 
observation can be made of the impact of the Peloponnesian War on daily Athenian 
life in the late 5th century BC.54 Besides, substituting traditional and popular beliefs by 
means of a philosophy of religion also seems to have been a marginal phenomenon 
that only a small number of Roman upper-class officials in the Late Roman Republic, 
such as Cicero and Cotta, would embrace.55 The large majority of officials would 
maintain the ancestral cultic customs, some (like Consul Appius Claudius Pulcher) 
even in the most meticulous manner.56 
 
21.1) descriptions of atheos in Roman (polytheist) sources  
 
In the Early Principate, Pliny the Elder appears to embody the critical attitude towards 
traditional and popular beliefs. As mentioned in the previous section, Pliny the Elder 
deals with the idea of belief in God(s) in the second book (chapter 5) of his Natural 
                                                      
53
 For a complete list of antique sources, dealing with religious neglect during the Late Republic, see 
Jocelyn (1982), p.158-164. 
54
 Thucydides, On The Peloponnesian War, 2, 47 & 53. 
55
 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, III, 94-95. See also Drachmann (1922), p. 115; Jocelyn (1982), 
p.160 & Hecht (2003), p. 144-145. 
56
 Cicero, On Divination, II, 75 & Cicero, On Laws, II, 32. 
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History. Pliny criticizes in this theological analysis not only the excessive amount of 
superstition that has crept into Roman religion, but also atheism in the form of a total 
disrespect for the Gods (quando aliis nullus est deorum respectus, aliis pudendus). It 
is interesting to observe in this respect that Pliny distinguishes ‘gods’ from ‘God’. The 
genuine godhead is ‘Nature’ (naturae potentia idque esse quod deum vocemus), while 
the concept of ‘gods’ can be explained by accepting euhemerism as a natural way of 
life: those noblemen who rescued Roman society from a certain doom deserve to be 
called ‘gods’: 
 
“For mortal to aid mortal-this is god; and this is the road to eternal glory: by this road went our Roman 
chieftains, by this road now proceeds with heavenward step, escorted by his children, the greatest ruler 
of all time, His Majesty Vespasian, coming to the succour of an exhausted world. To enrol such men 
among the deities is the most ancient method of paying them gratitude for their benefactions” (transl: 
H.Rackham).57 
 
Based on this information, Pliny seems to argue that the only proper form of worship 
involves the imperial cult (II, 18-19). All other forms of worship are reduced to 
superstition or persiflage (II, 20-21). This statement could indicate that Pliny the Elder 
related the lack of participation in the worship of the emperors (ca. 77 AD) to 
‘atheism’ in the sense of a dissident religious behaviour. When his nephew Pliny the 
Younger corresponded with Emperor Trajan on the persecution of Christians in the 
province of Bithynia between 110-112 AD58,  Pliny tried to unmask Christian suspects 
based on their reluctance to perform offerings and prayers to the Emperor and the 
Roman gods.  
                                                      
57
 Pliny the Elder, The Natural History, II, v, 18-19: deus est mortali iuvare mortalem, et haec ad 
aeternam gloriam via. hac proceres iere romani, hac nunc caelesti passu cum liberis suis vadit maximus 
omnis aevi rector Vespasianus Augustus fessis rebus subveniens. hic est vetustissimus referendi bene 
merentibus gratiam mos, ut tales numinibus adscribant. 
58
 Pliny the Younger, Epistulae, X, 96-97. 
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So, we can assume that, based on this passage, Christians were already being 
associated with ‘atheism’ in the sense of dissident religious behaviour in the early 2nd 
century AD, because of their refusal to engage in any sacrificial offerings to the 
Emperors.59  Although Pliny the Younger did not explicitly identify the Christians as 
‘atheists’ in Epistulae, X, 96-97, he did at least associate them with dissident religious 
behaviour. By doing so, the tone was set to identify Christians with atheism.  The 
polemical undertone of atheos, in the meaning of appointing opponents, would now 
shift from a predominantly philosophical meaning to a specific religious one. From 
the later 2nd century AD on, Christian apologists already dealt with the matter and 
explicitly refuted accusations of being atheos.60 In this context, Christian writers such 
as Tatian the Assyrian (ca. 120 – ca. 180) and Athenagoras of Athens (ca. 133 – ca. 
190) should be mentioned. The latter wrote an extensive plea (A Plea for the 
Christians), consisting of 37 chapters, to refute the many allegations of atheist or 
irreligious crimes, committed by Christians. Tatian (Address to the Greeks, 27) 
already reported how polytheists commonly referred to Christians as being 
atheotatous (“the most atheists of all”). The apologist Arnobius even introduced the 
Latin variant atheus.61 
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 See Cassius Dio, Roman History, LXVII, 14.2: ἐπηνέχθη δὲ ἀµφοῖν ἔγκληµα ἀθεότητος, ὑφ᾽ ἧς 
καὶ ἄλλοι ἐς τὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἤθη ἐξοκέλλοντες πολλοὶ κατεδικάσθησαν (“many who drifted into 
Jewish ways were condemned on the charge of atheism”) (transl. E. Cary). The use of ἀθεότης by Dio 
must be situated during the reign of Domitian in the context of ‘neglect of belief in the gods of the 
(Roman) state’. 
60
 An exception to this tradition is Justin Martyr, one of the earliest Christian apologists and author of 
Apology (ca. 154-155 AD). In Chapter 6, 2, Justin admits that Christians are ‘atheists’, but only in the 
sense of ‘anti-polytheism’. Also remarkably in Apology (76, 1-2), is the fact that Justin claims to 
recognize the source behind accusations of atheism against Christians, namely the Cynic philosopher 
Crescens (floruit c. 153 AD).  
61 Frend & Edwards (1993), p. 175. Arnobius’ disciple, Lactantius (Epitome of the Divine Institutes, 
LXVIII), however, mentioned atheus solely in the context of polytheist philosophy, using the Latin 
variant of the epithet ho atheos that was commonly applied to Theodorus “the Atheist” of Cyrene, in 
order to be distinguished from Theodorus “The Mathematician” of Cyrene. Besides Lactantius, two 
other references to Theodorus atheus can be mentioned, namely Eusebius (Hieronymi Chronicon 
p.127, 1 Helm ad Ol.117, 4 (309 BC)= Winiarczyk 1981 Theodorus T1A) and Pseudo-Dionysius 
Telmaharensis (Chronicon p.33 Siegfried-Gelzer= Winiarczyk 1981 Theodorus T1B), which indicates 
that atheus must be regarded as a rather artificial (Christian apologetic) synonym for atheos. 
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“Are we therefore charged before you with an impious religion? and because we approach the Head 
and Pillar of the universe with worshipful service, are we to be considered-to use the terms employed 
by you in reproaching us-as persons to be shunned, and as godless ones?” (transl. A. Roberts & J. 
Donaldson). 62  
 
The association of Christians with atheism, however, was not so surprising from a 
polytheist point of view. Considering the fact that Christians had no temples or statues 
of deities and did not perform sacrifices, it would be hard to imagine that polytheists 
would not have identified Christians with irreligious behaviour.63 In the 2nd century 
AD, Celsus, as quoted in Origen’s Against Celsus 7.62, compared Christians with 
uncivilized peoples like the barbaric Scythians and the nomadic Libyans. Both were 
infamous for their unfamiliarity with any religious practice.  
 
21.2) descriptions of atheos in Roman (Christian) sources  
 
However, the evolution of atheos does not end there. Christians also discovered the 
potential of atheos in order to reverse charges. For example, in the Martyrdom of 
Polycarp (9.2) by the Apostolic Fathers from ca. 160 AD, the old bishop of Smyrna is 
forced by the Roman governor to swear to the emperor’s good fortune and denounce 
his Christian faith by means of the words “Away with the atheists”, but instead 
Polycarp turns to the crowd in the arena while raising his fist and saying the words 
“Away with the atheists”.64  
 
                                                      
62 Arnobius, Against the Heathen, I, 29: Ergone impiae religionis sumus apud vos rei et, quod caput 
rerum et columen venerabilibus adimus obsequiis, ut convicio utamur vestro, infausti et athei 
nuncupamur.  
63
 Bremmer (2007), p. 21. 
64
 Bremmer (2007), p. 20-21 & Whitmarsh (2015), p. 240.  
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In a slightly younger testimony, Apology to Autolycus (II, 4; III, 2-3 & 6-7), from ca. 
180 AD, Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, does not only criticize the gods of Greek 
polytheism, but also accuses Greek philosophers, such as Empedocles, Plato and the 
Stoics of propagating atheism in their teachings.65  
 
Origen (ca. 185 – ca. 254 AD) later accused the polytheists of ‘polytheist atheism’ or 
‘atheist polytheism’,66 while Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150 – ca. 215 AD) had 
already defined atheism as ‘the denial of the existence of the true God in favour of 
gods that have no real existence’.67 Although “they may not have arrived at the 
knowledge of the truth”, Clement praised the actions and opinions of archetypal 
(radical) atheists such as Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene.68 At least, 
these atheists had demonstrated the absurdity of ‘polytheist’ religion by deposing it as 
mere pretence.  
 
21.3) descriptions of atheos in Roman (Jewish) sources  
 
The idea to associate polytheism with atheism was not a Christian invention, however. 
The Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 BC – ca. 50 AD), for example, 
already evaluated polytheism as being profoundly atheist. Philo used the adjective 
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 The phenomenon of Christian writers accusing Greek philosophers of atheism also resurfaces in 
Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus, II, 24, 2-4 & Arnobius, Against the Heathen, IV, 29. These 
Christian writers consider Diagoras, Theodorus, Hippo, Euhemerus and Nicagoras/Nicanor of Cyprus 
to be atheists, but mainly in the sense of ‘anti-polytheism’, while Lactantius, Treatise on the Wrath of 
God, IX-XI & Divine Institutes, LXVIII-LXVIII, indentifies Protagoras, Diagoras, Theodorus and the 
Epicureans as ‘genuine atheists’ (against polytheism and monotheism), because they denied the idea of 
Providence altogether. See on this matter also Beatrice (2004), p. 134 & 138. 
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 Origen, Against Celsus, 1.1 & 3.73. 
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 Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus, II, 23, 1. 
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 Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus, II, 24, 2. 
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ἄθεος twenty-eight times in his writings, next to the appearance of the noun ἀθεότης on 
twenty-five occasions.69  
 
These accusations of atheism are mainly aimed at Egyptian polytheism in his native 
Alexandria. Although Philo did not consider the Egyptians to be an impious people 
(comparable to Herodotus in regard to the Etruscans), he accused them of atheism, 
because of their inclination to fabricate idols (θεοπλαστεῖν) and deify natural objects 
such as the Nile.70  
 
But in Philo’s opinion, the nature of atheo(tè)s is even more versatible. It principally 
corresponds to every act or behaviour that does not comply with the superiority of 
(Jewish) monotheism.71 Consequently, atheism becomes synonymous with blasphemy 
in the biblical sense of ‘offending God’.72 In this respect, Philo already showed a 
degree of sympathy for Theodorus of Cyrene, who denied the existence of the Greek 
gods. His actions made him at least an ‘acceptable atheist’, according to Philo’s 
standards.73 
 
Chapter 22: conclusions 
 
Should we acknowledge a discontinuance of Greek atheism in the Roman period, 
resulting in a genuine ‘(ancient) Roman atheism’ or should we rather accept a 
continuance of ancient Greek atheism when analyzing this phenomenon in a Roman 
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 Reynard (2002), p. 211. 
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 Beatrice (2004), p. 139. 
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 Reynard (2002), p. 220. 
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 On βλάσφηµος/βλασφηµία/βλασφηµεῖν in the sense of ‘offending God’, see 2nd Maccabees, IX,    
28; Matthew, XII,31 & Timothy, I,13. 
73
 Reynard (2002), p. 220. 
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context? I believe the latter view to be truthful: due to fundamental differences in the 
way religiosity was experienced and how it could stimulate critical reflection, a 
genuine ‘(ancient) Roman atheism’ never emerged. At most, we can discriminate an 
intellectual interest in the topic of atheism from different Roman adherents of various 
Hellenistic philosophical schools in the late Republic and early Principate.  
 
This leads to some compelling Roman sources on ancient Greek atheism (e.g., 
Lucretius’s On the Nature of Things, Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods and Pliny’s 
Natural History) and modern theories regarding the way Roman intellectuals and 
officials dealt with the matter of atheism (cf. the pontifex Cotta supporting Academic 
Scepticism and the theory of brain-balkanisation), but regardless of this, it is safe to 
assume that the Romans did not innovate the concept of (ancient) Greek atheism in 
any particular way.74 The whole matter is actually confined to Lucretius, Cicero and 
Pliny the Elder, each being the Roman spokesperson of respectively Epicureanism, 
Academic Scepticism and Stoicism.  
 
Moreover, Romans showed little interest in the topic of atheism to such extent that 
one can hardly speak of a significant religious scepticism among members of the 
Roman nobility from the 2nd century BC on, as Drachmann, Wissowa and Latte once 
claimed. This ‘decline model’ has been regularly criticized and scholars now 
emphasize a continuation of public Roman religion in the transition between the late 
Republic and the early Empire.  
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 On the theory of brain-balkanisation, see section 7.4 of the dissertation. 
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An important element in the evolution of the adjective atheos in the Roman period 
should not be overlooked, however. We do witness a shift in the meaning of atheos in 
the first centuries AD: the subject of being atheos becomes a means to accuse 
religious opponents.75 Where atheism was a polemical means to discredit a 
philosophical opponent in the Hellenistic period and therefore restricted to an 
intellectual context, the social and intellectual dimensions of the adjective atheos 
seem to merge together in the period of the Roman Empire. It is not only a matter of 
‘polytheist’ writers accusing Christians of atheism or vice versa for polemical reasons. 
Charges of being atheos (or atheus) in the first centuries AD are comparable to the 
social assessment of irreligious behaviour in the polis-controlled system of the 
Classical period: those accused of being atheos/atheus (mainly Christians) posed a 
threat to the religious community and were therefore liable to the physical removal 
from civic society.  We have no indication at all of a Roman variant of the Athenian 
asebeia-trials or even proper Roman juridical procedures to prosecute those accused 
of atheos/atheus, but surviving sources such as Pliny the Younger’s Letter to Trajan 
do indicate a repressive attitude towards religious dissidents.  
 
In brief, I believe that ‘atheism’ in the Roman period represented a continuance with 
ancient Greek atheism on the philosophical level. A genuine (ancient) Roman atheism 
never developed. Only a marginal interest in the topic surfaced during the Late 
Republic and Early Empire. Another form of continuance can be detected in the 
repressive implications of atheus, the Latin variant of atheos, which labeled Christians 
as religious dissidents. Those athei accused of irreligious behaviour were evenso 
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 Bremmer (2007), p. 22. 
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liable to prosecution, similar to the way atheoi in the Classical period were associated 
with impiety.  
 
The phenomenon of atheism in the Roman period was thus characterized by a 
continuance of the Hellenistic period.  On the philosophical level, disbelief in the gods 
of Roman tradition resulted in their adjustment to the concept of philosophically 
envisioned gods, at least by (a few) Roman intellectuals. On the social level atheos (or 
atheus) also embodied a nonconformist religious behaviour, which induced a 
repressive response from sociopolitical authorities. This emphasized once again the 
negative implications ancient societies accredited to this particular adjective.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 
It has been the aim of this dissertation to demonstrate the existence of positive 
atheism in the ancient world, and more specifically Greek and Roman Antiquity, in 
contrast to general opinions that reject this type of philosophical atheism outside a 
modern (Western) context or reduce it to a mere denial of popular religion. Based on 
the research results of this dissertation, I believe it safe to assume that positive 
atheism did exist in Graeco-Roman Antiquity as a specific, yet exceptional form of 
philosophical atheism. The presence of positive atheism is not only detectable in the 
historical sources of its main representatives, but also by the embeddedness of these 
sources in the history of ancient Greek religion and philosophy. By doing so, we have 
been able to discern different societal levels of late 5th century BC Athenian society 
that indicate some kind of interaction with an extreme type of atheism.1  
 
But by applying this approach, supplementary research problems have been raised, 
such as the social and religious response to positive atheism and the relationship of 
this extreme type of atheism to other forms of philosophical atheism in Antiquity. 
These issues, in return, have led to the most elementary question: what must be 
understood by ‘atheism in Antiquity’? I have come to the conclusion that the 
application of the modern term ‘atheism’ to Greek and Roman Antiquity demands 
caution. First, the subject of ‘atheism in Antiquity’ displays a high degree of diversity 
and complexity. Second, these characteristics are also reflected in Greek wording, 
such as ἄθεος, ἀθεότης and θεοὺς οὐ/µὴ νοµίζειν. These words and expressions covered 
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 See on this matter section 14.3.2 (the polarization of the Athenian society in the 420s BC: the anti-
Athenian profile of Diagoras) and 14.3.3 (Diagoras and the Melian conflict). 
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multiple meanings, depending on chronology and context, and underwent many 
semantic shifts.  
 
The ongoing evolution of atheos, for example, from the late Archaic Age to the 
Roman period has proven the malleability of this particular adjective. From its earliest 
appearance until late Antiquity, atheos evolved numerous times, but it always 
expressed a socially inappropriate behaviour: from a state of being forsaken by the 
gods due to insanity or cruelty and ungodly behaviour (e.g., in the sense of cruelty to 
parents) to the philosophical denial of the (popular) gods or the refusal to participate 
in the imperial cult for religious reasons. Atheos appears to be a flexible adjective 
throughout Classical Antiquity, but always with an emphasis on an isolated and 
undesirable position within civic society. This isolation manifested itself in social, 
religious or philosophical ways. Representing a stigmatized minority, which had to be 
mentally or even physically removed from the majority of decent citizens as far as 
possible2, the maligned reputation of atheos was already an established fact in 
Antiquity and this would continue so during the modern era, when atheism was early 
on associated with negative aspects, such as immorality and lawlessness (cf. John 
Locke & Francis Bacon).  
 
But despite these similarities between atheism in Antiquity and atheism in the modern 
era on the level of a negative perception by society, ancient Greek ‘atheist’ 
terminology does not automatically correspond to (modern) atheism as a mind-set that 
does not believe in God(s). Nonetheless, I believe this complexity could be resolved 
by means of an etic and emic approach to the topic of ‘atheism in Antiquity’ (a loose 
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and merely overarching term of the topic, the brackets indicate that we are dealing 
with a more differentiated concept than modern atheism).  
 
The emic approach, which deals with the historical viewpoint of the Greek (Athenian) 
citizen, recognizes ‘atheism’ as ‘deviant religious behaviour’ in order to comprise all 
(moderate and radical) forms of unorthodox, nonconformist and innovative opinions 
concerning traditional Greek religion.  The etic approach, which concerns the 
perception of the modern observer, identifies deviant religious behaviour that 
concerns speculation on divine existence as ‘ancient Greek (philosophical) atheism’, 
which entails more specific forms, such as adevism, kainotheism, pantheism, 
euhemerism, agnosticism to deism and antitheism. Because most forms of ancient 
Greek atheism included alternative conceptions on divine existence and a more 
sophisticated understanding of traditional Greek polytheism and piety, ancient Greek 
atheism is therefore not identical to modern atheism and its antithetic characteristics 
to theism in general.  
 
In most cases, Greek atheoi did not wish to destroy Greek theism, but endeavoured a 
more balanced and profound sense of Greek religiosity. Based on the ancient sources 
on identified atheoi and asebeis and the preserved testimonia and ipsissima verba of 
numerous Greek thinkers, we can conclude that ancient Greek atheism has a much 
broader and dynamic meaning than modern atheism and comprised all forms of 
religious behaviour, which were deviant from civic religion. But ancient Greek 
atheism also aimed at the innovation of the traditional Greek religious experience 
instead of being a mere absence of belief or a denial of the existence of God(s). 
Ancient Greek atheism did not oppose theism or piety in general. On the contrary, it 
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rather challenged the many mythological, theological and sacrificial inconsistencies, 
mostly evoked by the problematic nature of Greek theodicies and the extreme 
anthropomorphism of the traditional Greek gods, which destabilized a more profound 
intellectual understanding of Greek religiosity.  
 
On the other hand, by distinguishing philosophical atheism in Antiquity into 
respectively negative and positive atheism, we can detect similarities with modern 
negative and positive philosophical atheism more adequately. Negative atheism in 
Antiquity could also manifest itself as an absence of belief in God(s), but this only 
surfaced in the Cynic agnosticism of Diogenes of Sinope and his followers (e.g., the 
2nd century AD Cynic philosopher Demonax, who refused to be initiated in the 
Mysteries of Eleusis). Similar to modern negative atheists, Cynics displayed a 
complete indifference to belief in the gods and religion altogether. But the majority of 
negative atheists in Antiquity, such as Protagoras in the Classical period and the 
(Academic and Pyrrhonian) Sceptics in the Hellenistic and Roman period, 
nevertheless acknowledged the existence of the gods as well as the importance of 
religion on different grounds, ranging from philosophical to sociological or biological 
reasons (for instance, the idea that a preconception of gods is innate to mankind).3 For 
these negative atheists, the gods were an undeniable reality, but beyond any 
comprehension by the human mind. Any contemplation on their exact nature or 
appearance was experienced as ‘dogmatist’ and therefore had to be rejected.  
 
The positive variant of philosophical atheism in Antiquity can be characterized by an 
active and open disbelief in the gods or the unequivocal denial of their existence. It 
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 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 33. 
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appears to be the most uncommon expression of deviant religious behaviour in 
Antiquity. As an intellectual phenomenon, it must be situated in Athens in the late 5th 
century BC as an exponent of a radicalizing sophist movement (e.g., Prodicus of 
Ceos) on religious traditions with the sophist Diagoras of Melos as its main 
representative. It was, nevertheless, briefly, but unsuccessfully revived by Theodorus 
of Cyrene, who was active as a sophist in Athens between 313 and 308 BC. Both 
philosophers are also the only intellectuals who were identified by the specific epithet 
ho atheos. Biographical and historiographical accounts seem to attest the fact that they 
must have been regarded as outsiders on the social and the intellectual level because 
of their identification with radical atheism.4 Both were alien residents in Athens due 
to their metic status, and in the case of Diagoras, his sociopolitical profile (Dorian, 
oligarchic, etc.) definitely associated his radical atheism with an anti-Athenian 
attitude during the Peloponnesian War. But, while Diagoras was most likely driven by 
different social, political and cultural motives to promote this exceptional form of 
atheism, Theodorus seems to have attempted to revive the atheism of Diagoras, based 
on a genuine intellectual interest.  
 
In any case, both philosophers practiced their radical atheism by divulging and 
ridiculing the Eleusinian Mysteries. Because of the emphasis on secrecy and 
individual salvation, these Mysteries might have been one of the few forms of 
religious experience that operated beyond the control of so-called polis religion. But, 
given the open and public character of their actions, both Diagoras and Theodorus, in 
all likelihood, only targeted the public aspects of the Mysteries, which fell under civic 
control. Moreover, the Mysteries also embodied the social power structures that 
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fueled polis religion. As such, the atheist actions by Diagoras and Theodorus were 
eventually experienced as a menace to civic society and were therefore the subject of 
retribution by the communities in which they ventilated their atheism. In both cases a 
death sentence was likely the outcome of their ‘impious’ activities, but well-timed 
flight or (forced) exile prevented their actual execution. So, one can hardly speak of a 
significant degree of tolerance or acceptance of positive atheism by Athenian society.  
 
As mentioned earlier, not only from a social point of view was any approval of 
positive atheism lacking, but from an intellectual as well. Positive atheism was mainly 
a sophist product. This principally embodied a more radical (Prodicean) interpretation 
of the Democritean idea on the aitological origins of belief in the gods. It also 
embraced the immoralism of Callicles and Thrasymachus, which resonated in the 
Sisyphus-fragment by Critias. The latter can be detected in the philosophy of 
Theodorus, who defended occasional theft, adultery and sacrilege, because physis 
does not condemn such acts. These passions are only suppressed in order to control 
the masses, but the wise man is not affected by this normative restraint.  
 
Moreover, positive atheism did also combine elements of atomism, the earliest Greek 
theory that no longer assumed an active divine force governing the physical world. 
This resulted in striking similarities between the aetiological theories of Democritus 
(the gods as a primitive explanation of physis or natural events in the world) and 
Prodicus (the gods being an invention of nomos, and more specifically of agricultural 
history). Perhaps this combination is best observed in the character of the ‘Socrates 
the Melian’ in Aristophanes’s Clouds (830). According to ‘Socrates the Melian’, Zeus 
does not exist. Instead, a cosmic vortex or swirl, called Dinos, dominates reality.  
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The situation for negative atheists might have been different for social and intellectual 
reasons. Negative atheism, such as Cynic agnosticism, did not actively or openly 
attack civic religion or its institutions in the way that Diagoras and Theodorus once 
did. Diogenes of Sinope and his followers (e.g., Demonax) shunned any aspect of 
religious life, but their ambition to ‘neglect the gods’ did not actually involve any 
attempt to ‘destroy the gods’ (theous anairein). Therefore, I believe it safe to assume 
that only positive atheism was perceived as a threat to civic society. Plato’s Laws 
(885b), for instance, did only target antitheists, deists and traditional theists, and not 
particularly agnostics. Agnosticism, especially the sophisticated type in the vein of 
Protagoras, did not experience disapproval by Plato, because of its inclination to piety 
and worship of the gods.5 This might also explain why moderate or ‘soft’ forms of 
ancient Greek atheism, such as euhemerism, pantheism, agnosticism and adevism 
were generally tolerated in the Hellenistic period, but why Epicureanist deism at the 
same time experienced many allegations of atheism. The former, in contrast to the 
latter, were relatively in accordance with Plato’s views on Greek theism. 
 
Apart from the sophist movement in late 5th centuy BC Athens with its outspoken 
opinions on religious traditions and conventions and the brief existence of the school 
of ‘Theodorians’, no philosophical school appears to have supported the radical 
variant of ancient Greek atheism. All philosophical schools in the Hellenistic period 
would dissociate themselves from any affiliation with atheism, of which Epicureanism 
is the most evident case.  As mentioned earlier, new ideas on piety and divine 
existence did materialize after Plato’s reforms on the concept of Greek piety and 
theism in general. These modifications comprised a further elaboration of Ionian 
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naturalism (mainly Xenophanes and Anaxagoras) and the Socratic concepts of 
teleology and intelligent design (Timaeus), combined with the principles of Eleatic 
thought and Democritean ethics. This new theism reinterpreted the existence of the 
traditional Greek gods within the (Platonic) concept of a metaphysical, all-good 
‘World-soul’, governing the physical world or the (Aristotelian) concept of ‘God’ 
being identical to reality.  Greek intellectuals no longer viewed the Gods as ‘Stronger 
Ones’ or purely anthropomorphic beings with supernatural powers, who were easily 
satisfied by means of prayers and sacrifices. They would now interpret the gods as 
moral symbols or role models for leading a more rightful and pious life. As such, a 
more sophisticated understanding of divine existence and religiosity in general was 
put forward. 
 
The positive atheism of Theodorus had not evolved since the days of Diagoras and 
was not able to challenge these renewed views on Greek theism and piety, which had 
made the bounderies between nomos and physis now redundant. Moreover, Theodorus 
still focused on the ridiculing and divulging of the Eleusinian Mysteries and might 
have also viewed Demeter as a mere invention of human agriculture.  By doing so, 
Theodorus could have still endorsed the doctrines of Prodicus, which had shaped the 
positive atheism of Diagoras. So, we can conclude that positive atheism in Antiquity 
was capable of confronting popular religion with proper arguments, but not the main 
principles of philosophical religion.  
 
With the deaths of Diagoras and Theodorus, a self-confident and self-declared radical 
atheism permanently disappeared in Classical Antiquity and would not resurface in 
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European history until it was revived in the course of the 18th century as a byproduct 
of a modern atheism that confronted traditional Christian theism.   
 
It is nonetheless important to trace the origins of positive and negative atheism not 
exclusively back to the classical era of Western civilization. In non-Western cultures 
of the ancient world, we can also detect similar (but sporadic) cases of positive and 
negative atheism like the materialist school of Charvākā, early Jainism and Buddhism 
in ancient India and naturalist thinkers such as Hsun Tzu or Wang Ch’ung in ancient 
China. Even a modern context is not necessarily a conditio sine qua non for the 
occurrence of negative or positive atheism. In premodern theocentric cultures like 
Medieval Europe and the Islamic World, we can also detect (rare) examples of an 
intellectualism that did not endorse any notion of God or denied the authority of 
revealed religion or the existence of God altogether.  
 
The intellectual choice to exclude divinity as a causal explanation for the external 
world therefore seems to be a universal phenomenon that is not restricted to specific 
cultures, paradigms or time periods. But it cannot be denied that this phenomenon was 
only limited to a small number of intellectuals in premodern times. Fearing the 
implications of such doctrines on many societal levels, communities often responded 
with social stigmatization (Plato’s Laws), condemnation (asebeia-trials in ancient 
Greece), forced public denouncements or executions (different cases of zandaqa in 
the early Islamic World) and the deliberate destruction of documented forms of 
positive atheism (in the case of the Charvākā), while the majority of fellow 
intellectuals (the early Hellenistic philosophical schools) would mostly disapprove of 
a positive atheism (in the case of Theodorus) that ‘destroyed divine existence’. This 
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does once again illustrate that in premodern times (or to mention Charles Taylor’s 
concept of ‘The Enchanted World’) mainly positive atheists were confined to an 
isolated position; not only from a social point of view, but from an intellectual as well.
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ANNEX 
 
 
The now following annex consists of the new classification of ‘atheism in Antiquity’ I 
propose, based on the distinction between an emic and etic approach. This 
classification is analysed in detail in Chapter 3 (pages 56 to 64) of this dissertation.  
 
In addition to this classification, I also provide (a) an overview of the most important 
sources in which historical persons (both philosophers and non-philosophers) were 
confronted with accusations of asebeia and/or atheos or associated with atheotès, (b) 
a historical timeline of the active career (floruit) and/or the dating of the impiety case 
of these individuals and (c) the most important sociopolitical developments of the 
concept of asebeia. 
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Overarching term: ‘atheism in Antiquity’ (Bremmer 2007) 
The emic approach 
(from the viewpoint of the ancient Greek mind) 
Overarching term: ‘deviant religious behaviour (in 
ancient Greek society)’ 
The etic approach 
(from the viewpoint of the modern observer) 
Overarching term: ‘ancient Greek atheism’ 
 
 
 
philosophers/ 
non-philosophers not called 
atheos 
(-) 
called 
atheos 
(-) 
accused of asebeia 
(“impiety”) 
(+)=executed 
associated with 
atheotès 
(“ungodliness”, 
“disbelief”) (*) 
adevism kainotheism agnosticism 
(negative 
atheism) 
deism antitheism 
(positive 
atheism) 
euhemerism pantheism 
Hecataeus of Miletus x        x(?)       
Xenophanes x    x       
Heraclitus x    x       
Empedocles x    x       
Anaxagoras 
 x x  x       
Aspasia 
  x         
Phidias 
  x         
Diogenes of Apollonia 
 x x         
Hippo of Rhegium 
 x   x       
Democritus 
   x x       
Protagoras 
 x x    x     
Prodicus 
 x  x     x   
Cinesias of Athens 
   x        
Critias 
 x  x        
Diagoras of Melos 
 x x x     x   
Alcibiades 
  x         
Thrasymachus x   x    x    
Callicles x   x     x   
Aristodemus 
   x    x    
Andocides 
 x x         
Socrates 
 x     x(+) x  x      
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The emic approach 
(from the viewpoint of the ancient Greek mind) 
Overarching term: ‘deviant religious behaviour (in 
ancient Greek society)’ 
The etic approach 
(from the viewpoint of the modern observer) 
Overarching term: ‘ancient Greek atheism’ 
 
 
 
philosophers/ 
non-philosophers not called 
atheos  
(-) 
called 
atheos 
(-) 
accused of asebeia 
(“impiety”) 
(+)=executed 
associated with 
atheotès 
(“ungodliness”, 
“disbelief”) (*) 
adevism kainotheism agnosticism 
(negative 
atheism) 
deism antitheism 
(positive 
atheism) 
euhemerism pantheism 
Antisthenes 
   x x       
Diogenes of Sinope x      x     
Archias of Athens 
      x(+)         
Nino(n) 
      x(+)         
Theoris of Lemnos 
      x(+)         
Phryne 
  x   x      
Demades 
  x   x      
Aristotle 
  x  x x      
Theophrastus 
  x  x x      
Stilpo 
  x  x       
Theodorus of Cyrene 
 x x x     x   
Epicurus 
 x  x    x    
Euhemerus 
 x        x  
Nicanor of Cyprus 
 x    x      
Leon of Pella 
 x        x  
Strato of Lampsacus x    x       
Bion of Borysthenes 
   x   x  x   
Persaeus of Citium 
   x x       
Cleanthes 
   x       x 
Chrysippus 
   x       x 
Carneades 
   x   x     
Demonax 
   x   x     
(-) refers to the (non)association with the adjective ἄθεος in sources. 
(*) does not strictly refer to ἀθεότης in sources, but applies to those individuals associated with ‘ungodly behaviour’/‘disbelief in the gods’ from a socioreligious perspective. 
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(selected) sources on ‘atheism in Antiquity’: 
 
Hecataeus:  Demetrius Phaleron, On Elocution, 12 (=Gregor. Corinth. VII 1215, 26 W) (=FGrHist 1 F1) 
Xenophanes:  Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 193(= DK 21 B 11); Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, V, 110 (= DK 21 B 15); Clement 
  of Alexandria, Stromata, VII, 22(= DK 21 B 16) 
Heraclitus: Aristocritus, Theosophia 68 (=DK 22 B5); Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus, II, 22 (=DK 22 B14) & Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus, 
  II, 34 (=DK 22 B15) 
Empedocles: Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, V, 81(=DK 31 B133); Ammonius Hermiae, On Aristotle On Interpretation, 249,1 (=DK 31 B134) 
Anaxagoras: Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 14 (= DK 59 A1); Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 12, 39, 2 (= DK 59  
  A17); Plutarch, Pericles, 32(=DK 59 A17) 
Aspasia: Plutarch, Pericles, 32; Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, 13, 589e 
Phidias: Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 121); Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 12, 39, 2; Plutarch, Pericles, 32 
Diogenes of A.: Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX, 57 (= DK 64 A1); Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 29 (=DK 64 A8) 
Hippo:  Simplicius, Physics, 23, 22 (=DK 38 A4); Plutarch, On Common Conceptions (Against the Stoics), 1075a (=DK 38 A8); Clement of   
  Alexandria, Protrepticus, II, 24 (=DK 38 A8)    
Democritus: Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr. 9 VI 3-13 Smith) (=DK 68 A50); Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 29 (=DK 68 A74) 
Protagoras: Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX, 52&54 (=DK 80 A1); Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 63 (=DK 80 A23) 
Prodicus: Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col.82, 1-18 (19, 519-536); Philodemus, On Piety, P.Herc. 1428, cols.II, 28-III, 13 (=DK 84 B5);  
  Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1428, fr. 19); Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 37(=DK 84 B5); Themistius, Oration 13 (=DK 84 B5) 
Cinesias: Lysias, Against Cinesias (fragment V Gernet & Bizos), 2 &19-20 & Athenaeus, The Deipnosphists, XII, 551e-552b 
Critias:  Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col.19, 519-536; Plutarch, On Superstition, 13; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 54 
   (=DK 88 B25) 
Diagoras: Aristophanes, Clouds, 830; Aristophanes, Birds, 1073; Aristophanes, Frogs, 320; Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 17; Diodorus Siculus, 
  Historical Library, XIII, 6-7; Melanthius, On the Mysteries of Eleusis (Scholia on Aristophanes, Birds, 1073 & Frogs, 320= FGrHist 326 F3); 
  Craterus, A Collection of Athenian Decrees (Scholia on Aristophanes, Birds, 1073 & Frogs, 320= FGrHist 342 F 16); Philodemus, On Piety, 
  P. Herc. 1077, col.19, 519-536; Diogenes of Oenoanda (Fr. 16 I-III 14 Smith); Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 1, 63 & 117; Sextus  
  Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 50-53 
Alcibiades: Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 6, 28,1 & 6, 61,7; Plutarch, Alcibiades, 22 
Thrasymachus:  Plato, Republic, I, 338c(=DK 85 B6a); Hermias, Commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus, p.239, 21(=DK 85 B8) 
Callicles: Plato, Gorgias 483b-483c & 489c 
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Aristodemus: Xenophon, Memorabilia, 1.4.2-18. 
Andocides: Andocides, On the Mysteries, 1 & Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides, 19 
Socrates: Plato, Apology 26c; Xenophon, Memorabilia, 1.1.2 
Antisthenes: Philodemus, On Piety, P. Herc. 1077, col. 82, 18-23 (19, 536-541); Philodemus, On Piety, P.Herc.1428, fr.21 & Cicero, On the Nature of the 
  Gods, I, 13&32 
Diogenes of S.: Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VI, 105 
Archias: Pseudo-Demosthenes, Against Neaera, 59,116 
Nino(n): Demostenes, On The False Embassy, 281; Scholia on Demosthenes’s On The False Embassy, 281; Josephus, Against Apion, 2, 267 
Theoris: Demosthenes, Against Aristogiton, 79-80; Plutarch, Demosthenes, 14.4 
Phryne:  Posidippus of Cassandreia, Ephesia (=Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, IV, 150) 
Demades: Aelianus, Various Histories, V, 12; Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, VI, 251b 
Aristotle: Aelianus, Various Histories, III, 36; Atheneaus, The Deipnosophists, XV, 696a-b; Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 
  V, 5-6 
Theophrastus: Aelianus, Various Histories, VIII, 12; Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, V, 37 
Stilpo:  Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 116-117 
Theodorus: Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 1, 63 & 117; Philo of Alexandria, Every Good Man is Free, 127; Plutarch, Phocion, 38,2; Sextus  
  Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 55; Diogenes Laertius, On The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 97-103; Epiphanius, On Faith, 
  IX, 28 
Epicurus: Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I, 48; Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 123; Plutarch, Against Colotes, 17 (1117a-b); Sextus Empiricus, 
  Against the Mathematicians, IX, 25 
Euhemerus: Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, III, 56 & VI, 1; Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, 1, 119; Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris, 23; Sextus  
  Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 51 
Nicanor: Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus, II, 24; Arnobius, Against the Heathen, IV, 29 
Leon:  Arnobius, Against the Heathen, IV, 29 
Strato:  Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 13 
Bion:  Diogenes Laertius, On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IV, 52 & 54-55 
Persaeus: Philodemus, On Piety, P.Herc. 1428  cols.II, 28-III,13; Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I, 15 & 38; Municius Felix, Octavius, XXI, 2 
Cleanthes: Plutarch, On Common Conceptions (Against the Stoics), 1075a-c 
Chrysippus: Plutarch, On Common Conceptions (Against the Stoics), 1075a-c 
Carneades: Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, III, 18; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, IX, 182-183 
Demonax: Lucian, Demonax, 11. 
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Chronology of ‘atheism in Antiquity’ (ca. 500 – ca. 150 AD): 
 
ca. 500 BC:   Hecataeus, Xenophanes, Heraclitus 
ca. 450 BC:   Empedocles 
ca. 438 – 437 BC:  Anaxagoras, Aspasia, Phidias 
ca. 425 BC:   Diogenes of Apollonia, Hippo, Democritus 
ca. 422 BC:   Protagoras 
ca. 420 BC:  Prodicus, Cinesias 
ca. 415 BC:   Critias, Diagoras, Alcibiades 
ca. 410 – 399 BC : Thrasymachus, Callicles, Aristodemus, Andocides, Socrates    
ca. 360 BC:   Antisthenes, Diogenes of Sinope  
ca. 355 – 350 BC:  Archias, Nino(n), Theoris 
ca. 340 BC:   Phryne 
ca. 324 BC:   Demades 
ca. 320 – 315 BC:  Aristotle, Theophrastus 
ca. 309 – 307 BC:  Stilpo, Theodorus 
ca. 300 – 290 BC:  Epicurus, Euhemerus, Nicanor, Leon, Strato 
ca. 270 BC:   Bion 
ca. 260 – 250 BC:  Persaeus, Cleanthes 
ca. 230 BC:   Chrysippus 
ca. 150 BC:  Carneades 
ca. 100 – 150 AD: Demonax 
 
Chronology of the system of asebeia-trials: 
 
ca. 500 – ca. 438 BC:  no known legislation to condemn impiety based on the charge of ‘teaching doctrines against the gods/ heavenly bodies’,    
   possible asebeia-trial of Aeschylus (between 480 and 460 BC) on the charge of revealing the secrecy of the Mysteries of    
   Eleusis 
ca. 438/437 BC:  Diopeithes-decree with accusation form eisangelia before the Assembly, verdict by People’s Courts 
ca. 403 BC:  reinscribing of the Athenian law code, Diopeithes-decree reformed with accusation form graphè, verdict by People’s    
   Courts (only known case of graphè: Socrates, only known case of endeixis: Andocides), no longer occurrence of     
   eisangelia in ancient sources 
ca. 355 BC:  Areopagus now in charge of asebeia-trials instead of People’s Courts, more rigorous climate with an increase of executed    
   asebeis 
after 307 BC:  system of asebeia-trials becomes defunct (loss of Athenian autonomy?), no later cases of asebeia-trials known (despite    
   accusations of atheism against Epicurus, Euhemerus and Bion) 
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